"  '■-.'\   mi 


m 


mm 


mm 


mm 


ftKSradfti 


BIB 


>^I^ 


•--v 


*?: 


"#H 


iWKWi£ 


i  SB 


IMiMis 


Hi 

;;Jafcl 


mmm 


THE 

HISTORY 

OF    NATIONS 


JAPAN 


THE     JAPANESE     AND     RUSSIAN       COMMANDERS     OF 

THE  LATE   WAR  IN   THE     PENINSULA     OF 

LIAO-TUNG,  MANCHURIA 


GENERAL  NODZU 

Opposed  to  General  Bilderding  at  the 

Battle  of  Mukden 


GENERAL  BARON  KUR0K1 

Commander-in-Chief  of  the  First 

Japanese  Army 


GENERAL   KUROPATKIN 

Commander-in-Chief    of    the     Russian 
Army  in  the  Far  East 


GENERAL   LIGNIEV1TCH 

Successor    to    General    Kuropatkin 


GENERAL  NOG  I 

Japanese  Commander  before  Port 
Arthur 


GENERAL  OKU 

Opposed    to    General    Kaulbars   at   the 

Battle  of  Mukden 


MARSHAL  OYAMA 

Commander     of     the     Japanese     Field 

Forces.     Victor    at    Liao-yang, 

Sha-ho  and  Mukden 


From  drawings  made  by  U.  W.  Koekkoek  from  photographs 


THE  HISTORY  OF  NATIONS 

HENRY  CABOT  LODGE  .Ph-D^LLD.  EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 

JAPAN 

From  the 
Japanese  Government  History 

Edited  With 

Supplementary  Chapters 

by 

K.ASAKAWA 

Instructor  in  Japanese  Civilization 
Yale  University 

Volume  VII 


Illustrated 


The  H  .W.  Snow  and  Son  Company 

C  h  i   c   a   g    o 


Copyright,  1907,  by 
JOHN  D.  MORRIS  &  COMPANY 


Copyright,  1910 
"HE  H.  W.  SNOW  &  SON  COMPANY 


THE    HISTORY   OF  NATIONS 

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 

HENRY  CABOT  LODGE,  PLD.,  L.L.D. 

Associate  Editors  and  Authors 


ARCHIBALD  HENRY  SAYCE,  LL.D., 

Professor     of     Assyriology,     Oxford     Uni- 
versity 


SIR  ROBERT  K.  DOUGLAS, 

Professor  of  Chinese,  King's  College,  Lon- 
don 


CHRISTOPHER  JOHNSTON,  M.D.,  Ph.D., 

Associate  Professor  of  Oriental  History  and 
Archaeology,  Johns  Hopkins  University 


C.  W.  C.  OMAN,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  History,  Oxford  University 


THEODOR  MOMMSEN, 

Late   Professor  of  Ancient   History.   Uni- 
versity of  Berlin 


ARTHUR  C.  HOWLAND,  Ph.D., 

Department  of  History,  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania 


JEREMIAH  WHIPPLE  JENKS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  Political   Economy  and   Pol- 
itics, Cornell  University 

KANICHI  ASAKAWA,  Ph.D., 

Instructor    in    the    History    of    Japanese 
Civilization,  Yale  University 


WILFRED  HAROLD  MUNRO,  Ph.D., 

Professor    of    European    History,     Brown 
University 


G.  MERCER  ADAM, 

Historian  and  Editor 


FRED  MORROW  FLING,  Ph.D., 

Professor  of  European  History,  University 
of  Nebraska 


CHARLES  MERIVALE,  LL.D., 

Late  Dean  of  Ely,   formerly   Lecturer  in       FRANCOIS  AUGUSTE  MARIE  MIGNET. 


History,  Cambridge  University 


Late  Member  of  the  French  Academy 


J.  HIGGINSON  CABOT,  Ph.D., 

Department  of   History,  Wellesley  College 


JAMES  WESTFALL  THOMPSON,  Ph.D., 

partmei 
..hicago 


Department     of     History,     University     of 
Ch- 


SIR  WILLIAM  W.  HUNTER,  F.R.S., 

Late  Director-General  of  Statistics  in  India 


SAMUEL  RAWSON  GARDINER,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  Modern  History,  King's  Col- 
lege. London 


GEORGE  M.  DUTCHER,  Ph.D., 

Professor  of  History,  Wesleyan  University 


R.  W.  JOYCE,  LL.D., 

Commissioner  for  the   Publication   of   the 
Ancient  Laws  of  Ireland 


VI 


ASSOCIATE  EDITORS  AND    AUTHORS-Continued 


justin  McCarthy,  ll.d., 

Author  and  Historian 


AUGUSTUS  HUNT  SHEARER,  Ph.D.. 

Instructor    in     History,     Trinity    College» 
Hartford 


W.  HAROLD  CLAFLIN,  B.A., 

Department    of     History,     Harvard     Uni- 
versity 


PAUL  LOUIS  LEGER, 

Professor  of  the  Slav  Languages,  College 
de  France 


WILLIAM  E.  LINGLEBACH,  Ph.D., 

Assistant   Professor  of  European  History, 
University  of  Pennsylvania 


BATARD  TAYLOR, 

Former  United  States  Minister  to  Germany 


CHARLES  DANDLIKER,  LL.D., 

President  of  Zurich  University 


SIDNEY  B.  FAY,  Ph.D., 

Professor  of  History,    Dartmouth  College 


ELBERT  JAY  BENTON,  Ph.D., 

Department  of  History,  Western  Reserve 
University 


SIR  EDWARD  S.  CREASY, 

Late  Professor  of  History,  University  Col- 
lege, London 


ARCHIBALD  CARY  COOLIDGE,  Ph.D., 

Assistant    Professor   of    History,    Harvard 
University 

WELLIAM  RICHARD  MORFILL,  M.A., 

Professor  of   Russian   and   other  Slavonic 
Languages,  Oxford  University 

CHARLES  EDMUND  FRYER,  Ph.D., 

Department  of  History,  McGill  University 

E.  C.  OTTE, 

Specialist  on  Scandinavian  History 

EDWARD  S.  CORWIN,  Ph.D., 

Instructor    in     History,     Princeton     Uni- 
versity 


J.  SCOTT  KELTIE,  LL.D., 

President  Royal  Geographical  Society 


ALBERT  GALLOWAY  KELLER,  Ph.D., 

Assistant   Professor  of  the  Science  of  So- 
ciety, Yale  University 


EDWARD  JAMES  PAYNE,  M.A., 

Fellow  of  University  College,  Oxford 


PHHJP  PATTERSON  WELLS,  Ph.D., 

Lecturer  in  History  and  Librarian  of  the 
Law  School,  Yale  University 


FREDERICK  ALBION  OBER, 

Historian,  Author  and  Traveler 


JAMES  WILFORD  GARNER,  Ph.D., 

Professor  of  Political  Science,  University 
of  Illinois 


JOHN  BACH  McMASTER,  Litt.D.,  LL.D., 

Professor  of  History,  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania 


JAMES  LAMONT  PERKINS,   Managing  Editor 


The  editors  and  publishers  desire  to  express  their  appreciation  for  valuable 
advice  and  suggestions  received  from  the  following:  Hon.  Andrew  D.  White, 
LL.D.,  Alfred  Thayer  Mahan,  D.C.L.,  LL.D.,  Hon.  Charles  Emory  Smith, 
LL.D.,  Professor  Edward  Gaylord  Bourne,  Ph.D.,  Charles  F.  Thwing, 
LL.D.,  Dr.  Emil  Reich,  William  Elliot  Griffis,  LL.D.,  Professor  John 
Martin  Vincent,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Melvil  Dewey,  LL.D.,  Alston  Ellis,  LL.D., 
Professor  Charles  H.  McCarthy,  Ph.D.,  Professor  Herman  V.  Ames,  Ph.D., 
Professor  Walter  L.  Fleming,  Ph.D.,  Professor  David  Y.  Thomas,  Ph.D., 
Mr.  Otto  Reich  and  Mr.  O.  M.  Dickerson. 

vii 


PREFACE 

The  present  revised  edition  of  the  "  History  of  the  Empire  of 
Japan  "  (compiled,  in  1893,  for  the  Imperial  Japanese  Commission 
of  the  World's  Columbian  Exposition  at  Chicago,  by  Messrs.  K. 
Takatsu,  S.  Mikami,  M.  Isoda,  and  others,  and  published  in  Tokyo 
by  order  of  the  Department  of  Education)  is  not  intended  to 
supersede  the  original  edition,  the  high  qualities  of  which  are,  on 
the  contrary,  recommended  to  all  students  of  Japanese  history. 
That  work  admirably  represents  what  might  be  termed  the  ortho- 
dox view  of  the  national  history,  and  is  free  alike  from  the  un- 
scientific method  of  the  more  conservative  historian,  and  from  the 
superficial  speculations  of  the  more  radical,  but  not  more  scientific, 
student.  Were  the  present  editor  to  write  an  original  work  on 
Japanese  history,  however,  he  would,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say, 
change  the  entire  manner  of  presentation  in  order  to  make  it  accord 
with  his  own  conception  of  the  subject-matter.  In  this  revision, 
he  has  not  changed  the  general  order  of  the  original  work,  but  has 
merely  corrected  a  few  data  which  are  obviously  out  of  date,  omitted 
those  minor  facts  which  may  well  be  dispensed  with,  and  made  the 
general  narrative  somewhat  smoother  than  it  was. 

The  fourth  part  is,  however,  the  editor's  own  work.  The 
primary  aim  in  this  division  of  the  volume  has  been  to  supply  a 
popular  and  accurate  account  of  certain  phases  of  the  national 
progress  that  has  taken  place  since  the  "  History  of  the  Empire  " 
was  prepared  a  dozen  years  ago.  The  substance  of  chapter  XVIII 
has  appeared  among  the  new  chapters  supplied  by  the  editor  to  the 
new  edition  of  Brinkley's  (edit.)  "Japan,"  (J.  B.  Millet  Co., 
Boston,  1905),  and  has  been  inserted  here  with  the  permission  of 
those  publishers. 


fCt  /fa<^<Z^uiAs&u/. 


Yale  University 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  Empire  of  Japan  consists  to-day  of  a  group  of  islands 
marshaled  in  the  northwest  corner  of  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
off  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Asiatic  continent.  These 
islands — including-  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores  ceded  by  China 
in  1895,  and  the  southern  half  of  Sakhalin,  acquired  from  Russia  in 
1905 — lie  between  the  parallels  of  500  56'  and  21  °  48'  north  lati- 
tude, and  the  longitude  of  their  extreme  eastern  and  western  points 
are  1560  32'  and  1190  20',  respectively,  east  of  Greenwich.  The 
empire  thus  covers  290  8'  of  latitude  and  370  12'  of  longitude.  On 
the  east  it  faces  the  Pacific;  on  the  southwest  it  looks  across  the 
waters  of  the  China  Sea  to  the  mainland  of  China ;  on  the  northwest 
the  Sea  of  Japan  and  Gulf  of  Tartary  separate  it  from  Korea  and 
Siberia.  The  fiftieth  parallel  divides  the  Japanese  half  of  Sakhalin 
from  the  northern  or  Russian  half,  and  the  Kurile  Strait  intercepts 
the  Chishima  or  Kurile  group  of  islands  on  the  north  from  the  Rus- 
sian peninsula  of  Kamchatka. 

The  whole  group  includes  five  and  one-half  large  islands  and 
nearly  six  hundred  islets.  The  large  island  lying  in  the  center  con- 
stitutes the  mainland;  the  island  directly  to  the  north  is  Hokkaido 
(Yezo  or  Ezo),  and  that  to  the  south,  Kiushu;  on  the  southwest 
of  the  mainland  and  east  of  Kiushu  is  Shikoku;  and  stretching  in 
a  northwesterly  direction  from  Hokkaido  are  the  Chishima  or 
Kuriles,  while  the  chain  of  the  Riukti  (Loochoo)  Archipelago  leads 
to  Formosa.  Floating,  as  it  were,  in  the  Sea  of  Japan  are  the 
islets  of  Sado,  Oki,  and  Tsushima,  the  last  lying  only  about 
fifty  miles  from  the  southern  coast  of  Korea.  Scattered  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  at  a  distance  of  nearly  500  miles  from  the  south- 
west coast  of  the  mainland,  lies  the  Ogasawara  group  (Bonins). 
To  these  must  now  be  added  the  recently  ceded  southern  half  of  the 
Island  of  Sakhalin. 

Owing  to  the  insular  nature  of  the  country,  the  area  of  the 
empire,  exclusive  of  the  half  of  Sakhalin,  which  is  perhaps  as  much 
as   12,000  square  miles,  little  exceeds   161,000  square  miles,  or 

xi 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

slightly  larger  than  the  area  of  the  British  Isles.  More  than  half  of 
this  superficies  is  comprised  in  the  main  island.  The  coast- 
line of  the  fourteen  larger  islands  and  archipelagoes,  again 
excepting  Sakhalin,  stretches  to  a  length  of  13,500  miles.  Little 
indented,  the  coast  along  the  Sea  of  Japan  offers  few  bays  or  pro- 
montories; but  the  Pacific  and  the  China  Sea  coasts  are  broken 
into  innumerable  capes  and  inlets,  and  abound  in  good  harbors. 

The  country  is  mountainous,  and  has  little  flat  land.  Two 
systems  of  mountain  chains  extend  north  to  south  and  east  to  west, 
each  having  numerous  branches.  The  highlands  of  the  empire  are 
the  two  provinces  of  Shinano  and  Kai,  situated  in  the 'center  of  the 
main  island.  At  the  boundary  of  Kai  and  Suruga  stands  Fujisan, 
or  Mount  Fuji,  capped  with  perpetual  snows,  its  summit  rising  to 
12,300  feet  above  the  sea  level.  Its  position  as  the  loftiest  peak 
in  the  country  has  been  lost  by  the  acquisition  of  Formosa,  which 
contains  Mount  Morrison,  now  called  Mount  Niitaka,  the  altitude 
of  which  is  not  less  than  14,200  feet.  The  mountains  of  the  main 
island  are  for  the  most  part  volcanic,  the  active  volcanoes  number- 
ing 170,  and  the  ranges  that  comprise  them  stretch  across  the 
extent  of  the  country.  Mines  and  mineral  springs  consequently 
abound.  Frequency  of  earthquakes  also  results  from  the  abun- 
dance of  volcanoes.  Minor  shocks  average  from  thirty  or  forty 
to  several  hundreds  annually,  and  of  severe  shocks  history  shows 
that  there  have  been  some  two  or  three  in  each  century,  entailing 
sometimes  a  frightful  destruction  of  life  and  property. 

From  the  general  configuration  of  the  country  it  follows  that 
great  rivers  with  long  courses  are  few,  but  numerous  streams  of 
lesser  magnitude  traverse  all  parts  of  the  empire,  affording  excellent 
facilities  for  drainage  and  irrigation.  Many  of  the  larger  of  these 
are  even  navigable.  The  Ishikari  River  in  Hokkaido,  with  a  length 
of  407  miles,  is  the  longest  in  the  empire,  followed  by  the  Shinano, 
in  the  main  island,  about  240  miles  long.  Nor  is  the  land  richer  in 
extensive  plains  than  in  great  streams.  Valleys  lying  deep  in  the 
bosoms  of  the  hills,  plateaus  along  the  margins  of  the  great  rivers, 
gentle  slopes  at  the  foot  of  mountain  ranges,  or  stretches  by  the 
seashore,  are  the  only  comparatively  level  places  to  be  seen.  The 
Ishikari  Moor,  bordering  the  Ishikari  River  in  Hokkaido,  is  per- 
haps the  most  extensive.  Its  soil  is  rich,  and  it  abounds  in  timber 
and  verdure.  Other  well-known  plains  in  the  north  lie  along  the 
course  of  the  Tokachi  River  and  by  the  seashore  at  Kushiro  and 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

Nemuro.  Passing  to  the  main  island,  we  find,  in  the  northeasterly 
section,  the  Oshu  plateau,  traversed  by  the  Kitakami  and  Abukuma 
Rivers,  and  extending  over  the  provinces  of  Rikuchu,  Rikuzen, 
Iwashiro,  and  Iwaki.  There,  too,  the  soil  is  rich,  and  fruitful  lands 
cover  a  wide  area.  In  the  central  section  the  valley  of  the  Tone 
River  forms  the  Hasshu  plain  of  the  Kwanto,  spreading  into  the 
four  provinces  of  Musashi,  Kozuke,  Hitachi,  and  Shimosa. 
Thickly  populated  and  highly  fertile,  this  plain  is  the  most  extensive 
in  the  main  island.  Next  in  order  of  magnitude  comes  the  valley 
of  the  Kiso  River,  forming  a  part  of  the  provinces  of  Mino  and 
Owari,  and  making  one  great  cultivated  field.  The  Echigo  plain, 
along*  the  lower  waters  of  the  Shinano  River,  is  the  most  extensive 
of  all  the  littoral  plains  of  Japan.  For  the  rest,  very  wide  plains 
exist  in  Kinai,  along  the  banks  of  the  Yodo  and  Yamato  Rivers; 
while  in  Shikoku,  the  most  extensive  flat-lands  are  found  along 
the  course  of  the  Yoshino  River,  and  in  Kiushu  the  lands  by  the 
banks  of  the  Chikugo  down  to  the  Ariyake  seabeach  give  to  the 
provinces  of  Chikugo  and  Hizen  a  broad  area  of  irrigated  fields. 

The  main  island  of  Japan,  being  situated  in  the  temperate 
zone,  enjoys,  for  the  most  part,  a  medium  degree  of  temperature. 
But  the  climate  of  the  empire  is  much  varied,  owing  to  the  elongated 
shape  of  the  country,  which  extends  over  nearly  thirty  degrees  of 
latitude,  to  the  great  differences  of  altitude  that  characterize  the  sur- 
face of  the  land,  and  also  to  the  action  of  a  warm  and  a  cold  current 
that  flow  past  its  shores.  Thus,  in  the  northern  part  of  Hokkaido 
and  in  the  Chishima  Islands  the  snow  never  disappears,  the  sea 
freezes  in  winter,  and  sleet  and  fogs  prevail.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
the  southern  district,  as  well  as  in  the  Riukiu  and  Ogaswara  groups, 
the  heat  is  very  great,  and  neither  snow  nor  ice  is  seen  in  winter. 
In  the  central  parts,  again,  the  temperature  varies  according  to  the 
elevation  of  the  land,  and  the  configuration  of  the  mountains  and 
seas.  As  for  Formosa,  it  is  partly  situated  within  the  tropical  zone, 
and  the  two  extremes  of  the  entire  island  are  recorded  to  be  960 
and  41  °  Fahrenheit. 

The  warm  ocean  current,  known  as  the  Kuro-shiwo  or  Black 
Stream,  from  the  deep  somber  color  it  displays  in  cloudy  weather, 
rises  from  the  distant  Equator,  and  possesses  an  average  tempera- 
ture of  81  °  Fahrenheit  in  summer.  Immediately  after  leaving 
the  Equator  it  travels  along  the  eastern  coast  of  China,  and  thence 
passing  northward,  approaches  the  coast  of  Kiushu,  where  it  bifur- 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

cates.  The  branch  stream  enters  the  Sea  of  Japan,  and  flows  to 
the  north;  the  principal  stream  passes  by  the  southern  coast  of 
Shikoku  and  the  main  island,  until  it  reaches  the  north  of  Cape 
Inubo  in  Shimosa,  where  it  again  bifurcates,  a  branch  turning 
northward,  and  the  current  itself  traveling  in  a  northeastern  di- 
rection until  it  leaves  the  main  island.  In  consequence,  perhaps, 
of  the  heat  received  from  this  warm  current,  all  the  provinces  of 
Kiushu,  Shikoku,  Sanyo-do  and  Tokai-do  seldom  see  snow.  There 
is  also  a  cold  stream  called  the  Oya-jiwo,  of  which  the  average 
summer  temperature  is  as  low  as  370.  Its  source  is  in  the  Sea  of 
Okhotsk,  whence  it  passes  through  the  Kurile  Islands,  and  flow- 
ing by  Hokkaido  and  the  east  coast  of  the  northern  section  of 
the  main  island,  reaches  the  neighborhood  of  Cape  Inubo,  where  it 
disappears.  Situated  in  a  high  degree  of  latitude,  Hokkaido  and 
the  northern  part  of  the  main  island,  being  further  exposed  to  the 
influence  of  this  cold  stream,  have  a  severe  climate.  The  snow  lies 
there  in  masses  for  many  days  and  the  winter  is  long. 

The  rainfall  is  heavy  in  summer  and  light  in  winter.  It  is 
greatest  along  the  coasts  washed  by  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  the  Sea 
of  Japan,  and  least  in  the  central  portions  of  the  country  along  the 
two  coasts  of  the  Inland  Sea,  as  well  as  in  the  northern  end  of 
the  main  island.     Hokkaido  has  an  average  fall. 

Rich  soil,  a  genial  climate,  and  a  sufficient  rainfall  produce 
luxuriant  vegetation.  Cultivated  fields  and  gardens  succeed  each 
other  for  wide  areas.  The  extraordinary  position  of  the  is- 
lands stretching  from  north  to  south  also  adds  greatly  to  the 
variety  of  vegetation.  Thus  in  Kiushu  and  Shikoku  are  to  be 
seen  thick,  verdant  forests  abounding  in  giant  trees.  Sugar-canes, 
tobacco,  and  cotton,  find  a  soil  congenial  to  their  growth.  The 
cocoa,  the  banyan  tree,  the  banana  and  their  congeners  flourish  in 
the  Riukiii  and  Ogasawara  Islands.  In  short,  the  general  aspect 
is  tropical.  Passing  thence  to  the  central  districts,  great  varieties 
of  plant  life  are  found.  The  pine  (pinus  densfflora  and  pinns 
massoniana) ,  oak  (quercus  dentata),  hi-no-ki  (thuya  obtusca),  sugi 
(cryptomeria  japonica),  camphor  and  bamboo  grow  in  the  woods; 
while  the  mulberry,  tea  plant,  lacquer  tree,  millet,  the  five  cereals, 
vegetables,  and  various  kinds  of  fruits  are  seen  in  the  fields  and 
gardens.  Finally,  even  in  the  cold  and  little  cultivated  Hokkaido, 
its  fruitful  soil  and  luxuriant  vegetation  invite  agriculture. 

The  forms  of  animal   life  are  also  much  varied.     Among 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

domestic  animals  are  the  ox,  the  horse,  the  pig,  the  dog,  and 
the  cat;  while  the  more  important  wild  animals  are  the  hog,  the 
deer,  the  hare,  the  fox,  the  badger,  and  the  monkey.  Ferocious 
beasts  and  noxious  reptiles  are  limited  to  the  bear  of  the  northern 
districts  and  the  habu  (a  kind  of  snake)  of  Riukiu.  In  the  waters 
that  lave  the  Hokkaido  coasts  sea-otters  and  fur-seals  abound; 
whales  frequent  the  seas  in  the  north  and  those  adjacent  to  Shikoku 
and  Kiushu;  and  along  all  the  coasts  fish  and  crustaceans  are 
found  in  such  abundance  that  they  more  than  suffice  for  the  or- 
dinary food  of  the  inhabitants.  Of  birds  there  is  great  abundance, 
some  possessing  beautiful  plumage,  others  melodious  notes,  and 
others  being  suitable  for  food.  To  the  last  mentioned  class  belong 
barn-door  fowls  and  ducks.  Among  insects,  the  silk-worm  is 
largely  reared  throughout  the  main  island,  the  climate  and  soil  being 
peculiarly  suited  for  the  purpose. 

Although  the  country  has  no  mountains  of  exceptional  altitude 
or  rivers  of  extraordinary  length,  the  conditions  of  climate  and  soil 
are  such  that  not  one  of  the  mountains  is  without  woods  nor  one  of 
the  rivers  without  limpid  water.  So  well  distributed,  too,  are  the 
highlands  and  streams,  that  places  of  beauty  are  everywhere  to  be 
found  in  the  interior,  and  owing  to  the  configuration  of  the  coasts 
as  well  as  to  the  number  of  islets,  gems  of  scenic  loveliness  abound 
by  the  seaside  in  all  the  provinces.  Moreover,  in  addition  to  wealth 
of  natural  charms,  numerous  shrines  and  temples  of  note  exist  in 
the  choice  districts  of  the  main  island,  so  that  architectural,  glyptic, 
pictorial,  and  horticultural  beauties  supplement  the  attractions  of 
the  scenery.  The  main  island  is  richest  in  places  of  note,  and 
Kinai  and  its  neighborhood  are  the  most  favored  parts  of  the  main 
island  in  this  respect.  From  794  a.  d.,  when  the  Emperor 
Kwammu  made  Kyoto  his  capital,  until  the  Emperor  Mutsuhito 
moved  to  Tokyo,  a  period  of  over  eleven  centuries,  Kyoto  remained 
the  imperial  seat  of  government.  Hence  it  offers  numbers  of  his- 
torical relics,  and  is  further  happy  in  the  possession  of  scenic  beau- 
ties attractive  at  all  seasons  of  the  year.  Separated  from  Kyoto  by 
a  range  of  hills  is  the  largest  lake  in  the  empire,  Lake  Biwa,  noted 
for  the  Omi-hakkei  which  have  ever  been  the  theme  of  poets  and 
the  inspiration  of  painters.  At  a  distance  of  nearly  twenty-five 
miles  from  Kyoto  is  Nara,  the  imperial  residence  during  a  large 
part  of  the  eighth  century.  Nara  abounds  in  things  historical, 
the  most  noteworthy  being  the  shrine  of  Kacuga  and  the  Temple  of 


> 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

Horiu-ji,  places  nobly  planned  and  naturally  lovely.  Totai-ji,  a 
large  temple  erected  by  the  Emperor  Shomu,  is  more  than  a  thou- 
sand years  old,  and  contains  the  celebrated  Great  Image  of  Buddha. 
The  cherries  of  Mount  Yoshino  and  the  plums  of  Tsukigase,  dis- 
plays of  bloom  that  have  no  peers  elsewhere  in  the  country,  are  in 
the  same  province  as  Nara.  Farther  west  the  face  of  the  Inland 
Sea  between  Shikoku  and  Sanyo-do  is  strewn  with  hundreds  of 
little  islands  whose  shining  white  sands  and  green  pine-trees  com- 
bine to  make  a  beautiful  picture.  Among  spots  renowned  for 
exquisite  seascapes  may  be  mentioned  Waka-no-ura  in  Kii,  the 
Sumiyoshi  beach  in  Settsu,  Suma-no-ura,  the  Maiko  beach,  and 
Akashi-no-ura  in  Harima,  and  Itsukushima  in  Aki.  The  last- 
named  place  is  a  small  island  close  to  the  seashore,  composed  al- 
most entirely  of  fantastically  shaped  cliffs  and  strange  rocks.  On 
it  stands  a  gracefully  modeled  shrine  said  to  have  been  built  by 
Taira-no-Ki-yomori  of  the  twelfth  century,  the  hall  and  veranda 
of  which  seem  to  float  on  the  surface  of  the  water.  The  singular 
combination  of  water  effect  and  architecture  and  the  loveliness  of 
the  whole  view  suggests  an  enchanted  abode  of  fairies. 

In  Kiushu,  Yabakei  is  renowned  for  its  landscape,  and  the 
Usajingu  shrine  for  its  architecture.  Still  more  celebrated  is  Ama- 
no-Hashidate  in  San-indo.  Here  a  sandy  promontory  completely 
covered  with  pine-trees  stretches  far  into  the  sea,  offering  a  scene 
of  beauty  and  making  with  Matsushima  and  Itsukushima  the  three 
most  celebrated  views  in  Japan. 

Among  places  of  note  in  the  neighborhood  of  Tokyo  is  Kama- 
kura  on  the  southeast  coast,  which  was  the  seat  of  the  feudal 
government  of  Japan  for  more  than  a  century  and  a  half  till  1333, 
and  still  offers  many  spots  of  historical  interest.  To  the  north  of 
the  capital  the  most  celebrated  places  are  Nikko  and  Matsushima. 
At  Nikko  is  the  mausoleum  of  Tokugawa  Ieyasu.  The  beauties  of 
its  architectural  decoration,  the  fineness  of  its  carvings,  and  the 
loveliness  of  its  scenery  have  inspired  a  popular  saying  that  without 
seeing  Nikko  a  man  is  not  qualified  to  speak  of  the  beautiful  (Nikko 
wo  minai  uchi  wa  kekko  wo  iuna).  Matsushima,  one  of  the  three 
landscapes  of  Japan,  is  on  the  seashore  of  Rikuzen.  Here  scattered 
over  the  face  of  the  bay  are  hundreds  of  tiny  islets,  every  one  of 
which  is  clothed  in  a  luxury  of  pine-trees.  Viewed  from  the  top  of 
the  hills,  the  scene  is  like  a  creation  of  fancy  rendered  on  the  canvas 
of  a  skillful  painter. 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

Japan  proper  is  divided  into  nine  principal  regions  accord- 
ing to  its  configuration:  they  are  Kinai,  Tokai-do,  Tosan-do, 
Hokuriku-d5,  Nankai-do,  Sanin-do,  Sanyo-do,  and  Hokkai-do. 
These,  again,  are  subdivided  into  eighty-five  provinces  (koku  or 
kumi).  The  province,  however,  has  little  importance  in  the 
administrative  divisions  of  the  country.  The  unit  of  the  latter  is 
either  the  urban  (cho)  or  rural  (son)  district,  which,  together  with 
the  larger  divisions,  city  (shi)  and  county  (gun),  constitutes  a 
self-governing  entity.  Over  and  above  these  divisions  are  one  board 
of  Hokkaido  (do-cho),  three  of  Tokyo,  Kyoto,  and  Osaka,  and 
forty-three  prefectures  or  ken.  At  present,  there  are,  outside  of 
Formosa,  638  gun,  58  shi,  1054  cho  and  13,468  son. 

The  city  of  Tokyo  was  formerly,  under  the  name  Edo,  the 
seat  of  the  feudal  government  for  nearly  two  and  three-quarters 
centuries.  To-day  it  is  the  capital  of  the  empire.  It  occupies  a 
central  position  and  is  the  largest  city  in  the  country.  Its  fifteen 
wards  have  a  total  population  of  nearly  a  million  and  a  half.  Kyoto, 
the  old  capital,  is  divided  into  two  wards  and  has  a  population  of 
over  353,000.  Osaka,  the  third  of  the  cities,  was  the  seat  of  the 
Taiko's  administration.  Possessing  exceptional  facilities  for  com- 
munication by  sea  and  by  river,  it  has  been  a  trading  center  from 
olden  times.  It  is  divided  into  four  wards,  and  has  a  population 
of  825,000.  These  three  cities  constitute  the  three  fu.  Next  in 
order  of  importance  come  Nagoya,  between  Tokyo  and  Kyoto,  with 
a  population  of  245,000;  Kanazawa,  in  the  north  of  the  main  island, 
with  a  population  of  85,000;  Sendai,  in  the  northeast,  with  a 
population  of  84,000;  Hiroshima,  in  the  southwest,  with  a  popula- 
tion of  123,000;  Kumamoto,  in  Kiushii,  with  a  population  of 
62,000.  Among  the  open  ports,  Yokohama,  with  a  population  of 
195,000,  and  Kobe,  with  a  population  of  216,000,  are  the  two  most 
important,  Nagasaki,  Hakodate,  and  Niigata  following  at  a  con- 
siderable interval. 

The  total  population  of  Japan  proper  is  nearly  forty-seven 
millions,  and  that  of  Formosa  about  three  millions.  The  distri- 
bution per  square  mile,  exclusive  of  Formosa,  varied  in  1898  from 
495  in  the  western  part  of  the  main  island  to  23.7  in  Hokkaido,  with 
the  average  at  about  300.  To-day  it  is  approximately  324.  The 
recent  national  activity  of  these  people  will  be  briefly  described  in 
the  last  division  of  this  volume,  and  the  career  of  their  ancestors  in 
the  earlier  parts. 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

Before  we  proceed,  however,  a  few  words  may  be  said  regard- 
ing the  general  nature  of  the  historical  account  of  Japan.  In 
ancient  times  Japan  possessed  neither  literary  script  nor  a  regular 
system  of  calendar  and  chronology.  All  events  had  to  be  trans- 
mitted from  generation  to  generation  by  oral  tradition.  The  use 
of  writing  was  imported  from  China,  probably  one  or  two  hun- 
dred years  before  Christ,  but  the  general  use  of  letters  for  the 
purpose  of  recording  events  dates  from  the  fifth  century  a.  d., 
while  the  compilation  of  the  national  annals  began  two  centuries 
later  still.  But  such  historical  records  as  were  then  compiled 
suffered  almost  total  destruction  a  short  time  afterward  by  fire,  and 
the  oral  records  of  remote  antiquity  must  have  already  been  greatly 
disfigured  by  omissions,  errors,  and  confusion  of  facts.  Regretting 
this,  and  perceiving  that  unless  steps  were  then  taken  to  correct  the 
annals,  subsequent  generations  would  be  without  any  trustworthy 
record  of  remote  events,  the  Emperor  Temmu  ordered  an  eminent 
scholar,  Hieda-no-Are,  to  prepare  a  brief  chronicle  of  sovereigns 
and  important  events.  Unfortunately  the  death  of  the  emperor, 
which  occurred  in  689,  interrupted  this  work.  Some  twenty  years 
later  the  Empress  Gemmyo  instructed  O-no-Yasumaro  to  continue 
the  compilation  of  Hieda-no-Are's  annals.  The  work  thus  com- 
pleted in  712  is  the  "  Kojiki"  as  we  now  possess  it.  It  must  be 
regarded  as  the  most  trustworthy  record  extant  of  the  events  of 
ancient  times.  Eight  years  after  the  appearance  of  the  "  Kojiki," 
or  in  720,  the  u  Nihongi  "  was  compiled.  We  find,  on  comparing 
these  works,  that  although,  on  the  whole,  they  agree,  certain  discrep- 
ancies exist  between  them.  In  these  two  works,  however,  is  found 
the  chief  material  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  history  of  ancient 
Japan.  If  curious  supernatural  incidents  figure  in  their  pages,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  literature  being  then  in  its  infancy  and  a 
long  interval  having  elapsed  since  the  time  of  many  of  the  events  re- 
corded, the  annalists  were  untrained  in  the  selection  of  matters 
worthy  of  a  place  in  authentic  history,  while,  at  the  same  time, 
in  the  oral  traditions  on  which  they  relied,  errors  had  doubtless 
been  included,  and,  ordinary  events  drifting  out  of  sight,  ex- 
traordinary incidents  and  supernatural  stories  had  alone  survived. 

As  regards  the  ancient  chronology  of  Japan  it  is  recorded  that 
almanacs  first  came  into  use  in  Japan  in  604  a.  d.,  although  it 
appears  that  the  Chinese  calendar  had  been  imported  about  the 
middle  of  the  preceding  century.     The  compilation  of  annals,  as 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

already  stated,  had  preceded  the  latter  event  by  a  considerable  in- 
terval. We  may  therefore  conjecture  that  some  method  of  reckoning 
months  and  years  had  been  practiced  from  an  early  era,  but  no 
certain  knowledge  of  this  matter  is  available. 

In  Japan  from  ancient  time  chronology  was  not  based  on  an 
era.  Originally  the  method  pursued  was  to  reckon  years  after  the 
accession  of  each  emperor  to  the  throne.  In  645  a.  d.,  however, 
was  introduced  the  Chinese  fashion  of  using  year  periods  designated 
usually  in  two  felicitous  Chinese  characters  and  changed  as  fre- 
quently as  was  desired.  The  change  of  the  name  of  a  year  period 
thus  occurred  at  the  beginning  of  each  new  reign,  and  also  on  the 
recurrence  of  a  cyclical  year  of  ill-omened  designation,  as  well  as 
on  occasions  of  exceptional  good  or  bad  fortune,  so  that  there  are 
extreme  instances  of  five  or  six  changes  of  designation  within  the 
reign  of  one  single  emperor.  It  results,  of  course,  that  a  trouble- 
some effort  is  required  to  commit  to  memory  the  sequence  and  dates 
of  the  various  year  periods.  The  Chinese,  in  the  reign  of  the  Ming 
sovereign  Taitsu,  decided  that  there  should  be  no  change  in  the 
designation  of  a  year  period  throughout  the  reign  of  a  sovereign. 
A  similar  ruling  was  made  in  1868  on  the  accession  of  the  present 
Emperor  of  Japan,  from  which  time  also  the  era  of  Jimmu  began 
to  be  used  as  a  chronological  basis.  This  latter  era  is  officially 
fixed  at  660  b.  c.1 

As  to  the  later  sources  of  Japanese  history,  following  the 
already  mentioned  "  Kojiki"  and  "  Nihongi,"  they  are  abundant, 
increasing  as  we  move  further  from  earlier  ages.  Much  of  this 
vast  historical  literature  has  been  published  and  edited  (though  thus 
far  little  translated  into  European  languages),  but  more  has  neither 
been  extensively  circulated  nor  even  seen  light.  The  Japanese 
Government,  which  has  been  searching  for  hidden  material  all  over 
the  land,  is  now  publishing,  through  the  Imperial  University  of 
Tokyo,  historical  documents,  mostly  unpublished  hitherto,  in  two 
large  series  2  of  two  and  three  hundred  volumes,  respectively,  to  be 
completed  in  about  fifteen  years. 

The  history  of  Japan  does  not  lend  itself  to  the  customary 
division  of  the  ancient,  mediaeval,  and  modern  ages.    On  the  basis 

1  It  should  always  be  remembered  that  the  historic  account  of  Japan  before 
the  fifth  century  a.  d.,  must  be  allowed  a  large  latitude  in  regard  to  its  events 
and  their  dates. 

2  Called  the  "  Dai-Nihon  Kobun-sho"  and  the  "  Dai-Nihon  Shi-ryO." 


xx  INTRODUCTION 

of  the  important  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the  administration 
and  politics  of  Japan,  her  history  will,  in  the  following  pages,  be 
divided  into  three  parts  of  unequal  lengths.  Part  one  covers 
the  long  space  of  time  between  the  founding  of  the  empire 
and  the  beginning  of  the  feudal  regime  toward  the  end  of  the 
twelfth  century.  During  this  period,  the  power  of  the  government 
rested,  theoretically,  in  spite  of  great  fluctuations  which  took  place, 
in  the  hands  of  the  sovereign.  This  was  followed  by  nearly  seven 
centuries  of  military  autocracy,  which  constitutes  the  second 
part.  The  third  part  begins  in  1868,  since  which  year  admin- 
istrative power  has  reverted  to  the  emperor,  a  constitutional 
regime  with  representative  institutions  has  been  established,  and 
the  general  aspects  of  the  life  of  the  nation  have  undergone  a  pro- 
found change. 


CONTENTS 


PART   I 

FROM  THE  FOUNDING   OF  THE  EMPIRE  TO   THE  ESTAB- 
LISHMENT  OF  FEUDAL  REGIME.  660   B.  C.-1186  A.  D. 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  The  Mythical  Age  .....  3 

II.  The  Beginning  of  the  Empire.    660  b.  c-192  a.  d.       6 

III.  Relations  with  Korea  and  China.     192-645  a.  d.     12 

IV.  The  Taikwa  Reform.    645-708  a.  d.        .         .         .22 
V.  The  Nara  Epoch.    710-794  a.  d.  .         .         .     31 

VI.  The  Hei-an  Epoch.    794-1186  a.  d.         .         .         .38 


PART   II 

THE  FEUDAL  AGES.   1 186- 1868 

VII.  The  Kamakura  Government.     1 186-1339        •         •     65 
VIII.  The  Temporary  Restoration  of  Imperial  Power. 

1339-1393 83 

IX.  The  Muromachi  Period.     1393-1573       .         .         .     92 
X.  Internal  Peace  and  External  War.    1573- 1603     .   109 
XI.  The  Foundation  of  the  Edo  Government.     1603- 

1651 122 

XII.  The  Decline  of  the  Edo  Government.     1651-1837  140 

XIII.  The  Fall  of  the  Edo  Government.    1837-1868       .  155 

PART   III 
THE   NEW  JAPAN.    1868-1893 

XIV.  Internal  Affairs.     1868-1893         .         .        ...        .  173 

XV.  Foreign  Relations.     1868-1893       ....   188 


YXii  CONTENTS 

PART    IV 
APPENDIX.  1893-191° 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XVI.  The   Constitution    in   Theory   and   in   Practice. 

1893-1906 199 

XVII.  Parties  and  Politics.    1893-1906    .         .         .         .213 
XVIII.  Economic  Progress.    1893-1906        ....  242 
XIX.  The  Chino- Japanese  War.    1894-1895      .         .         .  252 
XX.  Japan  and  Russia  in  Korea  and  Manchuria.   1893- 

1904 275 

XXI.  The    Russo-Japanese    War    and    its    Aftermath. 

1904-1910 3°3 

Bibliography 33 l 

Index 337 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Generals  of  the  Late  Russo-Japanese  War  (Photo- 
gravure) ....... 


Frontispiece 

FACING  PAGE 

Japanese  Fishing  with  Cormorants       .....       8 

Ainos  Worshiping         ........     26 

The  Home  of  a  Japanese  Nobleman      .         .         .         .         .44 

Abduction  of  Goshirakawa  (Colored)   .         .         .         .         .56 

In  a  Japanese  Artist's  Studio      .         .         .         .         .         .   106 

A  Japanese  Lady  Being  Ferried  across  a  River      .         .         .150 

The  Capture  of  Ping-yang 266 

Japanese  Torpedo  Boats  Nearing  Port  Arthur     .         .         .  306 
Assault  through  the  Barbed  Wire  Entanglements  against 
Fort  Ki-kwan 312 


TEXT  MAPS 

Japan  before  the  Fifth  Century 

Japan    . 

Northern  Japan 

Southern  Japan 

Korea    . 

Central  Japan 

Japanese  Ports  Opened  to  Foreign  Trade 

Downfall  of  the  Edo  Government 

The  Insurrection  in  the  Island  of  Kiushu  . 

Island  Possessions  of  Japan 

First  Engagements  of  the  Chino-Japanese  War 

Korea  and  Manchuria  .... 

Wei-hai-Wei,  Formosa,  and  Pescadores 

Foreign  Spheres  of  Influence  in  China  and  Manchuria 

Japanese  Advance  to  Liao-yang 

Battle  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  ..... 

xxiii 


PAGE 

10 

61 

85 

99 
117 
124 

159 
168 
181 

193 

261 
268 
270 
278 
309 
315 


PART  I 

FROM  THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  EMPIRE  TO 

THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  FEUDAL 

REGIME.    660  B.  C.-1186  A.  D. 


HISTORY  OF  JAPAN 

Chapter  I 

THE  MYTHICAL  AGE 

THE  period  prior  to  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Jimmu  is 
known  as  the  Age  of  the  Deities.      From  this  era  strange 
and  incredible  legends  have  been  transmitted,   some  of 
which  follow. 

Tradition  says  that  in  remote  times  the  deities  Izanagi  and 
the  Izanami  were  commanded  by  the  God  of  Heaven  to  form  a 
country  out  of  the  islets  floating  in  space.  They  forthwith  de- 
scended to  the  island  Onokoro,  and  there,  becoming  husband  and 
wife,  created  the  Eight  Great  Islands  of  Japan.  Thereafter  were 
created  deities  to  rule  the  sea,  the  mountains,  the  winds,  fire,  herbs, 
and  trees.  Subsequently  the  divine  pair  gave  birth  to  the  goddess 
Amaterasu-Omikami  and  the  gods  Tsukiyomi  and  Susanoo. 
These  newly-born  divine  beings  proving  themselves  greatly  superior 
to  other  deities,  found  high  favor  with  Izanagi.  He  commissioned 
Amaterasu  to  govern  Takama-no-hara,  or  the  Heavenly  Region; 
Tsukiyomi  to  govern  Yo-no-osukuni,  or  the  Land  of  Night;  and 
Susanoo  to  govern  Unabara,  or  the  Seas.  But  this  last  deity  prov- 
ing unfaithful  to  his  father's  commands,  Izanagi,  in  anger,  expelled 
him  from  his  kingdom,  whereupon  he  ascended  to  the  Heavenly 
Region  to  convey  to  his  sister  the  news  of  his  misfortune.  The 
fierce  and  enraged  demeanor  of  the  dethroned  deity  led  his  sister 
to  imagine  that  he  had  come  with  aggressive  intentions,  and  she 
hesitated  to  receive  him.  But  Susanoo  vehemently  declared  the 
integrity  of  his  purpose  and  succeeded  in  partially  reassuring  the 
goddess.  Nevertheless,  his  behavior  was  so  disorderly  that  Ama- 
terasu, becoming  fearful,  secluded  herself  in  a  cave,  with  the  result 
that  total  darkness  overshadowed  her  realm  and  troubles  of  various 
sorts  ensued.  The  other  deities  thereupon  met  in  conclave  and  took 
measures  to  pacify  the  goddess,  so  that  she  finally  emerged  from  her 
retreat  and  light  once  more  shone  upon  the  Heavenly  Region  and 
Nakatsu-kuni  (Midland).    The  deities  then  inflicted  upon  Susanoo 


4  JAPAN 

the  punishment  of  exile.  Driven  from  heaven,  he  proceeded  to 
.  Izumo,  and  there  destroyed  an  eight-headed  dragon,  obtaining 
from  its  body  a  precious  sword,  which  he  later  presented  to  his 
sister  Amaterasu.  Subsequently,  he  married  the  daughter  of  an 
earthly  deity  and  settled  at  Suga  in  Izumo.  At  a  later  date,  leaving 
one  of  his  sons,  Okuni-nushi,  to  govern  the  land,  he  himself  pro- 
ceeded to  Korea.  Okuni-nushi  had  many  brothers,  who  were  all 
engaged  in  a  struggle  for  the  sovereign  power.  The  victory  re- 
mained with  Okuni-nushi,  but  his  realm  continuing  to  be  more  or 
less  disturbed,  Sukunahikona,  a  son  of  the  Deity  of  Heaven,  came 
over  the  sea  to  Izumo  and  aided  in  restoring  peace.  Thenceforth 
Okuni-nushi  and  his  sons  administered  the  realm  in  tranquillity. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  Heavenly  Region,  Amaterasu,  concluding 
that  Midzuho-no-kuni  in  Toyo-ashihara,  which  is  perhaps  Japan 
proper  now,  ought  to  be  governed  by  her  son,  Amano-oshihohomimi, 
commanded  him  to  descend  and  assume  authority  in  the  land.  Inas- 
much, however,  as  he  represented  his  proposed  realm  to  be  in  a  very 
disordered  state,  Amaterasu,  by  order  of  the  Deity  of  Heaven,  held 
a  council  of  deities,  by  whom  a  mandate  to  restore  peace  was  given 
to  Amano-hohi.  He  failed  to  accomplish  his  purpose,  and  another 
deity  was  afterward  sent  on  the  same  errand.  The  latter  was,  how- 
ever, likewise  conquered  by  Okuni-nushi  and  did  not  return  to 
heaven.  Once  more  a  council  of  deities  was  convened  in  the  Heav- 
enly Region,  and  Nanakime  was  dispatched  to  reconnoiter  the  land. 
He,  however,  was  killed  by  Ama-no-wakahiko.  Finally,  Take- 
mikazuchi,  being  intrusted  with  the  duty,  proceeded  to  Izumo 
and  informed  Okuni-nushi  of  the  command  given  by  the  Deity  of 
Heaven  that  the  son  of  Amaterasu  should  assume  sovereignty  over 
the  country  then  ruled  by  Okuni-nushi.  The  command  was  at 
last  obeyed.  Ckuni-nushi  ceded  his  kingdom  to  the  son  of  the 
goddess,  and,  with  his  sons,  left  the  region.  Takemikazuchi  having 
carried  this  intelligence  to  Amaterasu,  she,  conforming  always  with 
the  commands  of  the  Deity  of  Heaven,  summoned  her  son,  Ama- 
no-oshihomimi,  and  informed  him  that,  peace  having  been  restored 
in  the  land  below,  he  must  proceed  to  govern  it.  He,  however, 
prayed  that  his  son,  Ninigi,  might  be  sent  in  his  stead,  and  the  god- 
dess consenting,  gave  to  Ninigi  a  mandate  to  rule  over  Japan  and  to 
maintain  its  prosperity  so  long  as  heaven  and  earth  should  endure. 
She  further  gave  him  the  Yasaka  Jewel,  the  Yasaka  Mirror,  and 
the  Kusanagi  Sword,  saying :  "  This  mirror  is  my  spirit ;  regard  it 


MYTHICAL     AGE  5 

as  myself."  Thenceforth  the  Jewel,  Mirror,  and  Sword,  venerated 
as  the  three  precious  relics  of  the  goddess,  were  transmitted  as  in- 
signia from  emperor  to  emperor  through  all  generations. 

The  terrestrial  deity,  Sarudahiko,  receiving  news  of  the  ap- 
proach of  Ninigi  and  his  divine  retinue,  came  out  to  greet  him. 
Under  his  guidance  Ninigi  passed  to  Takachiho  Mountain  in 
Hyiiga,  Kiushii,  and  took  up  his  abode  at  Kasasa  Promotory  in- 
Ada  (now  Kaseda  port  in  Satsuma).  Ninigi  took  to  wife  the 
daughter  of  a  terrestrial  deity,  and  by  her  had  two  sons,  Hosuseri 
and  Hikohohodemi.  These  deities  fell  out  and  fought,  with  the 
result  that  the  younger  subdued  the  elder  by  the  aid  of  the  deity  of 
the  sea,  whose  daughter  he  had  married.  The  victor's  son,  Ugaya- 
fukiaezu,  also  married  a  daughter  of  the  marine  deity  and  had  four 
sons,  Itsuse,  Inahi,  Mikenu,  and  Iwarehiko,  of  whom  the  fourth 
and  youngest  afterward  became  the  Emperor  Jimmu.  Inahi  went 
to  the  dominion  of  his  mother  over  the  waves,  and  Mikenu  to  the 
far-distant  Tokoyo,  or  the  Region  of  Eternal  Night.1 

1  Abridged  genealogy  of  the  "  Deities." 
Izanagi  (male)  Izanami  (female) 

I I 


I  I    .  i 

Amaterasu  Tsukiyomi  Susanoo 


i 1  .      i 

Amano-oshihomimi  Amano-hohi  Okuni-nushi 

I 
Hikoho-no-ninigi 


Hikohohodemi  Hosuseri 

I 
Ugayafukiaezu 


r      i        i  i 

Itsuse        Inahi        Mikenu        The  Emperor  Jimmu. 


Chapter    II 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE    EMPIRE 
660  B.  C.-192  A.  D. 

A  CCORDING  to  tradition,  Itsuse  and  Iwarehiko  took  counsel 
L\  together  one  day  in  their  residence  in  Hyuga,  as  to  the 
JL  JL  place  most  suitable  for  the  seat  of  administration,  and  re- 
solved to  proceed  eastward.  At  the  straits  beween  Kiushu  and 
Shikoku  they  were  received  by  a  terrestrial  deity,  and  under  his 
guidance  reached  Usa  in  the  present  Buzen,  where  the  inhabitants 
built  a  palace  for  them  and  treated  them  hospitably.  Passing  next 
to  Chikuzen,  they  subsequently  crossed  the  sea  to  Aki  on  the  main 
island,  and  thence  journeyed  to  Kibi,  ten  years  being  devoted  to 
these  travels.  From  Kibi  they  passed  over  by  Naniwa  to  Tadetsu 
in  the  present  Izumi  province.  The  objective  point  of  the  expedi- 
tion was  Yamato,  where  then  ruled  a  powerful  chieftain  named 
Nagasunehiko  who,  under  the  authority  of  Nigihayahi,  a  scion 
of  a  god  of  Heaven,  whom  he  had  received,  had  extended  his  sway 
over  the  surrounding  region.  This  chieftain,  learning  of  the  ap- 
proach of  the  deities  and  their  following,  marshaled  his  forces  to 
oppose  them.  In  the  battle  that  ensued  Itsuse  was  wounded  by  an 
arrow. 

The  invading  army  therefore  turned  their  course  over  the 
sea  to  Kii,  where  Itsuse  died  of  his  wound.  His  brother,  Iwarehiko, 
then  advanced  to  the  east  coast  of  Kii,  and,  having  there  killed  a 
local  chieftain,  pushed  on  to  Yoshino  under  the  guidance  of  Prince 
Michiomi  (ancestor  of  the  Otomo  family)  and  Prince  Okume 
(ancestor  of  the  Kume  family).  The  inhabitants,  cave-dwellers, 
learning  that  a  scion  of  the  god  of  Heaven  had  arrived,  went  out 
to  meet  him  and  made  submission.  Prosecuting  his  campaign, 
Iwarehiko  struck  down  several  rebel  chiefs,  and  once  more  planned 
an  expedition  against  Nagasunehiko.  The  latter,  however,  sent 
him  a  message,  saying :  "  Prince  Nigihayahi,  son  of  the  Deity 
of  Heaven,  came  hither  in  a  strong  boat,  and  married  my  sister, 
Kashiya,  by  whom  he  has  a  son,  Prince  Umashimate.    I  have  made 

6 


THE     BEGINNING  7 

660-97  B.C. 

obeisance  to  Prince  Nigihayahi  as  sovereign  of  the  land.  There 
cannot  possibly  be  two  legitimate  representatives  of  the  Heavenly 
Deity.  You  must  have  come  to  deprive  us  wrongfully  of  the  realm 
under  pretext  of  celestial  origin."  To  this  Iwarehiko  replied: 
"  There  is  more  than  one  son  of  the  Deity  of  Heaven.  If  your 
sovereign  be  in  truth  the  offspring  of  the  Celestial  Deity,  he  must 
possess  some  proofs.  Let  me  see  them."  Nagasunehiko  thereupon 
produced  arrows  and  an  arrow-case  which  Prince  Nigihayahi  had 
brought  with  him.  Iwarehiko,  having  examined  them,  declared 
them  to  be  genuine,  and  showed  his  own  arrows  and  arrow-case 
to  Nagasunehiko.  But  the  latter,  though  fully  sensible  that  Iware- 
hiko was  of  celestial  origin,  maintained  an  obstinate  mien  and  would 
not  change  his  view.  Prince  Nigihayahi,  now  clearly  perceiving 
his  unreasonable  disposition,  put  him  to  death,  and  passed  over 
with  all  his  men  to  serve  in  the  invading  army.  Well  pleased  by 
this  act,  Iwarehiko  treated  the  prince  kindly  and  rewarded  his  loyal 
conduct.  Orders  were  then  issued  to  the  captains  to  exterminate 
all  the  insurgents  in  the  land,  and  the  Yamato  district  having  been 
brought  into  complete  subjection,  the  conqueror  established  his 
capital  at  Kashiwabara  in  Yamato,  and  ordained  the  deities  of  the 
various  officials  of  his  court,  the  imperial  power  being  thus  ex- 
tended and  the  administration  placed  on  a  fixed  basis.  This  was 
the  opening  year  of  Japanese  history.  Later  annalists  fixed  the 
year  at  660  b.  c,  and  styled  the  victorious  prince  the  Emperor 
Jimmu,  the  first  sovereign  of  the  Empire  of  Japan. 

After  his  death  his  younger  son,  Prince  Takishimimi,  sought 
to  usurp  the  sovereignty.  The  eldest  son,  Prince  Kamyaimimi, 
suspecting  the  plot,  revealed  it  to  his  younger  brother,  Kannuna- 
gawamimi,  who  shot  the  usurper.  Thereupon  the  elder  prince 
waived  the  throne  in  favor  of  his  valiant  brother,  who  thus  became 
the  second  emperor,  Suisei.  After  him  followed  the  Emperors 
Annei,  Itoku,  Kosho,  Koan,  Korei,  Kogen,  and  Kaikwa,  whose 
reigns  are  said  to  have  lasted  450  years  and  are  singularly  bare 
of  recorded  events. 

In  these  primitive  ages  the  life  of  the  people  was  naturally 
simple.  The  population  must  have  been  small,  and  the  communica- 
tion between  different  parts  of  the  small  empire  extremely  difficult. 
Boats  were  propelled  by  oars,  for  sails  were  unknown.  The  in- 
vaders must  have  attained  to  a  higher  stage  of  culture  than  the 
vanquished  natives.     The  dwellings  of  the  aristocracy,  for  example, 


8  JAPAN 

660-97    B.  C. 

were  rudely  constructed  wooden  houses,  the  simple  model  of 
which  still  survives  in  the  Shinto  shrines  of  the  present  day,  while 
the  autochthons  mostly  dwelt  in  pits  dug  underground.  On  the 
whole,  however,  both  classes  had  partially  advanced  to  an  agri- 
cultural mode  of  life,  and  depended  for  subsistence  largely  on 
fishing  and  hunting.  Bows  and  arrows  or  snares  were  the  chief 
implements  used  in  hunting,  and  hooks,  cormorants,  and  weirs 
served  for  purposes  of  fishing.  Methods  of  preparing  food  had 
already  been  elaborated,  and  the  art  of  brewing  sake  was  known. 
Marked  progress  had  also  taken  place  in  matters  of  dress.  From 
skins  of  animals  or  textile  fabrics  woven  from  hemp  and  dyed  red 
and  green  with  juices  of  herbs,  were  made  hats,  robes,  and  panta- 
loons. Ornaments  for  the  neck,  arms,  and  legs  consisted  of  beads 
of  crystal,  agate,  glass,  serpentine  and  polished  gems,  shaped  into 
cylinders  or  crescents  and  strung  together.  The  arts  of  mining 
and  smelting  ores,  as  well  as  of  casting  metal,  were  known,  for, 
besides  arrow-heads  and  other  weapons  of  stone,  spears  and  swords 
of  copper  or  iron,  together  with  plows  and  hatchets  of  hard  metals, 
were  in  evidence. 

It  is  interesting  to  know  that  at  marriage  the  bridegroom, 
contrary  to  the  modern  custom,  went  to  the  house  of  the  bride.  A 
man  also  was  permitted  to  have  several  wives,  but  a  woman  was 
never  allowed  to  have  more  than  one  husband.  Divination  was 
always  employed  to  solve  doubtful  questions.  Music  and  dancing 
were  already  known,  the  koto'  and  the  flute  being  employed  as 
musical  instruments.  Emotions  of  grief  or  joy,  love  or  disap- 
pointment, were  expressed  in  song,  the  most  ancient  song  now 
extant  being  attributed  to  the  deity  Susanoo.  The  Emperor 
Jimmu  also  frequently  commemorated  brave  deeds  of  war  in  song, 
thus  encouraging  and  reviving  the  spirit  of  his  warriors. 

A  profound  awe  and  respect  toward  the  national  deities,  as 
well  as  a  superstitious  fear  of  innumerable  spirits,  seems  to  have 
prevailed  everywhere  in  all  classes  of  society.  If  the  people  sub- 
mitted readily  to  the  sway  of  the  Emperor  Jimmu,  it  was  largely 
because  they  regarded  him  as  a  scion  of  the  gods.  The  emperor, 
on  his  side,  firmly  convinced  that  good  and  evil  were  controlled  by 
divine  will,  never  neglected  to  perform  sacrificial  rites.  Out  of  the 
custom  of  extreme  reverence  toward  the  deities  grew  abhorrence 
for  impurity  in  any  form,  so  that  separate  huts  came  to  be  built 
for  the  bodies  of  the  dead  or  for  women  at  times  of  parturition,  and 


JAPANESE   FISHING    WITH    TRAINED   CORMORANTS 
i'ainting   by  A     Richlcr 


THE     BEGINNING  9 

97-27  B.  C. 

if  any  man  came  in  contact  with  an  unclean  object,  he  bathed  in 
a  river  to  purify  himself. 

Naturally,  little  distinction  existed  between  religion  and  gov- 
ernment, between  shrine  and  palace.  At  the  completion  of  his 
work  of  conquest,  Jimmu  erected  a  building  at  Kashiwa-brara,  in 
which  he  deposited  the  three  insignia,  and  in  which  he  himself  re- 
sided and  personally  governed  the  empire.  Each  one  of  his  eight 
successors  followed  his  example.  The  tenth  emperor,  Sujin,  how- 
ever, fearing  that  the  insignia  might  be  polluted,  made  duplicates 
of  the  Mirror  and  the  Sword,  and  reverently  deposited  the  originals 
in  a  shrine  at  Kasanui  in  Yamato,  where  one  of  the  imperial  prin- 
cesses was  intrusted  with  the  duty  of  guarding  them  and  performing 
due  religious  rites.  Thus,  shrine  and  palace  were  at  last  separated. 
Subsequently,  these  sacred  objects  were  removed  to  Ise,  and  placed 
in  the  shrine  now  existing  there.  The  Sword,  however,  was  after- 
ward carried  to  Atsuta  in  Owari,  where  it  now  lies  in  the  Atsuta 
Shrine. 

During  the  reigns  of  Sujin  and  his  successor,  Suinin,  the  agri- 
culture and  communication  of  the  country  are  recorded  to  have 
been  greatly  encouraged,  troubles  near  the  court  exterminated,  and 
also  the  area  of  the  empire  largely  extended.  The  extension  of 
the  imperial  domain,  however,  brought  it  in  sharp  conflict  with 
the  still  unsubdued  tribes  of  the  north  and  the  south.  From  the 
reign  of  Keiko,  Suinin's  successor,  we  hear  of  the  story  of  the 
conflict.  The  Kumaso  of  Tsukushi,  Kiushu,  rose  in  arms.  How 
seriously  this  was  regarded  is  seen  from  the  fact  that  the  emperor 
in  person  conducted  a  campaign  for  several  years  in  Kiushu.  No 
sooner  was  peace  restored  than  the  southern  tribes  again  rebelled. 
This  time  the  brave  Prince  Yamato-dake,  who  was  sent  to  Tsuku- 
shi to  subdue  the  insurgents,  had  to  resort  to  strategy  instead  of 
war.  Having  disguised  himself  as  a  girl,  he  obtained  entry  into 
the  house  of  the  Kumaso  chief,  where  he  killed  the  chief  and  his 
warriors  while  they  were  lying  drunk.  He  also  overthrew  many 
other  rebellious  princes  and  returned  to  Yamato  in  triumph. 

In  the  meantime  the  emperor,  after  his  return  from  Kiushu, 
had  heard  from  a  special  commissioner  whom  he  had  sent  that 
in  the  northeast  of  the  empire  there  was  a  strange  region  named 
Hidakami,  where  the  people  of  both  sexes  wore  their  hair  tied 
up,  tattooed  their  bodies,  and  performed  deeds  of  valor.  They  were 
known  as  the  Emishi,  and  their  land,  being  extensive  and  fertile, 


10 


JAPAN 


29   B.  C.-131   A.  D. 

the  commissioner  represented,  ought  to  be  added  to  the  im- 
perial domain.  These  Emishi  rose  in  rebellion  shortly  after  the 
return  of  Prince  Yamato-dake  from  the  conquest  of  the  Kumaso. 
Thereupon  the  prince  boldly  offered  to  undertake  the  conquest  of 
the  new  insurgents.  After  subduing  local  uprisings  on  his  way,  he 
proceeded  by  sea  to  the  region  of  the  northern  rebellion.  As  his 
boats  drew  near  the  shore  he  displayed  a  large  mirror  at  the  prow 
of  his  vessel,  and  when  the  rebel  chieftains  and  their  followers 
sighted  the  ships,  they  were  terrified  by  such  evidences  of  pomp 
and  power,  and  throwing  away  their  bows  and  arrows,  made  submis- 


JAPAN 

«  KMOWN  TO  Trt  EMPERORS  BEFORE  THE   riFTtl  CENTURY 


sion.  The  prince  accepted  their  homage,  and  enlisting  their  aid,  con- 
quered other  rebels  who  still  resisted  the  progress  of  the  imperial 
forces.  It  seems  probable  that  on  that  occasion  Prince  Yamato-dake 
advanced  as  far  as  the  present  province  of  Iwaki.  On  his  return 
journey,  which  was  again  beset  with  local  difficulties,  he  was  seized 
with  a  severe  illness,  which  soon  proved  fatal.  The  emperor  bitterly 
lamented  the  death  of  his  beloved  son,  and  the  story  of  the  gallant 
prince  is  still  dear  to  the  heart  of  every  child  of  Japan. 

The  local  administration  of  the  empire  so  materially  extended 
during  three  successive  reigns  was  now  reorganized  by  the  Emperor 
Shomu,  son  of  Keiko.     The  nature  of  Shomu's  reform  is,  however, 


THE     BEGINNING 


11 


131-192  A.  D. 

little  known.  When  the  Emperor  Jimmu  established  the  office  of 
local  governor,  there  were  only  nine  provinces,  but  the  number 
was  increased  by  more  than  ten  during  the  reigns  of  Kaika,  Sujin, 
and  Keiko,  and  became  sixty-three  in  the  time  of  the  Emperor 
Shomu.  The  imperial  sway  then  extended  northward  as  far  as 
Shinobu  (the  present  Mutsu),  Sado  and  Noto;  eastward  to  Tsu- 
kuba  (now  Hidachi)  ;  westward  to  Amakusa,  and  southward  to 
Kii.  Throughout  the  whole  of  this  district,  governors  were  ap- 
pointed to  administer  local  affairs.  Subsequently  the  process  of 
division  continued  until,  in  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Suiko,  the 
total  number  of  provinces  reached  144,  at  which  figure  it  remained 
until  645  a.  d.,  the  date  of  the  so-called  Taikwa  Reformation. 
These  local  divisions,  though  here  spoken  of  as  provinces,  had  in 
fact  different  appellations — as  kuni,  a  province,  or  agata,  a  district 
— and  were  not  of  uniform  area.  The  term  kuni  was  employed  to 
designate  an  area  bounded  by  mountains  or  rivers,  whereas  the 
agata  had  no  such  geographical  limits.  In  general  the  former  was 
the  more  extensive,  but  in  consequence  of  the  natural  features  of 
the  country  the  agata  was  sometimes  the  larger.  The  entire  sub- 
ject of  the  local  government  of  ancient  Japan  is,  however,  one  of 
the  most  obscure  subjects  in  history. 

The  reigns  of  the  first  thirteen  emperors,  from  Jimmu  to 
Shomu,  may  be  considered  the  era  of  the  founding  of  the  Japanese 
Empire.  The  main  work  of  the  sovereigns  of  this  period  consisted 
in  the  organization,  extension,  and  consolidation  of  their  domain. 
Foreign  relations  had  hardly  begun,  and  external  influence  was  as 
yet  slightly  felt.  The  following  table  gives  the  names  of  the 
thirteen  emperors,  with  the  officially  fixed  dates  of  their  reigns : 


1.  Emperor  Jimmu. 

660—585    B.  C. 
I 

2.  Emperor  Suisei. 

581-549  B.  c. 

I 

3.  Emperor  Annei. 

548—510  b.  c. 

I 

4.  Emperor  Itoku. 

510—475  b.  c. 
I 

5.  Emperor  Kosho. 
475—392  B.C. 


6.  Emperor  Koan. 
392 — 290  b.  c. 

I 

7.  Emperor  Korei. 

290-214  b.  c. 

I 

8.  Emperor  Kogen. 
214—157  B.  c. 

I 

9.  Emperor  Kaikwa. 

157—97  b.  c. 

I 
10.  Emperor  Sujin. 
97 — 29  b.  c. 


u.  Emperor  Suinin. 
29  b.  c — 71  A.  a 

I 

12.  Emperor  Keiko. 
71 — 131  A.  D. 

I 

13.  Emperor  Shomu. 
131-192  A.  D. 


Chapter    III 

RELATIONS  WITH    KOREA  AND   CHINA 
192-645  A.  D. 

JAPAN'S  foreign  relations  naturally  began  with  the  neighbor- 
ing peninsula  of  Korea,  which  then  contained  several  petty 
kingdoms  at  variance  with  one  another.  Political  relations 
of  Japan  with  some  of  these  small  states  must  have  begun  very 
early,  but  the  traditional  accounts  concerning  them  are  meager  and 
untrustworthy.  It  is  probable  that  some  of  the  Korean  chiefs  were 
at  different  times  tributary  to  Japan.  The  relations  with  Korea, 
however,  appear  to  have  become  serious  only  when  it  was  suspected 
that  the  restless  tribes  of  Kiushu  had  been  encouraged  by  Shiragi, 
the  most  warlike  kingdom  in  the  peninsula,  in  their  repeated  acts 
of  rebellion  against  the  emperor  of  Japan.  In  this  light  may  be 
read  the  following  famous  legend  of  the  Japanese  expedition  to 
Korea,  which  is  said  to  have  taken  place  about  200  a.  d.,  under 
the  leadership  of  the  valiant  Empress  Jingo  and  her  minister, 
Takenouchi. 

Tradition  says  that,  as  the  Kumaso  of  Tsukushi,  Kiushu, 
again  rose  in  arms,  the  Emperor  Chtiai  proceeded  thither  in  person, 
and,  through  his  minister,  prayed  for  the  guidance  of  the  gods. 
Thereupon  the  latter  inspired  the  empress,  who  had  joined  the 
imperial  expedition,  to  declare  that  if  Shiragi  was  first  conquered, 
the  Kumaso  would  submit  without  further  resistance.  The  em- 
peror, however,  hesitated  to  take  this  divine  counsel,  and  the  deities 
punished  his  disobedience  by  death.  Awed  by  this  startling  event, 
the  empress  gave  directions  that  her  consort's  death  should  be  kept 
secret,  and  having  intrusted  to  his  generals  the  duty  of  guarding 
the  temporary  palace  at  Tsukushi,  she  sent  Takenouchi  to  convey 
the  emperor's  remains  to  Nagato  by  sea,  while  she  herself  remained 
to  mourn  the  death  of  her  husband  in  his  prime.  Sacrifices  were 
again  offered  to  heaven,  and  prayers  again  addressed  to  the  deities, 
to  which  the  reply  was  the  same  as  before.  After  subduing  several 
rebel  tribes,  the  empress  came  to  a  river,  where  she  sought  by  fish- 

12 


KOREA     AND     CHINA  13 

192-400   A.  D. 

ing  to  obtain  an  omen  as  to  whether  the  conquest  of  Korea  should 
be  attempted.  The  indications  being  in  the  affirmative,  she  finally 
resolved  to  lead  an  expedition  in  person  across  the  sea.  Sacrificial 
rites  were  again  performed  to  all  the  deities,  and  the  empress,  re- 
turning to  Kashihi  Bay,  ordered  the  people  to  build  ships,  and  sent 
sailors  westward  to  reconnoiter  the  land  which  she  contemplated 
invading.  By  and  by,  a  lucky  day  having  been  chosen,  the  Japanese 
fleet  set  out  from  Wanizu  in  Tsushima,  and,  aided  by  a  favorable 
wind,  soon  reached  the  coast  of  Shiragi.  Hasankin,  the  king  of 
Shiragi,  was  so  much  alarmed  by  the  appearance  of  the  invading 
force  that,  without  offering  any  resistance,  he  came  to  sue  for 
peace,  and  made  a  solemn  pledge  that  he  would  henceforth  serve 
the  ruler  of  Japan  as  a  groom  and  send  her  annual  tributes.  Shi- 
ragi, he  declared,  would  abide  by  his  oath,  "  till  the  river  Yalu 
flowed  backward  and  sands  rose  to  sky  and  became  stars."  The 
kingdoms  of  Koma  and  Kudara  followed  the  example  of  Shiragi, 
so  that  the  three  principal  divisions  of  southern  Korea  became 
tributary  to  Japan. 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  from  this  time  on  neither 
was  Korea  always  obedient  nor  did  the  Kumaso  cease  to  be  re- 
bellious. In  the  meantime,  however,  an  important  event  in  an 
entirely  different  direction  resulted  from  Japan's  intimate  relations 
with  Korea.  It  was  the  introduction  through  Korea  of  the  Chinese 
art  of  writing.  Many  Koreans  accompanied  the  commissioners  who 
brought  the  annual  tribute  to  Japan,  and  the  literature  and  art  of 
the  west  were  gradually  introduced.  Annals  attribute  the  begin- 
ning of  Chinese  learning  in  Japan  to  the  reign  of  the  Emperor 
Ojin,  son  of  the  Empress  Jingd,  when  in  218  a.  d.  a  celebrated 
Korean  scholar,  Achiki,  visited  Japan  and  was  appointed  by  the 
emperor  tutor  to  his  son,  Wakairatsuko.  At  the  suggestion  of 
Achiki,  another  learned  man  named  Wani  was  sent  for,  who  is 
said  to  have  brought  with  him  blacksmiths,  weavers,  and  brewers, 
as  well  as  ten  copies  of  the  "  Lun-yu  "  (the  Confucian  Analects)  and 
a  copy  of  the  "  Chien-tze-wen"  (the  book  of  one  thousand  char- 
acters). Achiki  and  Wani  were  naturalized  in  Japan  and  received 
official  positions,  and  their  descendants  continued  to  hold  professor- 
ships at  court.  About  no  years  after  the  introduction  of  Chinese 
literature,  the  Emperor  Richu  appointed  historiographers  in  all  the 
local  districts  to  chronicle  the  chief  events  of  the  locality.  This  was, 
so  far  as  we  know;  the  first  organized  attempt  to  compile  regular 


14,  JAPAN 

400-500  A.  D. 

records.  Subsequently,  as  the  administrative  machinery  grew  more 
complex,  the  necessity  of  writing  became  more  imperative,  and  to 
a  service  of  this  kind  none  were  more  fitted  than  the  descendants 
of  the  naturalized  Korean  scholars,  who  kept  up  their  intellectual 
heritage  and  occupied  important  posts  at  the  court.  Fresh  scholars 
also  arrived  from  Korea  in  increasing  numbers.  Thus,  in  the 
reign  of  the  Emperor  Keitai,  there  came  from  Kudara  two  doctors 
in  the  Five  Classics,  and  a  little  later  doctors  in  medicine  and 
astronomy  and  other  savants  settled  in  the  country  and  opened 
classes  to  instruct  the  Japanese  in  their  special  branches  of  study. 
The  introduction  of  Buddhism  from  Korea,  which  soon  occurred, 
and  the  circumstances  of  which  will  presently  be  narrated,  gave  an 
added  impetus  to  the  learning.  Some  of  the  gifted  men  of  the 
court,  particularly  the  wise  Prince  Shotoku,  began  to  distinguish 
themselves  as  accomplished  scholars  in  Chinese  classics  and  Bud- 
dhist canons.  As  yet,  however,  the  native  language  and  the  Chi- 
nese grammar,  which  are  so  radically  different  from  each  other, 
did  not  begin  their  long  history  of  struggle  to  reconcile  themselves 
to  one  another.  The  vernacular  could  hardly  lend  itself  to  expres- 
sion in  Chinese  characters,  and  histories  and  inscriptions  were 
written  only  in  the  pure  Chinese  style. 

The  coming  of  Buddhism  was  an  incident  which  accelerated 
the  progress  of  a  profound  change  in  the  history  and  civilization 
of  Japan,  already  started  by  her  close  relations  with  the  continent 
of  Asia.  Buddhism  was  first  introduced  early  in  the  sixth  century 
by  a  Chinese  scholar,  Sumatah,  who,  however,  made  little  progress 
in  propagating  the  alien  faith  among  the  people  of  Yamato.  After- 
ward, during  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Kimmei,  in  the  year  552 
a.  d.,  the  king  of  Kudara,  in  Korea,  sent  the  emperor  of  Japan 
an  envoy  bearing  an  image  of  Buddha  and  a  copy  of  the  Sutras, 
together  with  a  message  that  the  creed  of  Buddha  excelled  all  re- 
ligious beliefs,  and  that  boundless  happiness  in  this  world,  as  well 
as  in  the  next,  was  insured  to  its  disciples,  among  whom  were 
already  all  the  nations  from  India  to  Korea.  The  emperor  was 
greatly  impressed  and  summoned  his  ministers  to  a  deliberation 
over  the  proper  attitude  to  be  assumed  by  Japan  regarding  this 
new  problem  of  the  western  civilization.  Soga-no-Iname,  min- 
ister president,  counseled  the  acceptance  of  the  foreign  faith, 
saying  that  Japan  should  not  alone  stand  aloof  when  all  nations  in 
the   west   had   embraced   Buddha's   doctrine.     Against   this   view 


KOREA     AND     CHINA  15 

552-586   A.  D. 

Mononobe-no-Okoshi  and  Nakatomi  Kamako,  ministers  of  state, 
argued  that  from  the  most  ancient  times  the  Japanese  had  wor- 
shiped the  celestial  and  terrestrial  gods,  and  that  if  reverence  were 
paid  now  to  any  alien  deity,  the  wrath  of  the  tutelary  gods  of  the 
land  might  be  provoked.  The  emperor  approved  the  latter  view, 
but  gave  the  image  of  Buddha  to  Iname  with  permission  to  wor- 
ship it  by  way  of  trial.  Iname  was  greatly  pleased  with  the 
behest,  and  lost  no  time  in  converting  his  residence  into  a  temple, 
where  he  placed  the  image.  Soon  afterward  a  pestilence  visited 
the  country,  sweeping  away  numbers  of  people.  The  opponents 
of  Buddhism  thereupon  having  represented  to  the  sovereign  that 
this  was  obviously  a  punishment  inflicted  by  Heaven,  the  temple 
was  burned  down  and  the  image  thrown  into  the  canal  in  Naniwa. 
The  emperor,  however,  did  not  altogether  abandon  his  predilec- 
tion for  the  worship  of  Buddha,  and  Iname  sent  secretly  to  Korea 
for  another  image.  Thus,  in  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Bidatsu, 
images  of  Buddha,  copies  of  the  Sutras,  priests,  and  manufacturers 
of  Buddhist  paraphernalia  came  from  the  kingdoms  of  Kudara 
and  Shiragi.  Subsequently  (584  a.  d.),  Soga-no-Umako,  who  had 
succeeded  his  father,  Iname,  as  minister  president,  built  temples 
and  pagodas  dedicated  to  Buddha.  Another  pestilence  came  to  re- 
vive the  anti-Buddhist  movement,  under  the  influence  of  which 
an  imperial  edict  was  issued  prohibiting  the  worship  of  Buddha; 
all  the  temples  and  pagodas  were  demolished  or  burned,  and  the 
images  of  Buddha  were  thrown  into  the  canal.  The  people's  suf- 
ferings were,  however,  not  relieved.  A  plague  of  boils  ensued,  and 
inasmuch  as  the  pain  caused  by  the  sores  resembled  that  of  burning 
or  beating,  old  and  young  alike  concluded  that  they  were  the 
victims  of  a  punishment  of  burning  inflicted  by  Buddha.  From 
this  it  may  be  inferred  that  Buddhism  had  already  established  a 
hold  upon  the  popular  imagination.  Shortly  afterward  Soga-no- 
Umako,  having  applied  for  permission,  was  allowed  to  worship 
Buddha  with  his  own  family. 

When  the  Emperor  Yomei  ascended  the  throne  in  586,  he  suf- 
fered so  much  from  bodily  infirmity  that  he  felt  tempted  to  worship 
Buddha.  By  this  time  the  influence  of  Buddhists  had  grown  so 
strong  that  they,  on  the  pretext  that  their  opponents  were  disloyal 
to  the  wishes  of  the  throne,  took  this  occasion  to  destroy  the  two 
most  powerful  anti-Buddhists.  Then,  by  the  combined  energy  of 
Prince  Shotoku  and  the  minister  president,   Soga-no-Mako,  the 


16  JAPAN 

586-645  A.  D. 

propagation  of  Buddhism  made  great  strides,  until  the  Empress 
Suiko  openly  encouraged  its  acceptance  among  the  people  of  all 
classes.  In  607,  in  order  to  obtain  copies  of  the  Sutras,  there  was 
sent  for  the  first  time  in  history  an  imperial  envoy  directly  to 
China,  where  the  Sui  dynasty  had  just  unified  the  long  disrupted 
empire.  This  was  the  commencement  of  intercourse  with  China. 
The  preamble  of  the  dispatch  sent  on  that  occasion  from  the  em- 
press of  Japan  to  the  sovereign  of  China  was  couched  in  the  follow- 
ing words :  "  The  Sovereign  of  the  Empire  of  the  Rising  Sun  to 
the  Sovereign  of  the  Empire  of  the  Setting  Sun  sends  greetings." 
Doubtless  the  name  "  Nippon  "  (Land  of  the  Rising  Sun)  had  its 
origin  in  this  incident.  By  and  by,  as  the  number  of  priests  and 
nuns  increased,  disorders  occurred  among  them,  and  for  purposes 
of  superintendence  the  offices  of  Sojo  (archbishop)  and  Sozu 
(bishop)  were  established.  From  the  introduction  of  Buddhism 
in  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Kimmei  to  the  time  of  which  we 
are  now  speaking,  seventy-five  years  elapsed.  During  the  first 
thirty-two  years  of  that  period,  Buddhism  failed  to  obtain  a  footing 
in  Japan,  but  from  584  it  gradually  extended  throughout  the  em- 
pire, until  in  627  there  were  in  Japan  46  temples,  816  priests,  and 
569  nuns. 

Let  us  now  observe  some  features  of  the  life  of  the  nation 
and  the  profound  influence  wrought  upon  it  by  the  introduction  of 
the  continental  civilization  and  of  Buddhism.  It  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that,  at  least  around  the  seat  of  the  central  government,  the 
arts  and  sciences  of  China  and  the  creed  of  Buddha  greatly  changed 
the  simplicity  of  Japanese  life  and  imparted  to  it  a  character  of  re- 
finement and  pomp  hitherto  unknown.  Chinese  literature  not  only 
taught  Japan  the  art  of  writing  and  composition,  but  also  brought 
with  it  an  advanced  ethical  sense  of  fidelity,  piety,  benevolence, 
and  justice.  The  Emperor  Ojin's  son,  who  was  the  first  Japanese 
student  of  Chinese  literature,  had  acquired  such  an  accurate  knowl- 
edge of  the  rules  of  composition  and  calligraphy  that  when  a  me- 
morial was  presented  to  the  throne  by  Korean  ambassadors,  he 
detected  the  presence  of  disrespectful  ideograms  and  rebuked  the 
envoys.  His  attainments  won  for  him  the  favor  of  his  father,  who 
nominated  him  heir  in  preference  to  his  elder  brother;  neverthe- 
less, on  the  death  of  the  emperor,  this  prince  resigned  his  claim 
in  behalf  of  his  brother.  For  such  self-denial  his  scholarship  had 
prepared  him.    So,  too,  the  erudite  Emperor  Nintoku  dwelt  for  the 


KOREA     AND     CHINA  17 

586-645  A.  D. 

space  of  three  years  in  a  dilapidated  palace,  in  order  that  his  people 
might  have  relief  from  taxation  during  a  famine,  and  know  the 
sense  of  love  and  duty  his  learning  had  taught  him.  The  prosperity 
of  the  nation,  he  said,  was  his  own  prosperity,  their  poverty  his 
poverty. 

The  doctrine  of  Confucius  inculcated  reverence  toward 
Heaven,  respect  for  ancestors,  loyalty  to  the  sovereign,  love  of 
the  people,  and  discharge  of  the  duties  of  filial  piety.  On  the 
other  hand,  Buddhism  proved  an  ennobling  influence  upon  the  mind 
of  the  nation.  Hitherto  the  people  naively  attributed  every  happy 
or  unhappy  event,  every  fortunate  or  unfortunate  incident,  to  the 
will  of  the  gods,  whom  they  appeased  by  offerings  and  sacrifices  that 
evil  might  be  averted.  The  gods  looked  and  acted  like  men.  High- 
est among  them  stood  the  celestial  and  terrestrial  gods;  lowest 
were  certain  wild  animals  and  venomous  snakes,  which  also  were 
propitiated  by  worship.  Gods  were  near  men,  and  some  of  the 
latter  were  conceived  as  scions  of  the  former.  This  primitive 
notion  of  a  deity  was  not  materially  affected  by  the  introduction 
of  the  Confucian  philosophy,  the  tenets  of  which  offered  no  con- 
tradiction to  the  ancient  idea.  Buddhism,  on  the  contrary,  told  of 
a  past  and  of  a  future;  announced  the  doctrine  that  virtue  would 
be  rewarded  and  vice  punished  in  a  future  state;  and  taught  that 
the  Buddha  was  the  supreme  being  and  that  whosoever  had  faith 
in  him  should  receive  unlimited  blessings  at  his  hands.  No  longer 
were  the  deities  the  only  objects  of  fear  and  reverence,  for  now  a 
being  of  supreme  wisdom  and  power  loomed  upon  the  mental 
horizon  of  the  people.  Even  the  sovereign  himself  was  seen  wor- 
shiping Buddha,  whose  servant  he  was  pleased  to  regard  himself. 
Prejudices  at  court  against  the  Hindu  doctrine  were  dispelled  by 
the  growing  light  shed  by  the  deeper  knowledge  of  Buddhism, 
while  the  golden  images  of  Buddha  and  the  imposing  structures 
enshrining  them,  as  well  as  the  gorgeous  paraphernalia  of  the  tem- 
ples and  the  solemnity  of  the  rites  performed  therein,  allured  the 
common  folk  into  the  faith.  At  the  same  time,  the  people's  rev- 
erence for  the  ancient  gods  of  the  nation  remained  unshaken,  so 
that  Shintoism,  Confucianism,  and  Buddhism  existed  side  by  side, 
supplying  the  defects  of  one  another  and  answering  different  moral 
needs  of  the  race. 

Along  with  learning  and  religion,  various  arts  of  civilized  life 
were  profusely  supplied  from  Korea  to  vivify  the  general  progress 


18  JAPAN 

586-645   A.  D. 

of  the  nation.  Among  the  most  important  was  the  production  and 
manufacture  of  silk,  which  was  largely  studied  by  the  people  and 
encouraged  by  the  Emperor  Yuryaku.  Many  Chinese  artisans  of 
the  fallen  dynasties  migrated  through  Korea  to  Japan,  where  they 
were  naturalized  and  transmitted  their  knowledge  of  the  western 
arts  and  sciences.  In  architecture,  also,  with  the  coming  of 
Buddhism  a  need  arose  for  lofty  and  large  edifices,  the  erection  of 
which  must  have  greatly  changed  the  appearance  of  the  capital. 
The  art  of  pottery  made  a  great  advance,  as  did  the  blacksmith's 
craft  of  forging  swords  and  other  articles  of  iron.  Nor  were 
medicine  and  the  calendar  neglected,  while  the  new  art  of  carving 
and  decorating  as  well  as  drawing  the  image  of  Buddha,  gave  a 
powerful  impetus  to  painting  and  sculpture.  The  collective  influ- 
ence of  all  these  and  other  new  changes  upon  the  life  of  the  people, 
nearer  the  center  of  the  government  at  least,  must  have  been  very 
great.  With  the  development  of  the  art  of  weaving,  apparel  was 
improved  by  the  addition  of  silk  garments;  as  agriculture  pro- 
gressed, rice  and  other  cereals  furnished  agreeable  aliment;  the 
influence  of  Buddhism  gradually  produced  a  distaste  for  animal 
food.  The  introduction  of  the  science  of  architecture  soon 
effected  a  marked  change  in  the  dimensions  and  decoration  of 
dwelling-houses.  Transmission  of  intelligence  was  facilitated  by 
the  imported  art  of  writing,  the  moral,  intellectual,  and  political 
thinking  of  the  ruling  classes  began  to  take  a  more  or  less  definite 
shape  from  the  coming  of  the  Chinese  classics,  while  Buddhism 
spread  over  the  nation  a  charm  which  was  at  once  captivating  and 
ennobling.    A  new  era  of  history  had  begun. 

We  shall  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  remarkable  political 
evolution  which  followed  and  was  in  fact  to  a  large  extent  occa- 
sioned by  the  introduction  of  Buddhism.  In  the  earliest  days  of 
the  empire,  administrative  posts  were  transmitted  by  heredity  from 
generation  to  generation.  It  thus  resulted  that  family  names  were 
derived  from  official  titles,  as,  for  example,  the  official  title  for 
persons  performing  religious  rites  was  Nakatomi  or  Imbe,  which 
titles  became  family  names  of  holders  of  that  office.  Similarly 
Otomo  and  Mononobe  were  family  names  of  officials  having  con- 
trol of  troops  or  direction  of  military  affairs.  Among  commoners, 
also,  there  were  many  who  performed  certain  kinds  of  work  for 
the  government,  the  art  of  which  they  bequeathed  to  their  children 
by  heredity.    Each  occupation  of  this  description  was  organized  into 


KOREA     AND     CHINA  19 

586-645  A.  D. 

a  guild,  and  each  guild  was  under  the  control  of  a  headman  who 
belonged  to  some  influential  family.  Not  only  were  public  offices 
and  private  guilds  similarly  organized  by  the  principle  of  heredity, 
but  also  there  was  no  rigid  line  drawn  between  the  public  property 
and  the  personal  possession  of  a  nobleman.  The  higher  one's 
position  among  the  aristocracy,  the  more  exalted  was  his  office 
and  the  more  plenteous  his  treasury.  Under  these  circumstances,  it 
is  not  strange  that  the  administration  of  the  state  gradually  fell 
under  the  control  of  the  heads  of  a  few  powerful  clans.  Originally, 
during  the  reign  of  the  first  emperor,  the  Nakatomi  and  Imbe 
families  discharged  religious  functions,  and  the  Otomo,  Kume, 
and  Mononobe  families  performed  military  duties.  The  influence 
of  these  families  was  then  about  equal.  But  subsequent  events 
resulted  in  the  decline  of  the  Kume,  while  the  Otomo  were  in  the 
main  intrusted  with  the  control  of  Korean  affairs.  Domestic  ad- 
ministration remained  chiefly  in  the  hands  of  the  Mononobe  and  the 
new  family  of  Soga,  descendants  of  Takenouchi,  the  tactful  min- 
ister of  the  Empress  Jingo.  The  Mononobe  stood  at  the  head  of 
all  the  noble  families  bearing  the  honorary  title  of  Muraji,  and  the 
Soga,  of  those  likewise  designated  as  Omi.  It  was  inevitable  that 
the  mutual  jealousy  of  the  two  leading  houses  should  bring  them 
to  a  clash  of  interests,  while  the  introduction  of  Buddhism  had  the 
effect  of  greatly  accentuating  their  hostility.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  the  Mononobe  family  adhered  steadily  to  conservative  prin- 
ciples and  opposed  the  spread  of  Buddhism,  which  the  Soga,  on 
the  contrary,  zealously  upheld.  So  long,  however,  as  both  families 
bowed  implicitly  to  the  imperial  commands,  their  dispute  did  not 
attain  serious  proportions.  But  when,  in  the  reign  of  Yomei,  not 
only  was  the  empress  dowager  a  daughter  of  the  Soga  family, 
but  also  the  emperor  himself  inclined  to  the  worship  of  Buddha,  the 
final  struggle  between  the  two  families  could  no  longer  be  deferred. 
On  the  death  of  the  emperor,  Mononobe  Moriya  sought  to  se- 
cure the  succession  for  a  brother  of  the  deceased  sovereign,  as  against 
another  prince,  son  of  the  empress  dowager.  His  plot  was  dis- 
covered, and  he  was  defeated  and  killed.  The  Mononobe  being 
thus  overthrown,  the  supremacy  rested  with  Umako,  the  head  of 
the  Soga,  and  the  throne  was  occupied  by  his  own  prince.  But 
the  prince  could  not  long  bear  the  arbitrary  conduct  of  Umako,  who 
then  caused  him  to  be  assassinated.  The  empress  dowager,  a 
daughter  of  the  Soga,  despite  the  presence  of  direct  successors  in 


20  JAPAN 

586-645   A.  D. 

the  male  line,  ascended  the  throne  under  the  title  of  the  Empress 
Suiko.  This  was  the  first  instance  of  the  scepter  being  held  by 
a  female.  On  the  death  of  Umako,  his  son,  Emishi,  succeeded  him, 
and  wielded  even  larger  influence  than  his  father.  Emishi  crushed 
an  opposition  offered  by  his  own  uncle,  and  placed  in  succession  to 
the  empress  a  prince  of  his  choice,  and  under  the  latter's  rule  as 
Emperor  Shomei,  Emishi  behaved  as  he  pleased.  After  Shomei's 
death,  his  consort  ascended  the  throne  under  the  name  of  Kokyoku. 
Emishi's  son,  Iruka,  who  now  discharged  the  administrative  func- 
tions, exercised  even  greater  power  than  his  father.  He  also  de- 
signed to  obtain  the  throne  for  Prince  Furuhito,  a  relative  of  his 
family.  But  an  obstacle  existed  in  the  person  of  Prince  Yamashiro, 
whose  goodness  and  discretion  had  won  popular  respect.  Steps 
were  taken  to  have  this  prince  assassinated,  and  otherwise  Iruka 
showed  himself  so  arbitrary  and  unscrupulous  that  there  appeared 
to  be  danger  of  his  compassing  the  destruction  of  the  lineal  suc- 
cessors to  the  throne  and  usurping  the  sovereignty  himself.  There- 
upon Nakatomi  Kamatari,  a  loyal  subject,  conferred  with  Prince 
Nakano-6ye,  son  of  the  Emperor  Shomei,  as  to  the  expediency  of 
making  away  with  Iruka.  This  plot  culminated  in  the  killing  of 
Iruka  in  the  throne  room,  on  a  day  when  Korean  ambassadors  were 
received  at  the  court.  Iruka's  father,  Emishi,  was  also  killed,  and 
with  them  the  glory  of  the  Soga  vanished. 

Thus  ended  the  interesting  period  of  history  in  which  active 
relations,  first  with  Korea,  and  then  with  China,  began  to  produce 
in  Japan  a  direct,  profound  effect  upon  her  society  and  politics. 
Agents  of  the  advanced  civilization  were  liberally  introduced,  and, 
in  the  midst  of  this  process,  a  grave  crisis  which  was  about  to  over- 
come the  central  institutions  of  the  state  system  was  averted  only 
by  an  anomalous  act  of  a  few  patriots.  It  was  these  latter  who  in- 
augurated in  the  next  period  the  grand  work  of  reconstructing 
the  entire  system  of  government  and  administration  after  the  pat- 
tern of  Chinese  institutions.  The  continental  civilization  in  all  its 
refinement  was  then  even  more  eagerly  studied  around  the  capital 
than  before,  while  the  country  at  large,  under  the  unforeseen  effects 
of  these  artificial  reforms,  passed  gradually  into  a  still  later  period 
of  her  history.  Before  taking  up  the  story  of  the  reform  period, 
we  as  usual  subjoin  a  table  of  the  sovereigns  of  the  period  which 
has  been  under  review  in  this  chapter. 


KOREA     AND     CHINA  21 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE  OF  SOVEREIGNS. 

14.  Emperor  Chuai,  192-270  a.  d.  (including  the  69  years  of  the  regency  of  Empress 

Jingo-kogo). 

15.  Emperor  Ojin,  270-313. 

I 

16.  Emperor  Nintoku,  313-400. 

I 

17.  Emperor  Richu, — 18.  Emperor  Hansho, — 19.  Emperor  Inkyo, 

400-405.                          405-4".                           4H-453- 
I  m I 

Prince  Ichinobe  Oshiiwa.     20.  Emperor  Anko, — 21.  Emperor  Yuryaku, 
I  453-456.  456-480. 

I  I 

22.  Emperor  Seinei. 
23.  Emperor  Kenso, — 24.  Emperor  Ninken,  488-499  480-485. 

485-488.  I 

25.  Emperor  Buretsu,  499-507. 
(Emperor  Ojin.) 

I 
(Emperor  Nintoku.) — Prince  Wakamikenofutamata. 

J 

Prince  Ohito. 

Prince  Hikouishi. 
26.  Emperor  Keitai,  507-534. 


27.  Emperor  Ankan, — 28.  Emperor  Senkwa, — 29.  Emperor  Kimmei,  540-572. 
534-536. 536-540 j 

30.  Emperor  Bidatsu, — 31.  Emperor  Yomei, — 32.  Emperor   Susun, — 33.  Empress 
572-586.  586-588.  588-591-  Suiko,  591-629. 

Prince  Oshisakahiko-nushibito. 


34.  Emperor  Shomei,  629-642. — Prince  Chinu. 

I 
35.  Empress  Kokyoku,  642-645. 


Chapter    IV 

THE   TAIKWA  REFORM.    645-708  A.  D. 

IT  was  in  the  year  645  a.  d.  that  a  small  league  of  supporters 
of  the  imperial  institutions,  under  the  leadership  of  two  true 
statesmen,  Prince  Naka-no-6ye  and  Nakatomi-no-Kamatari, 
overthrew  the  disloyal  family  of  Soga.  For  the  first  time  in 
Japanese  history,  the  Chinese  system  of  year-periods  was  adopted, 
and  the  name  Taikwa  ("Great  Change")  was  applied  to  the 
period  which  began  with  this  year.  No  more  appropriate  name 
could  be  invented,  for  the  reforms  henceforth  introduced,  known  in 
history  as  the  Taikwa  reformation,  were  of  such  a  sweeping  char- 
acter as  to  transform  within  a  few  years  all  the  fundamental  in- 
stitutions of  the  central  and  local  administration.  The  model 
of  the  changes  was  found  in  the  system  of  politics  and  society  of 
China,  which  had  lately  come  under  the  sway  of  the  dynasty  of 
T'ang,  the  centralized  government  and  refined  civilization  of  which 
had  excited  emulation  in  the  minds  of  the  Japanese  reformers.  The 
memorable  year  645  a.  d.  thus  marks  the  beginning  of  the  exhaus- 
tive reformation  which  was  completed  only  after  fifty-six  years, 
extending  over  the  reigns  of  six  sovereigns,  for  it  was  not  till  701 
that  the  celebrated  Taiho  code  of  laws  brought  the  work  of  state 
reorganization  to  a  close. 

It  would  hardly  be  necessary  for  us  to  study  the  reforms  in 
detail,  which  brought  profound  changes  upon  nearly  all  the  fea- 
tures of  national  life.  The  central  institution  of  the  new  state  may 
be  said  to  be  the  land  system.  Formerly,  noble  families  abused  the 
influence  of  their  position  and  extended  their  territorial  estates  so 
greatly  that  the  commoner  was  in  a  state  of  perpetual  eviction. 
Between  the  rich  and  the  poor  had  grown  a  widening  gap.  Now 
the  reformers,  after  their  Chinese  model,  boldly  confiscated  to  the 
state  all  the  landed  estates  of  private  individuals,  which  they  then 
allotted  equally  among  all  the  people  above  the  age  of  six  at  the 
rate  of  two  tan  for  a  male  and  one  and  one-third  tan  for  a  female 

22 


THE     REFORM  23 

645-708 

(a  cho,  or  10  tan,  at  the  time  being  approximately  equal  to  two 
acres),  subject  to  a  redistribution  at  every  sixth  year.  Naturally 
neither  the  periodical  redistribution  nor  the  system  of  equal  allot- 
ment itself  could  be  long  maintained,  but  the  notion  that  the  owner- 
ship of  land  was  ultimately  vested  in  the  state  was  not  abandoned 
until  the  present  reign,  when  the  people  of  all  classes  were  at  last 
allowed  to  own  land. 

The  economic  and  financial  unit  of  the  nation  being  thus  de- 
fined, it  was  also  provided  that  a  national  census  should  be  re- 
turned at  a  fixed  period.  New  taxes  were  of  three  kinds,  the  prin- 
cipal one,  called  so,  being  levied  upon  land.  The  method  of  its 
assessment  was  to  fix  the  annual  produce  of  two  tan  of  rice  land 
at  ioo  sheaves,  8  of  which — 4  large  and  4  small — were  taken  as 
tax,  or,  roughly,  five  per  cent,  of  the  gross  produce.  Of  the  other 
two  kinds  of  taxes  one  was  called  yd  and  the  other  cho.  The  for- 
mer may  be  regarded  as  a  species  of  corvee.  After  a  man  attained 
the  age  of  twenty-one  he  was  required  to  perform  ten  days'  public 
work  annually,  which  service,  however,  he  was  at  liberty  to  com- 
mute for  one  piece  of  cloth  (mtno).  The  cho  was  levied  on  silk, 
fish,  cloth,  and  generally  speaking  on  objects  produced  or  obtained 
in  considerable  quantities.  The  proceeds  of  the  rice-tax  were  ap- 
plied to  defray  the  expenses  of  local  administration,  while  the 
outlay  of  the  central  government  was  met  by  the  proceeds  of  the 
two  other  taxes,  yd  and  cho. 

As  regards  local  administration,  the  old  names  of  local  divi- 
sions, kuni  (provinces)  and  kori  (districts),  were  retained,  while 
towns,  sato,  were  organized  generally  by  grouping  together  fifty 
houses  under  a  town-head.  Along  the  principal  roads  relays  of 
post  horses  were  maintained  for  public  service,  and  every  person 
traveling  in  the  interior  was  required  by  law  to  carry  a  hand-bell 
and  a  document  similar  to  a  passport.  At  important  places 
guard-houses  were  established,  with  duly  appointed  lookouts  and 
garrisons  for  preserving  order.  Government  business  was  trans- 
acted in  the  provinces  under  the  control  of  officials  collectively 
called  kokushi,  and  in  the  districts  under  that  of  gunshi.  The 
former  set  of  officers  were  appointed  by  the  central  government 
from  among  the  nobler  families,  while  the  latter  seem  to  have  been 
largely  supplied  by  the  descendants  of  old  local  magnates.  In  those 
days  the  empire  comprised  58  kuni,  over  500  kori,  and  about  13,000 
sato,  but  subsequent  changes  resulted  in  66  kuni  and  more  than 


24  JAPAN 

645-708 

700  kori,  which  numbers  continued  till  the  beginning  of  the  pres- 
ent reign. 

Finally,  as  to  the  central  government,  its  ultimate  control  was 
vested  in  the  hands  of  three  principal  officials,  namely,  the  minis- 
ters of  the  left,  of  the  right,  and  of  the  interior ;  but  this  organiza- 
tion subsequently  underwent  considerable  modification.  The  eight 
departments  of  administration  were  Department  of  Records 
(Nakatsukasa) ,  Department  of  Ceremonies  (Shikibu),  Depart- 
ment of  Administration  (Jibu),  Department  of  Home  Affairs 
(Mimbu),  Department  of  Military  Affairs  (Hydbu),  Department 
of  Justice  (Kyobu),  Department  of  Finance  (Okura),  and  Depart- 
ment of  the  Imperial  Household  (Kunai).  Each  was  comprised 
of  three  bureaus,  between  which  the  functions  of  the  department 
were  distributed.  Over  and  above  the  eight  departments  stood  the 
two  highest  offices,  grand  council  (Daijo-kwan)  and  religious  rites 
(Jingi-kwan) . 

The  administrative  organization  having  been  thus  determined, 
steps  were  taken  to  make  suitable  selection  of  personnel  for  the 
various  official  posts,  and  in  connection  with  this  a  body  of  rules 
was  compiled,  fixing  the  ranks  of  officials  of  all  kinds.  The  sys- 
tem of  selection  by  merit  was  in  this  manner  substituted  for  that 
of  hereditary  succession.  But  the  change  did  not  find  complete 
expression  in  practice,  for  noble  families,  though  nominally  de- 
prived of  exclusive  official  privileges,  still  benefited  by  the  con- 
servatism of  custom.  Various  ranks  of  officials  were  minutely 
graded,  and  rigidly  marked  by  means  of  the  colors  of  garments 
and  head-gear  or  by  patents,  but  these  insignia  underwent  subse- 
quent changes  in  minor  details. 

Such,  in  brief,  were  the  principal  features  of  the  Taikwa  re- 
forms. The  government,  however,  did  not  confine  itself  to  the 
realm  of  enactment,  for  instructions  of  an  admonitory  character 
were  issued  with  a  view  to  improving  the  manners  and  customs  of 
the  agricultural  classes.  Diligence  in  the  pursuit  of  their  occupa- 
tions, economy,  integrity,  exclusion  of  mercenary  motives  from 
contracts  of  marriage,  simplicity  of  funeral  rites,  persistence  in 
habits  of  industry  even  during  periods  of  mourning — such  were 
the  virtues  recommended  to  farmers  by  official  proclamation.  At 
the  same  time,  in  order  to  establish  contact  between  the  ruling 
classes  and  the  ruled,  boxes  were  set  up  at  various  places  wherein 


THE     REFORM  25 

645-708 

the  people  were  invited  to  deposit  any  statement  of  grievances  from 
which  they  suffered,  and  it  was  provided  that  a  man  who  desired 
to  bring  a  complaint  speedily  to  the  notice  of  the  authorities  should 
ring  a  bell  hung  in  a  public  building. 

On  the  decease  of  the  Emperor  Kotoku,  after  a  reign  of  ten 
years,  the  previous  empress,  Kokyoku,  reassumed  the  scepter 
under  the  name  of  Saimei.  This  was  the  first  instance  of  a  sov- 
ereign occupying  the  throne  twice.  Prince  Naka-no-6ye,  who 
throughout  both  reigns  had  remained  heir-apparent,  succeeded  the 
Empress  Saimei  under  the  name  of  Tenchi.  This  sovereign,  who 
before  ascending  the  throne  had  greatly  distinguished  himself,  is 
not  noted  for  any  conspicuous  deeds  while  in  possession  of  the 
scepter.  Throughout  his  reign  the  country  enjoyed  profound  in- 
ternal tranquillity.  Its  foreign  affairs,  however,  assumed  a  com- 
plexion worthy  of  special  notice. 

Since  the  conquest  of  southern  Korea,  which  tradition  attri- 
butes to  the  Empress  Jingo,  its  kingdoms  not  only  rendered  tributes 
of  valuable  articles,  but  also  conferred  no  small  benefit  on  their  suze- 
rain by  contributing  to  the  latter's  material  and  moral  civilization. 
Nevertheless,  the  interval  that  separated  the  two  countries  made 
communication  difficult,  and  although  Japan  established  a  branch 
government  in  Korea  at  a  place  called  Mimana,  the  Koreans,  rely- 
ing upon  the  distance  of  the  latter  from  headquarters,  frequently 
acted  in  a  rebellious  manner.  During  an  interval  of  460  years 
after  the  legendary  invasion  of  the  Empress  Jingo,  no  less  than 
thirty  instances  are  recorded  when  the  Koreans  either  failed  to 
send  tribute,  insulted  Japanese  envoys,  or  broke  into  open  revolt. 
On  every  occasion  Japan  sent  embassies  to  demand  explanation 
and  redress,  or  reasserted  her  supremacy  by  force  of  arms. 
Shiragi,  which  in  those  days  stood  at  the  head  of  the  districts  into 
which  Korea  was  divided,  rose  in  562  against  Mimana  and  suc- 
ceeded in  expelling  the  Japanese  officials  and  obtaining  possession 
of  the  place.  This  disaster  weighed  greatly  on  the  mind  of  the 
Emperor  Kimmei,  whose  last  behest  uttered  on  his  deathbed  was 
that  Mimana  should  be  recovered.  A  great  army  was  accordingly 
sent  against  Shiragi,  but  success  did  not  attend  the  Japanese  arms. 
Not  only  was  it  found  impossible  to  reduce  Shiragi,  but  even  the 
maintenance  of  the  local  government  at  Mimana  proved  a  task 
beyond  the  military  strength  of  the  time.     Thenceforth  the  recov- 


26  JAPAN 

645-708 

ery  of  Mimana  became  an  object  upon  which  Japan's  attention  was 
ever  concentrated.  When  in  618  China  fell  under  the  powerful 
sway  of  the  T'ang  dynasty,  the  people  of  Shiragi,  relying  on  Chi- 
nese assistance,  conceived  the  project  of  bringing  under  their  rule 
the  neighboring  district  of  Kudara.  Reduced  to  extremities, 
Kudara  in  660  sent  envoys  to  seek  succor  from  Japan.  After 
considerable  discussion,  the  Japanese  Government  resolved  to  under- 
take an  expedition  against  Shiragi  on  a  large  scale.  Great  prepara- 
tions were  set  on  foot.  The  sovereign  himself  proceeded  to 
Tsukushi  and  oversaw  the  dispatch  thence  of  a  fleet  of  a  hundred 
war  vessels  under  the  command  of  Azumi-no-Hirafu,  whose  in- 
structions were  to  attack  Shiragi  and  rescue  Kudara.  But  the 
latter  was  found  to  be  in  a  helpless  condition.  Invaded  simul- 
taneously by  the  forces  of  China  and  Shiragi,  it  was  also  torn  by 
internal  dissensions,  and  could  not  cooperate  in  any  effective  man- 
ner with  the  Japanese  navy,  which  consequently  withdrew,  leaving 
Kudara  to  its  inevitable  fate.  The  final  fall  of  Kudara  occurred 
in  670,  and  a  few  years  later  the  third  Korean  district  of  Koma 
was  also  defeated  by  China.  Shiragi  subsequently  sent  occasional 
tribute  to  Japan,  but  was  never  afterward  included  in  the  Japanese 
dominions.  The  Emperor  Tenchi,  reviewing  the  history  of  his 
country's  relations  with  Korea,  seems  to  have  arrived  at  the  defi- 
nite conclusion  that  the  wisest  policy  was  on  the  side  of  abandon- 
ing all  idea  of  recovering  Kudara,  and  devoting  Japan's  energies 
solely  to  organizing  measures  of  defense  against  foreign  attack. 
He  accordingly  adopted  every  possible  means  of  promoting  mili- 
tary efficiency.  It  should  be  remembered  that  Japan  had  not  only 
lavished  money  and  blood  for  Korea,  but  also  had  outlived  the 
days  when  the  civilizing  influence  of  the  continent  had  to  come  by 
way  of  the  peninsula  and  had  already  been  in  communication 
with  the  source  of  enlightenment,  China.  It  was  during  the 
reign  of  the  same  Emperor  Tenchi  that  China  sent  an  envoy  to 
the  court  of  Japan,  and  the  latter  country  dispatched  an  embassy 
in  return,  so  that  the  two  empires  were  brought  into  more  friendly 
relations  than  before. 

If,  however,  the  extent  of  the  Japanese  dominions  suffered 
reduction  in  the  west,  it  in  the  meantime  received  an  increment  in 
the  north  by  the  subjection  of  some  recalcitrant  tribes.  It  will  be 
recalled  that  the  uprising  of  these  people,  called  Emishi,  or  Ebtsu, 
had  been  suppressed  by  Prince  Yamato-dake,  but  further  north  in 


X    -=    ~ 


j=  2 


E  ~  I 


re  H 


Z     E 


5  2  3  c 

—     .  u 

t-  £    >  ■«  1) 

re  re  u 

J*  a*  a  s 

*<    u         re 

13  £  $ 

■5     St"     «  id 

J  .S  „  £  2 

4i    u  re 

re       "C    p 

.re    £    re    2  o 


c  e  u 

«4-l  J= 


c    <   o  £ 

h    B  .E   o 


w    t>  "re 


~       -; 


.      JS  £     «     0> 

3   .5     3   T3     =.    0 


H   « 


o    t>    re    0    c 
>,  .c    t>  T3    re 


THE     REFORM  27 

645-708 

the  island  of  Ezo,  the  present  Hokkaido,  the  imperial  sway  received 
only  partial  acknowledgment.  There  the  Emishi  not  only  were 
restless,  but  also  generally  had  the  sympathy  and  support  of  their 
kinsmen  across  the  waters,  just  as  in  earlier  times,  the  Kumaso,  the 
autochthons  of  Kiushu,  habitually  espoused  the  cause  of  Korea  in 
any  conflict  between  the  latter  and  Japan.  The  government  al- 
ways found  itself  compelled  to  undertake  a  dual  campaign  in  times 
of  trouble  with  the  island  on  the  north  or  with  the  peninsula  on 
the  west.  Because  of  these  difficulties  forts  were  built,  about  650, 
at  Nutari  and  Iwafune  in  Echigo,  and  garrisoned  by  the  people  of 
that  province  and  of  Shinano,  for  the  purpose  of  holding  the  abo- 
rigines of  Ezo  in  control.  The  unsettled  condition  of  these  outlying 
districts  may  be  further  inferred  from  an  enactment  contemporane- 
ous with  the  great  Taikwa  reforms.  For  whereas  a  general  interdict 
was  then  issued  against  unauthorized  possession  of  arms  and  armor 
by  private  persons,  dwellers  in  the  remote  parts  of  the  east  were 
exempted  from  this  prohibition  on  the  ground  of  their  liability  to 
attack. 

During  the  years  658-660,  in  the  Empress  Saimei's  reign, 
Abe-no-Hirafu,  a  distinguished  governor  of  the  Koshi  provinces 
(Echigo  and  Uzen),  conducted  successful  campaigns  against  the 
autochthons  of  Ezo,  breaking  their  power  and  destroying  their 
vessels  of  war,  and  finally  invaded  Manchuria  at  the  head  of  a 
force  composed  of  subjugated  Emishi,  and  cut  off  the  source  from 
which  insurgents  had  usually  derived  succor.  The  result  of  this 
campaign  was  that  the  Emishi  were,  for  the  most  part,  brought  into 
subjection,  and  functionaries  called  Gunryo  were  posted  at  Shiribe- 
shi  in  the  northern  island.  Frequent  insurrections,  however,  fol- 
lowed, and  finally  it  was  found  necessary  to  build  the  castles  of  Taga 
and  Akita,  where  strong  forces  of  soldiers  were  maintained  to  pre- 
serve order. 

A  few  expeditions  on  a  large  scale  were  also  organized 
against  them  under  the  command  of  generalissimos  (shogun) 
upon  whom  the  duty  of  guarding  the  northern  and  eastern  marches 
devolved,  but  it  was  not  until  796,  during  the  reign  of  the  Emperor 
Kwammu,  that  these  autochthons  were  effectually  brought  into 
subjection.  The  campaign  against  them  at  that  time  was  directed 
by  a  renowned  captain,  Sakanoue-no-Tamuramaro,  who,  at  the 
head  of  a  great  army,  penetrated  to  the  limits  of  the  rebellious  dis- 
tricts, slaughtering  all  who  refused  to  surrender.     This  general's 


28  JAPAN 

645-708 

exploits  were  second  only  to  those  of  his  predecessor  Abe-no- 
Hirafu.  Not  only  was  the  sway  of  the  imperial  court  thus  ex- 
tended to  the  east  and  north,  but  in  the  south  also  various  islands — 
Tokuara,  Tane,  Yaku,  Amami,  Toku,  and  others — lying  off  the 
coasts  of  Satsuma  and  Osumi,  were  added  to  the  Japanese  do- 
minions. 

Let  us  now  see  what  important  incidents  took  place  during 
this  time  around  the  person  of  the  sovereign.  In  the  third  year 
of  the  Emperor  Tenchi's  reign,  670,  the  celebrated  statesman 
of  the  Taikwa  reformation,  Nakatomi-no-Kamatari  died.  He 
had  been  raised  to  the  position  of  lord  keeper  of  the  privy 
seal,  and  had  received  the  family  name  of  Fujiwara,  in  recog- 
nition of  his  meritorious  services.  Kamatari  was  a  man  of 
thorough  loyalty  and  integrity.  His  zeal  in  the  emperor's  service 
was  unflagging,  and  he  showed  great  ability  in  framing  useful  laws 
and  regulations,  so  that,  after  his  decease,  people  spoke  of  him  as  a 
model  of  fidelity.  Two  years  later  the  emperor  himself,  formally 
the  leader  of  the  reforms  since  645,  died,  leaving  behind  him 
a  reputation  for  good  government  which  was  held  in  so  grateful 
a  remembrance  that  when  more  than  a  century  later  the  Emperor 
Kwammu  promulgated  a  law  dispensing  with  the  observance  of 
religious  ceremonies  on  the  anniversaries  of  the  deaths  of  sover- 
eigns deceased  at  remote  periods,  public  sentiment  caused  the 
Emperor  Tenchi  to  be  excepted  from  the  general  rule.  Yet  he  had 
scarcely  been  laid  to  rest  when  a  serious  disturbance  took  place 
with  reference  to  his  successor.  In  accordance  with  the  rule  of 
primogeniture  followed  in  Japan,  the  scepter  was  bequeathed  to  the 
eldest  prince  of  the  blood  with  almost  unvarying  regularity  during 
the  thirteen  generations  from  Jimmu  to  Seimu;  and  throughout 
the  thirty-two  generations  from  Jimmu  to  Sujun  no  woman  held 
the  scepter,  for  although  Jingo  held  regency  for  sixty-nine  years, 
she  was  never  invested  with  the  dignity  of  the  title  of  sov- 
ereign. 

The  accession  of  the  Empress  Suiko  was  due  to  exceptional  cir- 
cumstances, and  did  not  mark  a  recognized  departure  from  the  old 
rule.  Subsequently,  however,  not  a  few  instances  occurred  of  the 
scepter  falling  into  the  hands  of  an  uncle  or  niece  of  a  deceased 
emperor,  and  on  these  occasions  more  or  less  disquiet  accompanied 
the  event.  But  no  disturbance  connected  with  such  a  cause  at- 
tained anything  like  the  dimensions  of  the  trouble  that  followed 


THE     REFORM 


29 


645-708 

Tenchi's  death.1  On  the  occasion  of  the  emperor's  visit  to  Tsukushi 
to  make  arrangements  for  the  invasion  of  Korea,  he  entrusted  the 
administration  of  affairs  during  his  absence  to  his  younger  brother, 
Prince  Oama,  and  caused  the  heir  apparent,  Prince  Otomo,  to  ac- 
company him  to  Tsukushi.  Otomo,  though  young  in  years,  had 
already  given  evidence  of  great  capacity  and  was  exceptionally 
learned.  The  sovereign  entertained  a  strong  affection  for  him, 
and  after  returning  from  Tsukushi  raised  him  to  the  position  of 
prime  minister.  On  the  other  hand,  the  relations  between  the 
emperor  and  his  brother,  Prince  Oama,  were  for  some  unknown 
reason  inharmonious.  When  the  emperor,  perceiving  the  dan- 
gerous character  of  his  malady,  would  fain  have  entrusted  the 
administration  of  affairs  after  his  death  to  Oama,  the  latter  pre- 
tending ill  health  declined  the  responsibility.  The  prince  imperial 
was  consequently  proclaimed  successor  to  the  throne,  and  Oama 
took  the  priestly  order  and  retired  to  Mount  Yoshino,  partly  for 
the  purpose  of  praying  for  the  soul  of  the  deceased  emperor,  but 
partly  also  to  dispel  the  suspicion  with  which  the  public  regarded 
his  acts.  None  the  less,  it  was  the  common  talk  of  the  time  that 
Oama's  retirement  to  Yoshino  was  as  "  the  letting  loose  of  a  tiger 
on  a  moor."  Twice  did  the  ministers  of  state  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  Prince  Otomo,  but  rivalry  and  evil  feeling  continued 
to  grow  between  the  partisans  of  the  new  sovereign  and  those  of 

1  The  following  is  a  brief  genealogical  table  of  the  sovereigns  of  this  period 
of  disputed  successions : 

30.  Emperor  Bitatsu. — (Prince  Oshisakahikohito) . 


— 34.  Emperor  Jomyo. — 38.  Emperor  Tenchi. — (41.  Empress  Jito,     consort  of 

the  40th  emperor,  Temmu). 


—  (43.  Empress  Gemmyo,  mother  of  the  42d  em- 
peror Mommu). 
—39.  Emperor  Kobun. 
— (Prince  Shiki). — 49.  Emperor  Konin. 


40.  Emperor  Temmu. — (Prince  Kusakabe). 

I 
(Prince  Toneri). — 47.  Emperor  Junnin. 

—(Prince   Chinu.)— 35-  Empress   Kokyoku.— 37.  Empress  Saimei. 


36.  Emperor  Kotoku. 


30  JAPAN 

645-708 

Prince  6ama.  In  the  end  a  state  of  open  hostilities  resulted. 
Prince  Oama,  rapidly  withdrawing  to  the  eastern  provinces,  ob- 
tained possession  of  all  the  strategical  positions,  and  was  followed 
by  large  numbers  of  adherents.  The  emperor  dispatched  an  army 
against  the  insurgents,  and  engagements  took  place  in  Mino,  Omi, 
and  Yamato,  but  on  every  occasion  the  imperial  forces  were  routed, 
and  the  eastern  army  gradually  pushed  on  to  Otsu  in  Shiga.  A 
final  and  desperate  stand  was  made  by  the  emperor's  troops  in  the 
Seta  district,  but  the  battle  ended  in  their  total  defeat,  and  the 
sovereign  himself,  escaping  from  the  field,  perished  by  his  own 
hand  at  the  age  of  twenty-five,  after  a  reign  of  only  eight  months. 
This  emperor  is  known  in  history  as  Kobun.  Prince  Oama  suc- 
ceeded to  the  throne  under  the  name  of  Temmu.  He  had  obtained 
the  scepter  under  questionable  circumstances,  but  as  a  ruler  he 
showed  high  qualities,  carrying  on  the  administration  with  zeal 
and  ability.  He  dispatched  inspectors  to  all  districts  throughout 
the  realm  in  order  to  acquire  full  knowledge  of  local  affairs,  and 
raised  the  military  establishment  to  a  state  of  high  efficiency.  On 
his  death  a  princess,  daughter  of  Tenchi  and  sister  of  Kobun,  suc- 
ceeded to  the  throne  as  the  Empress  Jito.  In  the  third  year  of 
her  reign  the  heir  apparent,  Prince  Kusakabe,  died.  The  empress 
convoked  a  council  of  all  the  high  dignitaries  of  state  to  determine 
a  successor  to  the  prince,  but  they  could  not  come  to  any  agree- 
ment until  Prince  Kadono  advanced  the  principle  that  when  neither 
son  nor  grandson  was  available  to  succeed  to  the  throne,  the  scep- 
ter should  pass  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  sovereign  in  due 
order,  since  by  no  other  means  could  disputes  be  avoided.  The 
outcome  was  that  Karu,  son  of  the  late  Prince  Kusakabe,  was  pro- 
claimed heir  apparent.  He  subsequently  ascended  the  throne  as 
the  Emperor  Mommu,  well  known  in  history  for  his  ability  and 
the  codification  under  his  direction  of  the  laws  of  the  Taiho  period.2 

2  Chronological  table  of  sovereigns. 

36.  Emperor  Kotoku,  645-655.  39.  Emperor  Kobun,  672-673. 

37.  Empress  Saimei,  655-668.  40.  Emperor  Temmu,  673-690. 

38.  Emperor  Tenchi,  668-672.  41.  Empress  Jito,  690-697. 

42.  Emperor  Mommu,  697-708. 


Chapter  V 

THE  NARA  EPOCH.     710-794  A.  D. 

IN  708  a.  D.  the  Empress  Gemmyo  ascended  the  throne  and  two 
years  later  the  seat  of  government,  which  had  hitherto  moved 
from  place  to  place,  was  fixed  at  Nara  in  the  province  of  Yam- 
ato.  The  imperial  palace,  as  well  as  the  left  and  right  halves  of  the 
city,  were  built  with  much  state,  the  place  being  thenceforth  known 
in  Chinese  style  as  Heijo  ("  castle  of  tranquillity  ").  The  interval 
of  seventy-five  years' from  that  date,  comprising  the  reigns  of  seven 
successive  sovereigns,  is  called  in  history  the  "  Nara  epoch,"  an 
epoch  worthy  of  special  reference  for  its  great  prosperity  and  re- 
finement. Under  the  sway  of  the  emperors  Tenchi  and  Temmu 
the  power  of  the  throne  had  already  increased  considerably,  and  it 
was  further  enhanced  by  the  ability  of  Mommu  and  his  immediate 
successors,  no  little  assistance  being  derived  from  the  royal  princes 
who  occupied  the  highest  posts  in  the  administration  with  con- 
spicuous talent.  Side  by  side  with  the  growth  of  the  power  of  the 
crown,  the  influence  of  the  Fujiwara  family,  descendants  of  Kama- 
tair,  also  steadily  advanced,  until,  as  will  be  seen  later,  they  came 
to  overshadow  the  real  authority  of  the  sovereign.  This,  how- 
ever, had  not  yet  become  noticeable  during  the  earlier  years  of 
the  Nara  epoch,  when  the  emperor  was  in  theory  and  in  prac- 
tice at  the  apex  of  the  grand  centralized  system  of  government 
inaugurated  by  the  Taikwa  reformation. 

Among  the  events  of  this  period,  none  is  more  worthy  of  note 
than  the  marked  spread  of  Buddhism.  This  result  may  be  at- 
tributed, first,  to  the  loyal  faith  of  the  imperial  court,  and,  secondly, 
to  the  exertions  of  priests  of  high  talent  who  labored  in  the  cause 
of  their  creed  with  remarkable  zeal  and  tact.  Ever  since  the  days 
of  the  Emperor  Kimmei,  when  Buddhism  was  brought  to  Japan, 
its  progress  had  been  sure  and  strong,  despite  all  opposition,  until 
there  came  a  time  when  the  Emperor  Temmu  went  so  far  as  to 
order  that  every  private  house  should  have  an  altar  for  the  wor- 
ship of  the  Buddha.  Subsequent  sovereigns  caused  the  canons  to 
be  copied  and  images  to  be  made  for  all  the  provinces  of  the  realm ; 

31 


82  JAPAN 

710-724 

and  the  Emperor  Shomu  supplemented  those  measures  by  an  edict 
requiring  that  provincial  temples  (kokubunji)  should  everywhere 
be  built  for  priests  and  nuns.  The  ruling  classes  contributed  lib- 
erally to  the  support  of  these  places  of  worship,  it  being  generally 
believed  that  by  such  means  individual  prosperity  and  national 
tranquillity  could  be  secured.  A  huge  image  of  Buddha,  fifty-three 
feet  high,  was  cast  of  copper  and  gold,  which  survives  to  this  day 
in  the  temple  where  it  was  originally  placed,  the  Totai-ji,  at  Nara. 

It  is  on  record  that  Shomu  himself  adopted  the  tonsure  and 
took  a  Buddhist  appellation.  The  mother  of  that  sovereign, 
Miyako,  and  his  consort,  Komyo, — both  daughters  of  Fujiwara 
Fubito, — were  most  zealous  devotees  of  Buddhism,  and  with  their 
cooperation  the  sovereign  established  in  the  capital  an  asylum  for 
the  support  of  the  destitute,  and  a  charity  hospital,  where  the  poor 
received  medical  treatment  and  drugs  gratis.  Measures  were 
also  taken  to  rescue  foundlings,  and  in  general  to  relieve  poverty 
and  distress.  Tradition  tells  us  that  the  empress  cared  for  the  sick 
to  the  number  of  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine.  The  thousandth  pa- 
tient was  a  miserable  old  man  who  asked  her  to  suck  pus  from  the 
ulcerated  sores  of  his  skin.  As  she  cheerfully  acceded  to  his  wish, 
he  was  transfigured  into  a  Buddha,  and  ascended  into  the  air,  bless- 
ing the  imperial  devotee  whose  faith  he  had  come  to  test.  Among 
the  great  subjects  we  also  find  instances  such  as  those  of  Kamartari 
and  Fuhito,  of  whom  the  former,  though  a  minister  of  the  court, 
built  a  temple  and  made  his  eldest  son  take  orders,  and  the  latter 
erected  the  temple  of  Kofuku-ji  and  endowed  it  as  the  place  of 
worship  of  the  Fujiwara  family.  Among  the  priests  of  high  rank, 
one  whose  name  has  been  transmitted  to  posterity  was  Gyogi. 

He  became  famous  in  the  reign  of  the  Empress  Gensho,1  and 
having  won  the  confidence  and  respect  of  the  next  sovereign,  Shomu, 
he  attained  the  rank  of  Daisojo  (archbishop)  and  was  subsequently 
worshiped  as  a  saint  under  the  title  of  "  Bosatsu."  It  was  by  this 
prelate  that  the  doctrine  of  successive  incarnations  of  the  Buddha 
was  first  enunciated,  a  doctrine  whose  skillful  application  greatly 
served  the  cause  of  Buddhism.     For  though  the  creed  obtained 

1  Chronological  table  of  the  sovereigns  of  the  Nara  Epoch. 

43.  Empress  Gemmyo,  708-715.  46.  Empress  Koken,  749-759. 

44.  Empress  Gensho,  715-724.  47.  Emperor  Junnin,  759-765. 

45.  Emperor  Shomu,  724-749.  48.  Emperor  Shotoku,  765-770. 

49.  Emperor  Konin,  770-782. 


NARAEPOCH  33 

710-794 

such  influence  and  success  in  the  times  now  under  consideration, 
its  universal  acceptance  by  the  people  encountered  a  strong  ob- 
stacle in  their  traditional  belief  that  the  Shintd  deities,  not  Buddha, 
had  founded  the  state,  bequeathed  its  scepter  to  their  posterity,  and 
prescribed  a  creed  with  which  the  very  existence  of  the  nation  was 
bound  up.  This  difficulty,  however,  the  Buddhist  priests  adroitly 
met  by  the  aid  of  the  doctrine  that  Gyogi  taught.  The  goddess 
Amateras.u  had  been  only  an  incarnation  of  Birushanabutsu,  and 
all  the  deities  of  the  land  were  but  the  Buddha  himself  in  various 
human  forms.  By  this  skillful  reasoning  they  dispelled  the  in- 
herited prejudices  of  the  people  and  gave  a  great  impulse  to  the 
spread  of  their  creed.  Gyogi,  Dosho,  Ryoben,  and  others  acquired 
notable  influence  with  the  masses,  and,  aided  by  their  pupils, 
preached  in  such  manner  as  to  popularize  Buddhism  throughout 
the  land.  About  this  era,  also,  many  priests  came  to  Japan  from 
China.  It  would  appear,  nevertheless,  that  side  by  side  with  the 
spread  of  Buddhist  conviction  the  doctrine  of  fate  and  fortune  was 
taught  and  the  necessity  of  vows  and  penances  inculcated,  to  the 
delusion  and  demoralization  of  ignorant  folks.  In  every  direction 
priestly  sway  made  itself  felt,  even  the  imperial  court  being  largely 
under  the  influence  of  Gembo,  Dokyo,  and  their  following. 

A  notable  factor  in  the  development  of  material  prosperity 
at  that  epoch  was  the  extraordinary  ability  of  the  priests.  Many 
of  them  made  voyages  to  China  to  study  the  arts  and  sciences  of 
that  empire,  and  on  their  return  traveled  up  and  down  the  land, 
opening  regions  hitherto  left  barren,  building  temples,  repairing 
and  extending  roads,  bridging  rivers,  establishing  ferries,  digging 
ponds,  canals,  and  wells,  and  encouraging  navigation,  thus  con- 
tributing as  much  to  the  material  civilization  of  the  country  as  to 
the  moral  improvement  of  the  people.  It  may  be  truly  said  that 
the  spread  of  Buddhism  was  synchronous  with  the  rise  of  art  and 
science.  Carpenters,  from  the  practice  acquired  in  building  tem- 
ples, learned  how  to  construct  large  edifices;  sculptors  and  metal- 
lurgists became  skillful  by  casting  and  graving  idols  of  gold  and 
bronze;  painting,  decorative  weaving,  the  ornamentation  of  uten- 
sils, and  the  illumination  of  missals,  owe  their  expert  pursuit  to 
the  patronage  of  Buddhism ;  the  first  real  impetus  given  to  the  pot- 
ter's art  is  associated  with  the  name  of  a  priest;  in  short,  almost 
every  branch  of  industrial  and  artistic  development  owes  some- 
thing to  the  influence  of  the  creed.    In  a  storehouse  forming  part 


34  JAPAN 

710-794 

of  the  Totai-ji,  and  in  the  temple  of  Horiu,  both  at  Nara,  there  are 
preserved  a  number  of  household  utensils,  objects  of  apparel, 
musical  instruments,  and  so  forth,  handed  down  from  the  Nara 
epoch,  every  one  of  which  bears  witness  to  a  refined  and  artistic 
civilization,  not  surpassed  by  succeeding  generations.  Among 
glyptic  artists  there  have  been  handed  down  from  these  days  the 
names  of  men  famous  for  their  skill  in  sculpturing  images,  two  of 
whom  were  called  "  Kasuga  "  after  the  place  where  they  lived,  and 
were  held  in  the  highest  honor.  It  is  true  that  architecture,  sculp- 
ture, dyeing,  and  weaving,  introduced  originally  from  China  and 
Korea,  had  long  been  practiced  with  considerable  success,  but  dur- 
ing the  Nara  epoch  these  arts  were  in  the  hands  of  men  celebrated 
then  and  subsequently  for  their  proficiency.  The  same  may  be  said 
also  of  the  arts  of  the  lacquerer  and  the  sword-smith,  which  at  that 
time  were  carried  far  beyond  ancient  standards  of  achievement. 
It  is  further  worthy  of  note  that  the  methods  of  manufacturing 
glass  and  soap  were  known  in  the  eighth  century.  Nara  and  its 
temples,  remaining  outside  the  range  of  battles  and  the  reach  of 
conflagrations,  have  escaped  the  destructions  that  periodically  over- 
took other  imperial  capitals,  so  that  those  who  visit  the  place  to-day 
can  see  objects  of  fine  and  useful  arts  more  than  a  thousand 
years  old. 

Simultaneously  with  the  progress  thus  made  in  art  and  in- 
dustry, learning  received  a  great  impetus.  The  Emperor  Tenchi 
was  the  first  to  appoint  officials  charged  with  educational  func- 
tions. A  university  was  established  in  Kyoto,  as  well  as  public 
schools  in  the  various  localities  throughout  the  provinces.  The 
subjects  chiefly  taught  in  the  university  were  history,  the  Chinese 
Classics,  law,  and  mathematics.  These  were  called  the  shido,  or 
four  paths  of  learning.  In  the  succeeding  reign,  education  con- 
tinued to  receive  powerful  encouragement,  but  the  principal  object 
in  view  being  the  training  of  government  officials,  instruction  for 
the  masses  still  remained  in  an  unsatisfactory  state.  Learning  in 
that  age  virtually  signified  a  knowledge  of  the  Chinese  Classics. 
Hence,  in  the  Nara  epoch,  scholars  versed  in  that  kind  of  erudi- 
tion were  very  numerous,  conspicuous  among  them  being  Awada- 
no-Mahito,  O-no-Yasumaro,  Kibi-no-Makibi  and  others.  Inter- 
course with  China  being  then  tolerably  close,  there  were  frequent 
instances  of  priests  and  students  proceeding  thither  by  order  of 
the  government,  the  former  to  investigate  religious  subjects,  and 


NARA    EPOCH  35 

710-794 

the  latter  to  study  Chinese  literature.  Even  in  China  some  of 
these  men  obtained  a  high  reputation  for  learning.  The  names  of 
Kibi-no-Makibi  and  Abe-no-Nakamaro  are  best  remembered.  The 
former,  on  his  return  to  Japan,  was  appointed  a  minister  of  state, 
but  the  latter  never  saw  his  native  country  again.  Encountering  a 
violent  gale  on  his  homeward  voyage,  he  was  driven  back  to  China, 
where  he  received  an  important  official  position  and  remained  until 
his  death,  constantly  hoping  to  return  to  Japan  but  always  unable 
to  realize  his  hope. 

Japan  in  those  days  possessed  many  scholars  who  could 
write  Chinese  fluently.  The  composition  of  Chinese  poetry  was 
commenced  in  the  reign  of  Kobun,  the  first  book  of  verses 
ever  published  in  Japan — the  "  Kwaifuso  " — making  its  appear- 
ance at  that  time.  It  is  on  record  that,  at  an  earlier  epoch — 
during  the  reign  of  the  Empress  Suiko — Prince  Shotoku,  Soga-no- 
Umako,  and  others,  jointly  compiled  some  historical  works,  which 
were,  however,  almost  totally  destroyed  at  the  time  of  the  over- 
throw of  the  Soga  family.  Subsequently,  the  Emperor  Temmu 
instructed  Prince  Kawashima  and  others  to  write  a  history,  and 
further  directed  Hieda-no-Are  to  dictate  for  transcription  the  annals 
of  the  successive  reigns.  Again,  in  712  a.  dv  O-no-Yasumaro,  by 
command  of  the  Empress  Gemmyo,  compiled  a  history  of  the  em- 
pire from  the  earliest  days  to  the  reign  of  Suiko.  This  work  was 
called  the  "  Kojiki."  A  year  later  the  various  provinces  received 
imperial  instructions  to  prepare  geographical  accounts,  each  of 
itself,  and  these  were  collated  into  the  "  Fudoki"  a  few  of  which 
still  remain.  During  the  next  reign,  the  Empress  Gensho  con- 
tinued this  literary  effort  by  causing  Prince  Toneri  and  others  to 
compile  the  "  Nihongi,"  comprising  a  historical  narrative  from 
the  beginning  of  the  empire  to  the  reign  of  Jito.  In  these  works, 
the  "Kojiki"  and  the  "Nihongi,"  the  most  ancient  traditions  of 
the  country  are  to  be  found.  Shortly  afterward  five  other  chroni- 
cles, known  with  the  "  Nihongi  "  as  the  "  Six  National  Histories," 
were  successively  undertaken,  the  compilation  of  which  continued 
down  to  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Daigo. 

To  the  Japanese  poetry  of  the  Nara  epoch,  however,  must  be 
assigned  the  first  place  among  the  literary  efforts  of  the  time. 
While  Kogen  was  on  the  throne,  Tachibana  Moroye  collected  all 
the  poems  then  extant,  and  these,  being  afterward  supplemented  by 
Otomo-no-Yakamochi,  constitute  the  "  Manyoshu"  a  work  contain- 


36  JAPAN 

710-794 

ing  stanzas  full  of  verve  and  imagination,  simple  yet  by  no  means 
deficient  in  taste.  The  longer  compositions  are  especially  admirable, 
and  have  ever  since  served  as  models  for  writers  of  Japanese  verse. 
Later  generations  considered  the  work  as  a  means  of  studying 
the  ancient  language  of  the  country  prior  to  the  Nara  epoch,  and 
from  it  they  also  derived  a  knowledge  of  the  customs  and  senti- 
ments of  early  times.  Consequently  the  "  Manyoshu,"  together  with 
the  "  Kojiki"  and  the  "  Nihongi,"  came  to  be  regarded  as  most 
precious  sources  of  historical  information. 

The  lavish  patronage  bestowed  upon  Buddhism  and  the  ar- 
tificial wealth  and  refinement  of  the  capital  were  not  without  an 
enervating  effect  upon  the  court.  From  the  latter  part  of  the  eighth 
century  favoritism  and  partisanship  began  to  cause  serious  troubles 
around  the  person  of  the  sovereign,  whose  conduct  was  in  a  meas- 
ure responsible  for  them.  The  story  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  various 
favorites  and  their  cliques  is  too  tedious  to  be  retold,  but  the  case 
of  the  priest  Doky5  deserves  a  brief  notice.  Holding  the  post  of 
palace  prelate  and  enjoying  undue  favor  from  the  empress  dowager, 
Dokyo's  power  assumed  such  proportions  that  the  prime  minister, 
Emi  Oshikazu,  took  up  arms  against  him.  The  latter's  forces 
were,  however,  completely  routed,  his  adherents  exterminated,  and 
he  himself  killed.  With  his  fall,  the  emperor,  who  had  ascended 
the  throne  by  the  influence  of  Oshikazu,  was  exiled  by  the  dowager, 
who  resumed  the  scepter  in  764.  This  was  the  first  instance  of 
an  emperor  being  exiled.  Many  princes  of  the  blood  were  also 
either  banished  with  him  or  killed,  with  the  result  that  the  princely 
adherents  of  the  imperial  house  were  materially  reduced  in  num- 
ber. Thereafter  Dokyo  received  the  posts  of  prime  minister  and 
second  prelate  of  the  realm  (Zenshi),  ultimately  attaining  the 
position  of  first  prelate  (Ho-o).  His  food,  raiment,  and  body- 
guards were  similar  to  those  of  the  emperor,  and  so  great  was  his 
influence  that  the  entire  administration  rested  in  his  hands.  His 
partisans  went  so  far  as  to  say  openly  that  were  the  prime  minister 
made  emperor,  the  realm  would  enjoy  peace.  Profound,  however, 
as  was  the  nation's  belief  in  Buddhism  at  that  epoch,  there  were 
just  men  who  could  not  tamely  endure  such  evil  doings.  Con- 
spicuous among  them  was  the  brave  Wake-no-Kyomaro,  who 
brought  back  from  the  shrine  of  the  Shinto  deity,  Usa-Hachiman, 
an  oracle,  saying:  "The  distinction  of  sovereign  and  subject  is 
fundamental.     Never  may  a  subject  become  emperor.     The  em- 


NARAEPOCH  37 

710-794 

peror  must  always  be  of  the  imperial  line.  Let  the  unrighteous 
subject  who  would  cut  off  the  imperial  succession  be  at  once  re- 
moved." Dokyo  was  much  incensed  by  this  procedure  and  caused 
Kyomaro  to  be  banished.  But  the  oracle  produced  its  effect  on 
the  empress,  who  at  last  repented  of  the  things  that  had  been  done, 
and  all  idea  of  raising  Dokyo  to  the  throne  was  abandoned.  The 
next  year  she  died  and  was  succeeded  by  a  grandson  of  Tenchi, 
the  Emperor  Konin.  At  this  point  the  descendants  of  the  Emperor 
Temmu  ceased  to  hold  the  succession,  and  those  of  the  Emperor 
Tenchi  assumed  it.  Dokyo  was  banished,  and  Kyomaro  was  re- 
called to  court.  Posterity  regards  his  memory  with  almost  religious 
respect. 


Chapter    VI 

THE  HEI-AN  EPOCH.  794-1186  A.  D. 

THE  Nara  epoch  had  come  to  an  end  when  in  794  the  Em- 
peror Kwammu  transferred  the  capital  to  Kyoto.  The 
new  seat  of  government  being  then  known  as  Hei-an  Kyo, 
or  Citadel  of  Tranquillity,  the  interval  that  separated  its  choice  as 
capital  from  the  establishment  of  feudal  administration  at  Kamakura 
in  1 186 — an  interval  of  nearly  four  centuries — is  known  in  history 
as  the  Hei-an  epoch.  A  few  words  may  be  said  about  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  change  of  the  seat  of  government  from  Nara  to  Kyoto. 
From  ancient  times  it  had  been  the  custom  for  the  emperor  and  the 
heir  apparent  to  live  apart,  from  which  fact  it  resulted  that  when  a 
sovereign  died  and  his  son  succeeded  to  the  throne,  the  latter  usually 
transferred  the  capital  to  the  site  of  his  own  palace.  It  some- 
times happened  also  that  the  residence  of  the  imperial  court  was 
altered  as  often  as  two  or  three  times  during  the  same  reign. 
Rarely,  however,  did  the  court  move  out  of  the  contiguous  prov- 
inces known  as  the  Go-kinai,  the  great  majority  of  the  seats  of 
government  being  in  the  province  of  Yamato.  So  long  as  the 
government  was  comparatively  simple,  the  transfer  of  its  seat  from 
place  to  place  involved  no  serious  effort.  As,  however,  the  busi- 
ness of  administration  became  more  complicated,  and  intercourse 
with  China  grew  more  intimate,  the  character  of  the  palace  assumed 
magnificence  proportionate  to  the  imperial  ceremonies  and  national 
receptions  that  had  to  be  held  there.  Hence  the  capital  established 
at  Nara  by  the  Empress  Gemmyo  was  on  a  scale  of  unprecedented 
magnitude  and  splendor.  There  seven  sovereigns  reigned  in  suc- 
cession without  any  thought  of  moving  elsewhere.  But  when  the 
Emperor  Kwammu  assumed  the  reins  of  government,  he  found 
that  Nara  was  not  a  convenient  place  for  administrative  purposes. 
He  at  first  moved  to  Nagaoka  in  Yamashiro,  but  a  brief  residence 
there  convinced  him  that  his  choice  had  not  been  well  guided. 

38 


HEI-AN     EPOCH  39 

794-1186 

At  last,  in  794,  a  new  capital  was  built,  after  the  model  of  Nara, 
with  some  modifications  introduced  from  the  metropolis  of  the 
T'ang  dynasty  in  China,  at  Uda  in  the  same  province.  This  was 
called  Kyoto,  which  means  capital.  It  measured  from  north  to 
south  17,530  feet  and  from  east  to  west  15,080  feet,  the  whole  being 
surrounded  by  moats  and  palisades,  and  the  imperial  palace  being 
situated  in  the  center  of  the  northern  portion.  From  the  southern 
palace  gate  (Shujaku-mon)  to  the  southernmost  city  gate  (Rajo- 
mon)  a  long  street,  280  feet  wide  (called  Shujaku-dji,  or  the  main 
Shujaku  thoroughfare),  extended  in  one  straight  line,  separating 
the  city  into  two  parts,  of  which  the  eastern  was  designated  Sakyo, 
or  the  left  capital,  and  the  western,  Ukyo,  or  the  right  capital. 
The  whole  city,  from  east  to  west,  was  divided  into  nine  districts* 
(jo),  and  between  the  first  and  second  districts  lay  the  imperial 
palace. 

An  elaborate  system  of  subdivision  was  adopted.  The  unit, 
or  ko  (house),  was  a  space  measuring  100  feet  by  50.  Eight 
of  these  units  made  a  row  (gyo)  ;  four  rows,  a  street  (cho)  ;  four 
streets,  a  ho;  four  ho,  a  bo;  and  four  bo,  a  jo.  The  entire  capital 
contained  12 16  cho  and  38,912  houses.  The  streets  lay  parallel  and 
at  right  angles  like  the  lines  on  a  checkerboard.  The  imperial 
citadel  measured  3840  feet  from  east  to  west,  and  4600  feet  from 
north  to  south.  On  each  side  were  three  gates,  and  in  the  middle 
stood  the  emperor's  palace,  surrounded  by  the  buildings  of  the 
various  administrative  departments.  This  citadel  was  environed 
by  double  walls,  and  contained  altogether  seventeen  large  and 
five  small  edifices,  every  one  of  them  picturesque  and  handsome. 

Great  and  fine  as  was  this  metropolis,  it  suffered  such  ravages 
during  the  disturbances  of  succeeding  centuries  that  the  Kyoto  of 
to-day,  the  "  Sakyo,"  or  Western  Capital,  is  but  a  shadow  of  the 
left  section  of  ancient  times.  Not  even  the  imperial  palace  escaped 
these  ravages.  Again  and  again  impaired  or  destroyed  by  con- 
flagrations, it  gradually  assumed  smaller  and  smaller  dimensions 
until  only  a  trace  remained  of  the  splendid  edifice  that  had  once 
stood  in  the  center  of  the  citadel.  But  the  regularity  of  the  streets 
could  not  be  obliterated.  That  at  least  survives  to  tell  the  story 
of  the  plan  on  which  the  city  was  constructed.  Indeed,  Kyoto  con- 
tinued to  be  the  seat  of  sovereigns  for  a  long  period,  covering  1074 
years,  and  until  the  capital  was  removed  in  1869  to  Tokyo. 


40  JAPAN 

794-1186 

In  the  Hei-an  epoch  *  were  accentuated  the  virtues  and  vices 
of  the  Nara  epoch.  Buddhism  now  advanced  to  an  even  greater 
extent  than  it  did  then,  the  luxury  and  pomp  of  the  court  were 
never  excelled  before  or  since,  and  the  control  of  the  administra- 
tive machinery  by  the  Fujiwara  family  became  completed.     The 

1  Table  showing  lineage  and  chronology  of  sovereigns. 

(49.  Emperor  Konin,  770-782.) 

I 

50.  Emperor  Kwammu,  782-806. 


I  .    .  I  I 

SI.  Emperor  Heizei,  52.  Emperor  Saga,         53.  Emperor  Junna, 

806-810.  810-824.  824-834. 

1 
54.  Emperor  Nimmyo,  834-851. 


55.  Emperor  Montoku,  851-856.  58.  Emperor  Koko,  885-893. 

I  I 

56.  Emperor  Seiwa,  856-877.  59.  Emperor  Uda,  893-898. 

I  I 

57.  Emperor  Yozei,  877-885.  60.  Emperor  Daigo,  898-931. 

!_ 

I  ! 

61.  Emperor  Suzaku,  931-947.  62.  Emperor  Murakami,  947-968. 

! 

63.  Emperor  Reizei,  968-970.  64.  Emperor  Enyu,  970-985. 


65.  Emperor  Kwazan,      67.  Emperor  San  jo,    66.  Emperor  Ichijo, 
985-987.  1012-1017.  987-1012. 

I 

I  I 

68.  Emperor  Goichijo,  1017-1037.  69.  Emperor  Gosuzaku,  1037-1046. 


70.  Emperor  Goreizei,  1046-1069.  71.  Emperor  Gosanjo,  1069-1073. 


72.  Emperor  Shirakawa,  1073-1087. 

I 
73.  Emperor  Honkawa,  1087-1109. 

74.  Emperor  Toba,  1109-1124. 

\ 

75-  Emperor  Sutoku,  77.  Emperor  Goshirakawa,  76.  Emperor  Konoye, 

1124-1142.  1156-1159.  1142-1156. 


78.  Emperor  Nijo,   1159-1166.  80.  Emperor  Takakura,   1169-1180. 


79.  Emperor  Rokujo,      81.  Emperor  Antoku,      [82.  Emperor  Gotoba, 
1166-1169.  1180-1186.  1186-1199.] 


HEI-AN     EPOCH  41 

794-1186 

growth  of  the  Buddhist  church  was  in  no  small  measure  due  to 
two  remarkable  priests,  Saicho  and  Kukai,  both  of  whom  studied 
in  China  the  profoundest  doctrines  of  Buddhism  and  gained  for 
themselves  a  great  reputation.  Saicho  founded  the  sect  called 
Tendai,  and  built  the  celebrated  temple  Enryaku-ji,  at  Hiyei-zan, 
to  guarantee  the  imperial  palace  against  maleficent  influences  from 
the  northeast.  Kukai  founded  the  Shingon  sect,  and  built  the  not 
less  famous  temple  of  Kongobu-ji,  at  Koya-san.  Other  new  sects 
were  also  founded  by  other  priests.  The  earlier  teaching  of  the 
identity  of  Buddha  and  the  Shinto  deities  was  further  extended  by 
Saicho  and  Kukai,  who  taught  that  the  Buddha  was  the  one  and 
only  divine  being,  and  that  all  the  gods  were  manifestations  of  him. 
On  that  basis  they  established  a  new  doctrine  the  tenets  of  which 
mingled  Shintoism  and  Buddhism  inextricably.  It  was  owing  to 
the  spread  of  this  doctrine  that  it  became  a  not  uncommon  occurrence 
to  find  Buddhist  relics  in  a  Shinto  shrine,  or  a  Shinto  image  in  a 
Buddhist  temple,  and  the  names  of  Shinto  deities  were  confused 
with  Buddhist  titles.  Buddhist  priests  wandered  everywhere 
throughout  the  land  preaching  their  doctrine  and  founding  temples 
on  choice  sites,  on  high  mountains  or  in  deep  dells. 

To  this  propagandism  music  lent  its  aid,  for  the  melody  of 
the  Buddhist  chants  touched  the  heart  of  the  people.  Devotees 
constantly  grew  in  number.  Many  of  the  highest  personages  in 
the  land  spent  great  sums  upon  the  building  of  temples ;  the  consort 
of  the  Emperor  Saga,  for  example,  constructed  Danrin-ji,  and  the 
Prime  Minister  Michinaga  erected  Hojo-ji.  Even  in  case  of  sick- 
ness, litanies  and  religious  rites  took  the  place  of  medicine  before 
the  science  of  the  latter  had  been  developed,  and  against  all  calami- 
ties of  nature  prayer  was  regarded  as  a  talisman.  It  is  easy  to 
conceive  that,  under  such  circumstances,  Buddhism  came  to  exercise 
greater  sway  than  even  the  ordinances  of  the  sovereign  himself. 
It  should  not  be  imagined,  however,  that  Shinto  was  completely 
forgotten.  Overshadowed  by  Buddhism  as  it  was,  it  did  not  yet  lose 
its  sway.  Thus  we  find  the  Emperor  Saga  dedicating  a  fane  at  the 
Kamo  shrine,  and  the  Emperor  Seiwa  establishing  a  place  for  the 
worship  of  Iwashimizu  Hachiman  at  Otoko-yama.  Imperial  visits 
to  these  two  shrines  were  not  infrequent.  Above  all  at  the  celebrated 
Shingu  shrine  in  Ise,  the  Shinto  rites  were  kept  free  from  all  ad- 
mixture of  extraneous  creeds. 

From  the  days  of  Kwammu  downward,  the  sovereigns  in  sue- 


43  JAPAN 

794-1186 

cession  encouraged  learning.  The  university  in  Kyoto  and  the 
public  schools  in  the  provinces  were  in  a  flourishing  condition,  and 
many  private  schools  sprang  into  existence.  The  patronage  of 
great  nobles  was  munificently  exercised  in  the  cause  of  education. 
Further,  great  numbers  of  students  were  engaged  in  compiling  not 
only  the  history  of  the  empire,  but  also  many  other  works  of  a 
general  character,  so  that  learning  occupied  a  high  place  in  popular 
esteem.  But  unfortunately  the  scholarship  of  the  age  drifted  into 
superficialities  of  style  to  the  neglect  of  practical  uses.  Writers  of 
verses  applied  themselves  to  imitating  Chinese  poets,  and  writers 
of  prose  thought  only  of  constructing  their  phrases  in  such  a 
manner  that  combinations  of  four  ideograms  should  in  regular 
alternation  be  followed  by  combinations  of  six — a  form  of  com- 
position known  as  the  Shirokuheirei  ( f our-and-six  order).  But 
despite  this  slavish  adherence  to  valueless  forms,  a  notable  literary 
achievement  has  to  be  placed  to  the  credit  of  the  era;  namely,  the 
elaboration  of  the  syllabaries,  the  hira-kana  and  the  kata-kana. 
The  first  syllabary  ever  used  in  Japan  had  been  the  manyo-gana,  in 
which  the  Chinese  ideograms  were  used  phonetically  with  little 
attention  to  their  original  meaning.  But  to  write  a  Chinese  ideo- 
gram for  each  syllable  of  a  Japanese  word  involved  much  labor, 
since  in  many  cases  a  single  ideogram  was  composed  of  numerous 
strokes  and  dots.  The  difficulty  was  gradually  lessened  during  the 
Nara  epoch  by  the  simplification  of  Chinese  characters  to  such  an 
extent  that  only  a  rudimentary  skeleton  of  each  ideogram  was 
symbolically  used  to  represent  its  sound.  The  syllables  thus  ob- 
tained were  arranged  in  a  table  of  fifty  sounds,  constituting  the 
kata-kana.  Thenceforth,  instead  of  the  pain  of  committing  to 
memory  thousands  of  ideograms,  and  employing  them  with  no  little 
toil,  it  became  possible  to  record  the  most  complex  thoughts  by  the 
aid  of  fifty  simple  symbols.  Nevertheless,  since  the  nation  had  come 
to  regard  Chinese  literature  as  the  classics  of  learning,  scholars  were 
still  compelled  to  use  Chinese  ideograms  and  to  follow  Chinese 
rules  of  composition,  so  that  the  cursive  forms  of  the  Chinese 
characters  became  the  recognized  script  of  educated  men.  These 
cursive  characters  possessed  one  advantage:  they  were  capable 
of  considerable  abbreviation  within  certain  limits.  Naturally,  the 
facility  they  offered  in  that  respect  was  more  and  more  utilized, 
until  at  length  their  forms  were  modified  to  comparative  simplicity. 
When  the  great  prelate  Kukai  composed,  for  mnemonic  purposes, 


I 


w   ft« 


HEI-ANEPOCH  43 

794-1186 

the  rhyming  syllabary  which  comprised  all  the  necessary  sounds 
without  repetition,  the  forms  of  the  simplified  characters  may  be 
considered  to  have  finally  crystallized  into  the  syllabary  known  as 
the  hira-kana. 

The  invention  of  these  two  systems  of  kana  syllabaries  gave 
a  powerful  impetus  to  the  growth  of  prose  writing.  Many  varie- 
ties of  composition,  fictions,  diaries,  travels,  and  fugitive  sketches, 
were  added  to  the  literature  of  the  time.  But  as  men  who  aspired 
to  the  title  of  scholar  continued  to  write  in  Chinese  ideograms,  the 
domain  of  Japanese  prose  was  occupied,  almost  exclusively,  by 
women.  It  is  recorded  of  the  Emperor  Ichijo  (987-1012  a.  d.) 
that  he  boasted  that,  although  his  own  abilities  did  not  entitle  him 
to  wear  the  crown,  his  reign  was  not  less  rich  in  talented  subjects 
than  had  been  the  reigns  of  even  Daigo  and  Murakami,  historically 
regai  led  as  the  best  sovereigns  of  the  whole  imperial  line.  The 
boast  was  not  unwarranted,  for  in  that  era  flourished  great  writers 
of  both  sexes,  the  charm  and  grace  of  whose  diction  have  been 
vainly  imitated  by  later  generations.  Of  these,  Mura-saki-shikibu 
especially  attracts  attention,  on  account  of  her  celebrated  work,  the 
"  Genji-monogatari,"  a  romance  in  fifty-four  volumes.  Sei-Shona- 
gon's  name  is  remembered  for  her  "  Makura-no-soshi,"  as  peerless 
a  production  in  literary  sketches  as  was  the  "  Genji-monogatari " 
in  fiction. 

Even  more  energy  was  expended  on  the  production  of  verses 
than  on  prose  writing.  In  the  last  part  of  the  ninth  century  after 
almost  a  century  of  the  sway  of  Chinese  poetry,  the  tide  flowed 
once  more  in  the  direction  of  Japanese  verses,  and  they  soon 
engrossed  the  minds  of  the  noble  classes.  Beginning  with  the 
"  Kokinshii"  poems  compiled  by  imperial  order  by  Ki-no-Tsurayuki, 
himself  a  celebrated  poet,  no  less  than  seven  poetical  compilations 
were  made  by  order  of  the  sovereigns  during  the  rest  of  the  Hei-an 
epoch,  to  which  were  still  later  added  others  to  the  number  of  twenty- 
one.  The  art  of  versification  made  a  wonderful  progress,  but  the 
rustic  vigor  and  grandeur  of  the  poems  of  the  "  Manyo-shu  "  gave 
place  to  tricks  of  phraseology  and  flowers  of  speech  in  the  later 
poetry.  Nor  were  poems  with  many  stanzas  approved  any  longer, 
for  it  became  the  pride  of  the  later  poets  to  embody  clever  wit  and 
hidden  charm  in  the  space  of  thirty-one  syllables.  Thus  poetry  was 
stunted,  and  literary  terms  and  the  speech  of  everyday  life  unneces- 
sarily separated  each  from  the  other. 


44  JAPAN 

794-1186 

As  was  so  clearly  reflected  in  poetry,  the  rude  and  unpolished 
but  frugal  and  industrious  habits  of  the  Nara  age  disappeared  as 
the  Hei-an  epoch  grew  older.  Instead  of  vigor  and  simple  strength, 
luxury  and  effeminate  gaud  became  the  fashion.  Society  grew 
more  and  more  enervated  and  self-indulgent.  The  metropolis  was 
the  center  of  magnificence  and  the  focus  of  pleasure.  Reference 
has  already  been  made  to  the  spaciousness  and  grandeur  of  the 
imperial  palace.  The  princes  and  great  nobles  were  scarcely  less 
superbly  housed,  every  aristocratic  dwelling  consisting  of  a  number 
of  artistically  arranged  buildings.  There  had  also  grown  up  among 
nobles  and  men  of  affluence  the  habit  of  choosing  in  the  suburbs 
some  spot  noted  for  scenic  charms,  and  there  building  for  them- 
selves retreats  on  which  all  the  artistic  and  decorative  resources 
of  the  time  were  lavished.  As  for  the  imperial  palace,  however, 
from  the  time  when  it  was  destroyed  by  a  conflagration  (960 
a.  d.),  it  suffered  a  steady  diminution  in  size  and  splendor,  whereas 
the  mansions  of  the  ministers  of  the  crown  grew  constantly  larger 
and  more  magnificent,  their  inmates  wearing  gorgeous  garments 
of  rich  brocades  and  elaborately  embroidered  silks.  Officials,  cour- 
tiers, and  their  families  emulated  one  another  in  the  richness  of 
their  apparel.  When  they  went  abroad,  they  rode  in  carriages 
resplendent  with  gold  and  silver.  By  and  by,  the  active  discharge 
of  official  and  administrative  functions  began  to  be  despised  by  the 
higher  classes,  military  training  and  the  rude  exercises  of  arms 
falling  into  especial  disfavor.  Thus  it  fell  out  that  the  nobles  of 
the  court,  having  abundant  leisure,  were  enabled  to  devote  their 
time  to  literary  culture,  the  elaboration  of  etiquette,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  luxurious  pleasures.  In  the  imperial  court,  at  pleasant  times 
in  the  fair  seasons,  on  fine  spring  mornings  or  under  the  soft  moon- 
light of  autumn,  gatherings  were  held  at  which  the  guests  vied  with 
one  another  in  making  music  and  composing  poetry.  There  were 
also  specially  appointed  festive  occasions:  as,  for  example,  enter- 
tainments in  April  (third  month  of  the  old  calendar)  when  wine- 
cups  were  floated  down  stream;  or  in  February  (first  month  of  the 
old  calendar)  when  young  pines  growing  on  the  hills  or  in  the  fields 
were  pulled  up  by  the  roots;  or  in  the  fall,  to  view  the  changing 
tints  of  the  maples;  the  most  aristocratic  of  all  these  festivities 
being  one  in  which  three  picturesquely-decorated  boats  were 
launched  upon  some  river  or  lake  and  filled  exclusively  with  persons 
who  excelled  in  some  one  of  the  "  three  accomplishments,"  namely, 


HEI-AN     EPOCH  45 

794-1186 

Chinese  poetry,  Japanese  poetry,  or  music.  In  the  reign  of  the 
Emperor  Uda  five  fete  days  were  established:  New  Year's  Day, 
the  third  of  the  third  month,  the  fifth  of  the  fifth  month,  the  seventh 
of  the  seventh  month,  and  the  ninth  of  the  ninth  month ;  to  which 
were  also  added  the  festival  of  the  "late  moonlight"  (13th  of  the 
ninth   month),   and   the   festival   of   "the   last   chysanthemums." 

Of  games  played  in-doors  checkers  (go)  and  a  kind  of  dice 
(sugo-roku)  were  much  in  vogue;  while  the  favorite  outdoor  sports 
were  foot-ball,  polo,  and  hawking,  together  with  horse-racing  and 
equestrian  archery.  At  wine-feasts,  various  kinds  of  songs,  some 
classical,  some  popular,  were  chanted  with  dancing,  and  Chinese 
and  Japanese  stanzas  were  composed  and  sung.  From  the  end  of 
the  eleventh  century  personal  adornment  was  carried  so  far  that 
even  men  began  to  imitate  women  in  the  matter  of  painting  their 
eye-brows  and  blackening  their  teeth,  much  as  though  they  sought 
to  disguise  themselves  in  the  likeness  of  the  puppets  set  up  at  the 
festival  of  the  third  month.  Not  inaptly  did  the  wits  of  the  time 
dub  these  mummers  "  lunar  courtiers,"  or  "  elegants  from  cloud- 
land."  On  such  occasions  of  festival  and  sport,  men  and  women 
of  noble  rank  mixed  freely,  and  laxity  of  morals  ensued.  The 
ceremony  of  marriage  had  been  duly  established,  but  wives  still 
continued  to  live  in  their  own  houses,  where  they  received  the 
visits  of  their  husbands.  In  short,  the  gratification  of  the  senses 
was  the  first  object  of  the  time,  and  if  men  thought  of  anything 
more  serious,  it  was  only  the  building  and  endowment  of  a 
temple  where  prayers  might  be  said  and  litanies  sung  for  the 
prosperity  of  themselves  and  their  children  in  this  world  and  their 
happiness  in  a  future  state. 

All  these  circumstances  should  be  viewed  only  in  conjunction 
with  the  progress  of  the  political  power  of  the  Fujiwara  family.  The 
great  deeds  of  Kamatari  and  the  scarcely  less  distinguished  services 
of  his  son  Fuhito  established  the  renown  of  the  family,  and  in  the 
marriage  of  the  Emperor  Shomu  with  a  daughter  of  Fuhito  we 
have  the  first  instance  of  a  procedure  which  afterward  became  com- 
mon, namely  the  elevation  of  a  subject  to  the  position  of  imperial 
consort.  A  daughter  of  another  Fujiwara,  Fuyutsugu,  became  the 
consort  of  the  Emperor  Nimmyo,  and  bore  him  a  son  who  afterward 
ascended  the  throne  as  Montoku.  Thus  Fuyutsugu  became  the 
reigning  sovereign's  grandfather  on  the  mother's  side,  and  the 
Fujiwara  family  occupied  a  position  of  transcendent  power.     This 


46  JAPAN 

856-893 

emperor  married  the  daughter  of  Yoshifusa,  his  mother's  elder 
brother,  and  had  by  her  a  son,  who  when  only  eight  months  old, 
was  declared  heir  apparent,  and  ascended  the  throne  in  his  ninth 
year  under  the  name  of  Seiwa,  so  that  in  two  succeeding  genera- 
tions one  of  the  sovereign's  grandfathers  was  a  Fujiwara.  Nor 
had  there  been  another  instance  of  the  scepter  coming  into  the 
hands  of  such  a  young  ruler.  From  Yoshifusa,  also,  began  the 
custom  of  appointing  a  Fujiwara  to  the  post  of  dajo  daijin  (chief 
minister  of  state),  a  post  which  not  only  was  the  highest  and  most 
respected  under  the  sovereign,  but  also  as  a  rule  had  been  reserved 
for  an  imperial  prince  of  unusual  virtue  and  ability.  Failing 
such  a  candidate,  it  had  even  been  left  vacant.  Furthermore,  owing 
to  the  extreme  youth  of  the  Emperor  Seiwa,  his  grandfather 
Yoshifusa  was  appointed  regent.  The  title  of  regent  (sessho) 
dates  from  that  time.  The  imperial  authority  now  passed  virtually 
into  the  hands  of  the  Fujiwara  family.  Seiwa  abdicated  after  a 
reign  of  twenty-one  years,  and  was  succeeded  by  Yozei,  then  in  his 
tenth  year  only,  Mototsune,  adopted  son  of  Yoshifusa,  holding  the 
offices  of  chief  minister  of  state  and  regent.  As  the  emperor  grew 
older,  he  became  addicted  to  pleasure  and  gave  evidence  of  vicious 
tendencies. 

Mototsune,  having  taken  counsel  of  all  the  ministers,  de- 
posed the  sovereign  and  placed  Koko  on  the  throne  in  his  stead. 
This  was  the  first  instance  of  an  emperor  being  dethroned  by  a 
subject,  but  evil  as  such  an  act  was  in  itself,  its  motive  in  the  case 
of  Mototsune  being  untainted  by  selfish  ambition,  he  has  not  incurred 
censure  either  from  the  men  of  his  time  or  from  historians.  The 
Emperor  Koko,  being  fifty-six  years  of  age  when  he  ascended  the 
throne,  Mototsune  resigned  the  regency,  but  the  sovereign  was 
pleased  to  make  a  special  rule  that  all  affairs  of  state  should  be  con- 
veyed to  himself  through  the  ex-regent.  The  latter's  office  was 
consequently  called  kwampaku  (signifying  one  who  receives  re- 
ports prior  to  their  transmission  to  the  sovereign),  and  it  became 
thenceforth  customary  to  confer  this  post  on  a  statesman  who  had 
resigned  the  regency.  In  effect,  the  sessho,  or  regent,  was  supposed 
to  manage  the  administration  during  the  minority  of  an  emperor, 
while  the  kwampaku  discharged  the  same  functions  after  the 
sovereign  had  attained  his  majority.  The  difference  became  nom- 
inal when  the  descendants  of  Yoshifusa  and  Mototsune  made  these 
two  posts  permanent  and  hereditary  in  their  line.     It  seemed,  in- 


HEI-AN     EPOCH  47 

893-898 

deed,  as  though  all  the  highest  offices  of  state  had  become  the  exclu- 
sive perquisite  of  that  omnipotent  family,  no  others  being  eligible 
except  princes  of  the  blood.  No  less  marked  were  the  marital  rela- 
tions between  the  imperial  house  and  the  Fujiwara,  for  only  a 
daughter  of  the  latter  could  become  the  sovereign's  consort,  so  that 
every  sovereign  had  a  Fujiwara  for  his  mother. 

The  power  of  the  puissant  family  met  a  temporary  check  under 
the  Emperor  Uda  (893-898),  who  selected  Sugawara-no-Michizane 
as  minister.  Michizane  was  a  descendant  of  Nomi-no-Sukune, 
and  did  not  belong  to  the  Fujiwara  family.  Reputed  for  high 
literary,  calligraphic,  and  artistic  skill,  he  also  possessed  a  profound 
knowledge  of  politics.  It  was  his  fortune  to  manage  all  adminis- 
trative affairs  jointly  with  the  young  and  keen  Tokihira,  son  of 
Fujiwara  Mototsune.  The  Emperor  Uda,  who  took  the  tonsure 
soon  afterward,  left  instructions  to  his  successor  Daigo,  then  a  boy 
of  thirteen,  to  consult  Michizane  in  all  important  affairs  of  the 
state.  Tokihira  filled  the  office  of  minister  of  the  left  (the  highest 
administrative  post  after  that  of  chief  minister  of  state  then  vacant), 
and  Michizane  was  minister  of  the  right.  With  the  exception  of 
Michizane  and  Kibi-no-Makibi,  no  man  of  the  middle  class  had  ever 
held  such  an  important  office.  The  ex-emperor  would  have  had 
Michizane  raised  still  higher,  and  urged  the  reigning  sovereign  in 
that  sense.  But  this  design  precipitated  Tokihira's  resolve  to  con- 
trive the  downfall  of  a  man  whose  great  reputation  with  the  nation 
and  marked  favor  at  court  dimmed  the  prestige  of  the  Fujiwara 
family.  Michizane  was  also  an  object  of  keen  jealousy  to 
Minamoto-no-Hikaru,  a  son  of  the  Emperor  Nimmyo,  who  held  the 
office  of  dainagon  (vice-minister),  as  well  as  to  Fujiwara-no- 
Sadakuni,  who  like  Hikaru,  was  incomparably  superior  to  Michi- 
zane in  lineage,  but  inferior  to  him  in  official  position.  These  men 
conspired  against  Michizane,  and  conveyed  to  the  sovereign  a 
false  charge  that  the  minister  of  the  right  was  plotting  to  depose 
him  and  place  his  younger  brother,  Michizane's  son-in-law,  Prince 
Tokiyo,  on  the  throne.  Daigo  believed  the  accusation,  and  re- 
duced Michizane  to  the  head  of  the  Kiushu  local  government,  a 
position  which  it  had  become  customary  to  fill  with  disgraced 
officials  of  the  imperial  court.  The  order  amounted  in  effect  to 
a  sentence  of  exile.  The  ex-emperor  did  everything  in  his  power  to 
save  Michizane,  but  in  vain.  Hikaru  succeeded  to  the  office  of 
minister  of  the  right.    In  all  this  affair  the  members  of  the  Fujiwara 


48  JAPAN 

898-1037 

family  left  nothing  undone  to  sweep  away  every  obstacle  to  their 
own  supremacy.  Treating  as  opponents  all  that  did  not  take  active 
part  with  them,  they  contrived  to  have  them  involved  in  the  dis- 
grace of  Michizane.  The  exiled  minister  died  after  two  years  of 
banishment.  His  popularity  had  been  so  great  that  the  nation  was 
filled  with  grief  for  his  unmerited  sufferings,  and  when,  after  his 
decease,  the  partisans  of  Tokihira  died  one  after  another,  and  a 
series  of  calamities  occurred  in  the  capital,  people  did  not  hesitate 
to  regard  these  evils  as  retribution  inflicted  by  Heaven  for  the  in- 
justice that  had  been  wrought.  Subsequently  Michizane  received 
the  posthumous  honor  of  the  first  class  of  the  first  rank  and  the 
post  of  chief  minister  of  state,  and  posterity  built  a  shrine  in 
Kitano  to  his  memory,  where  he  is  worshiped  to  this  day  as  the 
tutelary  saint  of  learning,  under  the  canonized  name  of  Kitano- 
no-Tenjin. 

After  the  exile  of  Michizane,  the  power  of  the  Fujiwara  family 
grew  steadily.  During  a  period  of  about  a  century  and  a  half 
after  that  event,  the  administration  was  virtually  in  their  hands. 
Fujiwara-no-Tadahira  occupied  the  post  of  chief  minister  of  state, 
while  his  sons,  Saneyori  and  Morosuke,  held  the  offices  of  minister 
of  the  left  and  minister  of  the  right  respectively,  the  three  highest 
posts  in  the  administration  being  thus  filled  simultaneously  by  a 
father  and  his  two  sons.  Among  the  descendants  of  these  three 
nobles,  those  of  the  last-named,  Morosuke,  attained  the  greatest 
prosperity.  It  has  been  already  noted  that  the  Fujiwara  ministers 
always  contrived  to  have  the  sovereign  choose  his  consort  from 
among  their  daughters.  Nay  more,  when  a  son  was  born  of  such 
a  union,  they  had  him  brought  up  in  their  own  house,  and  when 
he  ascended  the  throne,  the  Fujiwara  minister  who  was  his  grand- 
father became  either  regent  or  kwampaku,  was  recognized  as  the 
head  of  the  Fujiwara  family,  and  received  a  large  grant  of  state 
land.  Under  these  circumstances  the  choice  of  an  imperial  consort 
or  the  nomination  of  an  heir  apparent  being  synonymous  with  the 
acquisition  of  complete  control  over  administrative  and  financial 
affairs,  the  branches  of  the  Fujiwara  family  often  intrigued  and 
fought  among  themselves  to  secure  the  great  prize.  Michinaga, 
youngest  son  of  Kaneiye,  was  a  man  of  remarkable  strength  of 
purpose  and  tact.  He  held  the  office  of  kwampaku  during  the  reigns 
of  three  emperors,  Ichijo,  Sanjo,  and  Goichijo ;  his  three  daughters 
became  the  consorts  of  three  successive  sovereigns;  he  was  grand- 


HEI-AN     EPOCH  49 

1037-1186 

father  of  a  reigning  emperor  and  an  heir  apparent  at  the  same  time, 
and  his  power  and  affluence  far  surpassed  those  of  the  imperial 
house  itself.  To  this  great  noble  every  official  paid  court,  except 
Fujiwara-no-Sanesuke,  who  maintained  his  independence  and  was 
consequently  relied  on  by  the  emperor.  It  is  on  record  that 
Michinaga  once  composed  a  stanza  the  purport  of  which  was  that 
all  the  world  seemed  to  have  been  created  for  his  uses,  and  that 
every  desire  he  felt  was  satisfied  as  completely  as  the  full  moon  is 
perfectly  rounded.  In  truth  the  power  of  the  Fujiwara  family 
culminated  in  his  days.  A  contemporary  writer  described  the  con- 
ditions of  the  time  in  a  work  for  which  he  found  no  title  more  ap- 
propriate than  "  the  Story  of  Grandeur  "  ("  Eigwa  Monogatari"). 
With  Michinaga  the  power  of  the  Fujiwara  may  be  said  to  have 
reached  its  zenith,  for  although  his  sons  Yorimichi  and  Norimichi 
became  kwampaku  in  succession  and  retained  immense  influence, 
the  gradual  decline  of  the  family  really  began  from  that  time. 

Why  the  overwhelming  power  of  the  Fujiwara  should  have 
waned  may  only  be  understood  as  we  observe  the  conditions  of  local 
administration.  Within  Kyoto  reigned  luxury  and  pomp,  but  with- 
out it,  unrest  and  discontentment.  The  principal  cause  of  this 
sharp  contrast  between  the  capital  and  country  was  the  inevitable 
and  utter  failure  of  the  system  of  equal  land  allotment  upon  which 
the  great  Taikwa  reformation  had  been  constructed.  Uncultivated 
lands,  however,  were  suffered  to  remain  in  the  possession  of  local 
officials  and  farmers  who  reclaimed  them.  Originally  the  term  of 
service  for  the  governor  of  a  province  (kuni)  was  fixed  at  four 
years,  but  in  the  reign  of  the  Empress  Koken  it  was  extended  to  six. 
Reappointment  was  generally  an  object  of  keen  desire  to  these 
officials.  They  employed  every  possible  means  to  compass  it,  since 
to  remain  in  administrative  control  of  a  province  for  a  long  period 
signified  opportunities  of  appropriating  extensive  lands  and  ulti- 
mately acquiring  large  territorial  possessions.  In  the  case  of  the 
headman  of  a  district  (kori),  the  office  was  originally  held  for  life, 
but  even  that  limit  soon  fell  into  neglect,  and  the  post  was  handed 
down  from  father  to  son  through  many  generations.  To  check  the 
abuses  arising  out  of  such  a  state  of  affairs,  itinerant  inspectors 
were  appointed  in  the  reign  of  the  Empress  Gensho,  who  were 
chosen  from  among  the  ablest  of  the  provincial  governors.  In  a 
report  addressed  by  one  of  them  to  the  throne  in  762,  it  is  declared 
that  "  No  such  thing  as  justice  is  now  executed  by  any  provincial 


50  JAPAN 

794-1186 

governor  in  the  realm."  From  this  time  on,  provincial  governors 
not  only  continued  to  tread  the  old  wonted  paths,  but  their  selfish 
arbitrariness  became  more  unbridled  in  proportion  as  the  prestige 
of  the  administration  in  the  capital  grew  feebler  and  the  official 
organization  more  lax. 

Nor  was  the  illegal  practice  of  land-appropriation  confined  to 
rural  districts,  for  even  in  the  metropolis  men  began  to  obtain 
territorial  possessions.  As  the  living  in  Kyoto  grew  more  and 
more  luxurious,  and  it  became  difficult  for  the  princes  and  higher 
officials  to  maintain  their  dignity  by  means  of  their  regular  salaries 
and  allowances,  which  were  paid  in  kind  but  seldom  in  land,  they 
set  themselves  to  reclaim  extensive  tracts  of  waste  lands.  Such  lands 
were  called  shoyen,  a  term  originally  limited  to  lands  granted  to 
princes  and  ministers  of  state  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  ex- 
penditures incurred  in  connection  with  their  positions,  but  now 
extended  so  as  to  apply  also  to  land  reclaimed  and  appropriated 
by  these  nobles.  Even  as  early  as  the  reigns  of  Kwammu  and 
Saga  the  area  of  such  estates  was  very  great.  The  system  of 
periodical  redistribution  had  in  the  meantime  fallen  into  desuetude. 
People  were  often  forced  to  sell  their  lands  or  were  evicted  for 
their  debts.  It  was  in  vain  to  prohibit  by  edict  after  edict  the 
monopolization  of  land  by  the  wealthy  classes.  Cunning  people 
even  evaded  the  public  obligations  devolving  on  landowners  by 
nominally  transferring  their  lands  to  powerful  nobles  or  to  temples, 
and  themselves  taking  the  position  of  stewards  or  superintendents. 
In  that  capacity  they  were  called  either  "  intendants "  or  "  re- 
tainers," the  ostensible  holders  of  the  land  being  known  as  "  land- 
lords." By  degrees  all  the  fertile  districts  and  all  the  newly 
reclaimed  lands  were  in  that  manner  absorbed  into  the  estates  of 
the  great  nobles  or  of  the  temples,  and  since  they  were  thus  ex- 
empted from  the  control  of  the  provincial  governors  as  well  as  from 
the  necessity  of  paying  taxes,  not  only  the  power  of  the  local 
authorities,  but  also  the  revenues  of  the  central  government 
gradually  suffered  diminution. 

During  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Kwammu  the  plan  was  in- 
augurated of  reducing  to  the  rank  of  subjects  and  giving  family 
names  to  such  of  the  imperial  princes  as  were  of  inferior  descent 
on  the  mother's  side.  Kwammu's  son,  Saga,  who  had  so  many 
children  that  the  revenue  of  the  imperial  household  did  not  suffice 
to  maintain  them,  followed  the  precedent  established  by  his  father, 


HEI-AN     EPOCH  51 

794-1186 

giving  the  name  Minamoto  to  several  of  his  sons.  Thenceforth 
the  device  passed  into  a  custom,  and  imperial  princes  were  frequently 
appointed  to  official  positions  in  the  central  or  local  government 
under  the  family  names  of  Minamoto  or  Taira.  Those  who  ob- 
tained the  posts  of  provincial  governors  acquired  large  influence  in 
the  districts  administered  by  them,  their  descendants  becoming 
military  chiefs  with  great  followings  of  relatives  and  retainers. 
The  Minamoto  clan  comprised  no  less  than  fourteen  families,  among 
them  the  descendants  of  the  Emperor  Seiwa  being  the  most  numer- 
ous and  important.  It  was  from  this  clan  that  the  great  Yoritomo, 
the  first  feudal  ruler  of  Japan,  subsequently  sprang.  The  Taira, 
on  the  other  hand,  consisted  of  four  families,  principally  descend- 
ants of  the  Emperor  Kwammu.  To  them  belonged  the  notorious 
tyrant  Kiyomori,  of  whose  career  we  shall  soon  be  told. 

The  significance  of  the  rise  of  the  two  clans,  Minamoto  and 
Taira,  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  succeeded  in  gradually  controlling 
the  military  forces  of  the  nation,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other,  holding  a  great  share  of  the  landed  estates  of  the  country. 
The  process  of  land-appropriation  was  similar  to  the  one  already 
described.  The  manner  in  which  the  force  of  arms  passed  from 
the  state  into  the  hands  of  the  private  clans  must  now  be  explained. 
Under  the  elaborate  system  of  the  Taiko  laws,  garrisons  of  fixed 
strength  were  stationed  in  all  the  provinces,  and  in  the  metropolis 
were  guards  of  five  kinds.  Men  for  service  in  the  garrisons  and 
guards  were  levied  by  conscription  from  among  the  people,  those 
upon  whom  the  lot  fell  being  required  to  join  the  nearest  garrison, 
while  a  part  were  sent  to  Kiushu  to  defend  the  western  coast,  and 
another  part,  to  the  guardposts  in  Kyoto.  Equestrian  archery, 
the  use  of  the  sword,  and  the  manipulation  of  long  spears,  were  the 
arts  taught  to  the  soldiers,  and  for  the  defense  of  the  coasts 
catapults  also  were  used.  The  entire  military  organization  was 
imposing  and  complete,  but  its  real  value  was  questionable,  from 
the  beginning.  The  metropolitan  troops  grew  more  and  more  ef- 
feminate as  years  of  peace  succeeded  each  other.  Nor  were  the 
provincial  forces  of  more  service.  As  time  went  by,  bandits  and 
marauders  pillaged  the  provinces  in  the  interior,  while  the  coasts 
of  Nankaido  and  Chugoku  were  infested  by  pirates.  It  was  under 
these  circumstances  that,  early  in  the  ninth  century,  a  new  bureau 
called  the  kebiishi-cho  with  extensive  police  and  administrative 
powers,  was  created  in  Kyoto,  which  soon  began  to  dominate  over 


58  JAPAN 

794-1186 

other  offices  and  whose  branches  were  later  established  in  ever)' 
province  for  local  purposes.  A  century  later  it  was  found  necessary 
to  appoint  inspector-generals,  oryoshi,  for  the  eastern  provinces, 
which  were  particularly  restless.  In  the  hands  of  these  new 
officials,  then, — the  central  and  local  kebiishi  and  the  eastern 
oryoshi, — rested  the  real  powers  which  neither  rank  nor  title  could 
resist.  The  new,  vigorous  clans  of  Minamoto  and  Taira  eagerly 
sought  after  these  offices,  and  succeeded  more  and  more  completely, 
as  time  went  on,  not  only  in  controlling  them,  but  also  in  acquiring 
a  military  influence  far  larger  than  they  at  first  represented. 

As  local  unrest  grew,  people  who  had  armed  themselves 
either  for  defense  or  for  aggrandisement  now  came  with  their  arms 
and  land  under  the  wings  of  the  powerful  clans,  and  became  their 
"  men."  The  leaders  of  the  latter  received  them,  fed  them,  and 
made  with  them  a  personal  contract  of  mutual  loyalty  and  protec- 
tion. Either  with  the  chivalrous  relations  between  master  and 
follower  or  with  the  compact  and  efficient  organization  of  their 
society,  the  outside  world  had  nothing  else  to  compare.  The  feudal 
formation  thus  created  was  bound  to  transfigure  the  organization 
of  the  nation.  The  leaders  who  possessed  large  numbers  of  men 
and  wide  tracts  of  land  were  called  daimyo  ("  great  name  "),  and 
their  followers,  iyenoko  ("servitors")  or  rodo  ("retainers"). 
The  general  name  for  the  man  of  the  sword  was  samurai,  or  "  one 
who  serves."  As  the  military  class  increased  in  numbers,  it  became 
expedient  to  distinguish  one  house  from  another,  and  many  ap- 
pellations were  consequently  formed  by  suffixing  to  the  name  of 
a  clan  the  name  of  the  place  where  the  person  resided  or  of  the 
hereditary  office  which  he  held.  In  this  way  originated  many  of 
the  house  names  now  used  in  Japan.  At  the  same  time,  almost  all 
the  provinces  were  parceled  out  among  the  military  class,  especially 
the  eastern  provinces,  which  were  the  headquarters  of  the 
Minamoto.  It  is  true  that  appointment  of  provincial  governors 
continued  to  be  made,  but  their  functions  were  purely  nominal,  the 
so-called  "  governors  "  often  idly  remaining  in  the  capital.  The 
control  of  local  administration  now  rested  with  the  real  holders  of 
the  land. 

A  few  events  illustrative  of  the  conditions  we  have  described 
may  here  be  cited.  In  939  a  family  of  the  Taira  clan  raised  arms 
in  the  eastern  provinces  against  the  imperial  authority.  Taira-no- 
Takamochi,  a  great-grandson  of  the  Emperor  Kwammu,  had  been 


HEI-ANEPOCH  58 

794-1186 

appointed  vice-governor  of  the  province  of  Kazusa.  There  his 
family  gradually  grew  in  numbers  and  influence,  some  of  them  be- 
coming provincial  governors.  Among  Takamochi's  grandsons 
was  a  daring  but  fierce  soldier,  Masakado.  Though  of  imperial 
descent,  he  obeyed  the  custom  of  the  time,  namely,  that  every 
samurai  must  obtain  a  livelihood  by  entering  the  service  of  the 
Fujiwara.  Masakado  became  a  vassal  of  Fujiwara-no-Tadahira, 
through  whose  influence  he  hoped  to  obtain  the  office  of  kebushi. 
But  his  aspiration  was  not  satisfied,  and  being  incensed  by  failure, 
he  returned  to  the  province  of  Shimosa,  gathered  a  number  of  dis- 
affected warriors  to  his  standard,  and  made  organized  attacks 
upon  the  governors  of  the  neighboring  provinces.  He  established 
his  headquarters  at  Ishii,  in  the  district  of  Sashima,  nominated 
certain  of  his  followers  to  be  officers  of  his  court,  after  the  model 
of  the  governmental  system  of  Kyoto,  and  on  the  strength  of  being 
descended  from  a  sovereign,  proclaimed  himself  emperor.  In  the 
whole  course  of  Japanese  history  this  is  the  only  instance  of  a  re- 
bellion directed  against  the  throne.  Simultaneously  with  this  dis- 
turbance in  the  eastern  provinces,  Fujiwara-no-Sumitomo,  who 
held  the  third  post  in  the  government  of  Iyo  province  in  the  island 
of  Shikoku,  also  rebelled.  These  two  rebellions  shook  the  whole 
empire.  Yet  the  imperial  court  remained  for  a  long  time  ignorant 
of  the  dangers  that  were  impending.  When  finally  the  news 
reached  Kyoto,  it  caused  much  consternation.  A  general  was 
quickly  dispatched  against  the  rebels  in  the  east,  but  before  his 
arrival  Masakado's  cousin,  Taira-no-Sadamori,  and  Fujiwara-no- 
Hidesato,  the  oryoshi  of  Shimotsuke,  defeated  and  killed  Masa- 
kado. In  the  west,  Sumitomo  was  able  for  a  brief  period  to  retain 
the  ascendency,  but  he  too  was  ultimately  defeated  and  taken 
prisoner  by  Ono-no-Yoshifuru  and  Minamoto-no-Tsunemoto,  who 
had  been  sent  against  him.  Tsunemoto  was  a  grandson  of  the 
Emperor  Seiwa  and  founder  of  the  renowned  clan  of  Minamoto. 
The  precedent  thus  established,  namely,  that  of  one  military  clan 
applying  itself  to  quell  the  rebellion  of  another,  was  followed  in 
after  years,  with  the  inevitable  result  that  the  military  clans  became 
the  chief  factors  in  the  state. 

Ninety  years  later,  Taira-no-Tadatsune,  vice-governor  of  the 
province  of  Kazusa,  forcibly  took  possession  of  the  provinces  of 
Kazusa  and  Shimosa,  but  was  defeated  by  Minamoto-no-Yorinobu, 
a  grandson  of  Tsunemoto.     Soon  afterward  local  chiefs  raised  an 


54.  JAPAN 

794-1186 

insurrection  in  the  remote  northern  province  of  Mutsu,  and  main- 
tained their  authority  for  nine  years.  This  was  followed  soon 
after  by  a  three-year  revolt  of  the  Kiyowara  family,  which  threw 
the  provinces  of  Mutsu  and  Dewa  into  a  state  of  tumult.  These 
troubles  were  quelled,  respectively,  by  Yoriyoshi,  the  son,  and 
Yoshiiye,  the  grandson,  of  Yorinobu.  Thus  the  influence  of  the 
Minamoto  clan  became  paramount  among  the  military  men  of  the 
eastern  provinces. 

All  this  while,  courtiers  and  officials  of  Kyoto  despised  admin- 
istrative duties,  whether  civil  or  military,  so  that  in  the  event  of  a 
disturbance  or  of  a  feud  among  themselves,  they  were  driven  to 
rely  upon  the  military  classes,  thus  involuntarily  but  surely 
strengthening  the  influence  of  the  men  whom  they  professed  to 
contemn.  Although  the  Fujiwara  remained  in  Kyoto  and  filled 
all  the  important  posts  in  the  general  government,  their  sway  was 
only  apparent.  The  reins  of  state  affairs  were  in  reality  held  by 
the  military  classes  dispersed  throughout  the  provinces.  There 
were  also  certain  singular  circumstances  at  court  which  not  only 
hastened  this  revolution,  but  also  brought  the  military  forces  from 
the  provinces  into  a  clash  in  the  streets  of  Kyoto.  These  circum- 
stances, which  we  shall  briefly  describe  below,  were  in  the  main  ow- 
ing to  two  causes,  namely,  the  undue  wealth  and  power  of  the 
Buddhist  priests,  and  the  struggle  for  power  among  different  polit- 
ical factions  in  the  palace.  The  former  was  largely  due  to  the 
devotion  of  the  imperial  house,  particularly  the  Emperor  Shirakawa 
(1073- 1 087),  who  greatly  depleted  the  treasury  by  erecting  thou- 
sands of  temples  and  images,  and  ordering  the  performance  of  rites 
and  the  giving  of  alms  with  unprecedented  profusion.  The  priests, 
who  had  already  grown  rich  and  powerful,  began  to  be  engaged 
in  quarrels  among  themselves  and  with  the  outside  world,  for  which 
purpose  the  greater  monasteries  maintained  considerable  military 
forces. 

These  sacerdotal  soldiers  were  called  sohei.  The  principle  of 
maintaining  them  was  adopted  at  many  temples,  but  nowhere  did 
they  exhibit  such  truculence  as  in  the  case  of  Enryaku-ji  near 
Kyoto.  When  the  lord  high  abbot  of  a  temple  was  appointed,  it 
was  the  custom  that  the  priests  of  the  temple,  if  they  objected  to 
the  appointment,  or  if,  subsequently,  they  had  cause  of  complaint 
against  his  ministration,  should  appeal  to  the  imperial  court  for 
his  removal.     On  such  occasions,  it  became  customary  for  the  com- 


HEI-ANEPOCH  55 

1073-1142 

plainants  to  wear  armor  and  carry  bow  and  spear  when  they  sub- 
mitted their  grievance.  They  did  not  shrink  even  from  attacking 
the  residence  of  the  prime  minister.  During  the  reign  of 
Shirakawa,  the  military  priests  developed  such  lawless  inde- 
pendence that  on  more  than  one  occasion  they  entered  Kyoto  in 
turbulent  force,  dragging  with  them  sacred  cars,  the  sight  of  which 
restrained  the  hand  of  the  martial  defenders  of  the  court.  Not 
only  against  the  government,  but  also  among  themselves,  the  tem- 
ples openly  used  arms  and  caused  bloodshed.  It  was  said  that  there 
were  found  among  these  fighting  priests  men  originally  belonging 
to  the  military  class,  who,  failing  to  obtain  promotion  in  the 
regular  routine  of  feudal  administration,  adopted  the  cowl  as  a 
means  of  working  out  their  ambitious  designs.  This  state  of 
things  aggrieved  the  Emperor  Shirakawa,  but  he  appears  to  have 
been  unable  to  check  it.  On  one  occasion,  lamenting  the  arbitrary 
conduct  of  the  Buddhists,  he  said :  "  There  are  but  three  things  in 
my  dominions  that  do  not  obey  me :  the  waters  of  the  Kamo  River, 
the  dice  of  the  '  sugoroku '  game,  and  the  priests  of  Buddha." 
Finally,  the  sovereign  was  driven  to  invite  the  Minamoto  clan  to 
defend  him  against  the  rebellious  proceedings  of  the  priests,  and 
from  that  time  dates  an  era  of  feuds  between  the  followers  of 
religion  and  those  of  the  sword. 

It  was  the  same  Emperor  Shirakawa  who  instituted  the  pecu- 
liar system  of  the  Camera  administration  (Insei),  which  powerfully 
tended  to  break  down  the  last  remains  of  the  Taikwa  reformation. 
After  a  reign  of  fourteen  years  he  resigned  in  1087,  only  to  retain 
the  administrative  power  in  his  hands,  with  his  special  court  and 
special  ministers.  The  reigning  emperor  and  his  government  had 
few  functions  to  discharge,  as  the  entire  control  of  the  state  affairs 
rested  in  the  Camera  of  the  ex-emperor.  Shirakawa  sat  in  the 
Camera  till  1130,  and  was  succeeded  for  twenty-eight  years  by  the 
ex-Emperor  Toba.  All  this  while  Buddhist  soldiers  behaved  with 
the  greatest  lawlessness,  constantly  disturbing  the  peace  of  the 
capital,  and  the  military  class  simultaneously  became  turbulent  and 
vicious. 

Among  these  scenes  of  tumult  and  violence,  the  court  it- 
self was  torn  by  disputes  and  its  corruption  became  a  subject  of 
public  scandal.  Toba  had  many  female  favorites,  of  whom  Bifuku- 
monin  enjoyed  the  largest  share  of  his  affections.  Being  on  bad 
terms  with  his  eldest  son,  the  reigning  sovereign,  Toba  took  ad- 


56  JAPAN 

1142-1159 

vantage  of  the  birth  of  a  son  by  Bifukumonin  to  bring-  about  the 
abdication  of  the  emperor  and  cause  his  favorite's  child  to  succeed 
to  the  throne  at  the  age  of  two  years.  This  was  the  Emperor 
Konoye.  His  uncle,  Fujiwara-no-Tadamichi,  was  appointed  re- 
gent. The  ex-Emperor  Sutoku,  being  still  young,  was  much  in- 
censed at  having  been  obliged  to  abdicate,  and  when  Konoye  died 
after  a  reign  of  fourteen  years,  Sutoku  desired  ardently  that  his 
son,  Prince  Shigehito,  should  succeed  to  the  throne.  The  Regent 
Tadamichi  had  a  brother  named  Yorinaga,  and  their  father's  partial 
treatment  of  him  had  produced  a  feud  between  the  brothers. 

Yorinaga,  active,  learned,  and  able,  then  held  the  post  of  sec- 
ond minister  of  state,  and  strongly  supported  the  design  of  the  ex- 
Emperor  Sutoku.  Bifukumonin  and  Tadamichi,  on  their  side, 
acting  in  concert  with  Toba,  opposed  the  accession  of  Prince 
Shigehito,  and  alleged  in  objection  that  the  untimely  death  of  the 
late  Emperor  Konoye  had  resulted  from  sorcery  practiced  by 
Sutoku.  The  candidate  to  whom  they  gave  their  support  was 
Goshirakawa,  brother  of  Konoye,  who  was  counted  a  youth  of  in- 
ferior capacity.  Sutoku's  anger  against  these  proceedings  was 
intense.  Being  informed  just  then  of  the  death  of  Toba,  he  pro- 
ceeded to  the  latter's  palace,  but  the  guards  refused  to  admit  him, 
pretending  that  the  deceased  had  desired  his  exclusion.  This  insult 
incensed  Sutoku  beyond  endurance.  Repairing  to  the  residence 
of  Yorinaga,  *he  took  council  with  him,  and  finally,  retiring  to  the 
Shirakawa  palace,  declared 'open  war  against  his  opponents,  being 
bravely  succored  by  Minamoto-no-Tameyoshi,  Taira-no-Tada- 
masa,  and  their  followers.  Bifukumonin  and  Tadamichi  placed 
the  young  Emperor  Goshirakawa  in  the  Higashi  Sanjo  palace. 
They  counted  among  their  chief  allies  Yoshitomo,  the  eldest  son 
of  Tameyoshi,  Minamoto-no-Yorimasa,  and  Kiyorriori,  the  nephew 
of  Tadamasa.  One  sanguinary  engagement  sufficed  to  break  the 
power  of  Sutoku.  He  became  a  priest,  and  was  ultimately  exiled  to 
the  island  of  Sanuki.  Yorinaga  died  of  an  accidentally  inflicted 
arrow-wound,  and  Tameyoshi  and  Tadamasa,  together  with  many 
other  men  of  note,  were  slain.  The  name  of  the  era  being  there- 
after changed  to  Hogen,  this  affair  was  spoken  of  by  posterity  as 
the  Hogen  Insurrection.  The  battle  that  ended  the  long  struggle 
lasted  for  only  one  day,  but  its  character  and  circumstances  can 
never  be  forgotten.  It  was  veritably  an  internecine  fight;  Sutoku 
against  his  brother  Goshirakawa;  Tadamichi  against  his  brother 


J3 

O 
O 

Oh 


CO 


as 
o 

C5 


o 
£ 

Q 


a 


•  S  ^    R 

5  2 
•5  ^  § 
^   5,  .8 

«  ^  a 

•2     5.^ 

^    "R    ^ 

«?^ 

*  J  o 


a  -a 

a  ~ 


■a  ~a 


R 
•ft 


i 


*>  -~r 


3   £ 


R     © 
R    ««; 


-a 

•ft. 


•8   8  -5 


C  CO   .5 


-*.  »-»  ;•• 

«  S     *» 

&  s  a: 

©  - 

■2  Ji 

'*.  -2  ** 

,   *»  v>    © 


^    6 

S 

w  &q 

CO 

e 

0 

V.      5a 

■J 

•  2 

R 

M 

O 

■ 

b      C 

Si    fc 
£    © 

c  ."5 

<o 

0 

* 

5a 

0  •** 

0 

^ 

**   0 
v.    I 

is 

5 

i 
G 


Q  6 


<u     ©     5 

■a    ?;  >» 


3   g  £  ©  « 


a 

R    J 

!l 

CO     r 


^  z 


■*-«      ^» 

"~*      O 

«o  ^-^ 

R     Sj 

*»  -^ 

•**  *^3 

"^3  .. 

R  : 

«   ; 

o  aj 

o 

s  ^ 

«3      fto 


i 

i 


■ft.  j^    .« 


^&5   3 


« 
^ 


5li      .** 

■fc* 


«3 


fc/) 


Q     R 


^   "^     I   ^  ^ 


-S   -R   "S 


5  * 


v»    Si 


.3  "«  I 

h  -^  Si 

Q     «  ~R 

h      R 

^  5.  ^ 

:^"«  "S 

*j      R  » 

•Jh  co  r 


-R  5u 

5o  R 

^  5 

«  Si 


-R      <3 

®     R 

5S     R 


1      R  S 

fe  -2  «> 

•*-  s:  "5 

•~  »<a  ^_ 


-R     * 


<u     R 
R   *S 

.5 


-a 

«R 


N 


•  5 

~a 

0 
.* 

** 

-5 

-5 

5a 

vT 

0 

CO 

I 

4s 

§ 

h 

IS 

O 

■ 

■ 
a 

•5 

0 

■ 

0 

R 

5 

1 

i 

J* 

<<: 

^ 

.^0 

Us 

to 

~R 

•  i2 

14 

5a 
O 

0 

O 

R 

••-« 

■5 

rO 

C 

*m 

•« 

5o 

"C 

5a 
1-3 

>>• 

H 

■ 

O 

•■ — 

3 

S 

.  to 

■**, 

0 

a 

S 

-5 

"ft, 

<^, 

5u 

0 

h 

S| 

.  Si 

<5 

-5 

r^ 

R 

•  'c 

<o 

1 

■ 

1 

CO 

6 

•t 

S 

a 

H 

n 

5a 


»R 


est! 


-a 

s 

R 
R 


^    Si 


-R    75 


X 


=a  >^ 


R     S   *R 
R     o 

**     ^     b^ 


0 


■S     R 

<a 

•a  o 

"S  ^  .s 


0  -R  R 

^  Co  - 

■fc*  •*«  b« 

S3  R  © 

g  S  R 

,10  O  Vi 


"R   .5     *»     R 


■ft 

a"8 


g  ^   -2 

2  ■«  ^ 


■ft. 
B 


c5\   5 


•8  ^ 


a    B    a 


>••**■♦• 


5    £   ** 


>   C    Si    R 


53  ;'«3 


>.    R 


»s  "R 

a  -Si 


r     •ft.     <*; 


B  -S  ^ 

1  w 

H  a  > 

**  B 

"^  w 

•a  "a    o 

**  S  -S 

•*  Q    a 


a 

O      R 


^  S    B  ^ 


?  -S?    S  .52 


W.     -~    JS    -R 


S    ^S     ^     S>      ii      a,     I- 


^ 


•  S3 

~R 


C      R 

a  .5 


«  4  ^  ."S 

Ji    «  l.  « 


HEI-AN     EPOCH  57 

1159-1166 

Yorinaga;  Tameyoshi  against  his  son  Yoshitomo;  Tadamasa 
against  his  nephew  Kiyomori.  Men  spoke  in  after  years  of  this 
unnatural  contest  as  the  battle  that  destroyed  human  relations  and 
ignored  all  the  principles  of  morality. 

The  Hogen  disturbance  had  not  long  been  settled  when  fresh 
troubles  arose.  Among  the  councilors  of  state  at  that  era,  Fuji- 
wara-no-Michinori,  who  had  stood  high  in  the  estimation  of  the 
Emperor  Goshirakawa,  was  a  conspicuously  able  politician.  Even 
after  the  accession  of  the  Emperor  Nijo,  Michinori  continued  to 
enjoy  the  imperial  confidence.  But  he  had  many  enemies.  In  con- 
nection with  some  private  affair  he  had  given  deep  umbrage  to 
Fu j iwara-no-Nobuyori,  an  official  holding  the  office  of  chunagon 
kebushi  (councilor  of  state  and  chief  police  official),  who  had  been 
a  favorite  of  the  Emperor  Goshirakawa  after  the  latter's  abdica- 
tion. Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo  also  was  disaffected.  Believing 
that  his  services  in  the  Hogen  disturbance  had  been  more  meritor- 
ious than  those  of  Taira-no-Kiyomori,  he  nevertheless  saw  the 
latter  rewarded  with  much  greater  liberality;  and  having  offered 
his  own  daughter  in  marriage  to  a  son  of  Michinori,  the  proposal 
had  been  abruptly  declined,  Michinori  choosing  Kiyomori's  daugh- 
ter in  preference.  Nobuyori  and  Yoshitomo  ultimately  raised  the 
standard  of  revolt,  in  the  first  year  of  the  Heiji  era  (1159  a.  d.), 
and  having  secured  the  cooperation  of  the  ex-Emperor  Goshira- 
kawa by  intimidation,  forced  their  way  into  the  palace  and  ob- 
tained possession  of  the  person  of  the  reigning  sovereign.  No- 
buyori then  procured  for  himself  the  posts  of  chief  minister  of  state 
and  generalissimo,  promoted  Yoshitomo,  and  caused  Michinori  jto 
be  put  to  death.  The  revolution  was  short-lived.  Nobuyori  had 
not  administered  the  affairs  of  state  for  ten  days  before  the 
emperor  made  his  escape  to  the  mansion  of  Taira-no-Kiyomori  and 
the  ex-emperor  fled  to  the  temple  Ninnaji.  Thereupon  Kiyomori 
with  his  son  Shigemori  attacked  the  insurgents  and  utterly  routed 
them.  Nobuyori  was  captured  and  slain.  Yoshitomo  succeeded 
in  effecting  his  escape  to  Owari,  but  was  finally  put  to  death  by  the 
Taira  adherents.  All  the  other  leaders  of  the  rebellion  and  those 
who  had  prominently  participated  in  it,  were  exiled.  This  affair 
is  known  as  the  Heiji  Insurrection.  The  power  of  the  Minamoto 
clan  had  been  greatly  broken  in  the  Hogen  disturbance,  when 
Tameyoshi  and  his  followers  fell,  and  the  loss  of  Yoshitomo  and 
his  adherents  in  the  Heiji  trouble  brought  the  great  clan  almost  to 


58  JAPAN 

1166-1169 

complete  ruin.  Among  the  few  of  its  scions  who  survived  was 
Yoritomo,  son  of  Yoshimoto.  He  was  exiled  to  the  eastern 
provinces,  thence  to  emerge  at  a  later  date  and  win  one  of  the 
greatest  names  in  Japanese  history. 

After  the  quelling  of  the  Heiji  disturbance,  the  Taira  family 
attained  preeminent  prosperity  and  power.  The  fortunes  of  this 
great  house  had  been  materially  advanced  by  Tadanori,  a  brave 
and  able  captain,  who  enjoyed  the  favor  of  the  ex-Emperor  Toba. 
His  son  Kiyomori,  also  a  man  of  daring  and  decision,  raised  the 
family's  prestige  still  higher  by  his  services  at  the  Hogen  crisis, 
and  carried  it  to  its  zenith  by  the  conspicuous  ability  of  his  action 
in  the  Heiji  disturbance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rival  family  of 
Minamoto  having  been  reduced  to  insignificance  by  the  death  of  its 
chief,  Yoshitomo,  and  by  the  events  that  immediately  ensued,  the 
whole  military  power  of  the  empire  came  into  the  hands  of  the 
Taira.  Kiyomori  was  promoted  to  the  position  of  gondainagon 
(vice-councilor  of  state),  an  event  that  attracted  much  attention. 
The  Taira  family,  though  of  imperial  lineage,  had  been  looked 
down  upon  by  the  high  court  nobles  on  account  of  its  mili- 
tary career,  and  it  was  considered  a  notable  occurrence  that 
Kiyomori  should  have  been  nominated  to  a  post  of  such  con- 
sequence. This  was,  in  truth,  the  first  instance  of  a  military 
noble's  participation  in  the  administration  of  state  affairs,  and  it 
may  be  regarded  as  the  dawn  of  an  era  when  they  were  to  fall 
entirely  under  military  control. 

A  sister  of  Kiyomori's  wife  bore  a  son  to  the  ex-Emperor 
Goshirakawa.  Kiyomori's  favor  at  court  was  so  great  that  he  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  this  child  named  heir  apparent,  and  he  ultimately 
ascended  the  throne  in  1169  as  the  Emperor  Takakura.  Through- 
out his  reign  the  ex-Emperor  Goshirakawa  was  the  actual  ruler. 
Meanwhile,  Kiyomori  had  steadily  risen  in  imperial  favor,  until  in 
1 167  he  became  chief  minister  of  state.  Shortly  afterward,  how- 
ever, he  resigned  that  post,  and  taking  the  tonsure,  became  a  priest 
under  the  name  of  Jokai.  None  the  less  he  remained  at  his 
previous  place  of  residence,  Rokuhara,  in  Kyoto  attending  to  the 
management  of  state  affairs  as  before.  From  that  time  dates  the 
custom  subsequently  followed  by  the  military  class  of  making 
Rokuhara  the  seat  of  administration. 

When  the  influence  of  Kiyomori  reached  its  zenith,  he  con- 
ceived the  design  of  securing  permanent  official   supremacy   for 


HE1-AN     EPOCH  59 

1169-1180 

himself  and  his  heirs  by  contriving  that  the  consort  of  the  sov- 
ereign should  be  taken  from  his  family,  as  had  been  the  habit  in 
the  case  of  the  Fujiwara.  In  pursuance  of  that  project,  he  induced 
the  emperor  to  marry  his  daughter.  Shigemori,  his  son,  held  the 
important  offices  of  lord  keeper  of  the  privy  seal  and  general- 
issimo of  the  left,  while  almost  the  whole  of  his  kinsmen  and  fol- 
lowers occupied  prominent  positions  in  the  central  and  local 
government.  The  number  of  provinces  over  which  the  sway  of  the 
clan  extended  was  more  than  thirty,  and  it  came  to  be  a  saying  of 
the  time  that  a  person  not  belonging  to  the  Taira  family  was 
no  one.  The  members  of  the  Fujiwara  clan  could  not  compete 
with  those  of  the  Taira.  Even  the  regent,  Motofusa,  and  the 
chief  minister  of  state,  Motomichi,  saw  themselves  reduced  to 
comparative  insignificance.  Naturally  such  conspicuous  ascend- 
ency caused  offense  in  many  quarters,  and  the  Court  Councilor 
Fujiwara-no-Narichika,  a  favorite  official  of  the  ex-Emperor 
Goshirakawa,  in  combination  with  several  others,  elaborated  a  plot 
to  overthrow  the  Taira  sway.  But  the  scheme  was  detected,  and 
it  authors  and  promoters  were  all  put  to  death  by  order  of  Kiyo- 
mori.  Having  been  informed  that  the  ex-emperor  had  counten- 
anced the  plot,  Kiyomori  conceived  for  him  a  strong  hatred,  which 
was  greatly  accentuated  when,  on  the  death  of  the  Taira  chief's 
son  Shigemori,  the  ex-emperor,  after  consultation  with  Motofusa, 
caused  the  estates  of  the  deceased  nobleman  to  be  confiscated.  Too 
haughty  to  brook  such  a  slight  Kiyomori  set  out  from  his  mansion 
at  Fukuhara,  and  entering  Kyoto,  caused  the  ex-emperor  to  be 
seized  and  confined  in  the  Toba  palace,  and  thirty-nine  of  his 
majesty's    high  officials  to  be  dismissed  at  the  same  time. 

Toward  the  reigning  sovereign  the  demeanor  of  the  Taira 
was  so  arrogant  and  his  methods  so  arbitrary,  that  the  emperor 
finally  abdicated  in  favor  of  the  crown  prince,  who  reigned  under 
the  name  of  Antoku.  This  sovereign  was  the  son  of  the  retiring 
emperor  and  his  mother  was  Kiyomori's  daughter,  so  that  the 
Taira  then  stood  toward  the  imperial  house  in  the  same  relation 
as  that  formerly  occupied  by  the  Fujiwara,  with  the  tremendous 
difference,  however,  that  the  former  also  possessed  the  whole 
military  power  of  the  time,  which  gave  them  unprecedented  in- 
fluence and  supremacy.  Nevertheless,  even  among  the  members  of 
a  family  so  puissant,  there  were  to  be  found  some  feeble  nobles  who 
had  no  skill  in  military  exercises  nor  could  boast  any  accomplish- 


60  JAPAN 

1169-1183 

ment  except  the  art  of  composing  stanzas,  playing  on  musical  in- 
struments, or  practicing  some  effeminate  pastime. 

Among  the  members  of  the  Minamoto  family  at  the  time  of 
which  we  write  was  one  Yorimasa,  who,  incensed  by  the  arbitrary 
proceedings  of  the  Taira  officials,  persuaded  Prince  Mochihito,  son 
of  the  ex-Emperor  Goshirakawa  and  brother-in-law  of  the  Em- 
peror Takakura,  to  form  an  alliance  with  the  priests  of  Onjo-ji  and 
Kofuku-ji,  their  object  being  to  expel  Kiyomori  from  court  and  to 
rescue  the  ex-emperor  from  his  confinement  in  the  Toba  palace. 
In  1180,  the  prince  dispatched  Yukiiye,  younger  brother  of  the 
late  Yoshitomo,  to  the  remnants  of  the  Minamoto  in  the  eastern 
provinces,  carrying  an  edict  which  summoned  them  to  rise  and 
overthrow  the  Taira  family.  Fortunately  for  the  latter,  the  plot 
was  discovered  and  at  once  suppressed.  But  the  seed  sown  by  this 
abortive  rebellion  proved  beyond  Kiyomori's  control,  for,  in  the 
same  year,  1180,  the  exile,  Minamoto-no-Yoritomo,  who  was 
destined  to  become  the  founder  of  the  feudal  government  of  Japan, 
raised  a  force  of  troops  in  the  small  island  of  Izu  in  obedience  to  the 
mandate  of  Prince  Mochihito.  Many  partisans  flocked  to  his 
standard  from  Kwanto,  the  former  seat  of  Minamoto  influence. 
Almost  simultaneously,  another  Minamoto  chief,  Yoshinaka,  also 
took  the  field  in  the  prince's  cause,  his  headquarters  being  at  Kiso, 
in  Shinano,  where  he  collected  a  large  body  of  soldiers.  Kiyomori 
lost  no  time  in  dispatching  a  powerful  army  against  the  rebels,  but 
his  forces  suffered  defeat  and  were  driven  back.  Henceforth, 
many  puissant  warriors  of  the  Hokuriku  region  threw  in  their  lot 
with  the  Minamoto,  and  the  force  at  the  latter's  disposal  assumed 
formidable  dimensions.  Even  the  great  temples  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  capital  opened  communications  with  the  insurgents,  which  so 
exasperated  Kiyomori  that  he  reduced  the  temples  to  ashes  and  con- 
fiscated all  their  lands.  These  extreme  measures  served  to  check 
temporarily  the  active  exercise  of  priestly  power,  but  did  not  affect 
the  prestige  of  the  Minamoto,  whose  strength  continued  to  grow 
rapidly.  Kiyomori  finally  saw  himself  compelled  to  relax  the  ex- 
emperor's  confinement,  and  even  to  allow  him  to  resume  an  active 
part  in  the  administration  of  state  affairs.  But  in  the  year  11 82 
the  great  Taira  chief  was  stricken  by  a  fatal  malady,  and  expired 
after  a  brief  illness.  He  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Munemori,  who 
did  not  spare  to  direct  all  the  strength  of  the  clan  against  the 
Minamoto.     But   fortune  shone  on  the  latter's  arms   in  several 


HEI-AN     EPOCH 


61 


1183-1186 

encounters,  until,  in  1183,  Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka  inflicted  a 
signal  defeat  on  the  Taira  forces  in  a  pitched  battle,  and  dividing 
his  own  army  into  two  bodies,  pushed,  via  the  Tosan  and  Hokuriku 
routes,  as  far  as  the  temple  Enryaku-ji  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  Kyoto,  where  he  was  secretly  visited  at  night  by  the  ex-Emperor 
Goshirakawa.  The  Emperor  Antoku  now  fled  westward,  carrying 
with  him  the  three  insignia,  and  escorted  by  Munemori  and  the 
Taira  forces.  The  imperial  train  reached  Dazaifu,  in  Kiushu, 
where  the  Taira  wielded  great  influence.  Munemori  was  joined  by 
all  the  principal  warriors  of  the  locality,  and  being  further  rein- 


forced by  many  others  from  the  island  of  Shikoku,  found  himself 
once  more  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  army.  In  Kyoto,  however, 
another  emperor  was  enthroned,  whose  coronation  was  conducted, 
for  the  first  time  in  Japanese  history,  without  the  transfer  of  the 
insignia.  There  were  thus  two  sovereigns  simultaneously  ruling, 
one  at  Kyoto  and  the  other  in  Kiushu. 

The  forces  of  the  Taira  and  the  Minamoto  fought  many 
battles  in  the  Kiushu  and  Chugoku  districts,  the  gains  and  losses 
being  tolerably  even  on  both  sides.  But  by  degrees  the  military 
magnates  along  the  Sanyo,  Nankai,  and  Saikai  lines  joined  the 
Taira  army,  and  its  strength  became  so  irresistible,  that  it  marched 


62  JAPAN 

1183-1186 

back  toward  Kyoto,  escorting  Antoku.  Thus  the  Taira  saw  them- 
selves once  more  established  at  Fukuhara,  to  which  Kiyomori  had 
for  a  brief  period  removed  the  capital  from  Kyoto.  They  organ- 
ized their  lines  of  defense,  making  Fukuhara  their  base,  and  Ikuta 
and  Ichinotani  their  eastern  and  western  outposts,  respectively. 

Meanwhile  Yoshinaka,  the  Minamoto  leader,  had  become  so 
insolent  as  to  be  imprecated  and  dreaded  by  friend  and  vassal  alike. 
He  also  quarreled  with  Yoritomo,  who  had  hitherto  confined  his 
military  operations  to  the  eastern  provinces,  but  who  now  sent  his 
two  brothers,  Noriyori  and  Yoshitsune,  to  attack  Yoshinaka.  The 
latter  was  defeated  at  Seta  in  Ise,  and  killed  in  the  midst  of 
a  rice-field  by  a  stray  arrow.  The  victors  then  marched  on  in 
triumph  to  Ichinotani  to  attack  the  Taira.  The  first  conflict  was 
successful  for  the  Minamoto.  The  Taira  lost  many  a  stout  soldier. 
Munemori  and  the  remnant  of  his  troops  retreated  to  Yashima,  in 
Sanuki,  continuing  as  before  to  carry  with  them  the  child  emperor, 
Antoku.  Yoshitsune's  forces  pursued  the  retreating  army  to 
Sanuki,  where  a  fierce  fight  ended  in  the  second  defeat  of  the 
Taira.  The  latter  receded  still  further  to  the  bay  of  Dannoura  in 
Nagato.  There  the  decisive  battle  was  fought,  and  for  the  third 
time  the  Taira  were  utterly  routed.  Nearly  all  their  warriors  were 
killed. 

When  the  issue  of  the  battle  had  ceased  to  be  doubtful,  the 
empress-dowager  plunged  into  the  sea  with  the  infant  emperor  in 
her  arms  and  bearing  the  sword  and  seal.  Antoku  was  drowned 
but  the  Minamoto  soldiers  rescued  his  mother.  The  seal  was  after- 
ward recovered  from  the  sea,  but  the  sword,  which  was  itself  a 
copy,  was  irrevocably  lost.  Thenceforth  the  sword  called  Hiru- 
gosa-no-tsurugi  was  employed  for  ceremonial  and  official  purposes. 
The  Taira  chief  Munemori  and  his  son  were  captured  and  subse- 
quently executed.  Thus,  after  some  twenty  years  of  power  and 
prosperity,  the  great  Taira  clan  was  broken  and  destroyed.  Often 
in  subsequent  centuries  men  talked  of  the  meteor-like  rise  of  the 
Taira,  of  the  extraordinary  heights  of  autocracy  and  affluence  to 
which  the  illustrious  family  attained,  and  of  the  terrible  and  tragic 
scenes  that  marked  its  rapid  and  final  fall.  "  The  vain  house  of 
the  Taira  did  not  endure"  (ogoru  Heike  zva  hisashikarazu) ,  is  a 
familiar  Japanese  adage  suggestive  at  once  of  the  moral  import 
of  the  tragedy  and  of  the  swift  and  extreme  vicissitudes  of  fortune 
which  characterized  those  lawless  ages. 


PART    II 

THE  FEUDAL  AGES.     1186-1868 


Chapter  VII 

THE   KAMAKURA   GOVERNMENT.     1 186-1339 

THE  Taira  had  fallen,  and  Minamoto-no-Yoritomo,  one  of 
the  greatest  statesmen  Japan  has  produced,  had  established 
his  headquarters  at  Kamakura,  near  the  present  Tokyo. 
The  influence  of  his  clan  had  for  generations  been  implanted  in  the 
eastern  provinces,  where  the  robust  militarism  stood  in  great  con- 
trast with  the  effeminate  atmosphere  of  Kyoto. 

The  rule  of  Kamakura,  so  far  as  the  feudal  forces  of  the  east 
were  concerned,  was  now  almost  complete,  but  Yoritomo  aspired 
to  the  supreme  military  power  of  the  whole  empire.  Here  in  this 
connection  must  be  related  the  tragic  story  of  his  half-brother 
Yoshitsune,  perhaps  the  most  gallant  and  most  beloved  hero  in 
the  memory  of  the  children  of  Japan.  He  was  a  mere  babe  when 
after  the  Heiji  insurrection,  he  was  captured  with  his  mother 
by  the  Taira  soldiers.  He  would  have  been  killed  by  order  of 
Kiyomori,  had  it  not  been  for  the  intercession  of  the  latter's  mother 
and  for  the  beauty  of  the  young  mother  of  Yoshitsune.  For  the 
sake  of  the  lives  of  her  sons,  the  latter  became  the  concubine  of 
Kiyomori,  whom  she  did  not  love.  The  pathetic  story  still  excites 
feeling  in  the  heart  of  Japanese  womanhood.  Yoshitsune  was  as- 
signed to  a  priestly  career,  but  he  proved  unruly  and  fond  of  the  arts 
of  the  samurai.  Tradition  ascribes  to  the  child  many  a  super- 
human act  of  valor  and  military  skill.  At  length  he  ran  away  to 
the  northern  province  of  Mutsu,  where  he  was  kindly  received  by 
the  great  local  chieftain  Fujiwara-no-Hidehira.  Yoshitsune  grew 
to  be  a  man  of  commanding  genius,  and  his  personal  charm  at- 
tracted to  him  many  loyal  samurai,  the  romantic  careers  of  several 
of  whom  are  still  remembered.  When  Yoritomo  rose  in  1 180  at 
the  mandate  of  the  late  Prince  Mochihito,  Yoshitsune's  oppor- 
tunity came.  After  the  former  had  routed  the  first  large  detach- 
ment of  the  Taira  forces,  a  young  man  with  a  large  head  but  of 
small   stature   was   announced   to   him,    and   Yoritomo    at   once 

65 


66  JAPAN 

1186-1189 

recognized  his  long  forgotten  brother  Yoshitsune,  whose  coining, 
he  said,  was  to  him  more  reassuring  than  the  addition  of  a  million 
warrors. 

Henceforth  Yoritomo's  brilliant  victories  were  largely  ow- 
ing to  the  generalship  of  his  brother.  But  no  sooner  had  the 
latter  destroyed  the  remnants  of  the  Minamoto's  enemy  than  his 
own  safety  was  endangered  by  his  very  success,  for  Yoritomo  grew 
jealous  of  his  great  renown  and  popularity.  As  Yoshitsune 
escorted  the  captive  chief  of  the  Taira  clan,  Munemori,  to  Kama- 
kura,  he  not  only  received  no  recognition  for  his  achievements,  but 
also  was  refused  admission  to  the  presence  of  his  brother.  There 
were  not  lacking  men  around  the  latter  to  contrive  the  down- 
fall of  the  great  general.  Shortly  afterward  Yoritomo  sent  to 
Kyoto  a  man  of  proved  valor  and  strength,  Tosabo  Shoshun,  with 
orders  to  destroy  Yoshitsune,  but  Tosabd  himself  fell  under  Yoshi- 
tsune's  sword  in  the  attempt.  Thereafter  Yukiiye,  Yoshitsune's 
uncle,  induced  the  ex-emperor  to  authorize  them  to  put  down  Yori- 
tomo. But  Yoritomo  addressed  himself  to  the  ex-emperor  with  such 
persuasion  that  an  imperial  mandate  was  issued  to  all  the  provincial 
authorities  ordering  them  to  arrest  Yoshitsune  and  Yukiiye. 
Yoritomo  thereupon  dispatched  Hojo  Tokimasa  to  Kyoto  to  quell 
the  partisans  and  restore  order  in  the  capital.  Yukiiye  was  sub- 
sequently killed  in  the  province  of  Izumi,  but  Yoshitsune  escaped 
to  his  friend  Fujiwara-no-Hidehira  in  Mutsu.  The  latter,  however, 
died  soon  afterward,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Yasuhira, 
who  received  from  Yoritomo  orders  to  kill  the  fugitive.  So  great 
and  far-reaching  was  the  authority  of  the  Minamoto  chief  at  that 
time  that  Yasuhira  had  no  choice  but  to  comply  with  the  mandate. 
He  caused  Yoshitsune  to  be  put  to  death,  and  sent  his  head  to 
Kamakura.  Tradition  has,  however,  been  reluctant  to  admit  so 
ignominious  an  end  to  the  hero,  who,  it  says,  effected  his  escape 
to  the  island  of  Ezo  (Hokkaido)  and  thence  to  the  continent,  where 
he  became  a  great  prince  over  nomadic  tribes.  Nor  did  Yasuhira' s 
treachery  bring  fortune  upon  himself,  for  Yoritomo,  already 
desirous  to  bring  Mutsu  under  his  direct  rule,  pretended  to  believe 
that  Yasuhira  had  been  unduly  slow  in  destroying  his  rebellious 
brother,  and,  in  1189,  led  in  person  a  large  army,  which  succeeded 
in  a  brief  time  in  killing  Yasuhira  and  subduing  the  great 
provinces  of  Mutsu  and  Dewa. 

In  the  next  year,  Yoritomo  repaired  to  Kyoto  and  had  his  first 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT 


67 


1189-1191 

audience  of  the  emperor  and  the  ex-emperor.1  The  latter  treated 
him  with  great  consideration,  and  after  the  lapse  of  a  year  con- 
ferred upon  him  the  title  of  seii-taishogun,  or  generalissimo,  which 
has  since  been  the  customary  title  of  the  feudal  overlord  of  Japan. 
Let  us  here  describe  the  feudal  government  organized  by  Yori- 
tomo  at  Kamakura — the  first  attempt  of  like  kind  in  the  history  of 
Japan — and  observe  how  different  it  was  from  the  elaborate  system 
of  the  centralized  government  which  was  first  organized  in  645  and 
later  transferred  to  Kyoto.  One  of  the  first  steps  taken  by  the 
Minamoto  chief  to  consolidate  his  power  was  to  establish  the  re- 
lation of  lord  and  vassal  between  himself  and  the  great  local 
magnates  of  the  eastern  provinces  who  had  espoused  his  cause, 
and  to  secure  their  allegiance  by  confirming  them  in  the  possession 
of  their  estates.  For  the  better  organization  of  his  military  forces 
he  created  an  office  called  samurai-dokoro,  a  species  of  head- 
quarter staff  department,  which  was  presided  over  by  Wada 
Yoshimori  in  the  capacity  of  betto.  Thus  all  the  military  men 
throughout  the  east  were  brought  completely  under  his  sway. 
Later   he   created   a   department   of   public   archives    (kumonjo), 

1  Table  showing  lineage  and  chronology  of  sovereigns. 
[80.  Emperor  Takakura,  1169-1180.] 


[81.  Emperor  Antoku, 
1 180- 1 186.] 


Gotakakura. 


82.  Emperor  Gotoba, 
1 186- 1 199. 


86.  Emperor  Gohorikawa,      84.  Emperor  Juntoku,      83.  Emperor  Tsuchimikado, 
1222-1233.  1211-1222.  1199-1211. 


87.  Emperor  Shi  jo, 
1233-1243. 


85.  Emperor  Chiikyo, 
1222 


Emperor  Gosaga, 
1243-1247. 


00.  Emperor  Kameyama,  1266-1276. 

I 
91.  Emperor  Gouda,  1276-1288. 


89.  Emperor  Gofukakusa,   1247-1266. 


96.  Emperor  Godaigo,         94.  Emperor  Gonijo,  92.  Emperor  Fushimi, 

I3I9-I339-  1301-1308.  1288-1299. 


95-  Emperor  Hanazono,   1308-1319. 


93.  Emperor  Gofushimi,   1299- 1301. 


68  JAPAN 

1191-1200 

and  made  Oye  Hiromoto  its  minister,  and  Nakahara  Chi- 
kayoshi  its  vice-minister,  both  of  whom  were  originally  civil- 
ians at  Kyoto.  It  was  owing-  to  Yoritomo's  sagacity  that  they 
had  been  induced  to  enter  the  service  of  the  military  government 
at  Kamakura.  By  this  department  the  administration  of  civil 
affairs  was  chiefly  conducted,  as  was  the  administration  of  military 
affairs  by  the  staff  department  (samnrai-dokoro) .  A  department 
of  justice  (monchu-jo)  was  also  organized  with  Miyoshi  Yasun- 
obu,  another  civilian,  at  its  head,  its  functions  being  the  hearing  of 
all  civil  suits,  and  the  management  of  matters  relating  to  civil  law. 

Thenceforward  down  to  the  days  of  the  Ashikaga,  the  descend- 
ants of  the  three  statesmen  from  Kyoto  continued  to  direct  the  ad- 
ministration of  affairs  at  Kamakura.  By  1184,  the  organization  of 
Yoritomo's  central  government  (bakufu)  was  complete,  but  the 
local  administration  had  still  to  be  elaborated.  Advantage  was 
taken  of  the  general  disorder  that  still  existed  throughout  the  land, 
owing  to  the  disturbance  caused  by  the  remnants  of  the  Taira 
party  and  by  the  followers  of  Yukiiye  and  Yoshitsune.  On 
the  advice  of  Oye  Hiromoto,  Yoritomo  made  such  strong  repre- 
sentations to  the  ex-emperor  that  the  latter  sanctioned  the  appoint- 
ment of  high  constables  (shugo)  in  the  various  provinces  and 
superintendents  (jito)  of  the  great  estates,  the  whole  being  under 
the  control  of  the  shogun  himself.  By  the  energy  of  these  officials 
numbers  of  the  insurgents  were  arrested  in  different  localities,  and 
order  was  everywhere  restored.  Furthermore,  an  edict  was  issued 
requiring  that  all  cultivators  of  land  throughout  the  empire  should 
without  distinction  contribute  to  the  military  exchequer  a  tax  at  the 
rate  of  five  sho  (.256  bushels)  of  grain  per  tan  (one- fourth  of  an 
acre).  Thenceforth  the  power  of  the  former  provincial  governors 
and  headmen  gradually  declined,  and  the  authority  of  the  newly 
appointed  high  constables  and  superintendents  increased  propor- 
tionally. The  shogun,  of  course,  took  care  that  the  occupants  of 
the  new  offices  should  be  chosen  from  among  his  own  relatives  and 
partisans,  so  that  his  sway  was  eventually  consolidated  everywhere, 
and  the  control  of  the  empire  virtually  passed  into  his  hands. 

Yoritomo  died  in  1200  at  the  age  of  fifty-three,  his  eldest 
son,  Yoriiye,  succeeding  to  the  title  of  generalissimo.  But  Yoriiye 
being  only  eighteen  years  of  age,  and  having  given  no  evi- 
dence of  ability,  his  mother,  Masako,  commissioned  her  own 
father  Hojo  Tokimasa,  together  with  twelve  councilors,  to  assume 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT  69 

1200-1219 

the  direction  of  the  government  at  Kamakura.  From  this  time 
began  the  dark  age  of  Kamakura,  in  which  unbridled  ambition 
ignored  all  restraints  of  propriety.  When  the  young  Yoriiye 
fell  ill  in  1203,  his  mother,  acting  in  concert  with  Tokimasa, 
planned  to  relieve  him  of  his  office  of  generalissimo,  and  to  appoint 
his  son  Ichihata  to  be  lord  and  governor  general  of  the  twenty- 
eight  eastern  provinces  forming  Kwanto,  and  his  young  brother 
Chihata — afterward  called  Sanetomo — to  be  lord  of  the  thirty- 
eight  western  provinces  forming  Kwansei.  This  plot  so  incensed 
Yoriiye  that  the  latter,  with  his  wife's  father,  Hiki  Yoshikazu, 
planned  means  to  exterminate  the  Hojo  family.  Tokimasa  frus- 
trated the  design  by  having  Yoshikazu  assassinated,  and  then  attack- 
ing and  slaying  all  his  blood  relations  together  with  Ichihata. 
Yoriiye  he  afterward  shut  up  in  a  temple,  and  ultimately  caused  him 
to  be  put  to  death.  Sanetomo,  Yoriiye' s  younger  brother,  suc- 
ceeded him,  but  exercised  no  administrative  authority,  the  Hojo 
holding  everything  in  their  own  grasp.  The  shogun  consequently 
devoted  himself  to  literature  rather  than  to  military  exercises. 
Moreover,  foreseeing  that  fortune  would  not  long  continue  to  smile 
upon  the  Minamoto  family,  he  thought  to  obtain  a  high  position  in 
the  central  government,  and  add  luster  to  the  family's  renown 
while  there  was  yet  time.  Hence  he  was  promoted  to  the  post  of 
chief  councilor  of  state  (dainagon) ,  in  conjunction  with  that  of 
commander  in  chief  of  the  guards  of  the  left,  his  official  rank  being 
raised  to  the  first  of  the  second  class.  Shortly  afterward  he 
became  lord  keeper  of  the  privy  seal  and  then  minister  of  the  right. 
But  in  12 19,  on  the  occasion  of  worshiping  at  a  shrine  in 
Kamakura,  he  was  stabbed  to  death  by  Kugyo,  a  son  of  Yoriiye. 
This  event  terminated  the  descendants  of  the  Minamoto  family 
in  the  direct  line.  A  brief  interval  of  thirty-five  years,  or  three 
generations,2  from  the  time  when  Yoritomo  had  risen  to  the  head 
of  the  government,  sufficed  to  complete  the  supremacy  of  the  great 
clan,  the  first  shogun  of  which  had  so  systematically  pruned  off  the 
useful  members  of  its  own  branch. 

The  Minamoto  were  followed  by  the  Hojo  as  feudal  rulers. 
The  Hojo  family  was  of  Taira  origin,  its  founder  being  Taira-no- 
Sadamori.  The  name  Hojo  was  derived  from  the  fact  that  the 
family's  headquarters  were  at  Hojo  in  Izu.  During  the  period  of 
Yoritomo's  exile  in  Izu,  he  experienced  generous  and  hospitable 

2  Minamoto  Yoritomo,  1184-1199;  Minamoto  Yoriiye,  1199-1203;   Minamoto 
Sanetomo,  1203-1219. 


70  JAPAN 

1200-1219 

treatment  at  the  hands  of  Hojo  Tokimasa,  whose  daughter  he  mar- 
ried. All  during  Yoritomo's  campaigns  and  subsequent  administra- 
tion at  Kamakura,  Tokimasa,  though  of  the  Taira  family,  proved  a 
loyal  and  indispensable  counselor.  Under  Yoriije,  being  the  grand- 
father on  the  mother's  side,  he  naturally  enjoyed  the  widest  popu- 
larity and  wielded  the  greatest  power  of  all  the  military  nobles  of  the 
time.  As  has  been  seen,  the  Hojo  did  not  even  hesitate  to  assas- 
sinate the  shogun  in  order  to  further  their  personal  interests. 
Tokimasa  allowed  himself  to  be  controlled  by  the  counsels  of  his 
wife.  At  her  slanderous  instance  he  brought  about  the  overthrow 
of  a  great  territorial  noble,  Hatakeyama,  and  by  her  advice  he  con- 
ceived the  project  of  elevating  to  the  shogunate  his  younger  daugh- 
ter's husband,  Hiraga  Tomomasa.  The  third  shogun,  Sanetomo, 
then  a  mere  youth,  was  an  inmate  of  Tokimasa's  house  at  the  time 
of  this  plot.  His  mother,  Masako,  learning  what  was  on  foot, 
caused  him  to  be  removed  to  the  house  of  her  brother  Yoshitoki,  with 
the  assistance  of  the  military  vassals  of  the  Minamoto,  and  succeeded 
not  only  in  having  Tokimasa  and  his  intriguing  wife  sent  back  to 
Hojo,  but  also  in  compassing  the  death  of  Tomomasa  in  Kyoto. 
These  events  transferred  the  territorial  and  military  ascendancy 
among  the  Kamakura  nobility  to  the  Wada  family,  whom  there- 
fore Yoshitoki,  the  Hojo  chief  in  Kamakura,  formed  the  design  of 
destroying.  In  pursuance  of  that  scheme,  he  prompted  Kugyo  to 
assassinate  Sanetomo,  the  last  of  the  Minamoto  family.  Then 
Fujiwara-no-Yoritsune,  a  relative  of  Yoritomo,  was  summoned  from 
Kyoto  to  assume  the  nominal  office  of  shogun,  Masako,  the  widow 
of  Yoritomo,  exercising  the  controlling  power  and  Yoshitoki  hold- 
ing the  office  of  regent  (shikken,  an  office  virtually  corresponding 
with  the  sessho  of  the  central  government)  ;  in  which  capacity  he 
administered  all  the  affairs  of  the  bakufu  in  the  name  of  the  young 
shogun.  Yoshitoki  was  thus  a  shogun  with  the  name  of  a  shikken. 
It  was  about  this  time  that  the  civil  government  of  Kyoto 
rose  under  the  leadership  of  the  ex-Emperor  Gotoba  in  an  attempt 
to  overthrow  the  feudal  administration.  Ever  since  the  time  of 
Yoritomo,  Gotoba  had  cherished  the  hope  of  recovering  the  control 
of  administrative  affairs,  and  with  that  object  had  stationed  military 
men  of  his  own  choosing  in  the  west,  in  addition  to  those  already 
stationed  in  the  north,  conferring  on  their  leaders  swords  forged 
by  his  own  hands,  and  otherwise  sparing  no  pains  to  organize 
a  strong  military  following.    So  long,  however,  as  Yoritomo  lived, 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT  71 

1219-1222 

Gotoba's  designs  could  not  be  realized.  But  when  Sanetomo,  the 
third  shogun  of  Yoritomo's  line,  fell  under  the  sword  of  Kugyo, 
the  ex-emperor  thought  that  he  descried  an  opportunity  to  attain 
his  purpose.  But  Hojo  Yoshitoki  set  up  a  Fujiwara  as  a  nominal 
shogun,  and  himself  exercised  the  administrative  authority  in  a 
markedly  arrogant  and  arbitrary  manner.  Gotoba  then  selected  a 
vassal  of  Kamakura,  without  consulting  the  Hojo,  as  warden  of 
the  western  marches,  and  allowed  him  to  reside  in  Kyoto.  Yoshitoki 
forthwith  confiscated  all  the  lands  belonging  to  the  warden.  There- 
upon an  imperial  mandate  was  issued,  directing  that  the  estates 
should  be  restored,  to  which  Yoshitoki  paid  no  attention.  A  further 
instance  of  contumacy  occurred  in  connection  with  an  estate  which 
the  ex-emperor  had  conferred  on  one  of  his  favorite  mistresses. 

Stung  by  these  insults,  Gotoba  finally  resolved  to  overthrow  the 
Kamakura  government.  In  this  design  he  was  strongly  supported 
by  another  ex-emperor,  Juntoku,  who  had  just  abdicated  in  favor  of 
his  son,  Chukyo.  The  third  of  the  three  ex-emperors  of  the  time, 
Tsuchimikado,  opposed  the  project  of  the  other  two,  urging  that 
its  execution  was  still  premature.  Gotoba  could  count  upon  the 
support  of  seventeen  hundred  warriors,  so  in  1221  an  imperial 
mandate  circulated  through  all  the  provinces  of  the  empire  ordering 
the  destruction  of  the  Hojo  family.  It  was  specially  addressed  to 
the  powerful  lord,  Miura  Yoshimura.  But,  instead  of  obeying,  he 
conveyed  secret  information  of  the  fact  to  Yoshitoki,  who  in  turn 
informed  Masako,  the  widow  of  Yoritomo.  She  thereupon  sum- 
moned all  the  military  leaders  of  the  surrounding  provinces,  and 
having  reminded  them  of  the  possessions  and  ranks  bestowed  by 
the  Minamoto  chief  on  the  samurai  of  Kwanto,  said  that  an  oc- 
casion had  now  arisen  to  repay  her  deceased  husband's  favors. 
The  result  was  that  none  of  these  captains  espoused  the  sovereign's 
cause  in  the  struggle  that  ensued.  Meanwhile,  Yoshitoki  took 
counsel  of  his  generals  as  to  a  plan  of  campaign,  and  finally  adopted 
the  proposal  of  Oye  Hiromoto  that  the  bulk  of  the  forces  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Hojo  should  march  against  Kyoto,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Hojo  Yasutoki  and  Hojo  Tokifusa,  by  the  three  trunk 
routes,  the  Tokaido,  the  Tosando,  and  the  Hokurikudo.  On  receipt 
of  this  intelligence  in  Kyoto,  the  imperial  troops  were  divided  into 
two  bodies  under  Hideyasu  and  Taneyoshi,  and  moved  north- 
ward to  meet  the  invaders  in  the  Owari  and  Mino  provinces. 

But  the  defending  forces  suffered  defeat,   and  were  driven 


72  JAPAN 

1222-1256 

back,  so  that  Yasutoki  and  Tokifusa  were  able  to  enter  Kyoto 
at  the  head  of  a  large  army.  They  forced  the  reigning  sovereign 
to  abdicate  in  favor  of  Gohorikawa,  and  they  banished  the  three 
ex-emperors,  Gotoba  to  the  province  of  Oki,  Juntoku  to  Sado 
Island,  and  Tsuchimikado  to  Tosa.  Gotoba's  son  was  also  sent  into 
exile.  A  number  of  court  nobles  who  had  assisted  and  promoted 
the  attack  upon  the  Kamakura  government  were  put  to  death. 
Three  thousand  estates  belonging  to  these  nobles  and  to  the  samurai 
who  had  espoused  the  imperial  cause  were  confiscated  and  divided 
among  the  Hojo  followers.  Yoshitoki  then  stationed  Yasutoki 
and  Tokifusa  at  Rokuhara  to  preserve  peace  in  Kyoto.  Even  in 
the  days  of  Yoritomo,  affairs  of  state  had  been  administered  in 
consultation  with  the  court  nobles  and  the  Fujiwara  ministers,  but 
the  Hojo  recognized  no  such  obligation.  So  the  imperial  uprising 
not  only  proved  a  failure,  but  also  served  to  increase  immensely 
the  power  of  the  feudal  government. 

The  Hojo  were  aware  that,  great  as  was  their  influence,  it 
had  been  acquired  by  questionable  means,  and  that  their  position 
could  be  maintained  only  by  their  good  government.  For  this 
reason,  the  Hojo  administration  before  the  days  of  its  decline  has 
come  down  to  posterity  as  a  model  of  feudal  rule.  Yasutoki, 
who  succeeded  Yoshitoki  as  regent,  devoted  himself  zealously  to 
political  affairs,  treated  the  agricultural  classes  with  much  con- 
sideration, and  sought  earnestly  to  win  the  love  of  the  people. 
He  treated  his  relatives  with  uniform  kindness,  and  those  under  his 
sway  with  condescension,  never  abandoning  himself  to  passionate 
impulses  nor  ever  employing  his  power  wantonly.  He  framed  a 
law  of  fifty-one  articles  setting  forth  the  principles  of  adminis- 
tration and  supplying  regulations  to  guide  the  discharge  of  official 
functions.  Ruling  wisely  and  living  uprightly,  he  died  lamented 
by  people  of  all  classes.  He  was  succeeded  by  his  grandson,  Tsune- 
toki,  and  the  latter  by  his  younger  brother,  Tokiyori.  This  last, 
like  his  grandfather,  practiced  economy  in  his  administration  and 
showed  much  consideration  for  the  farming  classes. 

No  one  of  the  Hojo  family,3  however,  did  more  service  to 

8 The  following  is  the  list  of  the  Hojo  regents  (shikken).    Hojo  Tokimasa, 
father-in-law  of  Yoritomo,  who  died  in  1215,  did  not  assume  the  title  of  regent. 
Hojo  Yoshitoki,  1205-1224.  Hojo  Tokimune,  1256-1284. 

Hojo  Yasutoki,  1225-1242.  Hojo  Sadatoki,   1284-1300. 

Hojo  Tsunetoki,  1243-1246.  Hojo  Morotoki,   1300-1311. 

Hojo  Tokiyori,  1246- 1256.  Hojo  Takatoki,  13 12- 1326. 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT  73 

1256-1284 

the  nation  than  the  son  of  Tokiyori,  Tokimune,  who  saved  the 
country  from  the  Mongol  conquest.  This  deserves  our  special 
note. 

In  Mongolia,  on  the  northeast  of  China,  there  appeared  a 
conqueror  of  world-wide  fame,  Temujin,  the  great  Genghis  Khan. 
Against  his  armies  the  Tatar,  kings  were  unable  to  hold  their 
ground,  and  ultimately  the  wave  of  Mongol  conquest  flowed  into 
the  dominions  of  the  Sung  sovereign  in  the  south  of  China. 
Temujin's  grandson,  Kublai,  possessed  himself  of  a  great  part  of 
Korea,  and  having  concerted  measures  for  overthrowing  the  Sung 
dynasty  and  bringing  all  China  under  Mongol  rule,  he  conceived 
the  project  of  subjugating  Japan  also.  His  first  step  toward  con- 
summating that  design  was  to  send  envoys  via  Korea,  who  were 
instructed  to  remonstrate  with  the  Japanese  sovereign  for  his  in- 
different attitude  toward  the  Mongol  autocrat.  But  the  Koreans 
dissuaded  these  envoys  from  prosecuting  their  voyage.  Two  years 
later,  in  1268,  Kublai  dispatched  another  embassy  to  Dazaifu  in 
Kiushu,  with  letters  to  the  governor  of  Dazaifu  as  well  as  to  the 
Emperor  of  Japan,  the  ostensible  object  of  the  communications 
being  to  establish  amicable  relations  between  the  two  countries. 
From  Dazaifu  intelligence  of  the  coming  of  the  embassy  and  the 
nature  of  its  documents  was  forwarded  to  Kamakura,  thence  to  be 
sent  in  turn  to  the  court  in  Kyoto.  Considerable  anxiety  was  caused 
by  the  news,  both  in  official  and  in  civilian  circles.  The  emperor 
laid  before  the  shrine  of  Daijingti  an  autographic  supplication 
for  the  heavenly  protection  of  the  empire,  and  caused  prayers  of  a 
similar  purport  to  be  said  at  all  the  shrines  and  temples  throughout 
the  realm.  Careful  measures  were  also  taken  to  guard  the  coasts, 
more  particularly  the  points  of  strategical  importance  in  Hizen  and 
Chikuzen. 

A  draft  reply  to  Kublai's  dispatch  was  prepared  at  the  court 
in  Kyoto,  and  shown  to  Hojo  Tokimune,  who,  however,  gave 
it  as  his  opinion  that  inasmuch  as  the  communication  from  China 
lacked  the  forms  of  prescribed  courtesy,  Japan's  dignity  precluded 
the  sending  of  any  answer.  Orders  were  therefore  conveyed  to 
Dazaifu  for  the  immediate  expulsion  of  the  Chinese  envoys.  In 
March  of  the  following  year  Korean  officials  again  arrived  in  the 
island  of  Tsushima  escorting  Mongolian  envoys,  who  asked  for  a 
reply  to  the  dispatch  sent  by  their  sovereign  the  preceding  year. 
These  envoys  became  involved  in  quarrels  with  the  people  of  Tsu- 


74  JAPAN 

1256-1284 

shima,  and  finally  took  their  departure,  carrying  away  two  of  the 
latter  as  prisoners.  Five  months  later,  Kublai  caused  these  two  men 
to  be  restored  to  Japan,  and  made  the  act  an  occasion  for  addressing 
another  dispatch  to  the  Japanese  emperor.  Again  Japan  refrained 
from  making  reply.  After  an  interval  of  two  years,  the  khan 
sent  in  1271  another  ambassador,  with  a  train  of  a  hundred  fol- 
lowers, who  landed  at  Imatsu  in  Chikuzen.  The  ambassador's  in- 
structions were  to  present  the  dispatch  of  which  he  was  bearer  either 
to  the  imperial  court  or  to  the  shogun  in  Kamakura.  He  did  not, 
however,  intrust  the  original  document  to  the  Dazaifu  officials, 
but  gave  them  a  copy  only.  This  was  at  once  forwarded  to 
Kamakura,  being  from  thence  communicated  to  the  court  in  Kyoto. 
On  receiving  it,  the  kwanryo  took  counsel  of  the  other  ministers 
of  the  crown  and  came  to  the  decision  that  no  reply  should  be 
given. 

By  this  time  the  people  of  Japan  had  acquired  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  immense  power  wielded  by  Kublai  Khan  and  of  the 
vast  conquests  achieved  by  him  in  succession  to  his  grandfather 
Genghis.  Hence  there  was  no  little  anxiety  as  to  the  outcome  of 
these  futile  embassies.  The  emperor  ordered  prayers  to  be  offered 
up  as  before  at  the  shrines  and  temples  throughout  the  empire. 
Kublai  had  now  brought  almost  the  whole  of  China  into  subjection 
and  established  his  dynasty  of  Yuan.  He  continued  to  send  em- 
bassy after  embassy  to  Japan,  and  Japan  on  her  side  continued,  with 
equal  persistence,  to  make  no  reply  to  messages  which  she  construed 
as  national  insults.  Enraged  by  this  indifference,  the  khan  finally 
sent  against  Japan  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  war  vessels  under 
the  command  of  Liu  Fok-heng,  at  the  same  time  ordering  Korea 
to  reinforce  this  expedition.  The  invaders  arrived  at  Tsushima 
toward  the  end  of  1274,  where  they  killed  the  governor.  Thence 
they  passed  to  the  island  of  Iki  and  killed  its  acting  high  constable, 
and  therafter  directed  their  forces  against  Imatsu  in  Chikuzen. 
The  military  nobles  of  Kiushu — Shoni,  Otomo,  Matsuura,  Kikuchi 
and  others — collected  troops  and  made  a  stand  at  Hakozaki.  The 
Yuan  invaders,  armed  with  guns,  caused  great  havoc  among  the 
Japanese  army,  but  the  Chinese  leader,  Liu,  received  a  wound  that 
compelled  him  to  retire,  and  a  heavy  gale  arising  destroyed  num- 
bers of  the  foreign  war-vessels.  The  Korean  general's  ship  was 
wrecked  and  he  himself  drowned.  Finally,  the  remnant  of  the 
invading  force  escaped  under  cover  of  darkness.    Once  again  after  a 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT  75 

1256-1281 

few  months  the  Yuan  sovereign  sent  another  envoy,  but  he  was  sent 
up  to  Kamakura  and  there  put  to  death  by  Hojo  Tokimune. 

Hojo  Sanemasa  was  now  appointed  to  command  at  Dazaifu, 
and  instructions  were  issued  for  the  vigilant  guarding  of  all  the  coast 
line  in  the  south.  Further,  the  imperial  guards  were  temporarily 
withdrawn  from  Kyoto,  and  drafted  into  a  large  army  recruited 
from  the  east  of  the  empire  and  stationed  at  Dazaifu  as  well  as  at 
other  important  positions  along  the  coast.  Sanemasa  was  given  the 
command  of  this  army,  and  other  members  of  the  Hojo  family  were 
dispatched  to  direct  the  military  preparations  in  Harima  and  Nagato. 
Further,  the  territorial  nobles  of  Kiushu  received  orders  to  con- 
struct fortifications  along  the  coast,  and  this  work,  being  vigorously 
carried  on,  was  completed  in  1279.  That  year  the  Chinese  emperor 
again  sent  envoys,  seeking  to  establish  friendship  and  intercourse. 
They  landed  at  Hakata,  but  were  put  to  death  by  order  of  the 
shogun's  government.  The  Regent  Tokimune,  foreseeing  the  con- 
sequences of  these  complications,  dispatched  large  bodies  of  troops 
from  Kamakura  to  Kiushu,  to  repel  the  renewed  attack  inevitably 
pending  from  the  west.  By  this  time  the  feudal  society  of  Japan 
seems  to  haye  been  roused  to  its  height  of  patriotism.  It  not  only 
was  determined  to  resist  the  invasion  of  the  world-conqueror,  but 
even  plans  were  made  to  invade  the  continent  and  fight  with  the 
Khan  on  his  own  ground.  The  latter,  on  his  part,  had  now  com- 
pleted his  conquest  of  China,  and,  having  attained  the  zenith  of  his 
power,  resolved  to  gratify  his  long-cherished  desire,  supplemented 
as  it  was  by  indignation  at  the  repeated  slaughter  of  his  ambassa- 
dors in  Japan. 

Accordingly  in  the  middle  of  1281,  he  assembled  a  force 
of  100,000  soldiers,  whom,  together  with  a  contingent  of  10,000 
Koreans,  he  sent  against  Japan  under  the  command  of  Hwan 
Bunko.  The  invading  army  touched  at  the  island  of  Iki,  and  after 
a  cruel  massacre  of  its  inhabitants,  resumed  their  voyage  toward 
Dazaifu.  Thither  the  Japanese  troops  flocked  from  Kiushu, 
Chugoku,  and  Shikoku  to  defend  their  country.  Aided  by  the 
fortresses  that  had  been  erected  along  the  coast,  they  fought  stoutly. 
The  Chinese,  however,  enjoyed  the  great  advantage  of  possessing 
heavy  ordnance,  with  which  they  bombarded  the  forts  and  slaugh- 
tered such  multitudes  of  the  Japanese  soldiers  that  the  latter  were 
unable  to  meet  them  in  open  contest  Organized  tactics  as  much 
characterized  the  invaders  as  personal  valor  and  individual  combat 


76  JAPAN 

1281-1299 

did  the  defending  warriors.  Nevertheless,  the  latter  continued  to  re- 
sist so  obstinately,  that,  although  the  contest  waged  for  sixty  days, 
the  enemy  could  not  effect  a  landing.  Meanwhile,  a  rumor  reached 
Kyoto  that  the  Yuan  invaders,  having  borne  down  all  resistance  in 
Kiushu,  had  pushed  on  to  Nagato,  and  were  on  the  point  of  advanc- 
ing against  Kyoto  itself,  thence  to  carry  their  arms  into  the  Tokai 
and  Hokuriku  districts. 

The  Emperor  Gouda,  deeply  disquieted  by  these  tidings, 
proceeded  in  person  to  the  shrine  of  Iwashimizu  Hachimangu, 
god  of  war,  to  pray  for  the  safety  of  the  country,  and  more- 
over dispatched  an  autographic  supplication  to  the  shrine  of 
Daijingu  in  Ise,  vowing  that  he  would  offer  himself  as  a  sacrifice 
to  preserve  the  honor  of  his  empire.  But  in  Kiushu  the  contest 
continued  fiercely  when,  on  the  last  day  of  the  seventh  lunar  month, 
a  northwesterly  storm  swept  down  on  the  Chinese  fleet  and  wrecked 
a  number  of  the  ships  with  immense  loss  of  life.  Those  that  sur- 
vived the  tempest,  several  thousands  in  number,  took  refuge  in  the 
island  of  Takashima  off  the  coast  of  Hizen,  and  there,  under  the 
command  of  Chang  Pak — Hwan  having  fled  away  in  a  vessel  of 
exceptional  strength — set  themselves  to  cut  timber  and  build  new 
ships  to  carry  them  back  to  China.  But  Shoni  Kagesuke,  at  the 
head  of  a  body  of  the  Kiushu  troops,  followed  and  attacked  the 
fugitives,  killing  several  hundreds  and  taking  over  a  thousand 
prisoners,  so  that,  in  the  end,  only  three  out  of  the  hundred  thou- 
sand Yuan  invaders  succeeded  in  escaping  alive  to  China.  After 
this  success  the  Kamakura  government  redoubled  its  efforts  to  place 
the  defenses  of  the  country  on  a  strong  footing.  It  was  not  till 
1299  that  the  Chinese  sovereign  sent  two  Buddhist  priests  to  Japan 
with  a  peaceful  message.  The  country  had  been  in  a  state  of  con- 
tinuous defense,  since  the  arrival  of  the  first  Mongol  embassy 
thirty-one  years  previously.  Never  before  had  the  Japanese  nation 
encountered  a  more  colossal  struggle  with  a  great  conquering 
foe,  nor  had  she  since,  till  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
in  1904.  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  the  former  crisis  it  was  the 
feudal  forces  which  saved  the  land  from  foreign  conquest. 

If  by  this  great  service  the  Hojo  placed  all  Japan  under  obli- 
gation to  them,  it  was  also  after  this  crisis  that  their  power  began 
to  decline.  Great  sums  of  money  had  been  devoted  during  the 
thirty  years  to  maintaining  constant  religious  services  at  the  shrines 
and  temples  throughout  the  empire.    The  expense  incurred  on  that 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT  77 

1284-1326 

account  is  said  to  have  been  greater  even  than  the  outlay  in  con- 
nection with  military  affairs,  which  in  itself  must  have  been  immense. 
Moreover,  after  the  invaders  had  been  defeated  and  the  danger 
averted,  the  rewards  granted  to  Buddhist  priests  and  Shinto  officials 
far  exceeded  in  monetary  value  the  recompense  given  to  the  troops 
and  their  leaders.  On  the  other  hand,  the  wardens  and  territorial 
nobles,  on  whom  the  duty  of  defending  the  country  had  fallen, 
found  the  drain  on  their  resources  so  heavy  that  they  began  to  mur- 
mur. Thus  the  popularity  of  the  shogunate  at  Kamakura  com- 
menced to  wane. 

Tokimune  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Sadatoki,  and  then  followed 
Morotoki  and  Takatoki.  During  their  regency  the  authority  of  the 
Hojo  rapidly  declined.  Takatoki,  being  a  man  of  indolent  dis- 
position, entrusted  the  control  of  affairs  wholly  to  one  Nagasaki 
Takasuke,  who  was  betrayed  by  avarice  into  such  abuses  of  power 
that  men's  hearts  were  altogether  estranged  from  the  government. 
The  fall  of  the  Hojo  finally  ensued  in  1326,  a  century  and  a  quarter 
after  the  first  of  those  powerful  rulers  had  risen  from  the  position 
of  a  rear-vassal  to  the  most  puissant  office  in  the  land. 

The  circumstances  of  the  downfall  of  the  Kamakura  govern- 
ment will  be  related  in  the  next  chapter.  In  the  meantime,  we  shall 
observe  the  condition  of  society  during  the  hundred  and  forty  years 
of  the  rule  of  the  Minamoto  and  the  Hojo.  In  regard  to  the 
customs  of  the  upper  classes,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  ele- 
gance of  the  Kyoto  nobles  and  the  severe  simplicity  of  the  Kama- 
kura soldiers,  now  the  one,  then  the  other,  according  to  the 
varying  circumstances,  set  the  fashion  of  the  day.  When  the  war- 
rior element  was  in  the  ascendant,  its  manners  and  customs  were 
more  or  less  taken  as  a  model  in  Kyoto,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
Kyoto  sometimes  impressed  its  own  fashions  upon  the  military. 
An  instance  of  the  latter  case  is  furnished  by  the  story  of  the  Taira 
family,  whose  fighting  men  gradually  fell  under  the  charm  of  the 
court  life,  and  succumbed  with  comparative  ease  to  the  misfortunes 
that  afterward  overtook  them.  Minamoto-no-Yoritomo,  however, 
fixed  his  headquarters  at  Kamakura  and  did  not  visit  Kyoto  except 
for  very  brief  intervals.  His  habits  of  life  were  frugal  and  simple ; 
he  encouraged  the  samurai  to  adopt  a  severe  military  regimen,  and 
he  set  his  face  resolutely  against  costly  ostentation  and  enervating 
excesses. 

But  by  the  time  of  Sanetomo  prolonged  peace  had  produced 


78  JAPAN 

1284-1326 

its  usual  effects:  the  austerity  of  military  customs  underwent  re- 
laxation even  at  Kamakura,  and  refinement  and  luxury  began  to 
come  into  vogue.  So,  too,  in  Kyoto,  when  the  city  passed  under 
military  rule  after  the  Shokiu  troubles  and  when  the  power  of  the 
civil  nobles  declined  correspondingly,  the  customs  of  the  soldier 
class  prevailed  over  those  of  the  courtiers.  Speaking  generally, 
however,  it  may  be  said  that  Kamakura  was  the  nursery  of  mili- 
tary customs  and  Kyoto  the  center  of  courtly  effeminacy.  The 
warriors'  ethics  at  Kamakura  prescribed  frugality  and  simplicity, 
inculcated  love  of  soldierly  pursuits  and  encouraged  feelings  of 
gratitude  and  loyalty  in  the  relations  between  lord  and  vassal.  To 
such  a  pitch  were  these  latter  sentiments  carried  that  a  vassal 
would  choose  rather  to  be  estranged  from  his  parents  or  find  him- 
self opposed  to  his  own  brothers  and  sisters,  than  to  show  want  of 
fealty  to  his  lord.  Everything  must  be  sacrificed  in  the  cause  of 
one's  lord,  death  and  life  alike  being  shared  with  him.  The  rules 
of  etiquette  were  strictly  obeyed,  and  the  provisions  of  the  code 
of  honor  carefully  observed.  Even  when  a  samurai  went  into 
battle,  he  did  not  set  himself  to  slaughter  indiscriminately,  but 
having  first  recounted  the  achievements  of  his  ancestors,  crossed 
swords  with  his  foe  in  a  leisurely  and  dignified  manner.  Were  he 
guilty  of  any  fault,  it  was  expected  of  him  to  die  by  his  own  hand 
before  the  disgrace  of  lawful  punishment  could  overtake  him.  The 
obligations  of  honor  were  absolutely  binding  on  him  in  all  con- 
junctures. 

After  the  Hogen  and  Heiji  insurrections,  even  Kyoto  itself, 
the  seat  of  refinement  and  splendor,  became  like  a  deserted  battle- 
held,  and  when  Minamoto-no-Yoritomo  made  Kamakura  the  head- 
quarters of  his  military  government,  the  science  of  war  absorbed 
men's  attention  so  completely  that  little  or  no  heed  was  paid  to 
literary  pursuits.  The  Kyoto  University  and  the  provincial  schools 
decayed,  and  the  knowledge  of  Chinese  classics  became  the  mo- 
nopoly of  Buddhist  priests,  some  of  whom,  particularly  of  the  Zen 
sect,  had  spent  years  of  diligent  study  in  China.  Anyone  de- 
sirous of  obtaining  education  had  no  recourse  but  to  place  himself 
under  the  tuition  of  these  priests.  It  was  in  this  way  that  the  term 
tera-koya  (temple  annex)  came  to  be  generally  employed  all 
through  the  feudal  ages  to  designate  a  private  school.  But  despite 
the  people's  neglect  of  Chinese  studies,  Chinese  words  and  expres- 
sions were  largely  in  vogue  among  the  higher  classes,  and  Bud- 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT  79 

1284-1326 

dhist  terms  also  passed  appreciably  into  the  language  of  the  time 
owing  to  the  prosperous  and  influential  position  occupied  by  that 
religion. 

The  written  language  being  thus  enriched  by  a  multitude 
of  phrases  and  expressions  which  had  received  the  indorsement  of 
scholars,  the  vocabulary  and  literature  of  the  era  exhibit  marked 
evidences  of  change.  Not  only  the  manner  of  expression,  but  also 
the  taste  of  the  people,  had  undergone  a  decisive  change  since  the 
close  of  the  Hei-an  epoch,  and  this  difference  naturally  manifested 
itself  in  the  kind  of  literature  affected.  Men  no  longer  took 
pleasure  in  books  treating  of  the  lives  and  adventures  of  beautiful 
women  or  the  mental  feats  of  renowned  scholars.  Such  studies 
seemed  incongruous  amid  the  clash  of  arms  and  under  the  shadow 
of  the  sword  and  spear.  Striking  vicissitudes  in  martial  careers,  the 
intrepid  deaths  or  life-long  separations  of  warriors,  the  rise  and  fall 
of  principalities — these  were  the  themes  of  which  the  Kamakura 
samurai  loved  to  read.  Of  the  prose  compositions  expressive  of  this 
sentiment,  the  most  noted  were  the  "  Hogen "  and  the  Heiji 
Monogatari,"  stories,  respectively  of  the  insurrections  of  those  eras ; 
and  the  "  Heike  Monogaturi"  the  pathetic  epic  of  the  fate  of  the 
great  Taira  clan,  and  the  "  Gempei  Seisuiki"  the  stirring  tale  of 
the  rise  and  fall  of  the  families  of  Taira  and  Minamoto.  Other 
famous  productions  of  the  period  were  the  "  Hojo-ki"  and  the 
"  Shiki  Monogatari."  In  these  works  one  finds  a  skillful  blending 
of  graceful  Japanese  phrases,  strong  Chinese  expressions,  and 
lofty  Buddhist  terms.  At  times  the  style  has  all  the  ring  of  martial 
onset;  at  times,  it  is  plaintive  and  moving;  now  it  abounds  in 
graces  of  diction,  and  then  its  transitions  from  passion  to  delibera- 
tion, from  swift  terseness  to  smooth  tranquillity,  are  full  of  force 
and  sentiment.  Between  the  emotional  effect  of  such  writings  and 
the  gently  flowing  phraseology  and  uneventful  paragraphs  of  works 
like  the  "  Genji  Monogatari "  of  the  preceding  period,  there  is  a 
wide  interval.  Running  through  the  pages  of  the  "  Hojo-ki "  the 
reader  also  detects  a  current  of  discontent  and  disgust  for  the 
transient  world  and  its  vanity  that  reflects  the  growing  tendency 
of  educated  minds  at  that  epoch.  So  deeply  had  the  Buddhistic 
pessimism  entered  the  heart  of  the  people. 

On  the  other  hand,  poetry  in  the  Japanese  style  flourished  uni- 
formly in  Kyoto,  unaffected  by  the  vicissitudes  of  the  times  or  the 
decline  of  the  imperial  power.     Collections  of  verses  were  made 


80  JAPAN 

1284-1326 

from  time  to  time  and  published  by  imperial  direction,  among 
which  the  **  Shin-Kokinshu  "  contains  stanzas  constructed  with  so 
great  skill  that  it  remained  a  model  for  the  poets  of  all  subsequent 
generations.  In  Kamakura,  also,  the  Shogun  Sanetomo  was  an 
accomplished  writer  of  Japanese  poetry.  The  grace  and  polish  of 
his  songs  in  the  old-time  style,  as  well  as  the  verve  and  spirit  of 
their  sentiments,  reflecting  truly  the  mood  of  his  era,  find  no  paral- 
lel in  the  poetry  subsequent  to  the  Nara  epoch.  Indeed,  owing  to 
the  great  popularity  of  Japanese  poetry  in  those  days,  people  began 
for  the  first  time  to  study  it  under  teachers.  Thus  there  came  into 
vogue  men  who  made  a  business  of  giving  instruction  in  the  art  of 
poetry,  the  profession  being  transmitted  from  generation  to  gene- 
ration in  the  same  family.  The  result  was  that  canons  of  style 
and  tricks  of  composition  peculiar  to  special  schools  of  teachers 
became  more  or  less  binding  upon  students  of  those  schools,  inevit- 
able injury  being  done  to  originality  and  vigor.  To  these  circum- 
stances may  be  attributed  a  gradual  decline  of  real  poetic  ability. 
Hardly  less  instructive  is  the  change  that  overtook  the  nation's 
greatest  religion,  Buddhism.  It  will  be  remembered  that  during 
the  Hei-an  epoch,  two  Buddhist  sects,  the  Tendai,  founded  by 
Saicho,  and  the  Shingon,  by  Kukai,  were  incomparably  the  most 
influential,  all  others  being  more  or  less  in  a  state  of  decline.  But 
toward  the  close  of  the  epoch,  some  priests,  as  already  related,  be- 
gan to  take  more  interest  in  military  affairs  than  in  religious  func- 
tions. Yoritomo,  when  he  came  into  power,  interdicted  the  use  of 
arms  by  priests,  and  encouraged  them  to  devote  their  attention 
entirely  to  literature.  The  prestige  of  the  Tendai  and  the  Shingon 
suffered  from  these  events,  and  as  their  doctrines,  being  far  too 
recondite  and  lofty  to  be  comprehended  by  the  uninitiated,  had 
never  satisfied  the  bulk  of  the  people,  there  began  to  appear,  during 
the  Kamakura  epoch,  priests  who  taught  a  form  of  the  faith 
radically  different  from  the  others  but  eminently  suited  to  the 
spiritual  tone  of  the  new  age.  This  was  the  Zen  sect,  introduced 
in  its  various  branches  from  China.  It  at  once  attracted  men  of 
simple  and  robust  habits  by  its  remarkably  vigorous  and  effective 
method  of  enlightenment  and  the  great  practical  value  of  the  latter 
for  the  men  of  the  world  in  those  days  of  continual  fluctuations  of 
fortune.  Hojo  Tokiyori  and  Tokimune,  as  well  as  many  a  great 
warrior,  besides  some  emperors,  became  ardent  patrons  of  the  sect, 
which  consequently  attained  prominent  popularity  among  the  mili- 


KAMAKURA     GOVERNMENT  81 

1186-1339 

tary  men  at  Kamakura,  and  developed  widespread  influence.  Its 
temples,  Kencho-ji  and  Engaku-ji,  at  Kamakura,  stood  on  an  equal 
footing-  with  the  Kennin-ji  and  T6fuku-ji  of  Kyoto. 

While  the  Zen  tenet  so  powerfully  appealed  to  the  military 
class,  there  was  another  set  of  new  sects,  entirely  original  to  Japan, 
which  by  their  brief  formulae  and  impressive  ceremonies  attracted 
large  numbers  of  the  common  people.  Of  these  sects,  three,  namely, 
the  Jodo,  founded  by  Genkii  (or  Honen)  ;  Ikko  or  Shin,  founded 
by  Shinran  (or  Hanyen),  and  Ji,  founded  by  Ippen,  all  used  the 
same  litany,  while  the  fourth  sect,  Hokke,  or  Nichiren,  founded 
by  Nichiren,  used  another.  The  founders  all  met  opposition 
from  the  exponents  of  the  older  sects,  but  spread  their  teach- 
ings in  the  face  of  serious  difficulties,  until  they  won  the 
hearts  of  simple-minded  folks  whose  minds  had  been  in  a  state 
of  constant  uncertainty  under  the  violent  changes  of  the  time,  and 
who  were  now  delighted  to  find,  at  last,  doctrines  which  taught 
that  an  unmixed  faith  in  the  saving  power  of  a  Buddha  or  a  canon 
symbolized  in  a  single  word  of  formula  would  bring  them  to  a 
blissful  calm  in  this  present  world.  Not  less  attractive  were  the 
beautiful  harmony  of  the  litanies  and  the  impressiveness  of  the 
paraphernalia  of  the  temple  of  every  new  sect.  It  appeared  as  if  the 
spiritual  needs  of  the  age  were  at  last  answered,  and  the  new  tenets 
spread  themselves  among  the  people  like  a  fire  in  a  parched  meadow. 

In  the  domain  of  arts,  the  most  remarkable  industrial  achieve- 
ment of  the  era  was  the  progress  made  in  tempering  sword-blades. 
Gotoba,  after  he  had  abdicated  the  scepter  and  become  ex-emperor, 
freely  indulged  his  keen  love  for  sword-blades.  He  engaged  sword- 
smiths,  whom  he  kept  perpetually  tempering  steel,  and  did  not  hesi- 
tate even  to  forge  blades  with  his  own  hands.  Naturally  this  and 
the  extensive  demand  for  swords  at  the  time  gave  a  great  impulse 
to  the  industry.  Much  progress  was  also  made  in  the  art  of  forg- 
ing armor,  helmets,  bridle-bits,  and  the  like.  Other  arts  were  not, 
however,  greatly  encouraged  by  the  military  administrators  of 
Kamekura,  who  set  their  faces  against  luxury  and  inculcated  frugal 
fashions.  Yet  not  a  little  progress  was  made  in  ceramics,  lacquer, 
and  the  carving  of  Buddhist  images  and  other  temple  furniture. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  under  the  simple  rule  of  the 
Kamakura  government  the  commerce  and  trade  of  this  period 
made  a  tolerable  progress,  in  spite  of  frequent  interruptions  of  the 
peace.    At  Kamakura,  where  merchants  from  various  parts  of  the 


82  JAPAN 

1186-1339 

empire  assembled  and  made  it  the  commercial  center  of  the  country, 
there  existed  seven  kinds  of  markets  in  which  articles  were  sold  at 
small  stores  specially  designed  and  constructed.  The  custom  of 
peddling  merchandise  also  existed.  For  business  transacted  at  a 
distance,  bills  of  exchange  had  already  come  into  vogue.  While 
Sanetomo  administered  the  shogunate,  an  official  limit  was  fixed  for 
the  number  of  merchants  conducting  business  in  Kamakura.  This 
was  the  origin  of  hereditary  privileges  of  trade.  The  prices  for  the 
various  staples  of  commerce  were  determined,  according  to  the  cus- 
tom of  previous  times.  Thus  in  1 193  an  imperial  notification  ordered 
that  rice  should  be  sold  at  one  thousand  cash  (one  kzmmmon) ,  or 
the  tenth  of  a  ryo,  that  is  to  say  nominally  ten  sen  according  to 
present  denominations,  but  of  course  representing  a  much  larger  sum 
at  that  time.  Again,  in  1253,  firewood,  charcoal,  and  other  neces- 
saries having  risen  in  price,  Hojo  Tokiyori  proclaimed  the  rate  at 
which  each  must  be  sold.  Gold  was  at  that  time  constantly  mined  in 
Mutsu,  but  did  not  serve  for  coinage  purposes,  the  common  media 
of  exchange  being  Chinese  copper  and  the  iron  cash  of  the  Sung 
dynasty  and  similar  Japanese  coins  of  earlier  days.  Grass-cloth 
was  also  sometimes  used  as  a  medium  of  exchange,  and  prices  were 
quoted  in  terms  of  it.  Trade  with  China,  under  the  Sung  dynasty, 
and  with  Korea — or  Koma,  as  it  was  then  called — was  carried  on 
largely  at  Hakata  in  Chikuzen  and  Bonotsu  in  Satsuma,  both  in 
Kiushu.  Import  duties  upon  foreign  goods  were  levied  at  the  va- 
rious ports  of  entry.  The  principal  imports  from  China  were  raw 
silk,  indigo,  Chinese  ink,  porcelain  vessels,  mats,  and  so  forth,  while 
the  staple  exports  from  Japan  were  rice,  other  cereals,  and  timber. 
In  1254  Hojo  Tokiyori  limited  the  number  of  ships  engaged  in  the 
China  trade  to  five,  and  ordered  all  except  the  licensed  vessels  to 
be  destroyed.  But  the  trade  continued  as  brisk  as  ever.  Subse- 
quently, however,  during  the  interval  that  separated  the  decline  of 
the  Sung  dynasty  from  the  establishment  of  the  Yuan,  intercourse 
between  Japan  and  the  neighboring  empire  underwent  some  diminu- 
tion, and  was  suspended  altogether  for  a  time  after  the  Mongol 
invasion  of  Japan. 


Chapter  VIII 

THE   TEMPORARY   RESTORATION    OF    IMPERIAL 
POWER.    1 339-1 393 

THE  fall  of  the  Hojd  resulted  in  a  rehabilitation  of  the 
imperial  power,  which,  however,  as  quickly  relapsed  un- 
der a  new  feudal  rule.  The  story  of  this  momentary  suc- 
cess of  the  sovereign  house  must  be  prefaced  by  an  account  of  its 
domestic  affairs,  which  had  caused  its  renewed  uprising-  against  the 
usurping  regent  at  Kamakura.  It  will  be  remembered  that,  in 
122 1,  the  Hojo  exiled  three  ex-emperors  and  their  partisans,  who 
had  raised  their  arms  against  the  all-powerful  feudal  government. 
The  influence  of  the  Hojo  became  so  strong  in  Kyoto  after  this 
event  that,  when  the  Emperor  Shi  jo  died  without  heir,  in  1242, 
the  Regent  Yasutoki  succeeded,  in  spite  of  opposition,  in  rising 
his  nominee  on  the  throne  as  the  Emperor  Gosaga.  This  natu- 
rally further  enhanced  the  power  of  the  Hojo.  Gosaga  abdicated 
in  1246,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  two  sons,  one  after  the  other. 
Of  these,  the  younger  and  abler,  Emperor  Kameyama,  was  the  fav- 
orite of  his  retired  father,  and  would  have  bequeathed  the  throne 
exclusively  to  his  own  descendants,  had  it  not  been  for  the  inter- 
vention of  the  ex-emperor,  who  advocated  the  cause  of  the  elder 
prince,  the  Emperor  Gofukakusa.  It  was  finally  decided,  during  the 
regency  of  Hojo  Sadatoki,  that  the  descendants  of  the  two  em- 
perors— called,  from  the  names  of  their  respective  residences,  the 
Daikaku-ji  and  the  Jimyo-in  lines — should  reign  alternately,  each 
for  ten  years.  The  Daikaku-ji  line  came  first  to  the  throne  in  the 
person  of  Gonijo  (1301-1308),  followed  by  Hanazono  of  the  other 
line.  The  latter  had  to  abdicate,  in  13 19,  in  favor  of  Godaigo 
of  the  first  line.  It  was  this  last  emperor  who  successfully,  though 
for  a  brief  period,  restored  the  power  of  the  imperial  house,  for, 
being  like  all  other  princes  of  his  line,  penurious  and  discontented, 
he  was  particularly  offended  at  the  conduct  of  the  Kamakura 
regency,  which  not  only  kept  him  in  straitened  circumstances,  but 
also  alternated  his  house  with  the  other  and  richer  house  favorable 

83 


84  JAPAN 

1319-1339 

to  the  Hojo.  Godaigo  perceived  that,  if  he  would  insure  his  sov- 
ereignty, he  must  do  away  at  the  same  time  with  the  Hojo  rule  and 
the  system  of  alternate  succession. 

Such  an  attempt  promised  greater  success  in  1325  than  in 
1 22 1,  as  the  power  of  the  Hojo  had  now  greatly  declined,  particu- 
larly under  the  regency  of  the  dissolute  Takatoki.  Bribery  was 
ripe,  partiality  presided  at  the  tribunals  of  justice,  and  dissatisfac- 
tion with  the  Hojo  rule  prevailed  among  the  samurai.  A  prema- 
ture plot  of  Godaigo *  to  overthrow  Kamakura  was,  however, 
discovered,  and  he  barely  saved  his  throne  by  falsely  professing 
innocence  and  goodwill.  The  time  soon  came  when  a  prince  of  the 
Jimyo-in  line  should  replace  Godaigo,  who  on  the  contrary  sought 
to  name  his  own  son  heir  apparent.  This  project  was  peremp- 
torily opposed  by  Takatoki,  who  also  provoked  the  emperor  in 
other  matters,  until  the  latter  again  sought  to  find  means  to  undo 
the  Hojo.  The  immense  military  following  of  Kamakura,  how- 
ever, rendered  hopeless  all  schemes  of  open  defiance.  Under  the 
circumstances  the  emperor  conceived  the  idea  of  having  recourse 
to  priestly  aid.  He  placed  his  son,  Prince  Morinaga,  in  the  post  of 
lord  abbot  of  Enryaku-ji,  and  himself  proceeded  to  Hieizan  and 
Nara,  where  he  succeeded  in  winning  the  priests  and  elaborating 
with  them  a  scheme  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Hojo.  But  this  plan 
also  was  divulged.  In  August,  1331,  the  regent  sent  three  thou- 
sand men  to  Kyoto  with  orders  to  arrest  the  emperor.  Godaigo 
had  escaped  during  the  night,  and  taken  refuge  on  Mount  Kasagi, 
where  he  mustered  his  partisans  from  the  neighboring  provinces 
and  posted  them  for  the  protection  of  his  temporary  residence.  The 
siege  did  not  last  long,  for  Takatoki  raised  a  Jimyo-in  prince  to 
the  throne,  captured  Godaigo,  and  exiled  the  latter  and  his  two  sons 
to  distant  islands. 

1  Reference  to  the  following  table  will  make  the  genealogical  issues  clear : 
88.  Emperor  Gosaga,   1243-1247. 
Jimyo-in  Line.  Daikaku-ji  Line. 

89.  Emperor  Gofukakusa,  1247-1266.  90.  Emperor   Kameyama,    1266-1276. 

92.  Emperor  Fushimi,  1288-1299.  91.  Emperor  Gouda,  1276-1288. 


93-  Emperor  95.  Emperor  94.  Emperor  06.  Emperor 

Gofushimi,  Hanazono,  Gonijo,  Godaigo, 

1299-1301.  1308-1319.  1301-1308.  I3I9-I339* 


TEMPORARY     RESTORATION 


85 


1319-1339 


The  imperial  cause  seemed  completely  lost,  but  about  this  time 
a  warrior  destined  to  become  a  celebrated  hero  with  the  loyal  sons 
of  Japan,  Kusunoki  Masashige,  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  in 
Kawachi  and  declared  in  favor  of  the  exiled  emperor.  He  con- 
structed a  castle  at  Akasaka,  and  when  it  was  destroyed,  retired 
to  Mount  Kongo  and  there  held  his  ground,  subsequently  develop- 
ing sufficient   strength   to   restore   the   fortifications   at   Akasaka. 


Meanwhile  Prince  Morinaga  raised  troops  and  fought  against  the 
Hojo  at  Yoshino  in  Yamato,  and  afterward  at  Koya  in  Kii.  The 
time  had  now  come  for  the  Hojo  to  put  forth  their  strength.  In 
February,  1133,  a  large  army  was  sent  from  Kamakura  against 
Kyoto,  but  great  numbers  of  fighting  men  flocked  to  the  imperial 
standard  in  Sanyo  and  Nankai,  and  in  the  following  month  the 
exiled  emperor  escaped  from  the  Island  of  Oki  and  proceeded  to 
Hoki,  being  supported  by  Nawa  Nagatoshi,  who  raised  troops  in 


86  JAPAN 

1319-1339 

the  San-in  districts.  The  provinces  of  Hizen  and  Higo  were  also 
on  the  emperor's  side,  as  was  the  powerful  Yiiki  family  of  Mutsu. 
The  Hojo's  army  which  had  been  dispatched  against  Kyoto  suf- 
fered defeat  in  several  engagements.  Takatoki  now  sent  Ashikaga 
Takauji  to  assume  charge  of  the  campaign  in  Kyoto  and  its  neigh- 
borhood. This  was  a  fatal  choice.  For  not  only  was  Takauji 
closely  related  to  the  Minamoto  clan  whom  the  Hojo  had  over- 
thrown, but  he  also  viewed  with  strong  disfavor  the  oppressive  ar- 
bitrariness of  the  latter.  No  sooner  had  he  reached  Kyoto  than  he 
declared  for  the  imperial  cause,  and,  in  concert  with  other  loyalists, 
attacked  and  destroyed  Rokuhara,  the  headquarters  of  the  Hojo 
administration  in  Kyoto.  This  event  occurred  in  May,  1333.  The 
imperial  forces  then  reoccupied  Kyoto.  About  this  time  Nitta 
Yoshisada,  a  renowned  member  of  the  Minamoto,  laid  siege  to  the 
fortress  which  Kusunoki  Masashige  had  constructed  on  Mount 
Kongo,  combining  the  forces  of  the  Hojo  for  the  purpose.  But 
Prince  Morinaga  opened  relations  with  him,  and  in  obedience  to  the 
prince's  secret  instructions  he  pretended  illness,  retired  to  his  own 
province  of  Kozuke,  and  after  consultation  with  his  relatives  and 
partisans,  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  against  Kamakura.  Events 
now  marched  rapidly.  All  the  blood  relatives  of  the  Minamoto 
family  in  Echigo  and  Shinano  came  together,  and  marching  against 
Kamakura  in  great  numbers,  demolished  or  burned  all  the  offices 
and  public  buildings  there.  The  Regent  Takatoki,  together  with 
all  the  members  of  his  family,  committed  suicide,  and  the  rule  of 
the  Hojo  came  to  an  end. 

A  month  later  the  exiled  emperor  leentered  Kyoto  in  state 
and  resumed  the  reins  of  government.  The  eastern  provinces,  some 
of  which  were  still  loyal  to  the  memory  of  the  Hojo,  were  also 
greatly  reduced.  No  sooner  was,  however,  the  imperial  prestige 
assured,  than  difficulties  arose  which  might  long  have  been  ex- 
pected. The  restoration  had  been  effected  by  warriors  of  feudal 
tenure,  whose  merits  had  to  be  rewarded,  and  whose  ambitions  were 
hardly  compatible  with  a  centralized  civil  administration  such  as 
would  naturally  follow  the  return  of  the  imperial  government. 
At  this  juncture  the  emperor's  conduct  was  not  calculated  to  per- 
petuate his  success.  The  estates  of  the  late  Hojo  which  he  had 
confiscated  were  rather  indiscriminately  parceled  among  his  per- 
sonal favorites,  so  that  when  the  case  of  the  warriors  who  had 
rendered  real  service  to  his  cause  had  to  be  considered,  there  was 


TEMPORARY     RESTORATION  87 

1319-1339 

little  left  with  which  to  reward  their  merits.  Also,  private  sol- 
diers and  landlords  of  the  provinces  flocked  to  Kyoto  to  obtain 
confirmed  possession  of  their  holdings  or  additional  grants  for  the 
service  they  claimed  to  have  done  to  the  sovereign.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  was  inevitable  that  discontent  and  disappointment 
should  be  keenly  felt  in  many  quarters,  and  men's  minds  should 
once  more  turn  from  an  artificial  reign  of  peace  to  a  period  of 
unrest  and  plunder.  Nor  was  a  leader  of  exceptional  ability  lack- 
ing to  take  advantage  of  this  state  of  affairs. 

Of  the  two  great  soldiers  of  noble  descent,  Nitta  Yoshisada 
was  comparatively  little  known,  owing  to  the  fact  that  his  ancestor, 
being  on  bad  terms  with  Yoritomo,  had  lived  in  retirement  at  Nitta 
in  Kozuke.  The  other,  Ashikaga  Takauji,  who  was,  like  Yoshi- 
sada, of  the  historic  clan  of  Minamoto,  was  well  known  otherwise 
for  the  marriage  relations  of  his  ancestors  with  the  Hojo.  By 
nature  winning  and  brilliant,  he  enjoyed  both  influence  and  popu- 
larity. The  emperor  himself  was  highly  pleased  by  Takauji's 
achievements,  for  which  he  conferred  on  him  rewards  such  as  no 
one  else  received,  and  authorized  him,  among  other  things,  to  use 
for  the  first  part  of  his  name  one  of  the  ideograms  in  the  name  of 
the  sovereign  himself,  which  was  likewise  pronounced  "  Taka." 
Nothing,  however,  arouses  the  indignation  of  the  nation  of  the 
present  day  more  than  the  story  of  the  way  in  which  Takauji  at- 
tracted the  emperor  and  warriors  to  his  side  for  selfish  interests, 
and  wrought  the  ruin  of  one  after  another  of  all  the  truly  upright 
and  loyal  persons  of  the  day.  The  first  victim  of  Takauji's  grow- 
ing ambition  was  Prince  Morinaga,  who  had  already  doubted  the 
sincerity  of  his  motives.  Takauji  so  prevailed  upon  the  emperor 
as  to  cause  the  prince  to  be  arrested  and  confined  in  Kamakura, 
where  he  was  later  assassinated.  When  the  remaining  partisans 
of  the  Hojo  assembled  in  Shinano  and  marched  against  Kamakura, 
and  Tadayoshi,  Takauji's  brother,  finding  himself  unable  to  defend 
it,  retreated  to  Mikawa,  Takauji  at  once  affected  a  union  with 
Tadayoshi,  destroyed  the  Hojo  partisans,  reoccupied  Kamakura, 
and  bestowed  rewards  lavishly  on  the  captains  and  warriors  who 
had  aided  him.  Now  he  threw  away  the  mask.  Established  on  the 
vantage  ground  of  Kamakura,  he  called  himself  shogun,  and  under 
pretense  of  subduing  Nitta  Yoshisada,  sent  orders  throughout  the 
provinces  directing  that  troops  should  be  raised.  The  emperor, 
whose  eyes  were  at  last  opened,  appointed  Prince  Takanaga  to  the 


88  JAPAN 

1319-1339 

chief  command  of  a  large  army  against  Takauji,  with  Nitta 
Yoshisada  as  chief  of  staff,  and  at  the  same  time  instructed  Kita- 
batake  of  Mutsu  to  attack  Takauji's  rear.  So  began  the  dramatic 
campaign,  the  incidents  of  which  still  appeal  to  the  hearts  of  the 
Japanese  people. 

In  November,  1335,  Yoshisada  encountered  the  forces  of 
Takauji  in  Suruga  and  Mikawa,  and  defeated  them  in  successive 
engagements;  but  Takauji,  and  Tadayoshi  subsequently,  estab- 
lished themselves  at  strong  positions  in  the  Hakone  district,  and 
Yoshisada's  army  attempting  to  dislodge  them,  suffered  a  signal 
defeat  and  was  driven  westward.  This  event  determined  the  va- 
rious provincial  magnates  whose  position  had  been  undefined  to 
declare  for  Takauji,  and  the  Ashikaga  chief  found  himself  strong 
enough,  in  the  following  year,  to  pursue  Yoshisada  and  push  on 
to  Kyoto  itself,  where  in  the  face  of  a  stout  resistance  he  gained 
the  victory.  The  emperor  retreated  to  the  temple  Enryaku-ji. 
Meanwhile,  Kitabatake  Akiiye,  with  an  army  under  the  command 
of  Prince  Yoshinaga,  followed  Takauji  to  Kyoto,  and  having  ef- 
fected a  junction  with  the  forces  of  Nitta  Yoshisada  and  Kusunoki 
Masashige,  succeeded  in  defeating  the  Ashikaga  chief.  Shortly 
afterward  Takauji  sustained  another  severe  defeat  in  Hyogo,  and 
was  compelled  to  retreat  precipitately  westward,  the  imperialists 
once  more  occupying  Kyoto. 

Under  these  reverses,  Takauji  revealed  the  remarkable  re- 
sourcefulness of  his  nature.  The  restoration  of  imperial  authority 
by  Godaigo  had  resulted  in  completely  thrusting  the  princes  of  the 
Jimyo-in  line  into  the  background.  Takauji  descried  an  oppor- 
tunity in  this  circumstance.  Addressing  himself  to  the  dethroned 
Emperor  Kogon,  he  obtained  a  mandate  to  raise  an  army.  With 
remarkable  energy  he  got  together  troops  from  all  parts  of  the 
empire  and  once  more  renewed  the  contest,  defeating  Kikuchi,  Aso, 
Akitsuki,  and  other  supporters  of  the  Daikaku-ji  princes  at 
Tadaranohama.  Stationing  a  trusted  general  in  Kiushu,  with  in- 
structions to  bring  the  provinces  in  that  quarter  under  control,  he 
himself  advanced  eastward  by  land  and  by  sea  at  the  head  of  large 
forces  raised  in  the  west.  Yoshisada  and  Masahige  made  a  des- 
perate stand  in  Hyogo  against  the  Ashikaga  army,  but  were 
defeated.  It  was  then  that  the  pathetic  end  of  Masashige  occurred 
at  Minatogawa.  He  had  always  been  a  steadfast  and  unassuming 
servant  of  the  emperor,  ever  since  he  rose  from  his  retired  residence 


TEMPORARY     RESTORATION  89 

1336-1393 

at  Kawachi  to  champion  the  imperial  cause  against  the  Ho  jo. 
How  with  a  handful  of  soldiers  he  had  defended  his  castle  upon 
Mount  Kongo,  and  how  his  example  had  inspired  other  warriors 
in  the  land  to  take  a  stand  with  the  emperor,  is  a  story  that  the 
Japanese  school  children  love  to  tell.  To  him  more  than  to  any 
other  one  person  had  been  due  the  restoration  of  imperial  rule. 
But  his  wise  counsels  were  no  longer  followed  when  selfish  ambi- 
tion began  to  divide  the  sovereign's  supporters.  Yet  Masashige 
did  not  complain.  Seeing  in  the  last  campaign  that  his  end  had 
come,  he  dissuaded  his  son  Masatsura  from  following  him  in  the 
battle  and  exhorted  him  to  grow  up  to  gather  the  remnants  of  his 
followers  and  to  die  for  the  emperor's  cause.  He  himself  gallantly 
fell  in  battle.  After  his  death  the  imperial  cause,  which  had  al- 
ready begun  to  wane,  could  never  again  master  the  situation. 

Takauji,  who  had  occupied  Kyoto,  enthroned  there  a  Jimyo-in 
prince  as  the  Emperor  Komyo,  and  established  his  shogunate 
at  Muromachi  in  the  capital.  The  Emperor  Godaigo  shortly  after 
repaired  to  Yoshino,  about  fifty  miles  south  of  Kyoto.  For  fifty- 
seven  years  subsequent  to  this  event  (1336- 1393)  two  emperors 
reigned  simultaneously,  one  at  Kyoto  and  the  other  at  Yoshino. 
The  former  was  of  the  Jimyo-in  line  and  the  latter  of  the 
Daikaku-in  line,  now  known  respectively  as  the  Northern  and 
Southern  dynasties    (hoku-cho  and  nan-cho).2    It  was  a  period 

2  Table  showing  genealogy  and  chronology  of  the  Northern  and  Southern 
dynasties. 

DYNASTY   OF  THE   SOUTH. 

96.  Emperor  Godaigo,  [1319-]   1336-1339. 

I 

97.  Emperor  Gomurakami,  1339-1368. 


98.  Emperor  Chokei,  1368-1370.  99.  Emperor  Gokameyama,  1370-1393. 

DYNASTY   OF  THE   NORTH. 

(I.  Kogon,   1332-1336.)  II.  Komyo,  1336-1349- 


III.  Siiko,  1349-1352.  IV.  Gokogon,  1352-1372 

V.  Goenyu,  1 372- 1383. 

VI.  Gokomatsu,  1383-1393  [-1413]. 

In  the  year  1393  a.  d.  the  two  dynasties  became  united  in  the  person  of 
single  sovereign,  Gokomatsu. 


90  JAPAN 

1339-1393 

of  perpetual  conflict  between  the  supporters  of  the  two  imperial 
houses.  Among  the  partisans  of  the  Southern  dynasty  the 
most  puissant  and  popular  were  Nitta  Yoshisada  and  Kitabatake 
Akiiye,  of  whom  the  former  had  his  headquarters  in  Echizen, 
where  he  guarded  the  heir-apparent  of  the  South,  while  the  latter, 
under  the  auspices  of  Prince  Yoshinaga,  held  Mutsu  under  con- 
trol. Soon,  however,  the  armies  of  Ashikaga  overran  Echizen, 
and  Yoshisada  fell  in  battle.  This  was  followed  by  the  death 
of  the  Southern  emperor,  Godaigo  (1339),  who  on  his  death- 
bed summoned  all  the  imperial  princes  to  his  side,  and  laid  upon 
them  his  earnest  injunctions  never  to  rest  until  the  imperial  power 
had  been  restored.  He  was  succeeded  by  Prince  Yoshinaga,  who 
ascended  the  throne  as  Gomurakami. 

A  series  of  reverses  now  overtook  the  imperialists.  One  after 
another  their  armies  were  defeated  in  the  provinces,  until  Kitaba- 
take Chikafusa  alone  remained  unconquered  in  Hitachi.  But  he, 
too,  was  soon  overpowered  by  the  shogun's  forces.  He  effected 
his  escape  to  Yoshino,  and  the  emperor  issued  a  summons  to  the 
warriors  of  Chiugoku  and  Nankai  to  reinforce  the  imperial  army 
in  Kiushu.  The  southern  island  was  thus  once  more  brought  under 
the  imperial  sway,  and  this  success  encouraged  Chikafusa  at 
Yoshino,  who  now  made  one  supreme  effort.  Assembling  a  force 
in  Kyoto  and  its  neighborhood,  he  attempted  to  reoccupy  the  city, 
and  the  suddenness  of  his  effort  seemed  to  him  a  temporary  ad- 
vantage. But  Takauji  dispatched  large  forces  to  attack  the  tem- 
porary palace  at  Yoshino,  the  defenders  of  which  saw  themselves 
utterly  outnumbered.  Kusunoki  Masatsura,  son  of  the  great  Masa- 
shige,  had  hitherto  guarded  the  palace  with  stubborn  bravery.  But 
now  he  and  his  captains  bade  a  final  farewell  to  the  sovereign,  and, 
marching  out  to  encounter  the  foe,  fought  their  last  battle  at  Shijo- 
nawate,  and  fell  fighting.  After  this  victory,  the  shogun's  army 
burned  the  temporary  palace  at  Yoshino,  and  the  emperor  escaped 
to  Anau  in  Yamato. 

Despite  all  these  successes,  the  shogun's  forces  were  unable  to 
crush  the  defense  of  the  dynasty  of  the  South,  as  his  own  armies 
were  often  rent  by  the  disloyalty  and  mutual  jealousy  of  his  imme- 
diate followers.  Even  his  brother  Tadayoshi,  to  whose  stout  sup- 
port Takauji's  success  was  largely  due,  and  his  son  Yoshiakira, 
were  alienated  from  him.  His  generals  and  warriors  had  been 
attracted  to  him  only  from   ambition   and   selfishness,   and  now 


TEMPORARY    RESTORATION  91 

1339-1393 

they  readily  threw  off  their  fealty.  Many  a  soldier  vacillated 
between  the  two  sovereigns,  serving  the  one  who  suited  his  own 
interested  motives  the  better. 

Takauji  died  in  Kyoto  in  1357,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son, 
Yoshiakira.  The  latter  was  followed  in  1368  by  Yoshimitsu.  In 
the  meantime,  the  prestige  of  the  Southern  dynasty  had  further 
been  impaired,  until  finally,  in  1393,  the  Southern  sovereign 
Gokameyama,  handed  over  the  insignia  to  his  Northern  rival, 
Gokomatsu,  and  the  two  dynasties  being  thus  united.  Gokomatsu 
ascended  the  throne  as  the  hundredth  emperor  of  Japan. 


Chapter  IX 

THE   MUROMACHI    PERIOD.     1393-1573 

THE  reason  that  the  Ashikaga  shoguns  established  them- 
selves at  Muromachi  in  Kyoto,  the  civil  capital,  was  that 
the  seat  of  the  Southern  dynasty  being  near  and  the  tide 
of  battle  sweeping  again  and  again  as  far  as  Kyoto,  the  exi- 
gencies of  the  struggle  made  it  necessary  that  the  imperial  city 
should  also  be  the  headquarters  of  the  feudal  government.  Takauji 
had  to  intrust  the  administration  of  the  eastern  provinces  to  his 
son  Motouji,  as  the  regent  (kzvanryo)  at  Kamakura,  and  also  to 
another  general  the  control  of  the  southern  island  of  Kiushu.  At 
first  the  supporters  of  the  Southern  sovereign  kept  busy  the  regent 
of  Kamakura  and  the  warden  of  Kiushu,  who  remained  loyal  to 
the  Muromachi  shogun  so  long  as  this  trouble  lasted.  It  might 
have  been  foreseen,  however,  that  in  time  of  peace  the  vantage 
ground  occupied  by  these  magnates  would  be  turned  against  the  in- 
terests of  the  overlord.  Nor  did  the  central  government  at  Muro- 
machi promise  a  greater  security  to  the  will  of  the  Ashikaga,  for 
its  functions  were  performed  by  men  who,  unlike  several  of  Yori- 
tomo's  counselors,  were  at  the  same  time  the  greatest  landlords  of 
the  country.  They  might  readily  defy  an  effete  shogun  and  lapse 
into  a  bitter  quarrel  among  themselves.  Special  circumstances  were 
not  wanting  to  hasten  the  coming  of  the  logical  consequences  of 
the  careless  organization  of  the  Ashikaga  feudalism. 

It  so  happened  that  the  third  shogun,  Yoshimitsu,  under  whom 
the  rule  of  the  Ashikaga  seemed  to  have  risen  to  its  height,  was 
also  arbitrary  and  vainglorious.  He  ceded  the  shogunate,  in  1393, 
to  his  son  Yoshimochi,  and  received  for.  himself  the  appointment  of 
chief  minister  of  state  (daijo  daijin),  an  unprecedented  procedure 
for  a  feudal  overlord  since  Yoritomo.  After  a  brief  interval,  how- 
ever, he  resigned  that  post  also,  and  having  adopted  the  tonsure, 
nominally  retired  from  official  life.  Always  prone  to  luxury,  he 
now  more  freely  than  ever  gave  the  reins  to  his  fancy  for  pomp 
and  splendor.     Whenever  he  moved  abroad,  he  was  accompanied 

99 


MUROMACHI     PERIOD  93 

1393-1573 

by  an  escort  large  enough  for  an  ex-emperor,  and  such  was  the 
magnificence  of  his  mansion  at  Muromachi  and  so  great  the  profu- 
sion of  blossoming  trees  among  which  it  stood,  that  men  gave  to 
it  the  name  of  the  Palace  of  Flowers.  After  his  retirement  from 
official  life  he  established  his  residence  at  Kitayama,  where  he 
erected  a  three-storied  house  with  timbers  and  stones  of  the  finest 
quality,  contributed  by  the  territorial  magnates  of  the  land.  Its 
columns,  doors,  alcoves,  ceilings,  and  floors  were  decorated  with 
gold  dust.  Nothing  could  exceed  the  elegance  and  splendor  of  this 
edifice.  The  people  called  it  "  Kinkaku-ji,"  or  the  golden  temple, 
and  it  stands  to  this  day  one  of  the  most  interesting  relics  of  ancient 
Kyoto.  On  the  completion  of  this  gorgeous  mansion,  Yoshimitsu 
— or  Tenzan  Dogi  as  he  was  then  called — took  up  his  residence 
there,  and  thither  all  the  magnates  of  state  had  to  repair  in  order  to 
obtain  his  sanction  for  administrative  measures.  Banquets  were 
often  given  there  on  a  sumptuous  scale,  the  illustrious  host  amusing 
himself  and  his  guests  with  displays  of  music  and  dancing — Budo, 
Samgaku,  and  Shirabyoshi.  The  example  thus  set  by  the  ex- 
shogun  was  readily  imitated  by  the  military  men  of  the  time,  and 
to  support  all  this  luxury,  it  became  necessary  to  increase  the  bur- 
den of  taxation.  Yoshimitsu  had  strong  faith  in  Buddhist  doc- 
trines, and  devoted  large  sums  to  the  building  of  temples.  The 
doctrines  of  the  Zen  sect  found  special  favor  with  him,  and  its 
priests  were  the  recipients  of  much  munificence  at  his  hands.  He 
levied  contributions  on  all  the  provinces  for  the  purpose  of  erecting 
for  the  sect  in  Kyoto  a  temple  of  unparalleled  magnificence  called 
Shokoku-ji. 

Amid  the  exercise  of  all  this  pomp  and  while  the  power  of 
the  shogunate  was  thus  supreme  from  end  to  end  of  the  country, 
the  seeds  of  future  misfortune  were  sown.  Not  long  after  the  death 
of  Yoshimitsu  the  country  began  to  fall  into  disorder.  The  gen- 
erals and  military  partisans  of  the  Southern  dynasty  supposed  that 
a  return  to  the  system  of  alternate  succession  between  the  two  lines 
of  Jimyo-in  and  Daikaku-ji  had  formed  part  of  the  arrangement 
under  which  peace  was  restored,  in  1393,  and  Gokomatsu  raised  to 
the  throne.  Hence,  after  the  demise  of  that  sovereign,  they  looked 
to  see  a  prince  of  the  Southern  line  assume  the  scepter.  But  the 
shogun's  government  crowned  Shoko,  of  the  Northern  line.  Dis- 
contented with  this  act,  Kitabatake  Mitsumasa  of  Ise  declared 
war  against  the  shogun,  and  a  number  of  military  men  in  or  about 


94  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

Kyoto  and  in  Mutsu  raised  the  standard  of  revolt.  Serious  dis- 
turbance was  averted  on  that  occasion  by  the  shogun's  promising 
that  a  prince  of  the  Southern  line  should  be  the  next  sovereign. 
The  partisans  of  the  latter  dynasty  imagined,  therefore,  that  at  the 
death  of  Shoko,  Prince  Ogura,  a  son  of  Gokameyama,  would  come 
to  the  throne,  whereas  the  Ashikaga  family,  disregarding  the  en- 
gagement entered  into  by  its  chief,  again  secured  the  succession  to 
a  prince  of  the  Northern  dynasty.1  This  breach  of  faith  led  to 
a  renewed  demonstration  by  Kitabatake,  who,  in  collusion  with 
the  military  men  at  Kamakura,  unsheathed  the  sword  in  behalf  of 
the  son  of  Prince  Ogura.  There  rose  also  another  revolt  in 
Yamato.  The  supporters  of  the  Southern  line,  however,  never 
effected  any  material  success.  But  before  their  energy  withered 
away,  combats  and  tumults  of  the  most  inveterate  character  devas- 
tated the  land.  The  Ashikaga  shoguns  found  themselves  per- 
petually confronted  by  disturbance  and  disaffection.  One,  probably 
the  principal,  cause  of  the  frequent  insurrections,  was  that  the 
Ashikaga  made  immense  grants  of  land  to  their  supporters  without, 
at  the  same  time,  elaborating  some  efficient  system  for  the  control 
of  the  territorial  magnates  thus  created.  Many  nobles  developed 
such  puissance  under  these  circumstances,  and  acquired  command 
of  such  vast  local  resources,  that  they  gave  themselves  no  concern 
whatever  about  any  government,  whether  that  of  Kyoto  or  that 
of  Muromachi,  and  sided  with  whatever  party  they  found  most 
convenient.  Personal  ambition  and  individual  aggrandizement 
were  too  often  the  ruling  motives  of  the  time.  No  bonds  proved 
strong  enough  to  secure  men's  union  amid  these  scenes  of  tumult. 
Even  brothers,  as  in  the  time  of  Takauji  and  Yoshinori,  did  not 
hesitate  to  belong  to  opposite  camps,  nor  were  other  family  ties 
considered  more  sacred.  In  the  days  of  Yoshimitsu,  a  great  terri- 
torial magnate,  Yamana  Ujikiyo,  whose  estates  extended  over  ten 
provinces  so  that  men  spoke  of  him  as  Rokubuichi-shi  (lord  of  a 
sixth  of  Japan),  took  up  arms  against  the  Ashikaga.  So,  too, 
Ouchi  Yoshihiro  rebelled  because  his  success  in  subjugating  Kiushu 

1  ioo.  Emperor  Gokomatsu,  1383-1413. 

101.  Emperor  Shoko,  1413-1429. 

102.  Emperor  Gohanazono,  1429-1465. 

103.  Emperor  Gotsuchimikado,  1465-1501. 


MUROMACHI     PERIOD  95 

1333-1573 

had  given  him  confidence  in  his  own  powers.  The  regent  at 
Kamakura,  also,  to  whom  was  entrusted  the  government  of  the 
eastern  provinces,  became  so  puissant  that  his  influence  almost 
equaled  that  of  the  shogun,  who  regarded  the  growth  of  his  rela- 
tive's power  with  no  little  uneasiness.  So  independent  was  the 
attitude  of  this  Kamakura  official  and  so  openly  did  he  affect 
autonomic  state,  that  we  find  him  adopting  the  precedent  of  the 
Muromachi  ruler  and  nominating  two  of  the  Uyesugi  family — 
Yamanouchi  and  Inugake — to  the  office  of  kwanryo  or  regents. 
Immense  estates  were  also  held  by  the  branch  house  of  Ogigayatsu 
Mitsukane,  grandson  of  the  first  Kamakura  kwanryo.  Motouji 
(son  of  Ashikaga  Takauji),  carried  away  apparently  by  his  wealth 
and  strength,  supported  the  insurrection  of  Ouchi  Yoshihiro,  men- 
tioned above,  but  had  no  difficulty  in  making  peace  with  the  Muro- 
machi shogun  on  the  defeat  and  downfall  of  Yoshihiro.  Thus 
feud  succeeded  feud,  and  campaign,  campaign,  arising  out  of  the 
universal  creed  that  a  prize  scarcely  inferior  to  the  scepter  itself  lay 
within  reach  of  any  noble  whose  territorial  influence  and  military 
puissance  enabled  him  to  grasp  it. 

On  the  death  of  the  fourth  Ashikaga  shogun,  Yoshimochi,  in 
1428,  there  was  no  heir  in  the  direct  line  to  succeed  him,  his  son 
Yoshikazu  having  died  in  childhood.  His  younger  brother,  Prince 
Giyen,  but  later  named  Yoshinori,  was  supported  to  the  shogunate 
by  the  kwanryo.  This  chagrined  the  Kamakura  administrator, 
Ashikaga  Mochiuji,  who  had  aspired  to  the  office,  and  who  now 
entered  into  an  open  warfare  with  the  Kwanryo  Uyesugi  Norizane 
and  the  new  shogun.  Mochiuji  was  defeated,  and  the  Uyesugi 
family  intrusted  with  the  sole  administrative  control  in  the  eastern 
provinces. 

Yoshinori,  although  a  man  of  rare  administrative  ability  and 
military  achievement,  was  vain  and  profligate,  and  treated  his  gen- 
erals and  samurai  with  contempt.  An  object  of  his  constant  dislike 
was  Akamatsu  Mitsusuke,  whom  he  ridiculed  because  of  his  short 
stature  and  upon  whom  he  put  many  slights.  This  Mitsusuke  was 
the  grandson  of  Akamatsu  Norimura,  who,  in  consideration  of  con- 
spicuous services  rendered  to  the  Ashikaga  in  the  days  of  Takauji, 
had  received,  and  bequeathed  to  his  children,  broad  estates.  The 
shogun's  dislike  for  Mitsusuke  was  exceeded  only  by  his  affection 
for  a  relative  of  the  latter,  Sadamura.  He  would  fain  have  de- 
prived  Mitsusuke  of  his  domains   in  order  to  bestow  them  on 


96  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

Sadamura.  Mitsusuke  was  indignant  at  the  notion  of  such  con- 
fiscation in  the  absence  of  any  misdeed  to  justify  it.  In  June,  1441, 
he  invited  the  shogun  to  his  mansion,  where  a  splendid  banquet 
was  spread  and  a  new  kind  of  dancing  was  displayed.  While  the 
entertainment  was  in  progress,  Mitsusuke  killed  and  decapitated 
Yoshinori,  set  fire  to  the  house,  and  carrying  with  him  the  head 
of  the  shogun,  fled  to  Harima.  Thereafter  Yoshikazu,  eldest  son 
of  Yoshinori,  was  proclaimed  shogun  by  the  kwanryo.  Hosokawa 
Mochiyuki  and  Yamana  Mochitoyo,  having  received  the  emperor's 
mandate,  marched  against  Mitsusuke,  destroyed  his  castle  of  Shira- 
hata  and  killed  him.  Yoshikazu  commissioned  Mochitoyo  to  gov- 
ern the  three  provinces  over  which  Mitsusuke  had  ruled,  and  the 
Akamatsu  family  was  exterminated. 

Yoshikazu  died  in  childhood  and  was  succeeded  in  the  sho- 
gunate  in  1449  by  his  younger  brother  Yoshimasa,  who  thus  be- 
came the  eighth  Ashikaga  shogun,  the  Kwanryo  Hatakeyama 
Mochikuni  being  intrusted  with  the  administration  of  affairs  and 
showing  great  zeal  in  the  service  of  the  shogunate.  As  Yoshimasa 
grew  older  he  gave  himself  up  to  sensual  excesses,  and  paid  no 
attention  to  business  of  state,  leaving  everything  in  the  hands  of 
favorite  officers.  Thus  by  degrees  disaffection  began  to  appear 
among  the  generals  and  samurai.  Moreover,  the  two  kwanryo 
Hatakeyama  and  Shiba,  ceased  to  work  harmoniously  and  engaged 
in  competition  for  the  possession  of  power.  Taking  advantage  of 
this  state  of  affairs,  the  partisans  of  the  Southern  dynasty  once 
more  raised  their  heads  and  Kyoto  again  witnessed  scenes  of  dis- 
order, while  Mochiuji's  party  renewed  their  opposition  in  the 
Kwanto  and  the  rebellion  of  the  Shoni  family  still  continued  in 
the  west.  Yoshimasa,  nevertheless,  continued  his  life  of  extrava- 
gance, devoting  great  sums  to  the  gratification  of  his  pleasures  and 
to  the  building  of  a  magnificent  mansion.  Careless  of  the  dilapi- 
dated condition  of  the  capital,  Kyoto,  he  caused  the  celebrated 
pavilion  Ginkaku-ji  to  be  constructed  at  Higashiyama,  covering 
the  doors,  walls,  and  ceilings  with  dust  of  silver  in  order  to  rival 
the  golden  pavilion  (Kinkaku-ji)  built  by  Yoshimitsu  at  Kitayama. 
In  this  new  building  he  brought  together  rare  paintings  and  costly 
objects  of  virtu,  Chinese  and  Japanese,  and  there  also,  in  chambers 
specially  planned  for  the  purpose,  he  inaugurated  the  tea  cere- 
monial (cha-no-yu),  afterward  so  fashionable  in  Japan,  devoting 
his  days  to  the  practice  of  effeminate  dilettanteism. 


MUROMACHI     PERIOD  97 

1393-1573 

Official  duties  received  no  attention,  and  by  degrees  his  financial 
circumstances  became  so  straitened  that,  finding  it  impossible 
to  procure  money  for  the  indulgence  of  his  whims,  he  began 
to  lay  heavy  imposts  on  the  people  of  the  provinces  and  on  the  mer- 
chants of  Kyoto  especially,  who  were  taxed  five  or  six  times  in 
the  course  of  the  year.  Under  these  circumstances,  great  discontent 
prevailed  and  riots  occurred,  the  poor  breaking  into  the  houses 
of  the  wealthy,  and  destroying  all  certificates  of  debt  that  were 
found  there,  by  which  means  the  shogun  himself  was  simultaneously 
relieved  of  his  monetary  obligations.  To  this  device,  endorsed  in 
effect,  as  it  was,  by  the  authorities,  the  people  mockingly  gave  the 
name  of  tokusei,  or  the  government  of  virtue,  and  Yoshimasa  found 
it  altogether  to  his  taste,  since  it  extricated  him  from  many  of  his 
financial  embarrassments.  The  shogun  did  not  even  shrink  from 
sending  envoys  to  China  with  instructions  to  prefer  requests  for 
money  to  the  Chinese  government,  and  the  latter  were  not  un- 
willing thus  to  purchase  immunity  from  the  raids  to  which  their 
ports  were  exposed  at  the  hands  of  Kiushu  pirates.  Under 
Yoshimasa's  administration  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  sho- 
gunate  declined  sensibly;  the  affairs  of  state  fell  into  confusion; 
the  most  cruel  mandates  were  frequently  issued ;  customs  opposed 
to  the  dictates  of  humanity  and  the  principles  of  morality  prevailed ; 
the  kwanryo,  following  the  shogun's  example,  subserved  the 
duties  of  their  office  to  selfish  ends,  and  finally  this  hopeless  mis- 
government  culminated  in  the  celebrated  war  of  the  Ojin  era, 
marking  the  darkest  age  of  Japan's  history. 

The  proximate  causes  of  the  Ojin  conflict  are  to  be  sought  in 
personal  ambition.  Yoshimasa,  weary  of  official  duties,  deter- 
mined to  intrust  to  his  younger  brother,  Gijin,  the  task  of  adminis- 
tering affairs.  Gijin  had  entered  the  priesthood.  He  was  not 
averse,  however,  to  falling  in  with  Yoshimasa's  plan  on  condition 
that  in  the  event  of  a  child  being  born  to  the  latter,  it  should  be  de- 
voted to  a  life  of  religion.  This  compact  having  been  made,  Gijin 
abandoned  the  priesthood,  and  taking  the  name  of  Yoshimi,  as- 
sumed the  direction  of  the  affairs  of  the  shogunate,  Hosokawa 
Kazumoto  acting  as  controller  of  his  household.  By  and  by,  how- 
ever, Yoshimasa's  wife  bore  a  son,  Yoshihisa,  and  being  ambitious 
that  her  child  should  succeed  to  the  shogunate,  instead  of  retiring 
to  the  cloister,  she  took  into  her  confidence  Yamana  Sozen,  a  noble- 
man  possessing   domains   as   ample   and   power   as   extensive   as 


98  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

Hosokawa  Kazumoto  himself,  the  idea  of  the  confederates  being 
to  contrive  the  abdication  of  Yoshimi.  A  parallel  conjuncture 
occurred  in  the  family  of  Hatakeyama  Mochikuni,  the  kwanryo. 
Having-  no  son,  he  nominated  his  nephew  Masanaga  to  succeed 
him,  but  on  the  subsequent  birth  of  his  son  Yoshinari,  he  resolved 
to  deprive  Masanaga  of  the  distinction.  Further,  the  vassals  of 
the  other  kwanryo,  Shiba,  became  split  up  into  two  parties,  one 
espousing  the  cause  of  Yoshikado,  the  other  that  of  Yoshitoki. 
Yoshikado  and  Yoshinari  allied  themselves  with  Yamana  Sozen, 
and  Masanaga  and  Yoshitoshi  were  supported  by  Hosokawa 
Kazumoto. 

The  enmity  between  these  rival  factions  gradually  deepened, 
until  in  the  first  year  of  the  Ojin  era,  1467,  Sozen  attempted 
to  remove  Hatakeyama  Masanaga  from  the  office  of  kwanryo, 
and  to  replace  him  by  Yoshinari,  at  the  same  time  expelling 
the  partisans  of  Kazumoto  from  the  Hatakeyama  house.  A 
collision  ensued  in  Kyoto  between  the  parties  of  Masanaga  and 
Yoshinari,  and  the  shogun  gave  orders  that  they  should  settle  their 
dispute  by  a  combat,  the  guards  attached  to  them  alone  taking  part 
in  the  duel.  Sozen,  however,  contrived  secretly  to  render  aid  to 
Yoshinari,  so  that  Masanaga  suffered  defeat.  This  result  caused 
much  chagrin  to  Hosokawa  Kazumoto,  who  considered  that  his 
honor  was  tarnished  by  his  failure  to  assist  Masanaga.  He,  there- 
fore, privately  assembled  all  his  troops  and  partisans,  to  the  num- 
ber of  about  a  hundred  thousand,  and  posting  them  to  the  east  of 
Muromachi,  guarded  the  residence  of  Yoshimasa.  Sozen,  on  his 
side,  mustered  a  force  of  some  ninety  thousand,  and  encamped  on 
the  west  of  Muromachi.  Then  commenced  a  long  series  of  fights 
in  which  victory  nearly  always  rested  with  Kazumoto's  side. 
Kazumoto  had  the  countenance  of  the  retired  shogun,  Yoshimasa, 
and  also  procured  the  recognition  of  the  emperor  and  ex-emperor, 
while  Sozen,  taking  advantage  of  the  strained  relations  between 
Yoshimasa  and  his  successor  Yoshimi,  invited  the  latter  to  join 
him,  and  also  obtained  the  support  of  the  former  partisans  of  the 
Southern  dynasty  by  declaring  in  favor  of  the  grandson  of  Prince 
Ogura. 

Combats  occurred  almost  daily,  and  were  accompanied  by  nu- 
merous conflagrations.  The  citizens  of  Kyoto  fled  from  the  city, 
and  the  streets  were  left  desolate.  In  1470  Sozen  and  Kazumoto 
both  died,  but  their  parties  continued  to  fight  as  fiercely  as  ever. 


1393-1573 


MUROMACHI     PERIOD 


99 


Not  until  1477,  when  Yoshimi  had  escaped  to  Mino,  did  the  gen- 
erals abandon  the  campaign  and  retire  to  their  castles. 

Kyoto  had  then  been  a  battlefield  for  over  eleven  years,  and 
during  the  course  of  the  fierce  fighting,  the  imperial  palace,  the 
mansions  of  the  nobles,  the  residences  and  warehouses  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  many  of  the  largest  temples,  had  been  burned  to  the 
ground,  books  and  documents  transmitted  from  ancient  times  and 


invaluable  heirlooms  and  works  of  art  being  destroyed  at  the  same 
time.  In  truth,  the  once  splendid  city  was  reduced,  after  this 
war,  to  a  state  of  desolation  and  ruin.  The  military  and  civilian 
classes  alike  were  plunged  in  poverty.  The  laws  were  discarded; 
the  administration  of  justice  was  in  disorder.  The  territorial  mag- 
nates in  the  provinces  discontinued  the  payment  of  taxes,  closed 
their  districts  against  communication  from  without,  and  governed 
according  to  their  own  will.    The  mandates  of  the  sovereign  com- 


100  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

manded  no  respect.  After  the  palace  was  leveled  with  the  ground 
its  inner  buildings  were  later  reconstructed,  but,  inasmuch  as  the 
territorial  magnates  ceased  to  pay  taxes  to  the  central  government, 
the  court  nobles  found  themselves  without  revenues  and  the  admin- 
istrative officials  were  without  salaries,  so  that  some  of  them  had 
no  resource  but  to  wander  about  the  country  and  depend  on  the 
farmers  for  means  of  sustenance.  Under  such  circumstances  the 
usual  court  ceremonials  were,  of  course,  dispensed  with.  Such  was 
the  impecuniosity  in  Kyoto  that  the  Emperor  Gotsuchimikado  was 
unable  to  hold  the  wonted  ceremony  on  the  occasion  of  his  acces- 
sion, and  at  the  time  of  his  death,  his  funeral  rites  could  not  be 
performed  owing  to  lack  of  funds  for  the  funeral.  It  was  not  until 
the  utmost  exertions  had  been  employed  that  the  sum  of  a  thou- 
sand hiki  (2500  yen)  was  collected  and  the  burial  rites  were 
performed.  On  the  succession  of  Gokashiwabara,  also,  the  corona- 
tion ceremony  had  to  be  abandoned  for  similar  reasons,  nor  could 
it  be  performed  until  twenty-two  years  had  elapsed,  when  the  lord 
abbot  of  Hongwan-ji  contributed  a  sum  of  ten  thousand  pieces  of 
gold  for  the  purpose.  While  Gonara  was  on  the  throne,  even  the 
daily  necessaries  of  life  could  not  be  procured  in  the  imperial  court 
without  difficulty,  neither  could  the  palace  buildings  be  repaired, 
though  they  had  fallen  into  a  state  of  much  dilapidation.  The 
court,  at  that  era,  experienced  the  extremity  of  poverty.  It  is  on 
record  that  Sanjonishi  Sanetaka,  one  of  the  courtiers,  persuaded 
Ouchi  Yoshitaka  to  provide  funds  for  carrying  out  the  coronation 
ceremony,  which  must  otherwise  have  been  left  in  abeyance;  and 
that  the  Emperor  Ogimachi,  under  similar  circumstances,  had  re- 
course to  the  pecuniary  assistance  of  Mori  Motonari.2 

Not  less  did  the  shogun  himself  suffer  in  this  period  of  great 
decentralization  and  lawlessness.  He  was  a  tool  in  the  hands  of 
the  kwanryo,  and  the  house  of  the  latter  was  divided  against  itself. 
The  stories  of  usurpations  and  murders,  which  continually  dis- 
figured the  annals  of  this  period,  are  too  tedious  to  be  related. 
Finally,  in  1565,  the  Shogun  Yoshiteru  was  assassinated  by  a 
rear  vassal,  and  his  brother,  Yoshiaki,  fled  for  life.    It  was  in  this 

2  The  following  is  the  list  of  the  emperors  of  this  period : 

103.  Emperor  Gotsuchimikado,  1465-1501. 

104.  Emperor  Gokashiwabara,  1501-1527. 

105.  Emperor  Gonara,  1527- 1558. 

106.  Emperor  Ogimachi,  1558-1587. 

107.  Emperor  Goyozei,  1587-1612, 


MUROMACHI     PERIOD  101 

1393-1573 

connection  that  the  great  warrior-statesman,  Oda  Nobunaga,  came 
to  the  front,  for  through  his  aid  Yoshiaki  regained  his  ground 
and  rose  to  the  shogunate.  Unfortunately  the  young  shogun  was 
unable  to  brook  the  overshadowing  power  of  Nobunaga,  and  took 
means  to  compass  his  ruin.  The  contest  which  followed  proved 
too  unequal.  In  1573,  Yoshiaki  forsook  his  office  and  fled  to 
Kawachi,  thus  ending  the  two  hundred  and  fifty-eight  years  of  the 
Ashikaga  rule,3  as  well  as  a  century  and  a  half  of  lawlessness. 

Having  briefly  sketched  the  political  history  of  the  Muro- 
machi  period,  we  shall  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  remarkable 
history  of  the  foreign  relations  of  this  era.  After  the  repulse 
of  Kublai  Khan's  invasion  in  the  thirteenth  century,  the  sovereign 
and  people  of  China  conceived  sufficient  respect  for  the  prowess 
of  the  Japanese  to  refrain  from  any  renewed  onset.  But  the  priests 
of  the  two  empires  continued  to  communicate  with  one  another. 
When  the  long  and  bitter  struggle  between  the  rival  dynasties 
greatly  impoverished  the  country,  some  of  the  larger  provincial 
nobles  sought  to  replenish  their  exchequers  by  engaging  in  trade 
with  China  and  Korea.  The  custom  of  officially  recognized  trad- 
ing with  China  also  came  into  vogue  from  that  time,  restrictions 
being  imposed  on  the  number  of  ships  engaged  and  the  amount  of 
capital  involved.  Perhaps  more  noteworthy  than  the  trade  are  the 
exploits  of  the  Japanese  pirates,  for  about  this  time  the  Japanese 
living  on  the  southwestern  coasts  began  to  make  raids  upon  the 
seaside  towns  of  China  and  Korea,  taking  advantage  of  the  internal 
dissensions  then  prevailing  in  those  countries.  These  raiders  were 
aided  by  Chinese  insurgents,  and  entered  the  districts  of  Shantung, 
Fuhkien,  and  Sikkong,  burning  towns  and  putting  the  inhabitants 
to  the  sword.  They  were  in  China  called  wako,  whose  very  name 
struck  terror  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  coast.  From  1369  the 
dynasty  of  Ming,  which  had  just  overthrown  Yuan,  sent  envoys 

*The  shoguns  of  the  Ashikaga  family  and  the  years  of  their  rule  were  as 
follows : 

1.  Ashikaga  Takauji,  1335-1358.  8.  Ashikaga  Yoshimasa,  1449-1473. 

2.  Ashikaga  Yoshiakira,  1358-1367.  9.  Ashikaga  Yoshihisa,  1473-1489. 

3.  Ashikaga  Yoshimitsu,  1367-1394.         10.  Ashikaga  Yoshimura,  1489-1493 

4.  Ashikaga  Yoshimochi,  1394-1423  and  1508-1521. 

and  1425-1428.  II.  Ashikaga  Yoshizumi,  1493-1508. 

5.  Ashikaga  Yoshikazu,  1423-1425.  12.  Ashikaga  Yoshiharu,  1521-1545. 

6.  Ashikaga  Yoshinori,  1428-1441.  13.  Ashikaga  Yoshiteru,  1545-1565. 

7.  Ashikaga  Yoshikatsu,   1441-1449.  14.  Ashikaga  Yoshinaga,  1565-1568, 

15.  Ashikaga  Yoshiaki,  1568-1573. 


102  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

to  Japan  urging"  that  steps  be  taken  to  prevent  the  raids  of  Japanese 
pirates  into  Chinese  territory,  but  no  satisfactory  steps  were  taken. 
A  more  serious  complication  was  barely  averted  when,  in  1384,  an 
envoy  sent  to  China  by  the  Southern  dynasty  of  Japan  entered  into 
a  plot  in  collusion  with  one  of  the  Chinese  ministers,  Hu  Weiyung, 
to  assassinate  the  father  of  the  Chinese  emperor.  The  plot  was 
discovered,  and  the  incensed  sovereign  would  have  sent  an  expedi- 
tion against  Japan  had  he  not  recalled  the  ill  success  attending 
the  Chinese  arms  in  previous  conflicts  with  the  Japanese.  He 
contented  himself  with  the  issue  of  an  edict  forbidding  all  further 
intercourse  with  the  Japanese.  Stringent  measures  were  at  the 
same  time  taken  for  the  defense  of  the  coast. 

Korea  also  had  suffered  severely  from  the  attacks  of  Japanese 
pirates,  who  engaged  in  open  conflict  with  the  Korean  troops, 
killing  their  generals,  destroying  their  barracks,  and  plundering 
houses,  ships,  and  grain-stores.  In  these  encounters  the  army  of 
Korea  showed  lack  of  courage,  frequently  retreating  before  the 
Japanese  raiders  without  striking  a  blow.  The  earnest  requests 
of  the  Korean  king,  in  1367  and  1375,  that  measures  should  be 
taken  to  repress  the  pirates,  were  only  met  by  the  increased  auda- 
city of  the  Japanese  raiders.  In  1392  Li  Sei-kei,  a  Korean  general 
who  had  been  commissioned  to  beat  back  the  Japanese,  raised  the 
standard  of  revolt  and  usurped  the  sovereignty,  changing  the  name 
of  the  country  from  Korai  to  Chosen.  He  dispatched  an  envoy 
to  Japan,  seeking  to  establish  amicable  relations,  and  the  Shogun 
Yoshimitsu  ordered  Ouchi,  governor  of  Kiushu,  to  treat  the  dele- 
gate with  all  courtesy.  Thereafter  Japan  often  asked  for  books 
of  various  kinds  and  Buddhist  manuscripts,  and  the  Koreans 
showed  the  utmost  goodwill  in  acceding  to  these  requisitions.  Nev- 
ertheless the  littoral  population  of  Japan  did  not  desist  from  raid- 
ing the  Korean  coasts. 

After  the  union  of  the  Northern  and  Southern  dynasties,  the 
ex-Shogun  Yoshimitsu  frequently  sent  envoys  to  China,  and  on 
several  occasions  caused  the  pirates  to  be  arrested  and  handed  over 
to  the  Chinese.  Much  pleased  at  this  action,  the  Chinese  emperor 
sent  to  Japan,  in  1404,  a  hundred  tickets  (kango)  of  the  nature  of 
passports,  and  from  that  time,  once  in  every  ten  years,  gifts  were 
forwarded  from  China  to  a  fixed  number  of  ships  with  a  fixed 
personnel,  the  articles  sent  consisting  of  head-gear,  garments, 
brocade,  gold,   antiquities,   and  old  pictures.      Even   an   imperial 


MUROM  ACHI     PERIOD  103 

T393-1573 

commission  of  investiture  was  also  sent,  for  China  habitually  re- 
garded other  nations  as  tributary  to  herself.  Yoshimitsu  seems  to 
have  condoned  the  nominal  humiliation  so  long  as  he  was  certain 
of  the  gifts  of  the  sovereign  of  the  Middle  State,  but  when  at  his 
death  the  Ming  sovereign  dispatched  an  envoy  to  confer  on  the 
deceased  shogun  the  posthumous  title  of  Kyoken-o  (the  King 
Kyoken)  and  to  offer  various  gifts,  the  new  Shogun  Yoshimochi 
politely,  but  emphatically,  declined  to  receive  these  marks  of  favor. 
This  incident  terminated  the  official  intercourse  between  Japan  and 
China.     Trade  relations,  however,  still  continued. 

A  striking  incident  occurred  in  141 9,  when  a  flotilla  of  thir- 
teen hundred  ships  of  war  from  Mongolia,  Korea,  and  Namban 
(the  countries  south  of  China)  appeared  off  Tsushima.  The 
Kiushu  barons,  headed  by  the  So  and  the  Shibukawa  families,  who 
held  the  office  of  governors  of  Kiushu,  beat  off  the  invaders  and 
slaughtered  an  immense  number  of  them.  Thenceforth  Korea  held 
Japan  in  awe  and  made  no  attempts  against  her.  In  1440  the 
Korean  government  established  amicable  relations  with  the  So 
family,  sent  presents  of  valuable  books  and  opened  commercial 
intercourse.  The  same  year  another  Chinese  envoy  arrived  with 
dispatches  demanding  in  a  peremptory  tone  the  establishment  of 
amity  between  the  two  empires,  but  the  Shogun  Yoshimochi  de- 
clined to  entertain  the  proposal.  In  the  time  of  the  Shogun 
Yoshinori,  however,  official  intercourse  with  China  was  reopened, 
the  emperor  sending  to  Japan  two  hundred  tickets  in  the  nature 
of  passports  which  were  placed  by  the  shogunate  in  the  charge 
of  the  Ouchi  family.  The  So  family  was  then  appointed  to  control 
the  trade  with  Korea,  that  with  China  being  intrusted  to  Ouchi. 
Under  the  Shogun  Yoshimasa  intercourse  with  China  received  con- 
siderable development,  and  parcels  of  books  as  well  as  quantities 
of  copper  coin  were  frequently  forwarded  to  Japan  at  her  request. 
The  Ming  sovereigns  always  complied  with  Japan's  wishes  in  these 
matters,  but  considerable  irregularities  occurred  in  the  trade  be- 
tween the  two  nations,  owing  to  selfish  disregard  of  the  regulations 
issued  for  its  control.  Moreover,  Japanese  from  Kiushu  and 
other  places  crossed  over  to  China,  carrying  with  them  not  only 
legitimate  articles  of  trade,  but  also  implements  of  war.  They  pre- 
tended that  the  latter  were  gifts  from  the  Japanese  government  to 
China,  but  they  did  not  hesitate  to  use  them  for  purposes  of  intimi- 
dation when  they  found  an  opportunity  to  plunder  the  Chinese. 


104.  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

Still  later,  in  the  closing  years  of  the  Ashikaga  shogunate, 
outlaws  from  Kiushu  entered  China  and  Korea  in  constantly  in- 
creasing numbers  for  purposes  of  plunder,  the  provinces  on  the 
Chinese  littoral  sustaining  great  injury  at  the  hands  of  these 
marauders.  On  the  flags  of  the  Japanese  piratical  ships  were 
inscribed  the  ideograms  Hachiman-gu  (Hachiman,  the  God  of 
War).  The  Chinese  consequently  termed  these  vessels  Papan-sen, 
"  Papan  "  being  the  Chinese  pronunciation  of  "  Hachiman,"  and 
regarded  them  with  the  greatest  apprehension.  With  them,  too, 
Chinese  pirates  were  associated,  and  the  people  of  China  suffered 
so  much  from  their  raids  that  the  emperor  deputed  two  of  his 
principal  generals  to  attack  and  destroy  the  raiders,  but  the  task 
could  not  be  successfully  accomplished.  From  Korea,  too,  came 
a  request  to  the  So  family  that  they  would  restrain  the  Japanese 
from  further  incursions  into  the  peninsula,  but  the  head  of  the 
family  paid  no  heed,  and  the  result  was  that  the  Koreans  treated 
with  great  cruelty  a  number  of  the  inhabitants  of  Tsushima  who 
happened  to  be  sojourning  in  the  peninsula.  This  procedure  so 
enraged  the  people  of  Tsushima  that,  in  1510,  they  attacked  Fusan 
in  force,  and  having  destroyed  its  fortifications,  returned  unmo- 
lested to  Tsushima.  After  this,  the  pillage  of  the  Korean  coast 
towns  by  Japanese  pirates  continued  without  intermission.  It  will 
be  seen  in  the  next  chapter  that  this  long  history  of  piracy  in  Korea 
culminated  in  an  organized  invasion  into  the  peninsula  of  large 
Japanese  forces  under  the  leadership  of  their  best  generals. 

The  closing  days  of  the  Ashikaga  shogunate  are  also  noted  for 
the  opening  of  Japan's  relations  with  the  Europeans.  Merchant- 
men of  Portugal  arrived  for  the  first  time,  in  1541,  at  the  Island 
of  Tanegashima,  off  the  coast  of  Osumi.  They  subsequently  visited 
Kagoshima,  and  thence  proceeded  to  Bungo,  where  their  captains 
concluded  with  the  nobleman  Otomo  Sorin  a  convention  opening 
commercial  intercourse.  Thenceforth  Portuguese  vessels  fre- 
quently visited  Kiushu  for  purposes  of  trade,  the  people  competing 
with  each  other  to  purchase  the  rare  and  valuable  articles  offered 
by  the  strangers.  It  was  then  that  firearms  were  for  the  first  time 
introduced  into  Japan,  and  the  military  class,  fully  appreciating 
the  advantages  of  such  a  weapon,  set  themselves  eagerly  to  learn 
the  method  of  handling  and  manufacturing  it.  With  trade  and 
weapons  came  also  religious  teaching.  In  1548  Francis  Xavier,  a 
Jesuit  missionary,  with  two  disciples,  arrived  at  Nagasaki,  and  by 


MUROMACHI     PERIOD  105 

1393-1573 

permission  of  the  Shimazu  family,  began  to  preach  Christianity 
throughout  the  provinces  of  Kiushu.  This  was  the  first  time  since 
the  introduction  of  Buddhism  that  the  tenets  of  a  foreign  religion 
were  laid  before  the  Japanese  people.  The  alien  creed  soon  began  to 
spread  in  the  island,  as  also  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kyoto,  and  after- 
ward in  Kwanto,  Mutsu,  and  Dewa.  The  largest  number  of  converts 
were  found  in  Kiushu,  where  the  people  built  chapels  for  the  purpose 
of  Christian  worship.  The  great  noble  Otomo  Sorin  was  an  earnest 
believer,  while  Ouchi  Yoshitaka,  as  well  as  the  Shogun  Yoshiteru, 
were  also  converted.  So  successful  was  Christian  propagandism  in 
those  early  days,  that  in  1581  the  Omura  and  Arima  families  of 
Hizen  sent  envoys  to  Rome  with  letters  and  articles  of  Japanese 
production  for  presentation  to  the  Pope.  Thus  in  religion,  as  in 
piracy  and  trade,  this  period  was  characterized  by  a  certain  un- 
conscious freedom,  which  stands  in  great  contrast  with  the  policy 
of  restriction  and  exclusion  which  was  adopted  by  the  Japanese 
rulers  of  later  ages. 

In  the  domain  of  learning  and  literature,  the  Muromachi 
period  has  left  little  to  posterity.  The  continual  and  widespread 
warfare  and  devastation  naturally  turned  men's  attention  away 
from  intellectual  refinement.  Sporadic  efforts  were  made  by  some 
lords  to  encourage  learning,  but  the  latter  had  almost  completely 
passed  into  the  monopoly  of  the  Buddhist  priests,  some  of  whom 
continued  in  active  communication  with  the  source  of  enlighten- 
ment, China.  In  short,  literature  must  be  said  to  have  suffered 
great  neglect  as  compared  with  the  attention  bestowed  on  it  in  earlier 
ages.  But  the  contrary  is  true  of  the  fine  arts.  During  the  period 
of  the  Southern  and  Northern  dynasties  many  Japanese  priests 
traveled  to  China  for  the  purpose  of  studying  the  books  and  paint- 
ings of  the  Sung  and  Yuan  dynasties.  Moreover,  from  the  time 
of  Yoshimitsu,  and  especially  in  the  days  of  Yoshimasa,  a  general 
tendency  prevailed  to  refined  pleasure  and  artistic  display  of  all 
kinds,  so  that  objects  of  virtu  and  paintings  by  the  old  masters 
were  enthusiastically  admired  and  sought  after.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances art  industry  naturally  made  great  progress  in  Kyoto. 
Imperial  patronage  was  extended  to  painters,  an  office  being 
established  at  court,  under  the  name  of  cdokoro,  where  affairs  re- 
lating to  pictorial  art  were  controlled.  During  the  reign  of  Go- 
tsuchimikado  the  great  painter  Tosa  Mitsunobu,  founder  of  the 
Tosa  school,  flourished.     His  style  was  elaborate,  his  use  of  colors 


106  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

skillful  and  striking1,  and  his  brushwork  showed  great  delicacy  and 
boldness  combined.  Previous  to  his  time,  Chinese  paintings  of 
the  Sung  masters,  distinguished  for  refined  simplicity  of  concep- 
tion and  execution,  had  stood  very  high  in  Japanese  estimation, 
their  vogue  being  increased  by  the  widespread  popularity  of  the 
Zen  sect  of  Buddhism,  which  had  been  brought  from  China  to  Japan 
during  the  era  of  the  Sung  sovereigns.  People's  taste  had  been 
educated  to  prefer  simple  water-color  sketches  to  the  more  showy 
and  labored  productions  of  the  Yamato  school.  During  the  Oyei 
era  (1394-1427  a.  d.),  three  celebrated  painters,  Mincho,  Josetsu, 
and  Shubun,  flourished.  Mincho's  second  art  name  was  Chodensu. 
His  skill  in  painting  figure  subjects,  Buddhas,  Rishi,  Arhats,  and 
so  forth,  was  most  remarkable.  His  pictures  were  generally  of 
large  size  and  the  few  that  remain  are  immensely  prized.  Josetsu 
took  for  his  models  the  masters  of  the  Sung  and  Yuan  dynasties, 
and  developed  great  skill  in  depicting  figure  subjects,  landscapes, 
birds,  and  flowers.  Shubun  was  a  pupil  of  Josetsu.  His  favorite 
subjects  were  those  of  his  master,  and  he  excelled  in  lightly  tinted 
water-colors.  Among  his  pupils  were  the  renowned  artists  Oguri 
Sotan,  Soga  Dasoku,  Sesshu,  the  priest  Shokei,  and  others.  Sotan 
painted  landscapes  of  the  most  charming  and  faithful  character, 
and  was  also  great  in  figure  subjects,  birds,  and  flowers.  Dasoku 
was  conspicuous  for  the  boldness  and  strength  of  his  touch.  Shokei, 
who  is  often  called  Keishoki,  was  famous  for  his  pictures  of  sacred 
figures  and  landscapes,  and  Sesshu  excelled  even  his  master  in  the 
directness  of  his  methods,  the  sentiment  of  his  pictures,  and  the 
delicacy  of  his  execution.  During  the  Kansei  era  (1460-1465), 
he  crossed  to  China  in  order  to  study  the  landscapes  and  foliage 
of  that  country.  The  journey  added  to  his  fame,  for  in  the  neigh- 
boring empire  he  found  no  peer,  and  the  emperor  of  China  as 
well  as  the  people  paid  him  great  honor.  Sesshu  has  had  few  equals 
in  the  art  of  depicting  landscapes,  figures,  floral  subjects,  dragons, 
and  tigers.  Students  of  his  style  were  Sesson,  Soyen,  and  Tokan 
(called  also  Shugetsu),  all  artists  of  note.  A  contemporary  of 
Sesshu,  Kano  Oyenosuke,  was  taken  under  the  special  patronage 
of  the  Shogun  Yoshinori,  and  his  son,  Kano  Masanobu,  who  had 
studied  under  Oguri  Sotan,  was  employed  in  the  decoration  of  the 
Golden  Pavilion,  where,  by  order  of  the  ex-Shogun  Yoshimasa,  he 
painted  the  eight  Siao-siong  views.  His  eldest  son,  Kohogen 
Motonobu,  was  the  initiator  of  a  new  style  based  on  the  Yamato 


X    ^ 


£      b« 


MUROMACHI     PERIOD  107 

1393-1573 

school  of  Nobuzane  and  the  methods  of  the  Sung  and  Yuan  dynas- 
ties. His  colors  were  applied  with  the  greatest  feeling  and  delicacy, 
and  the  facility  and  force  of  his  brush  were  evidenced  by  noble 
paintings  of  landscapes,  figure  subjects,  and  foliage.  He  was  the 
ancestor  of  the  Kano  family,  and  his  son,  Shoyei,  and  grandson, 
Eitoku,  worked  on  his  lines  with  conspicuous  success. 

Sculpture  and  the  ceramic  industry  made  progress  not  less 
remarkable  than  that  of  painting  during  the  Muromachi  epoch. 
Muneyasu  of  the  Myochin  family  stood  at  the  head  of  workers 
in  metal.  He  made  for  the  Shogun  Yoshimitsu  a  helmet  of  ex- 
traordinary beauty.  Another  helmet  equally  remarkable  for  the 
grace  and  fineness  of  its  workmanship  was  forged  for  Takeda 
Shingen  by  Nobuiye,  also  a  Myochin.  The  era  was  also  rich 
in  swordsmiths  of  note.  Of  these  Goto  Sukenori  was  the  most 
famous.  A  short  sword  made  by  him  for  Yoshimasa  was  consid- 
ered a  marvel  of  skilled  forging.  Glyptic  work  in  various  metals 
found  masters  of  the  highest  craft  in  the  representatives  of  the 
Goto  family.  They  took  their  decorative  designs  from  pictures 
painted  by  the  artists  of  the  Kano  school,  and  reproduced  these 
charming  conceptions  on  sword  fittings  with  extraordinary  fidel- 
ity, using  the  chisel  as  though  it  were  a  painter's  brush.  Aoki 
Kanaiye  and  Myochin  Nobuiye  were  specially  celebrated  as  makers 
of  sword-guards,  a  part  of  the  warrior's  equipment  on  which  much 
manufacturing  care  was  lavished. 

The  vogue  attained  by  the  cha-no-yu  (tea  ceremonial)  cult 
under  the  Ashikaga  shoguns  and  owing  to  the  efforts  of  Sen-no- 
Rikiu,  a  celebrated  dilettante  of  Hideyoshi's  time,  had  a  marked 
influence  in  encouraging  the  development  of  ceramics,  and  several 
experts  of  the  craft  made  their  appearance.  During  the  reign  of 
Gokashiwabara,  a  potter  named  Shozui  traveled  to  China  to  study 
the  processes  of  his  art,  and  on  his  return  established  a  kiln  in 
Hizen,  where  the  first  Japanese  translucent  porcelain  was  produced. 
Shozui  adapted  his  methods  to  the  canons  of  the  cha-no-yu  cult, 
making  simplicity  and  purity  of  style  his  chief  objects. 

The  lacquerer's  art  also  made  great  progress  in  this  era.  Its 
experts  found  munificent  patronage  owing  to  the  luxurious  and 
costly  tastes  which  prevailed  at  the  time  in  obedience  to  the  example 
set  by  the  Ashikaga  rulers.  Objects  of  extraordinary  richness  and 
delicacy  were  produced,  especially  in  the  line  of  gold  lacquer,  where 
the  Japanese  workers  developed  unique  skill.     Their  chefs-d'oeuvre 


108  JAPAN 

1393-1573 

were  not  more  valued  in  Japan  than  in  China,  where  they  were 
known  as  "  Yatpun  T'sat-ki."  Two  other  famous  varieties  of 
lacquer  work  had  their  origin  in  this  era,  namely,  tsuishu,  or  red 
lacquer,  chiseled  in  high  relief,  and  tsuikoku,  or  lacquer  laid  on  in 
alternate  layers  of  red  and  black  and  carved  deeply,  the  edges  of 
the  design  being  sloped  so  as  to  show  the  gradation  of  layers. 
Despite  the  continued  warfare  and  unceasing  disturbance  of  the 
Muromachi  epoch,  the  shoguns  and  the  great  nobles  and  generals 
affected  a  most  luxurious  and  refined  manner  of  life,  and  it  conse- 
quently resulted  that  the  blackest  era  of  Japanese  history,  so  far 
as  concerned  the  preservation  of  public  peace  and  order  and  the 
security  of  life  and  property,  was  nevertheless  a  time  of  marked 
artistic  development. 


Chapter   X 

INTERNAL   PEACE   AND   EXTERNAL   WAR.     1573-1603 

A  T  the  end  of  the  last  chapter  we  left  feudal  Japan  wasted  by 
L\  internal  anarchy.  It  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  phe- 
JL  Jm.  nomena  in  history  that  within  two  decades  after  the  fall 
of  the  Ashikaga  the  national  life  not  only  was  restored  to  its  nor- 
mal peace,  but  also  attained  to  such  fullness  of  vigor  as  to  embark 
in  a  warfare  of  unprecedented  magnitude  for  foreign  conquest. 
The  period  of  thirty  years  between  the  fall  of  the  last  shogun 
of  Muromachi  and  the  foundation  of  the  Edo  rule,  1573- 1603, 
stands  unparalleled  in  the  annals  of  the  Japanese  nation  for  its 
wealth  of  stories  of  valor  and  heroism.  The  spirit  of  the  time 
was  such  as  brought  to  the  surface  only  men  of  uncommon 
ability.  The  era  was  of  itself  rich  in  inspiring  events,  but  the 
latter  were  in  no  small  measure  due  to  the  brilliant  achievements 
of  three  heroes — Oda  Nobunaga  (1 573-1 582),  Toyotomi  Hideyo- 
shi  (1583-1598),  and  Tokugawa  Iyeyasu  (1600-1616) — who  rose 
one  after  another  to  rule  over  feudal  Japan.  Deferring  the 
story  of  the  work  of  the  last  statesman,  we  shall  now  turn  to  the 
career  of  Oda  and  Toyotomi,  who  respectively  unified  the  long 
dismembered  nation,  and  organized  the  great  Korean  expedition. 
The  tendency  of  the  Ashikaga  times  was  to  encourage  indi- 
vidual ambition.  Military  chieftains  devoted  themselves  to  or- 
ganizing armies  and  equipping  soldiers  in  the  most  efficient  manner, 
in  order  to  overcome  rivals  and  establish  their  own  independence. 
But  none  of  them  ever  succeeded  in  introducing  order  into  the 
provinces  they  overran  or  organizing  their  administration  on  a 
permanent  basis.  Probably  the  origin  of  this  defect  is  to  be  sought, 
not  in  the  administrative  incompetence  of  these  chieftains,  but 
rather  in  the  absence  of  any  supreme  head  to  issue  general  orders. 
The  power  of  the  imperial  court,  indeed,  had  greatly  declined,  but 
the  nation  nevertheless  regarded  the  sovereign  with  the  utmost 
respect,  and  whatever  the  prowess  of  military  nobles  or  however 

109 


110  JAPAN 

1573-1603 

great  the  number  of  their  following,  it  was  impossible  for  them 
to  undertake  any  decisive  campaign  against  Kyoto,  because,  in 
traversing  the  interval  that  separated  their  bases  of  operations 
from  the  capital,  they  would  have  found  themselves  environed  by 
enemies  ready  to  protect  the  court  against  violence,  as  well  as  by 
rivals  whom  the  prospect  of  any  one  noble's  supremacy  would  have 
moved  to  union  against  him.  Nothing  remained,  therefore,  but 
to  establish  local  autonomy.  Beyond  that  none  of  the  great  nobles 
succeeded  in  attaining  until  the  Oda  family  appeared  in  Owari, 
and  owing  to  their  sagacity  and  valor,  as  well  as  to  the  strategical 
advantages  of  their  position,  accomplished  more  than  any  of  their 
predecessors. 

This  remarkable  family  was  descended  from  the  family  of 
Taira.  Nobunaga's  father,  Nobuhide,  from  his  early  youth,  was 
an  ardent  imperialist.  He  made  large  pecuniary  sacrifices  to  effect 
the  repairs  of  the  emperor's  palace  and  the  reconstruction  of  one 
of  the  principal  shrines  in  Ise.  His  son  Nobunaga,  a  man  of 
daring,  harbored  ambitious  designs,  and  following  his  father's  ex- 
ample, treated  the  sovereign  with  the  utmost  deference,  and  con- 
stantly revolved  plans  for  the  general  pacification  of  the  country 
and  the  restoration  of  order.  In  his  youth  he  showed  a  disposition 
to  profligacy,  but  when  his  chief  vassal  committed  suicide  to  em- 
phasize a  protest  against  these  dissolute  courses,  Nobunaga  com- 
pletely reformed  his  conduct.  An  opportunity  soon  occurred  to 
test  his  military  genius.  Among  the  rival  lords  of  that  time, 
Imagawa  Yoshimoto,  chief  of  the  provinces  of  Suruga,  Totomi, 
and  Mikawa,  showed  a  conspicuous  disposition  to  attack  and  raid 
the  neighboring  territories.  In  1560  he  invaded  Owari  at  the  head 
of  a  great  army,  overbearing  all  resistance  and  destroying  several 
strongholds.  Pushing  on  to  Okehazama,  he  rested  there,  and  or- 
ganized an  immense  banquet  to  celebrate  his  successes.  During  the 
progress  of  these  festivities,  Oda  Nobunaga,  in  command  of  a 
comparatively  small  force,  surprised  the  Imagawa  camp,  inflicted 
a  crushing  defeat  on  the  invaders,  and  killed  Yoshimoto,  a  disaster 
from  which  the  Imagawa  family  never  recovered.  Soon  afterward 
Nobunaga  annexed  the  province  of  Mino,  the  lord  of  which  had 
alienated  his  followers  by  his  unworthy  manner  of  life.  Nobunaga 
further  strengthened  his  position  toward  the  east  by  entering  into 
marital  relations  with  the  families  of  Takeda  and  Matsudaira. 
He  now  watched  closely  for  a  favorable  opportunity  to  direct  his 


PEACEANDWAR  111 

1573-1603 

arms  against  the  military  magnates  in  Kyoto.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered how  one  Matsunaga  assassinated  the  Shogun  Yoshiteru,  and 
how  the  latter's  brother,  Yoshiaki,  in  1568,  succeeded  to  the  sho- 
gunate  with  the  loyal  support  of  Nobunaga.  Nobunaga  had  in 
the  meantime  annexed  Omi  and  all  the  Kinai  provinces.  Nom- 
inally a  vassal,  his  influence  was  greater  than  that  of  the  shogun. 
Nobunaga  built  a  castle  at  Nijo,  summoning  the  people  of  the 
Kinai  and  other  districts  to  contribute  to  its  completion  either  in 
money  or  labor.  This  place  he  assigned  as  residence  to  the  shogun, 
intrusting  the  duty  of  guarding  him  to  Kinoshita  Hideyoshi,  after- 
ward Toyotomi.  Nobunaga  also  repaired  the  imperial  palace,  and 
restored  it  to  its  ancient  and  long-forgotten  splendor.  One  of  the 
methods  employed  by  Nobunaga  to  obtain  funds  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  imperial  buildings  was  to  lend  rice  to  the  people,  the 
interest  accruing  on  the  loans  being  devoted  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  palace.  Nobunaga  reversed  the  policy  of  the  Ashikaga,  not 
only  in  thus  manifesting  his  loyalty  to  the  imperial  house,  but  also 
in  dealing  harshly  with  the  Buddhist  priests  of  Mount  Hiye,  whose 
great  influence  had  been  feared  by  temporal  rulers  ever  since  the 
ninth  century.  In  his  war  with  the  lord  of  Echizen,  he  found  these 
sacerdotal  warriors  on  the  side  of  his  enemy.  As  soon  as  Echizen 
was  reduced,  Nobunaga,  disregarding  the  remonstrance  of  his 
vassals,  destroyed  several  of  the  temples,  putting  the  priests  to  death 
as  well  as  the  women  and  children  who  lived  with  them,  con- 
fiscating their  lands,  and  bestowing  them  on  his  vassal  Akechi 
Mitsuhide.  Thus  fell  the  contumacious  and  powerful  priests  who, 
relying  on  the  authority  of  their  religion,  had  treated  even  imperial 
mandates  with  contempt.  Nothing  remained  of  them  but  a  few 
of  their  temples  and  the  doctrines  they  had  taught.  Kosa,  how- 
ever, the  lord  abbot  of  Hongwan-ji,  fled  from  one  place  to  an- 
other and  gathered  a  body  of  strong  supporters  wherever  he  went, 
and  it  was  not  till  eleven  years  later  that  the  priestly  opposition 
was  completely  reduced.  Meanwhile,  the  Shogun  Yoshiaki  grew 
jealous  of  the  immense  power  which  Nobunaga  was  acquiring,  and 
in  spite  of  the  latter's  repeated  effort  to  convince  him  of  his  loyalty, 
at  length  in  1573  raised  an  army  to  destroy  Nobunaga.  The  cam- 
paign, however,  ended  in  the  defeat  of  the  shogun.  He  escaped 
to  the  province  of  Kawachi,  and  the  supremacy  of  the  Ashikaga 
family  came  to  an  end.  In  1576  Nobunaga  built  a  castle  of  un- 
precedented strength  at  Adsuchi  in  Omi.    The  keep  was  a  hundred 


112  JAPAN 

1573-1603 

feet  in  height.  It  stood  within  seven  stone  walls  of  circumvalla- 
tion,  with  moats  constructed  of  large  masses  of  granite. 

Having  thus  fixed  his  headquarters  in  Adsuchi,  Oda  Nobunaga 
set  about  subduing  those  eastern  provinces  which  still  remained 
independent,  and  also  all  of  the  western  provinces,  where  his  in- 
fluence was  almost  unknown.  No  sooner,  however,  had  the  former 
been  reduced  under  his  sway  and  the  plans  of  campaign  against 
the  latter  matured,  than  Nobunaga  met  an  untimely  death  in  1582 
at  the  hand  of  his  vassal,  Akechi  Mitsuhide.  With  great  strategic 
skill,  Nobunaga  had  combined  the  faculty  of  discovering  able  men 
and  winning  their  loyalty.  Seldom  had  so  large  a  number  of  great 
men  been  found  under  the  control  of  a  single  ruler  as  under 
Nobunaga.  Death  prevented  him  from  carrying  out  his  design  of 
subjugating  Kiushu,  as  he  had  conquered  the  other  districts  of  the 
empire.  Toward  the  imperial  court  he  had  shown  unvarying  rev- 
erence. He  had  devoted  considerable  sums  to  renovating  the 
shrines.  He  also  had  adopted  effective  measures  for  the  repair  of 
roads  and  bridges,  and  facilitated  travel  by  abolishing  military 
barriers.  But  his  character  was  austere,  and  his  administrative 
measures  were  strict  and  uncompromising.  It  was  by  the  exercise 
of  these  traits  that  he  provoked  the  anger  of  Mitsuhide,  and  thus 
unfortunately  met  an  untimely  end  without  achieving  the  great 
ambition  of  his  life. 

Akechi  Mitsuhide,  the  assassin,  proceeded  to  Adsuchi,  and 
having  there  possessed  himself  of  a  large  supply  of  money  and 
other  valuables,  returned  to  Kyoto.  Hashiba  Hideyoshi,  who 
led  the  western  campaign  against  the  great  Mori  family,  quickly 
accepted  the  surrender  of  the  latter,  who  were  ignorant  of 
Nobunaga's  death,  and  hastened  back  to  turn  his  arms  against  the 
rebel  general.  Mitsuhide  sustained  a  crushing  defeat  at  Yamazaki 
in  Settsu.  Fleeing  toward  Omi,  he  was  assassinated  en  route  by 
a  farmer,  only  thirteen  days  after  he  had  raised  the  standard  of 
revolt.  The  celerity  with  which  Hideyoshi  avenged  the  death  of 
Nobunaga  had  a  decisive  effect  upon  the  course  of  events  that 
followed.  Other  great  vassals  of  the  late  Nobunaga  also  hurried 
from  their  provinces  to  accomplish  the  same  end,  only  to  find  that 
Hideyoshi  had  forestalled  them  all.  A  consultation  was  now  held 
between  Hideyoshi  and  these  generals  regarding  Nobunaga's  suc- 
cessor, his  two  sons,  Nobukatsu  and  Nobutaka,  being  keen  rivals 
for  the  honor.     Hideyoshi,  apprehending  that  their  mutual  enmity 


PEACE     AND     WAR  113 

1573-1603 

might  prove  disastrous  if  either  were  nominated,  would  not  listen 
to  the  advice  of  his  colleagues,  but  insisted  that  Samboshi,  son 
of  Nobutada,  the  heir  of  Nobunaga,  who  perished  with  his  father, 
should  be  appointed.  Samboshi  was  then  a  child  only  three  years 
of  age,  so  the  power  of  the  Oda  family  devolved  upon  Hideyoshi. 
The  other  generals,  however,  refused  to  endorse  this  arrangement. 
Nobutaka  especially  was  hostile  to  the  influence  of  Hideyoshi.  Act- 
ing in  collusion  with  Shibata  Katsuiye  and  Takikawa  Kazumasu, 
he  attempted  to  destroy  Hideyoshi.  But  again  Hideyoshi's  victory 
was  quick  and  decisive,  for  not  only  did  the  conspirators  fall  one 
after  another  in  battle,  but  their  fiefs  were  annexed  by  Hideyoshi, 
whose  prestige  was  thus  greatly  increased.  The  emperor  now  con- 
ferred on  him  the  title  of  sangi  (councilor  of  state).  He  estab- 
lished his  headquarters  in  Osaka,  judging  the  place  convenient  for 
purposes  of  transportation  and  administration  alike.  Instructions 
were  issued  to  the  various  territorial  nobles  to  furnish  timber  and 
stones,  with  which  Hideyoshi  caused  to  be  constructed  in  Osaka 
a  magnificent  castle.  Meanwhile,  Nobukatsu,  the  remaining  son 
pf/Nobunaga,  had  conceived  hostility  toward  Hideyoshi,  and  in 
conjunction  with  Tokugawa  Iyeyasu,  raised  an  army  and  occupied 
a  strong  position  at  Komaki  in  Owari.  Hideyoshi,  finding  himself 
unable  to  overcome  these  adversaries,  concluded  peace  with  them. 
He  also  subdued  the  independent  provinces  of  the  north  and 
Shikoku.  In  Kiushu,  where  the  powerful  family  of  Shimadsu  had 
held  sway  over  the  whole  island,  Hideyoshi  reduced  their  fief  to 
three  provinces  of  Hiuga,  Satsuma,  and  Osumi,  and  confiscated 
the  other  six.  The  Hojo  family  of  Odawara  and  Date  Masamune 
of  the  extreme  north  held  out  the  longest  against  Hideyoshi,  but 
they  also  finally  yielded  to  the  overwhelming  military  genius.  Fur- 
ther, he  recognized  as  lord  of  the  Island  of  Ezo,  Matsumaye 
Nobuhiro,  whose  grandfather 'had  crossed  thither  and  subdued  the 
aborigines.  For  the  first  time  the  wars  and  tumults  that  had  con- 
vulsed Japan  since  the  Ojin  era  were  at  last  brought  to  an  end. 
and  the  whole  country  came  under  the  administrative  sway  of  one 
strong  ruler. 

The  story  of  the  rise  of  Hideyoshi  from  the  humblest  to  the 
most  elevated  position  in  the  feudal  world  of  Japan  is  highly  char- 
acteristic of  the  man  and  his  times.  The  son  of  a  foot-soldier  in 
Owari,  Hideyoshi's  orginal  name  was  Tokichi.  From  early  child- 
hood he  acquired  among  his  playmates  a  reputation  for  cleverness. 


114  JAPAN 

1573-1603 

Subsequently,  attracted  by  the  great  renown  of  Nobunaga,  he  took 
service  under  him,  who,  pleased  with  the  sagacity  displayed  by  the 
youth,  raised  him  after  a  time  to  the  command  of  a  division  of 
soldiers.  Tokichi  grew  in  favor  with  the  Oda  chief,  who  conferred 
on  him  the  name  of  Hashiba,  deriving  it  from  the  names  of  his  two 
ablest  generals,  Niwa  and  Shibata.  When  Nobunaga  was  assassin- 
ated, Hideyoshi  showed  remarkable  promptness  and  ability  in 
destroying  the  traitorous  vassal,  a  deed  that  won  for  him  high  popu- 
larity among  the  partisans  of  the  deceased  chief.  Thenceforth  his 
career  was  a  series  of  brilliantly  conceived  and  boldly  executed  con- 
quests. Professing  always  to  protect  the  Oda  family,  he  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  discussions  between  Nobutaka  and  Nobukatsu  to 
overthrow  Katsuiye  and  Kazumasu,  and  showed  at  once  his  mag- 
nanimity and  his  prowess  in  the  easy  terms  of  peace  which  he 
granted  to  the  Shimadsu  family  while  pushing  his  operations  against 
the  Hojo  to  their  complete  overthrow.  Thus,  despite  his  humble 
origin,  he  succeeded  ultimately  in  grasping  the  administrative  reins 
of  the  whole  empire.  His  ambition  prompted  him  to  desire  the  post 
of  sei-i-tai-shogun,  but  custom  had  required  from  time  immemorial 
that  the  occupant  of  that  high  office  should  be  a  member  of  the 
Minamoto  clan.  This  difficulty  Hideyoshi  sought  to  overcome  by 
getting  himself  adopted  as  the  son  of  the  Shogun  Yoshiaki,  but  the 
latter  could  not  be  persuaded  to  consent.  Ultimately,  he  induced 
the  emperor  to  appoint  him  kwanryo  or  regent,  a  position  really 
ranking  higher  than  that  of  shogun.  On  that  occasion  the 
sovereign  conferred  on  him  the  family  name  of  Toyotomi.  Hide- 
yoshi also  spared  no  pains  to  restore  the  prestige  of  the  throne, 
supplying  all  the  expenses  required  for  the  imperial  household  and 
exacting  from  the  nobles  an  oath  that  they  would  reverence  the 
sovereign  and  make  no  encroachment  on  the  imperial  domains. 

Hideyoshi's  administrative  organization  was  remarkable.  He 
created  five  bugyo;  namely,  a  mayor  of  the  city  of  Kyoto,  a  manager 
of  taxation,  a  judicial  administrator,  a  supervisor  of  the  public 
works,  and  a  supreme  judge  of  civil  suits.  He  also  selected  Toku- 
gawa  Iyeyasu,  Uyesugi  Kagekatsu,  Mori  Terumoto,  Ukita  Hideiye, 
and  Mayeda  Toshiiye  to  form  a  council  of  state,  called  the  gotairo, 
five  elders,  for  the  purpose  of  deliberating  upon  all  weighty 
national  affairs.  The  question  of  the  land  also  received  careful 
attention  at  his  hands.  Perceiving  that,  owing  to  faulty  admin- 
istration of  the  regulations,  many  irregularities  had  arisen,  and 


PEACEANDWAR  115 

1573-1603 

estates  were  in  many  cases  wrongly  registered,  he  dispatched  in- 
spectors to  all  the  provinces  and  caused  accurate  surveys  and  returns 
to  be  made,  severe  punishment  being  meted  out  to  any  officials  con- 
victed of  receiving  bribes  in  the  execution  of  this  office.  The  result 
was  that  large  tracts  of  land  hitherto  improperly  exempted  from 
taxation  were  brought  within  the  fiscal  system.  A  radical  change 
was  also  introduced  in  the  manner  of  registering  lands:  hitherto 
they  had  been  classed  according  to  the  monetary  income  obtained 
from  them ;  thenceforth  they  were  estimated  according  to  their  pro- 
duce in  kind,  and  the  taxes  were  calculated  on  the  basis  of  this  new 
valuation.  Speaking  roughly,  about  two-thirds  of  the  produce  went 
to  the  state,  the  remainder  to  the  cultivators  of  the  land.  Further, 
in  view  of  the  defective  condition  of  the  currency,  Hideyoshi  caused 
gold  coins  of  two  dimensions — oban  and  koban — to  be  struck,  as 
well  as  ingots  of  silver,  and  coins  of  silver  and  copper  known  as  the 
tensho  tsiiho-sen. 

In  Hideyoshi's  time  Christianity  had  already  obtained  consider- 
able vogue  throughout  the  country.  Oda  Nobunaga  had  sanctioned 
the  preaching  of  the  foreign  creed,  and  had  built  for  it  a  place  of 
worship,  called  Namban-ji,  in  Kyoto.  But  when  Hideyoshi,  in  the 
course  of  his  campaign  against  Shimadsu,  reached  Hakata,  the  Chris- 
tian priests  showed  such  an  arrogant  demeanor  that  Hideyoshi, 
enraged  by  their  conduct,  ordered  that  they  should  leave  Japan  by  a 
certain  day,  and  prohibited  the  people  from  embracing  Christianity. 
He  even  went  to  the  length  of  causing  Namban-ji  to  be  destroyed. 
Some  of  the  converts,  however,  managed  to  conceal  themselves  and 
carry  on  their  worship  in  secret.  When  the  Tokugawa  shoguns 
came  into  possession  of  the  administrative  power,  the  edicts  against 
the  foreign  faith  were  strictly  enforced,  and  steps  were  taken  to 
restore  to  Buddhism  those  who  had  embraced  Christianity.  These 
measures  were  unsuccessful,  however,  and  culminated  in  the  Shima- 
bara  disturbances  in  1637,  which  will  be  subsequently  described. 

We  shall  now  relate  the  story  of  Hideyoshi's  Korean  expedi- 
tion. It  will  be  remembered  how,  during  the  period  of  the  lax 
administration  of  the  Ashikaga,  the  laws  were  ill  respected,  dis- 
orders were  constant,  and  the  littoral  population  took  advantage  of 
the  situation  to  engage  in  piratical  raids  against  China.  These  pro- 
ceedings led  to  a  cessation  of  intercourse  between  Japan  and  China, 
and  Korea  also,  having  been  conquered  by  China,  ceased  to  maintain 
friendly  relations  with  Japan.     At  the  same  time,  on  Japan's  part, 


116  JAPAN 

1573-1603 

much  cause  of  complaint  existed  against  Korea.  The  Koreans  had 
always  assisted  the  Yuan  dynasty  of  Mongols  in  their  attacks  upon 
Japan,  and  had  shown  themselves  her  bitter  enemies.  But  owing 
to  the  unceasing  prevalence  of  internal  disturbances  in  Japan,  it 
was  not  possible  to  avenge  the  hostile  acts  of  China  and  Korea.  So 
soon,  however,  as  domestic  broils  were  brought  to  an  end  and  the 
control  of  the  administration  rendered  effective  throughout  the 
empire,  Hideyoshi  formed  the  project  of  leading  an  expedition 
against  the  Ming  sovereigns.  He  had  entertained  this  idea  for 
some  time,  and  had  made  it  known  to  Oda  Nobunaga  when  prepara- 
tions were  in  progress  for  the  campaign  against  the  M5ri  family. 
In  1587,  after  his  successful  expedition  against  the  Shimadsu  in 
Kiushu,  Hideyoshi  sent  a  dispatch  to  So  Yoshitomo,  warden  of 
Tsushima  Island,  directing  him  to  take  steps  for  inviting  the  king 
of  Korea  to  come  to  Japan  in  order  to  have  audience  of  the  Japanese 
emperor.  This  invitation  was  to  be  accompanied  by  an  intimation 
that  unless  the  king  obeyed  the  summons,  the  Japanese  forces  would 
at  once  be  directed  against  Korea.  Following  up  this  measure, 
he  determined — in  1590,  by  which  time  the  country's  domestic 
troubles  had  been  entirely  settled — to  insist  on  presents  being  sent 
to  Japan  by  both  China  and  Korea,  on  pain  of  being  invaded  unless 
they  consented  to  take  that  step.  He  dispatched  an  envoy  to  Korea 
with  instructions  to  make  known  his  purpose,  and  to  require  that 
the  Koreans  should  act  as  intermediaries  to  procure  China's  con- 
sent. In  the  event  of  the  Koreans'  refusing,  they  were  threatened 
with  the  punishment  of  being  compelled  to  march  in  the  van  of  the 
Japanese  army  to  the  invasion  of  China.  The  Koreans,  however, 
declined  to  accept  such  a  proposition.  Hideyoshi  thereupon  gave 
up  the  office  of  kwanryo  to  his  adopted  son,  Hidetsugu,  and 
assuming  the  title  of  taiko,  he  decided  to  lead  an  expedition 
against  Korea.  The  emperor  having  given  his  approval  of  the 
step,  orders  were  issued  to  all  the  provinces  to  furnish  troops  and 
military  supplies,  as  well  as  to  build  a  great  fleet  of  war-vessels. 
In  1592  Hideyoshi  appointed  Ukita  Hideiye  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army,  with  Masuda  Nagamori,  Ishida  Mitsunari,  and  Otani 
Yoshitaka  for  his  staff.  The  whole  force,  numbering,  it  is  said, 
130,000  men,  was  divided  into  eight  corps,  and.  with  the  van  were 
Konishi  Yukinaga  and  Kato  Kiyomasa.  The  sailors  of  the 
fleet  aggregated  9000,  and  were  under  the  command  of  Kuki 
Yoshitaka. 


PEACE     AND     WAR 


117 


1573-1603 


In  March,  Hideyoshi  left  Kyoto,  and  proceeding  westward 
worshiped  at  the  sepulchers  of  the  Emperor  Chuai  and  the  Em- 
press Jingo,  passing  thence  to  Nagoya  in  Hizen,  where  the  forces 
from  all  the  provinces  were  being  mustered.  In  April  the  expedi- 
tion sailed  from  the  coast  of  Japan.  The  number  of  ships  was  so 
great  that  they  seemed  to  cover  the  sea  and  struck  the  Koreans  with 
consternation.     Konishi  Yukinaga  and  his  division  were  the  first  to 


reach  Korea.     They  effected  a  landing  at  Fusan,  and  took  prisoner 
the  Korean  general  who  attempted  to  defend  the  port. 

From  this  point  Yukinaga  marched  confidently  on  Toku- 
negi,  overbearing  all  resistance  and  putting  the  enemy's  officers 
to  the  sword.  Shortly  afterward  Kiyomasa  and  his  corps  also 
reached  Fusan,  and  heading  for  Kegushagushu,  attacked  and 
took  it.  Korea's  opposition  was  soon  crushed,  and  the  whole 
country  submitted  to  the  vast  force  of  invaders.  Meanwhile,  the 
king,  Lien,  who  had  not  failed  to  convey  to  China  intimation 
of  the  pending  danger,  sent  to  the  court  of  the  Ming  sovereigns 
earnest  appeals  for  succor;  and  his  troops  having  been  everywhere 
defeated  by  the  Japanese,  he  finally  fled  from  the  capital  with  his 


118  JAPAN 

1573-1603 

son,  and  took  refuge  in  Hegushagu,  having  left  one  of  his  generals 
to  defend  Kanko.  The  Japanese  troops,  everywhere  victorious, 
pushed  on  to  the  capital,  which  was  taken  by  Konishi  Yukinaga, 
the  other  generals  subsequently  assembling  there.  Yukinaga  now 
made  preparations  to  invade  Hei-ando,  and  Kiyomasa  took  Hamu- 
kyando  as  the  scene  of  his  next  campaign.  Meanwhile,  Hideyoshi, 
forseeing  that  a  Chinese  army  would  be  sent  to  aid  the  Koreans, 
dispatched  reinforcements  to  the  invading  troops,  and  conveyed  to 
the  commanders  messages  of  encouragement  and  exhortation.  He 
was  persuaded  that  the  Japanese  army  would  defeat  the  Chinese, 
and  he  believed  that  in  the  space  of  two  years  the  conquest  of  China 
might  be  effected,  in  which  event  he  purposed  transferring  the  capital 
of  Japan  to  China.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  determine  the  routine 
to  be  followed  in  the  removal  of  the  Japanese  court  to  China. 
Kiyomasa  now  marched  northward  to  Hamukyando,  where  he  took 
a  town  called  Eikyo.  Learning  there  that  two  Korean  princes  were 
at  Kaineifu,  he  attacked  it  and  took  them  both  prisoners.  Con- 
tinuing his  advance,  he  crossed  the  northern  frontier  and  entered 
Orankai,  where  he  destroyed  the  castle,  taking  and  putting  to  death 
a  number  of  Koreans.  The  impetuosity  of  his  movements  and  the 
unvarying  success  of  his  arms  filled  the  Koreans  with  dismay.  They 
gave  him  the  name  of  " Kishokwan"  (i.  e.,  the  demon  general), 
and  fled  at  the  mere  news  of  his  approach. 

Yukinaga,  in  the  meanwhile,  having  conquered  Hei-an,  the 
king  of  Korea  retired  from  Hegushagu  and  would  have  entered 
Hamukyan,  but  finding  that  Kiyomasa  had  already  overrun  that 
district,  he  turned  westward  to  Gishu  (Wiju).  Yukinaga  marched 
against  Kuimeigen  and  took  Hegushagu,  the  Japanese  troops  being 
everywhere  victorious.  Things  did  not  fare  equally  well  with  the 
navy,  however.  The  ships  sustained  several  defeats,  and  their  inten- 
tion of  proceeding  from  Terura-do  to  Kanai-do  to  effect  a  junction 
with  the  army  was  frustrated  by  the  Korean  commander  Li  Shun- 
shin,  who  fought  with  the  utmost  tenacity  and  stoutness. 

The  emperor  of  China,  having  received  intelligence  of  what 
was  going  forward  in  the  peninsula,  had  dispatched  from  Ap-lok- 
kong  a  general  named  Tso  Shingfon  at  the  head  of  a  considerable 
force,  to  succor  the  Koreans.  Yukinaga  encountered  this  army  and 
completely  routed  it,  the  Chinese  general  barely  escaping  with  his 
life,  the  news  of  which  event  inspired  much  alarm  in  China.  Ki- 
yomasa, whose  operations  had  also  been  attended  with  uniform  sue- 


PEACEANDWAR  119 

1573-1603 

cess,  now  directed  his  forces  southward,  and  Lien,  the  king  of 
Korea,  in  his  extremity,  once  more  applied  to  China  for  aid.  The 
Chinese  sovereign  thereupon  commissioned  a  minister,  Chom  Wei- 
king,  to  consult  with  his  colleagues  as  to  the  advisability  of  conclud- 
ing peace  with  Japan.  But  among  the  Chinese  captains  there  was 
one  Li  Chiu,  who,  having  much  confidence  in  his  own  prowess,  in- 
sisted that  no  terms  should  be  offered,  and  that  the  war  should  be 
prosecuted  to  the  end.  Another  army  was  accordingly  dispatched  to 
Korea  under  his  command,  and  marching  with  rapidity,  he  soon 
reached  Hegushagu  at  the  head  of  a  great  force.  There  he  en- 
countered the  Japanese  under  Yukinaga  and  defeated  them.  Yu- 
kinaga  retired  to  the  Korean  capital,  whither  also  the  other  Japanese 
generals  concentrated  their  troops,  the  corps  under  the  command  of 
Kobayagawa  Takakage  alone  remaining  to  guard  Kaijo,  despite 
the  urgent  advice  of  the  other  three  generals  that  he  too  should  con- 
centrate his  forces  at  the  capital.  Li,  following  up  his  victory, 
pushed  on  toward  the  capital  at  the  head  of  a  large  army.  Taka- 
kage and  others  encountered  the  Chinese  army  at  Hekitei-kan,  and 
the  divisions  of  Tachibana  Muneshige  and  Mori  Hidekane  fought 
with  such  bravery  that  Li's  force  was  almost  exterminated,  Li 
himself  barely  escaping.  Takakage  hotly  pursued  the  retreating 
Chinese,  great  numbers  of  whom  either  fell  under  the  swords  of 
the  Japanese  or  were  drowned  in  attempting  to  cross  rivers.  This 
blow  threw  the  Chinese  into  a  state  of  disorganization.  Li  retired 
into  Hegushagu,  and  remained  inactive. 

Meanwhile,  the  victorious  career  of  the  Japanese  had  been 
checked  in  Chiushu,  in  attacking  which  place  they  were  repulsed. 
Moreover,  plague  broke  out  in  the  camp  and  provisions  were  ex- 
hausted. Under  these  circumstances  the  Japanese  were  not  unwill- 
ing to  listen  to  proposals  of  peace  made  by  a  Chinese  envoy,  Chom 
Wei-king.  Hideyoshi  dictated  seven  articles  as  the  basis  of  a  treaty ; 
first,  that  in  order  to  secure  amity  between  the  two  empires,  a  Chi- 
nese imperial  princess  should  become  the  consort  of  a  Japanese 
imperial  prince:  second,  that  permits  for  commercial  intercourse 
should  be  sent  to  Japan ;  third,  that  the  ministers  of  the  two  coun- 
tries should  exchange  a  friendly  convention;  fourth,  that  Korea 
should  be  divided  into  halves,  one  to  belong  to  Japan,  and  the 
other,  including  the  four  provinces  and  the  capital,  then  in  Japanese 
hands,  to  be  restored  to  Korea;  fifth,  that  Korea  should  place  in 
Japan's  hands,  as  pledges  of  good  faith,  her  prince  royal  and  certain 


120  JAPAN 

1573-1603 

ministers  of  the  crown ;  sixth,  that  Japan  should  restore  to  Korea 
the  two  Korean  princes  whom  she  had  taken  prisoners;  and 
seventh,  that  influential  Korean  subjects  should  give  written  prom- 
ises of  submission  to  Japan.  The  Chinese  envoy  objected  to  the 
two  conditions  relating  to  the  marriage  of  a  Chinese  princess  with 
a  Japanese  prince,  and  to  the  partition  of  Korea.  Hideyoshi,  how- 
ever, urged  him  to  return  to  China  and  report  the  situation  to  his 
sovereign.  Meanwhile,  he  ordered  the  Japanese  generals  to  send 
back  the  two  Korean  prisoners,  and  to  renew  the  attack  on  Chiushu, 
pending  the  conclusion  of  peace.  But,  after  some  further  parleying, 
the  Chinese  envoy  finally  refused  to  comply  with  Hideyoshi's  sug- 
gestion, and  no  answer  to  Japan's  conditions  was  received  from  the 
Chinese  emperor.  Hideyoshi,  now  concluding  that  peace  was  im- 
possible, began  to  make  preparations  for  himself  leading  an  army  to 
attack  China.  At  this  juncture  the  envoy  who  had  been  sent  to 
Japan,  as  well  as  other  Chinese  statesmen,  suggested  to  their  em- 
peror that  what  Hideyoshi  really  wanted  was  an  imperial  com- 
mission appointing  him  king  of  Japan.  The  Chinese  emperor 
accordingly  dispatched  another  envoy  to  Japan  carrying  a  gold  seal 
and  a  headpiece  specially  manufactured  for  the  purpose.  In  1596, 
Hideyoshi  gave  audience  to  this  envoy  in  the  castle  at  Fushimi,  and 
ordered  him  to  read  the  documents  with  which  he  had  come  en- 
trusted. The  envoy  complied,  but  when  he  came  to  the  clause 
where  it  was  stated  that  the  Chinese  government  appointed  Hide- 
yoshi to  be  king  of  Japan,  the  taiko  became  greatly  enraged.  Seiz- 
ing the  document  he  threw  it  and  the  headpiece  on  the  floor,  and 
declared  that  his  intention  was  to  become  king  of  China,  and  that 
the  Chinese  government  should  learn  how  little  it  had  to  do  with 
the  sovereignty  of  Japan.  He  dismissed  the  Chinese  and  Korean 
envoys,  and  issued  orders  for  a  campaign  against  China.  In  Feb- 
ruary of  the  following  year,  the  Japanese  generals  assembled  at 
Nagoya  in  Hizen,  Kiyomasa  and  Yukinaga  being  the  first  to  set  out 
for  Korea.  The  Chinese  government,  learning  that  the  negotia- 
tions had  been  unsuccessful,  sent  another  army  to  the  peninsula 
under  the  command  of  Ying  Kai  and  Tik  Ho. 

Meanwhile,  the  Korean  general  Li  Shunshin  had  gained  several 
victories  over  the  Japanese  forces,  and  joined  by  this  new  army,  his 
strength  became  very  great.  Thereupon  Kiyomasa  fortified  his 
position  at  Urosan,  and  there  sustained  a  stubborn  siege,  the  Chinese 
General  Tik  Ho's  repeated  efforts  to  reduce  the  place  proving  abor- 


PEACEANDWAR  121 

1573-1603 

tive.  By  degrees  the  provisions  within  Kiyomasa's  lines  became 
exhausted.  His  men  were  obliged  to  eat  horse-flesh,  and  being  ex- 
posed to  the  bitter  cold  of  mid-winter  many  lost  their  hands  from 
frost-bite.  Hearing  of  the  evil  plight  of  their  comrades,  Toyotomi 
Hideaki  and  Mori  Hidemoto  marched  to  the  relief  of  Kiyomasa, 
and  the  besieging  army  retired  without  resistance.  Kuroda  Naga- 
masa  fell  on  them  as  they  retreated,  and  being  joined  by  Kiyomasa, 
the  two  generals  attacked  the  Chinese  with  great  vehemence  and 
completely  routed  them.  Shimadsu  Yoshihiro  also  defeated  a 
Chinese  army  at  Shinsai  and  Shisen.  At  this  juncture,  however, 
the  taiko  died.  On  the  point  of  death  he  issued  instructions  for  the 
recall  of  the  Japanese  army  from  Korea.  This  event  occurred  in 
1598,  and  the  news  caused  great  rejoicing  in  China.  The  Chinese 
forces  in  Korea  hung  upon  the  flanks  of  the  Japanese  troops  as  they 
withdrew,  but  were  so  disheartened  by  the  crushing  reverses  they 
had  just  experienced  that  they  did  not  dare  to  make  any  serious 
attack.  The  Japanese  ships  also  defeated  the  Chinese  squadron,  and 
were  thus  enabled  to  return  to  Japan  unmolested.  In  the  following 
year,  the  services  of  Tokugawa  Iyeyasu  and  other  Japanese  gen- 
erals were  duly  considered  by  the  imperial  court  in  Kyoto,  and  re- 
ceived adequate  recognition.  A  few  years  later,  in  1607,  Korea 
sent  an  envoy  to  Japan  carrying  gifts  and  suing  for  peace.  The 
Shogun  Tokugawa  Hidetada  received  these  overtures  favorably 
and  amicable  relations  were  established  between  the  two  countries. 
During  the  closing  years  of  Hideyoshi's  life,  his  adopted  son 
Hidetsugu,  in  whose  favor  he  had  resigned  the  office  of  kwanryo 
so  greatly  abused  his  power  that  Hideyoshi  became  indignant  and 
ordered  him  into  retirement  in  the  monastery  of  Koya-san,  where, 
shortly  afterward,  he  received  instructions  to  commit  suicide. 
Hideyoshi  bequeathed  his  rank  and  titles  to  his  son  Hideyori,  who 
was  a  mere  child  at  the  time  of  his  illustrious  father's  decease.  A 
few  hours  before  his  death  the  great  captain  and  administrator  sum- 
moned all  his  generals  to  his  side,  and  made  them  swear  to  protect 
his  youthful  successor,  appointing  Mayeda  Toshiiye  to  the  post  of 
guardian.  The  generals,  however,  entertained  toward  each  other 
sentiments  of  such  jealousy  and  hostility  that  the  old  disorders 
would  have  been  renewed  but  for  the  transcendent  ability  and 
prowess  of  Tokugawa  Iyeyasu. 


Chapter    XI 

THE    FOUNDATION    OF   THE    EDO   GOVERNMENT 

1603-1651 

WE  have  now  to  speak  of  the  fifth  line  of  shoguns,  the 
Tokugawa  at  Edo,  who  held  administrative  sway  for 
255  years  from  1603  to  the  time  of  the  imperial  restora- 
tion in  1868,  a  period  which  is  not  far  removed  from  the  present; 
and  during  which  the  feudal  organization  of  Japan  attained  its 
most  perfect  development. 

The  original  name  of  the  Tokugawa  family  was  Matsudaira. 
They  were  of  the  same  blood  as  Nitta  and  Ashikaga  and  of  the  clan 
of  Minamoto.  From  the  time  of  the  Southern  and  Northern 
dynasties  their  forefathers,  generation  after  generation,  espoused 
the  cause  opposed  to  the  Ashikaga,  and  consequently  during  the 
Muromachi  shogunate  they  were  relegated  to  a  position  of  insignifi- 
cance. Subsequently,  they  acquired  large  territorial  possessions 
and  had  their  seat  in  Mikawa  during  eight  generations.  But  being 
surrounded  by  powerful  enemies,  they  experienced  no  little  difficulty 
in  maintaining  themselves.  When  Iyeyasu  was  a  mere  child,  he 
was  confined  in  various  places  as  a  surety  for  his  family's  conduct. 
These  experiences  probably  helped  to  sharpen  his  naturally  great 
abilities.  At  the  age  of  seventeen  he  succeeded  to  the  headship  of 
the  family,  and  as  he  grew  to  manhood  he  gave  proofs  of  magna- 
nimity and  coolness,  no  less  than  of  strategical  skill.  Gradually  and 
astutely  he  encroached  upon  the  neighboring  provinces,  taking 
clever  advantage  of  the  disordered  state  of  the  country,  until  finally 
he  obtained  possession  of  all  the  provinces  that  had  belonged  to  the 
Takeda  and  the  Imagavva  and  found  himself  the  strongest  chieftain 
in  Tokai-do,  lord  of  the  five  provinces  of  Mikawa,  Totomi,  Suruga, 
Kai,  and  Shinano.  In  1590,  when  Hideyoshi  had  overthrown  the 
Hojo  at  Odawara,  all  the  eight  provinces  of  Kwanto — Sagami, 
Musashi,  Izu,  Kazusa,  Shimosa,  Kozuke,  Shimotsuke,  and  Hitachi 
— hitherto  held  by  the  Hojo,  were  given  to  Iyeyasu,  the  taiko  re- 
ceiving in  their  stead  the  five  provinces  previously  possessed  by 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  123 

1603-1651 

Iyeyasu  in  T6kai-do;  an  exchange  doubtless  suggested  to  the  taiko 
by  the  comparative  propinquity  of  the  latter  five  provinces  to  Kyoto, 
and  the  advisability  of  relegating  to  a  distant  part  of  the  empire  a 
chieftain  of  such  commanding  gifts  as  Iyeyasu  exhibited.  Hav- 
ing come  into  possession  of  the  eight  provinces,  Iyeyasu  made  his 
headquarters  at  Edo  (now  Tokyo).  A  castle  had  been  built  here 
more  than  a  century  before  by  Oto  Dokan,  a  vassal  of  the  Uyesugi, 
but  it  was  of  insignificant  dimensions,  and  the  town  which  it  over- 
looked was  touched  on  three  sides  by  the  Musashino  plain,  its  south- 
eastern front  being  washed  by  the  sea.  The  streets,  where  one  and 
a  half  million  citizens  now  congregate,  were  then  overgrown  with 
reeds.  So  soon,  however,  as  Iyeyasu  moved  thither,  he  inaugurated 
extensive  improvements,  leveling  hills,  filling  marshes,  digging  great 
moats,  and  building  colossal  parapets,  until  a  site  was  fully  prepared 
for  a  great  capital. 

Iyeyasu,  though  of  indomitable  courage  in  war,  was  a  man  of 
gentle  methods.  His  keen  perception  showed  him  every  aspect  of 
an  affair,  and  his  patience  in  unraveling  difficulties  never  failed.  So 
long  as  the  reins  of  administration  remained  in  his  hands,  quiet 
obedience  was  everywhere  accorded  to  his  sway.  No  one  opposed 
him.  As  for  Hideyoshi,  he  soon  appreciated  the  Tokugawa  chief 
and  treated  him  with  all  the  consideration  due  to  his  great  gifts. 
Iyeyasu  had  large  ambition.  Coming  into  possession  of  the 
Kwanto  provinces,  he  sat  down  quietly  to  foster  his  strength  and 
bide  his  time,  Hideyoshi,  meanwhile,  wasting  his  resources  in  fruit- 
less attacks  upon  Korea  and  thus  impairing  the  prosperity  which 
his  transcendent  abilities  had  obtained  for  him.  Finally,  before  his 
foreign  wars  had  reached  any  issue,  he  died,  bequeathing  his  power 
to  his  son,  Hideyori,  then  a  lad  of  only  seven  years.  The  usual 
results  of  a  minor's  administration  ensued.  The  government  fell 
into  disorder.  Once  more  the  old  rivalry  sprang  up  among  the 
feudal  chiefs,  each  struggling  for  supremacy.  Above  them  all 
towered  Tokugawa  Iyeyasu,  for  his  influence  was  superior  even  to 
that  of  the  Toyotomi  family. 

Gradually  the  various  dissentient  elements  disposed  them- 
selves into  two  great  parties.  The  one,  including  Kato  Kiyo- 
masa,  Fukushima  Masanori,  Kuroda  Nagamasa,  Asano  Yukinaga, 
and  other  notables,  was  under  the  leadership  of  Iyeyasu,  and  the 
other,  to  which  belonged  Mori  Terumoto,  Uyesugi  Kagekatsu, 
Ukita  Hideiye,  and  forty-three  other  feudal  chiefs,  hostile  to  the 


124 


JAPAN 


1603-1651 

Tokugawa,  was  under  the  real  leadership  of  Ishida  Mitsunari,  a  fav- 
orite of  the  late  Hideyoshi,  and  under  the  nominal  leadership  of  the 
taiko's  son,  Hideyori.  The  latter  party  had  their  headquarters  in 
the  Osaka  castle,  and  the  struggle  for  mastery  was  finally  concluded 
in  a  great  battle,  fought  on  September  15,  1600.  Iyeyasu  was  the 
assailant.    Marching  westward  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  80,000,  he 


CENTRAUAPAN 


encountered  Mitsunari's  forces,  numbering  130,000,  on  the  Sekiga- 
hara  plain  in  Mino,  the  Osaka  confederates  having  moved  thus  far 
to  the  combat.  Swords  were  crossed  at  eight  in  the  morning,  and 
the  battle  waged  with  the  utmost  fierceness  for  six  hours,  the  Osaka 
army  being  ultimately  defeated  with  a  loss  of  30,000.  Mitsunari 
and  Yukinaga  were  among  the  slain,  and  tradition  says  that  the 
whole  plain  was  red  with  gore.  So  decisive  was  this  victory  that 
other  nobles  who  had  espoused  the  cause  of  Hideyori  and  were 
fighting  for  it  in  their  own  districts  now  laid  down  their  arms  and 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  125 

1603-1651 

hastened  to  come  to  terms  with  the  victor.  Iyeyasu  now  set  him- 
self to  consolidate  his  power.  Confiscating,  wholly  or  in  part,  the 
estates  of  the  chiefs  who  had  opposed  him,  he  made  ample  grants  to 
his  own  supporters.  The  administrative  power  of  the  empire  came 
wholly  into  his  hands,  and  every  part  of  the  country  accepted  his 
control.  Three  years  later  he  was  nominated  sei-i-tai-shogun,  and 
thenceforth,  through  many  generations,  his  family  ruled  in  Edo. 

But  although  the  administrative  supremacy  had  been  acquired 
by  the  Tokugawa,  the  taiko's  son  and  successor,  Toyotomi  Hide- 
yori,  still  resided  at  Osaka.  Possessing  a  princely  income  of  650,- 
000  koku  of  rice,  ruler  of  three  provinces,  Settsu,  Kawachi,  and 
Izumi,  old  enough  now  to  direct  his  own  affairs,  and  enjoying  the 
prestige  of  his  renowned  father,  he  wielded  a  degree  of  influence 
which  even  Iyeyasu  could  not  afford  to  despise.  Among  Hide- 
yori's  adherents  there  were  some  who  hoped  to  see  him  restored  to 
the  position  his  father  had  occupied,  and  these,  plotting  secretly  to 
effect  their  purpose,  found  supporters  among  the  feudal  chieftains, 
who,  though  they  had  made  act  of  submission  to  the  Tokugawa, 
still  remembered  the  benefits  they  had  received  from  the  late  Hide- 
yoshi  and  were  fain  to  succor  his  son.  Thus  Osaka  remained  a 
constant  menace  to  the  Tokugawa,  who,  on  their  side,  watched 
keenly  for  some  act  on  the  part  of  the  Toyotomi  that  might  furnish 
a  pretext  for  their  overthrow,  whereas  the  adherents  of  the  Toyo- 
tomi, bitterly  jealous  of  the  Tokugawa  supremacy  and  resenting 
every  evidence  of  it,  naturally  committed  acts  of  tactlessness  and 
contumacy. 

Just  at  this  time  the  Toyotomi  family  caused  to  be  rebuilt 
a  great  image  of  Buddha  which  stood  in  the  temple  of  Hokoji, 
in  Kyoto.  The  work  was  completed  in  16 14.  A  bell  was  cast  to 
commemorate  the  event,  and  in  its  superscription  there  appeared  a 
phrase  praying  for  the  tranquillity  of  the  state.  Two  of  the  four 
characters  forming  this  phrase  happened  to  be  the  ideograms  spell- 
ing the  name  of  Iyeyasu.  The  latter  pretended  to  be  much  offended 
at  this.  He  declared  that  the  obvious  intention  of  the  affair  was  to 
invoke  the  curse  of  heaven  on  his  head,  and  being  strongly  sup- 
ported in  this  view  by  the  nobles  who  espoused  his  cause,  he  directed 
that  an  inquiry  of  the  strictest  nature  should  be  at  once  instituted 
in  Osaka.  The  Toyotomi  family  refusing  to  submit  tamely  to  this 
indignity,  determined  to  appeal  to  the  sword,  and  there  flocked  to 
Osaka  from  the  provinces  some  60,000  ronin  (unenrolled  military 


126 


JAPAN 


1603-1651 

men),  who  formed  themselves  into  a  garrison  for  the  defense  of  the 
castle.  But  the  power  of  Iyeyasu  was  too  great  for  such  a  movement 
to  develop  large  proportions.  Intelligence  of  the  designs  of  the 
Toyotomi,  so  far  from  enlisting  the  sympathy  of  the  feudal  chief- 
tains, led  them  rather  to  renew  their  professions  of  loyalty  to  Iye- 
yasu, and  the  latter,  who  had  anticipated  this,  ordered  them  to  march 
to  the  conquest  of  Osaka.  After  the  castle  had  undergone  a  long 
siege,  peace  was  temporarily  restored,  only  to  be  broken  again  in  the 
following  year,  when  rivalry  led  the  Osaka  folks  to  once  more 
declare  war.  On  this  occasion  the  number  of  Toyotomi  partisans 
who  assembled  at  Osaka  was  twice  as  great  as  it  had  been  in  the  pre- 
ceding year.  They  were  all  brave  men,  resolved  to  fight  to  the 
death.  But  among  such  a  variously  composed  host  it  was  difficult 
to  secure  unanimity  of  opinion  or  concert  in  action.  Moreover,  the 
moats  of  the  castle  having  been  filled  on  the  conclusion  of  peace  the 
year  before,  it  had  lost  its  old  impregnability  and  become  useless  as 
a  defensive  stronghold.  Hence,  the  vast  army  marshaled  under  the 
Tokugawa  banners  had  little  difficulty  in  taking  it  by  assault.1  Hide- 
yori  and  his  mother,  Yodogimi,  threw  themselves  into  the  flames  of 

1  Chronological  and  genealogical  table  of  the  Tokugawa  shoguns. 
I.  Iyeyasu,  1603. 


2.  Hidetada,  1605. 


3.  Iyemitsu,  1624. 


Yorinobu  (founder  of 
the  Kisuhu  house). 

I 
Mitsusada. 


Yorifusa  (founder  of 
the  Mito  house). 

Nariakira  (eight  in  descent 
from  Yorifusa). 


4.  Iyetsuna,    Tsunashige.    5.  Tsunayoshi,    8.  Yoshimune,     15.  Yoshinobu, 
1651.  1680.  1716.  1866. 


6.  Iyenobu,  1709. 

7.  Iyesugu,  1713. 


9.  Iyeshige,  1745. 

10.  Iyeharu,  1761. 


Munetada   (founder  of  the 
Hitotsubashi  family). 

I        . 
Harunari. 


II.  Iyenari,   1787. 


12.  Iyeyoshi,  1837. 

13.  Iyesada,  1854. 


Nariyoshi  (head  of  the  Kisuhu  house). 
14.  Iyemochi,  1857. 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  127 

1603-1651 

the  burning  castle,  and  Ono  Harunaga,  together  with  the  principal 
of  those  who  had  counseled  war,  killed  themselves  out  of  respect  to 
their  lord.  The  Toyotomi  family  was  thus  finally  overthrown,  and 
the  power  of  the  Tokugawa  completely  established.  Thenceforth 
the  country  entered  upon  a  long  era  of  peace. 

In  the  following  year,  1616,  Iyeyasu  fell  ill  and  died  at  the  age 
of  seventy-five.  He  was  interred  at  Kunozan  in  Suruga,  but  his 
remains  were  subsequently  transferred  to  Nikko  in  Shimotsuke, 
where,  amid  natural  scenery  of  the  greatest  beauty,  a  mausoleum  of 
of  unexampled  magnificence  was  erected  in  his  honor. 

Hidetada,  the  second  Tokugawa  shogun,  devoted  his  energies 
to  enforcing  and  observing  the  laws  and  precepts  of  his  father. 
Under  him  the  influence  and  prestige  of  the  Tokugawa  family 
increased  greatly.  Further,  the  third  shogun,  Iyemitsu,  was  a  man 
of  high  courage  and  magnanimous  generosity.  In  his  hands  the 
organization  of  the  government  was  brought  to  a  state  of  perfection. 
This  system  we  shall  now  describe,  as  it  shows  the  feudalism  of 
Japan  at  the  height  of  its  development. 

During  many  centuries  it  had  been  customary  for  the  military 
classes  to  own  estates  and  to  govern  the  people  residing  on  them 
according  to  feudal  methods.  In  the  closing  days  of  the  Ashikaga 
many  military  families  of  old  standing  were  ruined,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  not  a  few  soldiers  who  followed  the  fortunes  of  Oda 
and  Toyotomi  became  the  founders  of  new  and  opulent  families. 
When  the  Tokugawa  came  into  power  they  divided  the  nobles  into 
two  classes.  The  fudai  class  comprised  the  barons  who  had  espoused 
the  Tokugawa  cause  from  the  time  of  the  latter's  residence  in 
Mikawa  and  Totomi.  The  second  were  called  tozama,  that  is  to 
say,  those  who  did  not  give  in  their  adherence  until  after  the  decisive 
battle  of  Sekigahara  of  1600.  This  distinction  was  intended  to 
define  the  intimacy  existing  between  the  Tokugawa  and  the  other 
military  chiefs.  For  the  rest,  the  estates  of  the  nobles  were  fixed 
according  to  their  exploits  at  the  battle  of  Sekigahara.  In  consid- 
eration of  the  vital  importance  of  preserving  uninterrupted  com- 
munication with  the  capital,  the  estates  of  the  barons  were  so 
distributed  that  none  of  the  tozama  class  held  sway  along  the  line 
of  communications.  Further,  although  the  fudai  barons  were  chiefly 
of  the  smaller  order,  they  occupied  the  most  important  provinces, 
and  were  so  distributed  that  they  could  easily  combine  if  necessary ; 
whereas  the  tozama  magnates,  though  ruling  great  territories,  were 


128  JAPAN 

1603-1651 

separated  from  each  other  by  the  fudai  barons,  and  were  moreover 
remotely  situated  from  important  centers  of  action.  For  example, 
Mayeda,  the  most  puissant  among  the  tozama  nobles,  had  his  terri- 
tories extended  over  the  three  provinces  of  Kaga,  Noto,  and  Echi- 
zen,  and  his  annual  revenues  aggregated  over  a  million  koku  of  rice, 
while  his  prestige  and  popularity  were  very  high.  Hence,  a  number 
of  fudai  barons  were  located  in  Echigo,  to  act  for  the  Tokugawa  in 
case  of  emergency,  and  in  Echizen  also  one  of  the  nobles  most  closely 
related  to  the  Tokugawa  was  placed  to  block  the  route  of  the  Mayeda 
to  Kyoto.  A  similar  policy  was  adopted  throughout  the  empire,  so 
that  everywhere,  at  a  given  instant,  the  Tokugawa  partisans  would 
find  themselves  in  a  majority.  Places  of  vantage  were  also  occupied 
by  the  shogun's  adherents.  Such  was  the  case  with  Nagasaki,  the 
most  important  port  of  foreign  trade;  the  Island  of  Sado,  where 
valuable  gold  and  silver  mines  were  worked;  the  shrine  of  Daijin-gu 
at  Yamada  in  Ise,  the  headquarters  of  Shinto  worship,  and  so  forth. 
At  other  places  the  management  of  local  affairs  was  entrusted  to 
nominees  of  the  shogunate,  gundai  and  daikwan,  all  of  which 
arrangements  operated  to  prevent  any  effective  union  among  the 
tozama  nobles. 

In  the  opening  years  of  the  Tokugawa  administration  an  un- 
compromising policy  was  pursued.  Even  such  a  puissant  tozama 
noble  as  Fukushima  Masanori,  and  such  a  loyal  feudatory  as  Honda 
Masazumi,  who  had  assisted  in  the  first  organization  of  the  sho- 
gunate, had  their  estates  confiscated  by  way  of  punishment  for  vio- 
lations of  the  law,  while  several  other  important  nobles  were  deprived 
of  their  territories  on  the  ground  of  incompetence  to  govern  them. 
The  principle  of  succession  was  enforced  with  especial  strictness 
among  the  samurai.  If  a  man  died  without  direct  male  issue  his 
family  was  declared  extinct,  and  were  he  a  noble,  his  estate  reverted 
to  the  shogunate.  Subsequently  the  severity  of  this  system  was 
modified  and  adoption  began  to  be  permitted,  to  the  great  satisfac- 
tion of  the  feudal  chiefs  and  the  military  class  in  general.  But  in 
the  early  days  the  reins  of  administration  were  held  so  unflinchingly 
that  even  consanguinity  with  the  shogun  did  not  save  from  condign 
punishment  a  nobleman  who  failed  in  respect  for  the  law.  Degra- 
dations and  removals  from  one  province  to  another  were  frequent 
forms  of  punishment  for  slight  breaches  of  law. 

The  autonomy  of  each  individual  fief  was  complete  within 
itself.     The  feudal  barons,  whether  large  or  small  and  whether 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  129 

1603-1651 

their  relations  with  the  shogunate  were  close  or  remote  enjoyed 
the  privilege  of  governing  the  districts  under  their  control  in 
whatever  manner  they  pleased,  entirely  independent  of  the  ad- 
ministration in  Edo.  This  applied  to  financial,  military,  judicial, 
educational,  industrial,  and  all  other  matters,  the  central  govern- 
ment reserving  to  itself  only  the  right  of  declaring  war  or  concluding 
peace,  of  coining  money  and  of  repairing  or  constructing  roads. 
But  while,  on  the  one  hand,  this  principle  of  non-interference  was 
strictly  observed,  any  dangerous  independence  that  it  might  have 
developed  was  effectually  obviated  by  another  device,  namely,  that 
of  requiring  the  sojourn  in  Edo  of  every  feudal  baron  at  fixed  inter- 
vals and  for  a  fixed  period.  This  was  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
measures  conceived  by  the  Tokugawa.  The  policy  itself  had  been 
formulated  in  the  time  of  Iyeyasu,  but  it  did  not  come  into  operation 
until  1635,  under  the  third  shogun,  Iyemitsu.  Each  feudal  chief 
was  compelled  to  spend  a  part  of  every  second  year  in  Edo,  the 
dates  of  setting  out  from  his  province  and  of  leaving  Edo  on  his 
return  journey  being  fixed  by  the  shogunate.  Nothing  could  have 
been  simpler  than  this  device ;  nothing  more  efficacious  in  establish- 
ing and  preserving  the  Tokugawa  sway.  Probably  no  factor  in 
the  Tokugawa  system  contributed  more  materially  to  the  unprece- 
dented duration  of  domestic  peace  throughout  two  centuries  and 
a  half.  It  was  not  until  1862,  a  few  years  before  the  fall  of  Edo, 
that  this  astute  policy  was  allowed  to  fall  into  abeyance.  Further, 
during  the  first  part  of  the  Tokugawa  shogunate  the  feudal  barons 
were  obliged  to  leave  their  sons  in  Edo  as  pledges  of  their  own  good 
behavior.  This  custom  was  discontinued,  however,  in  the  days  of 
the  fourth  shogun,  though  the  rule  that  the  barons  with  their  wives 
and  children  must  reside  for  a  given  time  in  the  capital  every  second 
year  was  enforced  up  to  within  five  years  of  the  restoration.  One 
consequence  of  the  rule  was  that  the  feudal  lords  built  mansions  for 
themselves  in  Edo,  some  owning  three,  some  as  many  as  six,  of  such 
city  residences,  their  inmates  varying  from  hundreds  to  thousands. 
The  effect  thus  produced  upon  the  prosperity  of  the  capital  may 
easily  be  conceived.  It  was  also  the  custom  under  the  Tokugawa 
regime  to  prevent  undue  accumulation  of  wealth  in  the  hands  of 
individuals  by  ordering  conspicuously  rich  folks  to  carry  out  some 
great  public  work  at  their  own  expense.  In  fact,  no  means  were 
neglected  to  prevent  the  feudal  barons  from  developing  incon- 
venient strength. 


130  JAPAN 

1603-1651 

In  addition  to  these  rules,  exact  and  rigidly  enforced  laws — 
called  buke  hatto,  or  military  statutes — were  enacted  for  observ- 
ance by  feudal  chiefs  and  samurai  in  general.  The  first  body 
of  such  laws,  comprising  thirteen  articles,  was  promulgated  in 
1615.  Subsequently,  the  laws  were  repromulgated  on  the  acces- 
sion of  each  shogun,  sometimes  with  modifications  or  additions. 
The  principal  provisions  of  these  statutes  were:  that  attendance 
in  Edo  must  be  as  punctual  as  possible;  that  no  new  castles  must 
be  built;  that  repairs  of  old  ones  must  not  be  undertaken  without 
special  permission;  that  leagues  must  not  be  formed;  that  mar- 
riages must  not  be  contracted  without  due  permission;  that  gar- 
ments must  be  worn  and  methods  of  conveyance  employed  such  as 
suited  the  rank  of  the  wearer  or  traveler,  and  so  forth ;  these  vetoes 
being  supplemented  by  provisions  for  encouraging  the  pursuit  of 
military  and  literary  professions,  the  practice  of  frugality  and  other 
virtues. 

The  position  of  the  feudal  lords  was  further  lowered  and  that 
of  the  shogun  made  more  secure  when,  with  a  consummate  tact, 
Iyemitsu,  the  third  Tokugawa,  annulled  the  formal  distinction  be- 
tween the  tozama  and  fudai  barons,  and  reduced  the  former  to 
the  level  of  the  latter.  On  his  accession  he  summoned  to  the  palace 
in  Edo  all  the  tozama  barons,  and  addressed  them  as  follows: 
"  Our  ancestor,  having  been  originally  of  the  same  rank  with  your- 
selves and  enabled  to  pacify  the  country  through  your  assistance, 
was  prompted  by  a  sentiment  of  deference  to  refrain  from  classing 
you  with  the  fudai  barons.  But  I  differ  from  my  ancestor  in  that 
I  was  born  to  the  position  which  he  acquired,  and  am  under  no 
obligation  to  preserve  any  distinction.  It  is  therefore  my  intention 
to  place  you  on  the  same  footing  as  the  fudai.  Should  this  be 
displeasing  to  any  of  you,  an  interval  of  three  years  will  now  be 
given  you,  during  which  time  you  should  consider  the  matter  ma- 
turely in  your  own  dominions  and  come  to  a  final  decision."  Then, 
adding  that  the  creed  of  the  samurai  was  to  guard  with  weapons  of 
war  the  things  acquired  by  such  means,  he  presented  to  each  of  the 
barons  a  sword.  This  injunction,  at  once  so  frank  and  so  irre- 
sistible, evoked  no  dissent.  The  barons  acquiesced  respectfully, 
but  the  greater  tozama  never  forgot  the  position  they  once  held,  and 
their  loyalty  was  often  more  formal  than  sincere,  until  after  i860, 
when  some  of  them  turned  open  enemies  of  the  Tokugawa. 

The  Tokugawa's  policy  toward  the  imperial  house  and  the 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  131 

1603-1651 

civil  nobility  at  Kyoto  was  not  less  clever  and  effective  than  the 
control  of  the  daimio.  Theoretically,  the  shogun  derived  his  powers 
primarily  from  the  emperor,  and  ruled  his  vassals  under  the  au- 
thority delegated  to  him  by  the  sovereign.  The  Tokugawa  showed 
deference  to  this  theory  by  making  every  effort  to  enhance  the 
social  position  and  enrich  the  temporal  domains  of  the  emperor. 
But  it  was  at  the  same  time  important  for  the  shogun  that  the 
exercise  of  his  executive  power  should  not  be  inconveniently  ham- 
pered by  interference  on  the  part  of  the  court.  Hence,  in  the  same 
year  that  saw  the  promulgation  of  the  military  statutes,  1615, 
Iyeyasu  compiled  a  law  of  seventeen  articles  destined  chiefly  for 
observance  by  the  court  nobles,  and  entitled  "  Kinchu  Jomoku," 
or  palace  regulations.  In  this  law  we  find  provisions  recapitulat- 
ing orders  issued  by  the  emperor  in  the  Kwampei  era,  to  the  effect 
that  men  should  study  the  ancient  poetry  of  Japan,  that  the  prime 
minister,  the  minister  of  the  left,  and  the  minister  of  the  right 
should  rank  above  the  princes  of  the  blood;  that  the  ranks  held 
by  samurai  should  be  considered  entirely  distinct  from  those  held 
by  court  nobles,  and  so  forth.  Men  said  that  this  law  was  designed 
to  augment  the  prestige  of  the  imperial  house,  but  in  reality  it  set 
limits  to  the  exercise  of  the  sovereign's  authority.  The  principal 
official  of  the  shogun's  government,  the  shoshidai,  was  stationed  in 
Kyoto  and  intrusted  with  the  duty  of  supervising  the  imperial 
guards.  Moreover,  strict  regulations  were  enacted  to  control  the 
journeys  of  the  feudal  nobles  to  and  from  Kyoto.  In  a  word,  the 
policy  of  the  shogunate  was  to  preserve  the  fullest  semblance  of 
reverence  for  the  sovereign,  simultaneously  with  the  fullest  admin- 
istrative independence.  The  imperial  court  was  organized  in  Kyoto 
with  all  pomp  and  circumstance;  it  had  its  ministers,  vice  min- 
isters, and  subordinate  officials;  it  had  its  five  principal,  as  well 
as  more  than  a  hundred  ordinary,  court  nobles;  but  as  for  the 
sovereign's  actual  power,  it  did  not  extend  beyond  the  direction 
of  matters  relating  to  rank  and  etiquette,  the  classification  of  shrine- 
keepers,  priests,  and  priestesses,  and  professionals  of  various  kinds 
— functions  of  no  material  importance  whatever.  Alone  the 
kwanryo,  the  denso,  and  the  giso  exercised  a  certain  measure 
of  authority  in  the  shogun's  government.  The  control  of  affairs 
relating  to  lands,  to  the  army,  to  finance,  and  to  everything  included 
in  the  domain  of  practical  politics  rested  absolutely  in  the  hands  of 
the  shogun. 


132  JAPAN 

1603-1651 

This  state  of  affairs  greatly  mortified  the  Emperor  Gominoo,2 
a  sovereign  of  much  talent,  who  reigned  during  1612-1630.  He 
would  fain  have  effected  some  change  in  the  system,  but  found 
himself  helpless  to  accomplish  anything  against  the  all-powerful 
Tokugawa.  An  additional  check  to  such  designs  was  given  by  the 
marriage  of  Kazuko,  daughter  of  the  second  shogun,  Hidetada,  to 
the  emperor,  the  offspring  of  the  union,  a  daughter,  subsequently 
coming  to  the  throne  as  the  Empress  Myosho.  This  close  relation- 
ship with  the  imperial  family  naturally  increased  the  prestige  of 
the  Tokugawa.  Subsequently  Gokomyo,  Gosai-in,  and  Reigen, 
sons  of  the  Emperor  Gominoo,  successively  ascended  the  throne 
and  Gokomyo  cherished  the  design  of  achieving  his  father's 
ambition.  But  he  died  without  accomplishing  anything  and  the 
times  remained  unfavorable  to  the  imperial  aspirations  until  1868. 

With  regard  to  the  organization  of  the  shogun's  government 
in  Edo,  the  cabinet,  called  yobeya,  held  its  sessions  in  the  castle, 
and  was  composed  of  the  tairo,  rojiu,  and  wakadoshiyori.  The 
tairo  corresponded  with  the  prime  minister  (daijo  daijin)  of 
Kyoto;  it  was  an  office  sometimes  actually  filled,  sometimes  left 
without  occupant.  The  rojiu  were  five;  their  functions  were  the 
general  direction  of  administrative  affairs,  of  the  feudal  barons 

2  Table  showing  chronology  and  lineage  of  emperors. 

107.  Emperor  Goyozei,  1587- 1612. 

108.  Emperor  Gominoo,  1612-1630. 


109.  Empress        no.  Emperor        ill.  Emperor        112.  Emperor 

Myosho,  Gokomyo,  Gosai-in,  Reigen, 

1630-1644.  1644-1655.  1655-1663.  1663-1687. 


1  •  .  . 

113.  Emperor  Higashiyama,  1687-1710.      Tadahito  (ancestor  of  Prince  Kan-in). 

114.  Emperor  Nakamikado,  1710-1736.  Massahito. 

115.  Emperor  Sakuramachi,  1736-1747.      119.  Emperor  Kokaku,  1780-1817. 

I  I 

120.  Emperor  Ninko,  1817-1847. 

116.  Emperor  117.  Emperor 

Momozono,  Gosakuramachi,     121.  Emperor  Komei,  1847-1867. 

1747-1763-  1763-1771.  I 

122.  The  present  Emperor  (Mutsuhito). 

118.  Emperor  Gomomozono,  1771-1780. 


EDO     GOVE.RNMENT  133 

1603-1651 

and  of  the  city  of  Kyoto.  The  wakadoshiyori,  also  five  in  number, 
assisted  in  the  administration  and  supervised  the  samurai  directly 
connected  with  the  shogunate.  The  posts  in  the  cabinet  were 
given  invariably  to  fudai  nobles,  the  tozama  barons  being  entirely 
excluded.  Next  in  importance  were  the  offices  of  the  three  gover- 
nors (bugyo),  the  senior  and  junior  supervisors  (metsuke)  and  so 
forth.  One  of  the  three  governors  was  called  the  jisha  bugyo,  and 
was  charged  with  the  management  of  temples,  shrines,  and  Shinto 
and  Buddhist  priests.  Another,  the  machi  bugyo,  had  control  of 
municipal  and  mercantile  matters  in  Edo ;  and  the  third,  the  kanjo 
bugyo,  had  to  do  with  all  the  lands  in  the  direct  possession  of  the 
shogunate.  These  three  governors  had  judicial  functions  also, 
being  required  to  hear  and  determine  all  suits  connected  with 
matters  falling  within  their  respective  provinces.  In  addition  to 
duties  of  general  supervision,  the  metsuke  were  charged  with  the 
superintendence  of  special  classes,  the  ometsuke  being  intrusted 
with  the  function  of  keeping  watch  on  the  feudal  barons  and  on 
officials  below  the  rank  of  rojiu,  in  conjunction  with  the  rojiu; 
while  the  shometsuke,  similarly  cooperating  with  the  wakadoshi- 
yori, had  to  superintend  the  samurai  who  were  direct  vassals  of  the 
shogun,  as  well  as  the  samurai  in  general.  Attached  to  the  above- 
mentioned  principal  officials  there  was  a  duly-ordered  staff  of  sub- 
ordinates, the  whole  constituting  the  organization  of  the  general 
government.  Posts  inferior  to  those  of  the  three  governors  were 
generally  filled  by  hatamoto  (bannerets).  Turning  to  local  officers, 
we  find  the  shoshidai,  or  governor,  in  Kyoto,  entrusted  with  the 
supervision  of  the  imperial  guards,  and  the  Osaka-jodai,  or  lord 
warden  of  Osaka  castle.  These  two  officials  had  general  charge 
of  affairs  in  the  western  provinces,  in  addition  to  the  duties  of  their 
special  offices.  They  also  were  selected  from  among  the  fudai 
barons,  and  their  post  was  usually  a  stepping  stone  to  the  important 
position  of  rojiu.  Further,  in  Nijo  of  Kyoto  there  was  a  zaiban 
shihai,  or  controller  of  the  guards;  in  Osaka,  a  joban  shihai,  or 
controller  of  the  castle  guards,  and  in  Shimpu,  Kofu,  and  so  forth, 
there  were  joban  shihai,  or  kinban  shihai,  performing  functions 
similar  to  those  of  the  Kyoto  and  Osaka  shihai.  Governors,  who 
were  regarded  as  officials  of  great  importance,  gundai  (headmen) 
of  lands  under  the  direct  control  of  the  shogun,  daikwan  and  other 
principal  officers,  were  selected  by  the  shogun  from  among  the  fudai 
barons  and  bannerets.     In  the  city  of  Edo  there  were  machidoshi- 


134.  JAPAN 

1603-1651 

yon,  or  wardmasters,  nanushi,  or  mayors,  and  so  forth,  while 
in  provincial  towns  there  were  five  nanushi  who  managed  munici- 
pal affairs. 

Turning  to  the  foreign  relations  of  Japan  during  this  period, 
we  find  that,  after  the  invasion  of  Hideyoshi's  army,  which,  like  the 
Hundred  Years'  War  in  France,  devastated  Korea  from  one  end  to 
the  other,  the  people  of  the  peninsula  regarded  the  Japanese  with 
such  aversion  that  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  were  vir- 
tually severed.  It  was  with  great  difficulty  that  Iyeyasu  at  last 
succeeded  in  convincing  the  Koreans  that  the  Japan  of  the  To- 
kugawa  differed  essentially  from  the  Japan  under  Hideyoshi,  and 
that  the  former's  intentions  were  entirely  pacific.  Finally  the 
Koreans,  having  obtained  tacit  consent  of  China,  sent  to  Japan  a 
letter  from  their  king  together  with  some  presents,  and  thenceforth, 
on  each  occasion  of  a  change  of  shogun,  Korean  envoys  came  to 
offer  their  country's  congratulations,  the  Tokugawa,  on  their  side, 
treating  these  delegates  with  all  courtesy  and  consideration.  In  the 
days  of  the  Ashikaga  family,  it  had  been  customary  for  the  shogun 
to  assume  the  title  of  king  of  Japan  in  his  communications  with 
other  sovereigns.  The  Tokugawa  discontinued  this,  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  an  infraction  of  the  imperial  dignity,  and  adopted  in- 
stead the  title  taikun,  or  great  prince.  The  So  family  of  Tsushima 
acted  from  generation  to  generation  as  intermediaries  between 
Japan  and  Korea.  They  had  a  monopoly  of  the  trade  with  the 
latter  country,  whither  they  dispatched  twenty  vessels  annually,  the 
total  value  of  the  trade  being  limited,  however,  to  18,000  ryo.  But 
though  Korea  thus  accepted  Japan's  amicable  overtures,  China 
would  not  do  so.  Nevertheless,  the  inhabitants  of  her  southeastern 
parts  came  to  Nagasaki  in  great  numbers  for  purposes  of  commerce, 
and  many  Japanese  ships  crossed  to  the  neighboring  empire  with 
the  same  object.  These  ships,  called  shuin-bune,  because  of  the 
vermilion-seal  permits  of  the  shogun,  were  owned  by  wealthy 
merchants  residing  in  or  near  Kyoto,  Sakai,  and  Nagasaki. 

The  Portuguese,  who  were  the  first  Europeans  to  establish 
commercial  intercourse  with  Japan,  held  a  monopoly  of  the  trade 
for  some  time,  so  that  the  Dutch  settlers  in  the  Indies  were  excluded 
from  competing  with  them.  Finally,  however,  in  1596,  the  Dutch 
managed  to  make  their  way  to  Hirado  in  the  province  of  Hizen, 
in  order  to  arrange  the  preliminaries  of  a  commerce  destined  to 
continue  for  a  long  time.     Among  the  persons  who  arrived  in  the 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  135 

1603-1651 

Dutch  ships  were  a  Dutchman  named  Jan  Joost  and  an  English- 
man, William  Adams,  the  latter  coming  in  the  capacity  of  pilot. 
These  two  foreigners  had  an  interview  with  Iyeyasu,  who,  much 
pleased  with  them,  conceived  the  idea  of  trading  with  Western 
countries.  Houses  and  lands  were  given  to  the  two  strangers,  and 
they  resided  in  Edo,  the  streets  now  known  as  Yayosugashi  and 
Anjincho  being  the  places  where  they  are  said  to  have  lived.  The 
Dutch,  eager  to  monopolize  the  trade  with  Japan,  made  another 
visit  to  Japan  in  a  vessel  of  war,  with  a  view  to  expelling  the 
Portuguese  merchants.  They  brought  with  them  an  autograph 
letter  and  presents  from  the  King  of  Holland  for  the  shogun,  and 
solicited  permission  to  carry  on  commerce,  to  which  Iyeyasu  readily 
acceded.  In  1612  the  first  Dutch  merchantman  arrived  in  Japanese 
waters  and  was  soon  afterward  followed  by  a  British  ship,  the 
coming  of  the  latter  being  due  to  information  furnished  by  William 
Adams  to  his  country  with  reference  to  the  state  of  affairs  in  Japan. 
Iyeyasu  placed  no  obstacles  in  the  way  of  British  trade,  but  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Dutch  and  the  English  at  Hirado  were  so  in- 
harmonious that  at  one  time  they  were  on  the  point  of  resorting 
to  open  hostilities.  The  Dutch  finally  prevailed  upon  the  shogun  to 
impose  as  many  restrictions  as  possible  on  the  trade  of  the  English, 
and  the  result  was  that  although  the  friction  between  the  British 
and  the  Dutch  was  ostensibly  removed,  the  former,  finding  them- 
selves unable  to  carry  on  business  profitably,  finally  took  their  de- 
parture. About  this  time  great  numbers  of  merchants  came  to 
Japan  from  Annam,  Siam,  Luzon,  and  other  places  of  the  south, 
as  well  as  from  the  southern  districts  of  China  and  from  India, 
while  on  the  Japanese  side  wealthy  traders  of  Kiushu  traveled 
abroad  to  a  great  extent  for  business  purposes,  and  Iyeyasu  himself 
went  so  far  as  to  dispatch  people  across  the  Pacific  to  New  Spain 
in  America  in  order  to  open  commercial  relations.  The  Japanese 
at  that  era  possessed  very  strongly  constructed  vessels,  measuring 
as  much  as  120  feet  by  54,  fully  rigged  with  three  masts,  having 
dark-red  lacquered  hulls  and  capable  of  carrying  a  great  number 
of  passengers.  In  these  ships  were  exported  copper,  bronze 
utensils,  lacquered  articles,  umbrellas,  fans,  screens,  sulphur, 
camphor,  dyed  textile  fabrics,  wheat  flour,  and  so  forth,  and  on 
their  return  voyage  they  brought  to  Japan  silk  cocoons,  silk  fabrics, 
woolen  stuffs,  sugar,  drugs,  incense,  vermilion,  quicksilver,  glass, 
coral,  whalebone  and  so  forth.     This  list  of  exports  and  imports 


186  JAPAN 

1603-1651 

furnishes  some  clue  to  the  industries  and  customs  of  the  Japanese  of 
that  era.  Foreign  trade  flourished  greatly,  and  a  spirit  of  enter- 
prise prevailed  throughout  the  country.  Date  Masamune,  feudal 
chief  of  Sendai,  sent  an  envoy  to  Rome  who  came  back  eventually 
to  Japan,  having  devoted  seven  years  to  studying  the  state  of  affairs 
in  Rome,  where  he  was  received  in  audience  by  the  Pope.  Early  in 
the  seventeenth  century  one  Yamada  Nagamasa  (or  Nizayemon), 
a  native  of  Suruga,  crossed  to  Siam,  and  organizing  a  force  with 
the  Japanese  settlers  in  that  country — who  had  already  become 
sufficiently  numerous  to  people  a  village,  hence  called  Nippon-machi 
— rendered  material  assistance  to  the  king  of  the  country,  twice 
quelling  a  rebellion  that  prevailed  at  the  time.  This  same  Yamada, 
fighting  always  for  Siam,  led  his  troops  against  an  invading  army 
of  Spaniards  and  defeated  them,  an  exploit  regarded  with  the  great- 
est admiration  at  that  era  when  the  prestige  of  the  Spanish  arms 
was  at  its  height.  The  king  rewarded  Yamada  by  adopting  him 
into  the  royal  family  and  giving  him  his  own  daughter  in  marriage, 
so  that  the  Japanese  adventurer's  name  became  widely  renowned. 
Another  example  of  the  adventurous  spirit  of  the  age  was  afforded 
by  Hamada  Yahei,  who  led  a  considerable  force  to  Formosa,  to 
avenge  the  plunder  of  a  Japanese  ship  by  the  natives,  and  having 
overrun  the  island,  brought  back  the  son  of  the  chief  as  a  hostage 
to  Nagasaki. 

Unfortunately,  however,  unexpected  religious  squabbles 
fatally  interrupted  the  course  of  the  country's  foreign  trade.  The 
Dutch  settlers  made  a  discovery,  real  or  pretended,  that  the  Por- 
tuguese and  Spanish  missionaries,  leaguing  themselves  with  the 
native  Christians,  were  plotting  to  overthrow  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment. Many  proofs  of  the  truth  of  this  accusation  were  submitted 
to  the  shogun  by  the  Dutch,  and  color  was  lent  to  the  charge  by 
evidence  that  the  missionaries  themselves  or  their  converts  behaved 
with  much  intolerance  and  arrogance.  The  Edo  government  was 
moved  by  these  accusations  and  by  the  doings  of  the  missionaries 
to  take  active  steps  against  them.  Several  of  the  principal  were 
put  to  death  and  the  rest  were  expelled.  Shortly  afterward  an 
order  was  issued  against  the  voyages  of  the  shuin-bune  and  it  was 
further  declared  unlawful  to  construct  ships  of  more  than  a  certain 
size,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  method  of  construction  was  so 
modified  that  distant  voyages  became  impossible.  Travel  to  foreign 
countries  was  also  strictly   interdicted,  and  as  a  necessary  con- 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  137 

1603-1651 

sequence  the  arts  of  ship-building  and  navigation  sensibly  declined. 
It  was  at  this  epoch,  too,  that  the  Christian  rebellion  of  Shimabara 
occurred,  culminating  in  the  battle  of  Amakusa  in  1637-1638,  which 
had  a  decisive  influence  upon  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Tokugawa. 

At  the  time  of  the  first  introduction  of  Christianity  into  Japan, 
it  spread  very  rapidly  throughout  the  empire,  receiving  no  check 
until  the  arrogance  and  intolerance  of  the  missionaries  provoked 
the  anger  of  Hideyoshi  and  induced  him  to  issue  an  edict  forbidding 
the  propagandism  of  the  foreign  faith.  This  law,  however,  was 
not  rigorously  enforced,  and  moreover  official  attention  was  shortly 
afterward  diverted  to  the  war  with  Korea.  When  Iyeyasu  came  to 
power,  as  has  been  shown,  he  expelled  the  foreign  missionaries 
from  Japan  and  deputed  Buddhist  priests  to  reconvert  the  Japanese 
who  had  embraced  the  Christian  creed,  the  efforts  of  these  priests 
being  reinforced  by  an  edict  that  all  who  refused  to  abjure  Chris- 
tianity should  be  either  exiled  or  put  to  death.  But  it  appeared  that 
many  of  the  Japanese  Christians  had  adopted  the  new  faith  with 
sincerity  and ,  devotion  which  neither  teaching  nor  threats  could 
alter.  In  the  provinces  of  Bungo  and  Hizen,  in  Kiushu,  where  even 
the  feudal  barons  themselves  had  become  converts  to  the  Western 
creed,  a  great  majority  of  the  population  was  Christian,  and  from 
them  issued  the  forces  of  propagandism  which  made  themselves 
felt  elsewhere.  Shimabara,  in  Hizen,  was  especially  regarded  as 
the  headquarters  of  the  foreign  faith,  and  the  shogun  accordingly 
nominated  as  feudal  chief  of  that  place  Matsukura  Shigemasa,  a 
bitter  foe  to  Christianity.  The  latter  issued  proclamations  against 
the  profession  of  the  faith,  and  inflicted  most  cruel  punishments  on 
its  votaries.  The  people  suffered  in  silence,  for  Shigemasa's  mili- 
tary following  was  so  great  that  resistance  was  hopeless. 

On  Shigemasa's  death,  his  incapable  and  tyrannous  son  Shige- 
tsugu  succeeded  him,  and  popular  discontent  began  to  take  a  con- 
crete form.  Gradually  the  plan  of  a  combination  for  open  re- 
sistance found  advocates.  Among  the  generals  on  the  defeated  side 
in  the  battle  of  Sekigahara  of  1600  had  been  one  Konishi  Yukinaga, 
an  ardent  believer  in  Christianity.  After  the  battle  his  principal 
retainers  retired  to  the  Island  of  Amakusa  off  the  coast  of  Hizen, 
among  whom  the  most  influential  constantly  sought  means  to  be 
revenged  on  the  Tokugawa  and  to  promote  the  spread  of  Chris- 
tianity. They  found  a  youth  named  Masuda  Shiro  who  to  remark- 
able graces  of  person  added  a  mind  of  great  craftiness,  and  they 


138  JAPAN 

1603-1651 

presented  him  to  the  people  in  1637,  alleging  that  he  was  the 
heavenly  messenger  of  whom  Francis  Xavier  had  spoken  twenty- 
five  years  previously  when  leaving  Japan,  and  who  was  destined  to 
establish  the  supremacy  of  the  Christian  faith.  They  also  spread 
rumors  that  the  shogun  had  died  in  Edo,  and  the  people,  much  en- 
couraged by  these  things,  assembled  in  great  numbers  and  openly 
offered  thanksgivings  to  heaven.  The  officials  in  Shimabara  en- 
deavored to  disperse  this  meeting  and  to  arrest  the  leaders,  but  in 
a  contest  which  ensued  the  Christians  were  victorious.  Now  the 
insurrection  spread  far  and  wide  throughout  Shimabara,  Amakusa, 
and  the  neighboring  districts,  until  the  insurgents  under  the  com- 
mand of  Masuda  Shiro  numbered  over  thirty  thousand.  At  first 
the  Edo  government  regarded  the  rebels  as  a  mere  mob  of  peasants, 
and  dispatched  a  petty  baron,  Itakura  Shigemasa,  to  restore  order. 
But  the  latter's  inability  to  cope  with  the  trouble  having  afforded 
a  gauge  of  its  true  dimensions,  the  commission  was  given  to 
Matsudaira  Nobutsuna,  a  powerful  chief.  The  insurgents  fought 
with  desperate  resolution  and  inflicted  numerous  defeats  on  the 
government's  troops,  Shigemasa  himself  falling  in  battle.  But  the 
end  came  at  last.  In  1638,  the  stronghold  of  the  rebels  was  taken, 
and  its  defenders  were  either  burned  in  the  flames  kindled  by  their 
own  hand  or  put  to  the  sword. 

This  experience  taught  the  government  that  the  spread  of 
Chistianity  was  attended  by  the  gravest  dangers  to  public  tran- 
quillity. Strict  laws  were  therefore  enacted  for  its  suppression. 
Foreigners  who  came  to  Japan  for  the  purpose  of  propagating  the 
faith  were  refused  admission,  and  those  who  declined  to  depart 
despite  the  edicts  were  put  to  death.  Thenceforth  Buddhism  was 
adopted  as  the  national  religion,  receiving  the  allegiance  of  all 
classes,  high  and  low.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  revival  of 
Buddhist  influence  was  not  only  simultaneous  with  the  downfall  of 
Catholicism,  but  also  due  largely  to  an  institution  which  was  now 
for  the  first  time  placed  on  a  religious  basis.  The  system  of  taking 
a  census  at  regular  intervals,  which  was  introduced  by  the  Taikwa 
reformers,  had  never  been  successfully  practiced  for  a  long  period 
of  time,  until  the  Tokugawa  government  made  the  extermination 
of  Catholicism  an  occasion  for  the  restoration  of  the  system.  It 
was  ordered  in  17 16  that  the  census  should  be  taken  in  each 
fief  and  the  results  duly  reported  every  six  years.  Births,  deaths, 
and  marriages  were  registered  in  books  kept  by  Buddhist  priests, 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  139 

1603-1651 

so  that  no  Christian  should  remain,  in  society  under  the  protec- 
tion of  law.  The  operation  was  called,  from  its  religious  char- 
acter, shumon-aratame,  or  examination  of  faith.  This  of  course 
contributed  materially  to  the  influence  of  the  Buddhist  church, 
for  which  the  Tokugawa  period  was  an  era  of  marked  pros- 
perity, the  number  of  temples  throughout  the  empire  aggregating 
four  hundred  thousand.  Nevertheless,  the  government  was  careful 
to  avoid  a  return  to  the  excesses  of  former  days.  The  building 
of  new  temples  was  forbidden,  the  lands  assigned  for  the  support 
of  those  already  in  existence  were  rigidly  defined,  and  the  people 
were  encouraged  to  study  Chinese  literature,  so  that  the  corruption 
which  disfigured  the  Buddhist  priesthood  in  earlier  ages  was,  in 
great  part,  corrected. 

Even  more  important  than  the  revival  of  Buddhist  influence 
was  the  bearing  of  the  Catholic  extermination  upon  the  almost  total 
exclusion  of  foreign  trade  from  the  shores  of  Japan.  The  entry  of 
all  foreign  ships,  except  those  of  China  and  Holland,  into  Japanese 
ports  was  peremptorily  forbidden.  Neither  the  Chinese  nor  the 
Dutch  entertained  any  idea  of  religious  propagandism,  their  sole 
purpose  being  commercial.  The  Dutch,  indeed,  having  shown  a  dis- 
position to  assist  Japan  in  every  way,  enjoyed  great  credit  with  the 
Edo  government,  as  will  be  more  fully  set  forth  in  the  next  chapter. 
At  first  no  restrictions  were  imposed  on  the  commercial  transactions 
of  the  Chinese  and  the  Dutch,  but  subsequently  a  limit  was  set.  to 
the  amount  of  trade  and  to  the  number  of  ships  engaged,  and  the 
prices  at  which  imported  articles  must  be  offered  for  sale  were  also 
determined  officially.  These  restrictions  were  suggested  by  the 
fact  that  the  trade  involved  a  heavy  drain  of  the  precious  metals. 
Indeed,  the  quantity  of  gold  and  silver  exported  from  Japan  during 
the  interval  between  the  inauguration  of  foreign  commerce  and  the 
imposition  of  the  above  restriction  was  so  large  that  Japan's 
resources  were  seriously  impaired.  It  was  found  necessary  to 
strictly  interdict  the  shipping  away  of  the  precious  metals,  but  there 
is  strong  reason  to  doubt  whether  the  interdict  effected  much,  for 
foreigners,  disregarding  the  laws  of  Japan,  contrived  to  carry  on 
clandestine  commerce  in  waters  beyond  the  purview  of  the  govern- 
ment's officials. 


Chapter    XII 

THE  DECLINE   OF  THE   EDO   GOVERNMENT 

1651-1837 

THE  period  of  the  third  shogun,  Iyemitsu  (1624-1651). 
perhaps  marks  the  height  of  the  vigor  and  efficiency  of 
the  Tokugawa  feudalism.  He  was  assisted  by  able  coun- 
cilors, and  his  strong  administration  was  emulated  by  many  great 
local  barons  in  their  respective  fiefs,  so  that  a  profound  peace 
reigned  over  the  country  broken  only  by  the  Christian  insurrection 
at  Shimabara.  From  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
however,  signs  of  the  decline  of  the  Edo  power  began  to  manifest 
themselves.  At  the  accession  of  the  fourth  shogun,  Iyetsuna 
(1651-1680),  Yuino  Shosetsu  and  Marubashi  Chiiya,  two  military 
captains  not  attached  to  any  feudal  baron,  collected  a  great  number 
of  ronin  ("wave  men,"  samurai  attached  to  no  lord)  in  Suruga 
and  in  Edo,  their  project  being  to  raise  the  standard  of  revolt 
simultaneously  in  the  west  and  in  the  east.  Their  attempt  was 
unsuccessful,  but  its  failure  did  not  deter  two  other  ronin  from 
plotting  a  similar  insurrection  in  Edo  the  following  year.  They, 
too,  were  discovered  and  punished  before  their  plans  matured. 
Thereafter,  for  a  time,  owing  doubtless  to  the  fact  that  the  feudal 
barons  were  too  frequently  deprived  of  their  estates,  their  vassals 
found  themselves  homeless  and  resourceless,  and  the  peace  of  the 
country  was  broken  here  and  there  by  bands  of  ronin.  These 
troubles,  however,  were  speedily  dealt  with.  Nor  was  the  Edo 
castle  itself  free  from  trouble,  for  toward  the  close  of  Iyetsuna's 
shogunate,  the  tairo,  Sakai  Tadakiyo,  acquired  so  much  influence 
that  the  authority  of  the  shogun  himself  was  somewhat  impaired. 

The  next  shogun,  Tsunayoshi  (1680-1709),  however,  re- 
turned to  the  vigorous  policy  of  the  first  three  of  his  predecessors. 
He  dismissed  Tadakiyo,  and  appointed  Hotta  Masatoshi,  a  states- 
man of  great  acumen,  in  his  stead  as  tairo.  The  shogun  and  his 
ministers  alike  devoted  themselves  unwearyingly  to  promoting  the 
welfare  of  the  country.  This  era  is  worthy  of  close  attention.  We 
find,  among  other  things,  that  Tsunayoshi  greatly  encouraged  the 

140 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  141 

1651-1837 

study  of  literature.  Tokugawa  Iyeyasu,  though  essentially  a 
soldier  and  statesman,  fully  appreciated  the  importance  of  litera- 
ture, which  he  conceived  as  an  indispensable  factor  in  encouraging 
the  pursuit  of  virtue  and  promoting  the  peace  of  society.  Even 
while  his  hands  were  busy  with  campaigns  and  battles,  he  invited 
great  savants  and  listened  to  their  lectures  on  the  Chinese  classics. 
He  also  caused  his  officers  to  collect  and  reprint  valuable  books  that 
would  otherwise  have  been  lost  to  the  nation.  His  three  successors 
followed  his  example  in  this  respect,  but  it  was  the  fifth  shogun, 
Tsunayoshi,  who  above  all  contributed  to  the  spread  of  literary 
pursuits.  Devoted  from  his  youth  to  the  study  of  the  Chinese 
classics,  he  made  a  habit,  after  his  succession,  of  delivering  lectures 
to  the  feudal  barons  and  vassals,  and  Shinto  and  Buddhist  priests, 
and  it  may  well  be  supposed  that  this  action  gave  a  great  impetus 
to  literary  pursuits. 

Prior  to  this  time,  it  had  been  customary  for  the  military 
men  to  neglect  the  study  of  reading  and  writing.  Such  occupa- 
tions were  abandoned  to  the  priests,  and  it  resulted  that,  even 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  wars,  men  having  a  predilection  for 
literature  generally  drifted  into  the  ranks  of  the  priests.  Such  per- 
sons, however,  were  not  required  to  adopt  the  tonsure  or  to  give 
up  their  position  as  samurai.  The  learned  family  of  Hayashi  were 
a  case  in  point.  The  succeeding  shoguns  paid  them  high  respect, 
and  a  school  founded  by  them,  at  first  in  the  character  of  a  private 
establishment,  but  afterward  taken  under  government  protection, 
grew  into  an  institution  of  much  importance  under  the  name  of  the 
Shohei-ko.  The  example  of  Edo  was  widely  followed  in  various 
provinces  of  Japan,  and  numerous  institutions  of  learning  sprang 
up  in  all  the  fiefs,  from  which  the  most  distinguished  pupils  were 
selected  and  sent  to  the  central  school,  Shohei-ko,  for  purposes  of 
further  study.  So  far  was  the  study  of  Chinese  literature  carried 
by  the  Japanese  of  the  time  that  some  of  their  publications  in  that 
line  elicited  admiration  of  the  Chinese  themselves.  The  Edo  epoch 
may  thus  be  described  as  the  golden  era  of  Chinese  literature  in 
Japan,  although  unfortunately  this  record  is  somewhat  marred  by 
the  acrimonious  disputes  that  sprang  up  among  the  different  schools 
of  philosophy,  each  considering  itself  orthodox  and  denouncing  the 
teachings  of  others  as  spurious.  The  study  of  the  Chinese  classics 
also  called  forth  the  revival  of  Japanese  history  and  belles  lettres. 
Fiction,  dramatic  pieces  called  kikyoku,  and  the  popular,  pithy 


142  JAPAN 

1651-1837 

verses  known  as  haikai,  flourished  greatly,  particularly  during  the 
Genroku  era  (1688-1703).  Education  among  the  masses  also  at 
last  made  its  appearance,  for  in  almost  every  temple  there  existed 
a  private  school,  called  tera-koya,  in  which  the  children  of  farmers, 
merchants,  and  artisans  were  taught  rudimentary  lessons  in  read- 
ing, writing,  and  arithmetic. 

A  few  words  may  be  said  regarding  the  literary  productions 
of  this  period.  Mitsukuni,  lord  of  Mito  and  grandson  of  Iyeyasu, 
himself  a  distinguished  scholar  and  munificent  patron  of  literature, 
established  in  his  Edo  mansion  a  historiographical  bureau,  where, 
under  his  direction,  a  number  of  savants  undertook  the  compilation 
of  the  history  of  Japan  from  the  days  of  the  Emperor  Jimmu.  This 
work,  "Dai  Nihon  shi"  (History  of  Great  Japan),  in  243  books, 
written  in  the  Chinese  style  of  composition  stands  at  the  head  of 
Japanese  histories  of  this  era,  the  second  in  order  being  the 
"  Honchotsugan"  (Mirror  of  Our  Dynasty),  in  300  books,  com- 
piled under  the  direction  of  Hayashi  by  order  of  the  shogun's  gov- 
ernment. In  the  same  category  may  be  placed  the  "Fusoshuyoshu," 
30  volumes  of  Mitsukuni,  and  the  "Reigiruiten,"  510  volumes,  of  the 
same  author.  Of  other  greater  works,  the  "  Kansei  Choshu  Sho- 
kafu"  in  1053  books,  the  "Choya  Kyubuniko,"  in  1083  books,  and 
the  "  Tokugawa  Jikki"  in  516  books,  may  be  mentioned.  There 
was  also  a  large  work  on  botany  called  "Shobutsuruisan,"  in  1054 
volumes.  Hanawa  Hokiichi,  a  renowned  scholar,  though  blind, 
made  a  business  of  collecting  old  rare  works,  as  the  "Gunsho  Ruijii  " 
(1821  volumes).  Arai  Hakuseki  was  the  author  of  over  three  hun- 
dred books  on  classics,  history,  and  law.  The  novels  of  Kyokutei 
Bakin  aggregated  more  than  two  hundred.  And  in  addition  there 
were  numerous  works  by  less  prolific  students.  On  the  whole,  in 
the  variety  and  height  of  literary  development  the  Tokugawa  period 
is  unrivaled  in  the  history  of  Japan.  The  monopoly  of  learning  of 
the  Buddhist  priest  was  completely  broken,  and  the  intellectual 
power  of  the  nation,  long  held  in  abeyance  under  the  stress  of 
continual  warfare,  now  asserted  itself  with  tremendous  vigor. 

At  the  same  time  proofs  became  more  abundant  that  the  prime 
of  the  real  greatness  of  the  Tokugawa  had  been  passed.  The  same 
fifth  shogun  who  so  vigorously  encouraged  learning,  and  under 
whom  the  glorious  era  of  Genroku  occurred,  unduly  promoted 
Yanagizawa  Yoshiyasu,  a  man  of  humble  origin,  and  treated  him 
with  unbecoming  favor.     Peace  had  then  lasted  for  eighty  years, 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  143 

1651-1837 

and  both  the  government  and  the  people  had  begun  to  fall  into 
luxurious  and  extravagant  ways,  so  that,  for  the  first  time  in  the 
history  of  the  Tokugawa,  the  government  found  itself  straitened  for 
funds.  The  total  revenue  of  the  empire  derived  from  land  then 
amounted  to  30,000,000  koku,  of  which  23,000,000  koku  belonged 
to  the  feudal  barons,  and  3,000,000  koku  to  the  bannerets,  shrines, 
and  temples,  the  remaining  4,000,000  representing  the  income  of 
the  government.  Of  this  last  named  sum,  1,400,000  koku  were 
absorbed  by  the  shogun' s  household,  a  paltry  sum  of  150,000  being 
considered  sufficient  for  the  maintenance  of  the  sovereign,  the  pay- 
ment of  the  civil  nobles'  allowances,  and  the  other  expenses  of  the 
court  in  Kyoto.  The  method  of  taxation  varied  according  to 
provinces,  but  the  general  rule  was  that  the  government,  or  the 
feudal  lord,  took  forty  per  cent.,  and  the  cultivator  sixty  per  cent., 
of  the  gross  produce.  In  the  early  years  of  the  shogunate  large 
reserves  of  money  were  accumulated  by  Iyeyasu,  Hidetada,  and 
Iyemitsu,  but  Tsunayoshi  expended  the  whole,  and  found  himself 
reduced  to  considerable  straits.  Yoshiyasu  prevailed  upon  him  to 
adopt  a  scheme  proposed  by  one  Hagiwara  Shigehide,  namely,  the 
issue  of  a  debased  currency.  The  coins  isssued  in  the  early  years 
of  the  Tokugawa,  namely,  the  Keicho-kingin  (gold  and  silver  of 
the  Keicho  era),  were  very  pure,  but  in  the  recoinage  of  Tsunayoshi, 
gold  was  alloyed  with  silver  and  copper,  and  copper  with  lead  and 
tin,  so  that  the  cost  of  the  coins  was  below  their  face  value.  Many 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  ryo  were  obtained  by  this  device,  and 
thereby  the  embarrassed  finances  of  the  shogun  seemed  to  have 
resumed  their  normal  state.  But  the  evils  incidental  to  currency 
debasement  did  not  fail  to  ensue.  Prices  appreciated  suddenly  and 
counterfeiting  took  plafce  on  a  large  scale.  Subsequently,  however, 
the  government  corrected  these  abuses  by  restoring  the  currency 
to  its  pristine  purity,  and  substituting  administrative  economy  for 
false  finance.  The  bad  example  once  set  by  the  shogun,  however, 
was  followed  by  the  feudal  barons  long  after  he  had  mended  his 
ways,  for  they,  also,  finding  themselves  in  an  impecunious  state, 
began  to  issue  fiat  paper  money,  hansatsu,  for  circulation  within 
their  own  fiefs.  It  is  a  point  well  worthy  of  the  attention  of 
students  of  history,  that  from  the  time  of  their  accession  to  power 
until  the  day  of  their  downfall,  the  Tokugawa  shoguns  never 
resorted  to  the  device  of  issuing  fiduciary  notes. 

Neither  the  sixth  nor  the  seventh  shogun  held  his  office  long 


144  JAPAN 

1651-1837 

enough  to  accomplish  much.  In  1716  the  shogunate  passed  to 
Yoshimune  of  the  Kii  branch  of  the  Tokugawa  family.  He  was 
gifted  with  rare  administrative  talent,  and  during  the  thirty  years 
of  his  rule  sought  to  reform  the  government  so  as  to  place  it  again 
on  a  sound  and  strong  basis.  At  this  period  the  impecuniosity  of 
Edo,  which  had  been  going  from  bad  to  worse  under  succeeding 
shoguns,  and  which  resulted  chiefly  from  extravagant  and  useless 
expenditure  in  the  Tokugawa  household,  began  to  be  a  subject  of 
serious  embarrassment.  Yoshimune  had  no  sooner  assumed  admin- 
istrative control  than  he  set  himself  to  restore  financial  order  by 
closing  or  destroying  several  of  the  splendid  mansions  kept  for  the 
shogun's  amusement,  and  dismissing  their  female  and  male  inmates, 
while  he  himself  sought  to  set  an  example  to  his  people  by  wearing 
rough  garments  and  faring  in  the  simplest  manner.  Finally,  he 
issued  an  edict  urging  the  necessity  of  economy  in  all  affairs  both 
public  and  private,  and  as  the  nation  had  practical  evidence  of  this 
spirit  in  the  conduct  of  its  rulers,  not  alone  the  ministers  of  state, 
but  also  the  feudal  barons  adopting  and  following  the  admonition 
of  the  shogun  by  the  exercise  of  strict  frugality,  economy  became 
one  of  the  most  marked  features  of  the  era.  Yoshimune  not  only 
sought  to  foster  this  spirit  of  frugality,  but  also  endeavored  to  pro- 
mote industrial  and  agricultural  enterprise.  He  encouraged  the 
cultivation  of  Korean  ginseng  as  well  as  Batavian  and  sweet  pota- 
toes; he  inaugurated  the  planting  of  Japanese  sugar  cane,  and  at 
the  same  time  dispatched  officials  to  various  parts  of  the  empire  to 
promote  the  growth  of  other  products.  Naturally  there  appeared 
many  persons  in  the  different  clans  who  devoted  themselves  to 
industry  and  agriculture.  Enumerating  the  principal  developments 
of  the  time,  we  find  that  sericulture  was  greatly  extended  and  its 
methods  were  improved  throughout  the  eastern  provinces;  tfiat 
indigo  was  cultivated  in  Awa,  and  oranges  were  grown  in  Kiushu ; 
that  the  raising  of  tobacco  and  the  operation  of  drying  bonito  were 
considerably  encouraged  in  Satsuma;  that  salt  was  manufactured 
in  Shikoku  and  Chiukoku,  and  the  hardware,  lacquer,  goldsmith's 
and  furrier's  trades  were  greatly  developed.  Regulations  were 
enacted  for  the  protection  and  encouragement  of  farmers,  pro- 
viding, among  others,  that,  in  the  event  of  a  farmer  being  prevented 
from  carrying  on  the  necessary  operations  of  agriculture,  his  near- 
est neighbors  must  assist  him.  Indiscriminate  transactions  in  real 
estate  were  prohibited.     The  sale  and  purchase  of  land  were  for- 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  145 

1651-1837 

bidden;  measures  were  framed  to  prevent  the  undue  growth  of 
large  estates,  as  well  as  to  protect  the  humble  classes  and  obviate 
their  dispersal  through  poverty.  Further,  the  shogun  encouraged 
the  development  of  water-ways  for  the  transport  of  goods  and  for 
the  irrigation  of  lands.  The  result  of  all  this  beneficent  adminis- 
tration was  such  a  marked  increase  of  the  production  of  rice  that 
the  people  called  Yoshimune  the  kome  (rice)  shogun.  His  policy, 
so  far  as  concerned  the  promotion  of  industry  and  agriculture,  was 
adopted  and  pursued  by  several  of  his  successors. 

From  the  middle  ages  of  Japanese  history  taxes  on  land  con- 
stituted the  chief  item  of  state  revenue.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
during  the  Tokugawa  period  four-tenths  of  the  produce  of  the  land 
went  to  the  government  and  six-tenths  to  the  farmer.  There  were 
two  methods  of  collecting  the  tax.  One  was  called  kemmi-dori. 
According  to  this  system,  the  quality  of  the  rice  raised  from  each 
particular  place  had  to  be  determined  annually  and  the  rate  of  tax 
fixed  accordingly.  As  the  procedure  was  tedious,  Yoshimune  gave 
preference  to  the  other  method,  jomen-dori,  the  principle  of  which 
was  to  fix  the  rate  of  tax  according  to  the  average  rice-harvest  of 
the  preceding  five  or  ten  years,  and  thenceforth,  during  the  interval 
of  years  to  which  this  rate  applied,  the  farmers  were  required  to 
pay  the  tax  thus  determined  whatever  might  be  the  nature  of  the 
crops,  exceptions  being  made,  however,  in  the  event  of  drought, 
tempest,  or  floods. 

The  industrious  hand  of  Yoshimune  extended  also  to  the  do- 
main of  law.  Throughout  the  government  of  Iyeyasu  and  his  first 
successors  no  code  of  criminal  law  was  specially  enacted,  the  ad- 
ministrative maxim  of  the  time  being  that  moral  doctrines  should 
guide  all  officials,  and  that  the  judges  should  consult  the  dictates  of 
their  own  conscience  in  dealing  with  criminals.  But  as  popular 
knowledge  increased,  it  became  obviously  necessary  that  uniformity 
of  punishments  should  be  secured  by  fixed  and  universally  applicable 
laws.  Yoshimune  caused  the  various  old  laws  to  be  collated  and  em- 
bodied into  a  fifteen-volume  code,  called  "Hatto-sho."  Another 
volume  of  law,  the  "Kujikata-sho,"  popularly  called  "Gojo-sho 
hyak-ka-jo"  was  prepared  after  consultation  with  various  jurists 
and  officials.  These  enactments  constituted  the  complete  criminal 
code  of  the  Tokugawa.  From  its  provisions  were  expunged  all  pun- 
ishments such  as  had  been  practiced  in  times  of  war ;  examination  by 
torture  was  restricted  to  cases  the  circumstances  of  which  obviously 


146  JAPAN 

1651-1837 

dictated  its  application,  and  on  the  whole  the  object  aimed  at  was  to 
lighten  the  scale  of  punishment  as  far  as  possible.  These  criminal 
laws  were  not,  however,  made  public.  The  people  to  whom  they  ap- 
plied knew  little  of  their  precise  provisions,  only  the  officers  charged 
with  the  duty  of  administering  them  having  cognizance  of  their  pur- 
port. The  object  of  this  system  was  to  inculcate  respect  for  the  laws 
themselves  rather  than  fear  of  the  consequences  of  violating 
them. 

Among  the  judicial  officers  of  the  time  was  one  Ooka  Tadasuke, 
whose  acumen  in  judging  offenses  was  so  remarkable  that  the 
people  credited  him  with  almost  supernatural  ability.  Many  of  his 
judgments  were  such  as  to  be  thought  worthy  of  perpetual  record. 
As  to  the  punishments  commonly  inflicted,  we  find  manacling, 
scourging,  and  exile,  the  most  severe  being  transportation  to  a  dis- 
tant island  and  death.  The  degree  of  punishment  in  the  same  class 
varied  with  the  nature  of  the  crime.  There  were  also  other  punish- 
ments, as  branding,  public  exposure,  confiscation  of  property,  and 
the  like.  In  the  case  of  samurai,  it  was  assumed  that,  being  suffi- 
ciently conversant  with  the  code  of  etiquette  and  the  principles  of 
morality,  minor  penalties  were  not  required  for  their  control. 
Hence  the  methods  resorted  to  with  them  were  confinement  to  their 
own  residences,  shutting  them  off  from  general  intercourse,  dis- 
missal from  office,  or  compulsory  suicide.  Samurai  who  had  been 
guilty  of  an  offense  were  first  degraded  from  their  class  and  then 
suitably  punished.  With  regard  to  priests,  also,  special  penalties 
were  applied;  as,  for  example,  exposure  to  public  view,  expulsion 
from  the  temple  at  which  they  officiated,  or  absolute  suspension 
from  religious  duties.  In  all  the  fiefs  care  was  taken  to  preserve  a 
close  relation  between  local  penalties  and  those  inflicted  by  the 
central  government,  but  differences  in  the  degree  of  severity  exer- 
cised made  themselves  apparent  in  the  sentences  of  different  judges, 
and  further,  since  the  judiciary  was  not  independent  of  the 
executive,  miscarriages  of  justice  were  not  infrequent. 

Another  feature  of  the  feudal  society  of  the  time  which 
Yoshimune  deeply  regretted  was  the  general  neglect  by  the  samurai 
of  their  military  practices  under  a  long  reign  of  peace.  For  this 
grave  fault  the  shogun  strongly  rebuked  his  vassals,  encouraging 
them  to  practice  equestrian  archery,  fencing,  spear-exercise,  swim- 
mmg>  gymnastics  (jiujitsu),  and  other  martial  arts,  and  reviving 
the  long-discarded  pastime  of  pursuing  game  with  hawks  on  the 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  147 

1651-1837 

Kogane  plain.  Originally  fond  of  such  pursuits,  he  applied  him- 
self to  them  with  added  ardor  in  order  to  popularize  them  among 
the  samurai.  Fencing  with  the  sword  was  the  most  practiced  and 
most  esteemed  of  all  military  exercises.  Every  member  of  the 
feudal  class,  from  the  shogun  downward,  received  regular  instruc- 
tion in  this  art,  and  regarded  his  two  swords  with  the  utmost  love 
and  veneration,  the  skill  and  spirit  shown  by  him  in  their  use  being 
justly  a  source  of  pride  to  Japan.  Spears  and  firearms  were  also 
widely  employed,  and  the  practice  of  jiujitsu — a  species  of  gym- 
nastics based  on  the  laws  of  balance  and  reaction  and  directed  to 
purposes  of  self-defense — received  general  attention.  Men  con- 
spicuous for  skill  in  fencing  and  other  martial  exercises  built 
schools  and  became  teachers  of  their  respective  specialties.  Thus 
theoretically  the  military  training  was  very  perfect,  but  as  there 
had  been  no  occasion  for  the  practical  exercise  of  the  art  of  war 
during  many  years,  the  samurai  became  gradually  Unfit  for  service 
in  the  field,  and  would  doubtless  have  lapsed  into  an  even  worse 
condition  but  for  the  strenuous  efforts  made  by  Yoshimune  on  his 
accession  to  power.  Subsequently,  toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  Matsudaira  Sadanobu,  a  minister  of  state,  spared  no  pains 
to  encourage  the  pursuit  of  martial  exercises,  but  the  continued 
absence  of  any  practical  need  of  such  attainments  told  steadily  upon 
the  samurai,  and  toward  the  close  of  the  shogunate  not  only  had 
the  nation  become  comparatively  enervated,  but  also  its  military 
systems  were  old-fashioned  and  inefficient  from  foreign  points  of 
view.  The  government  then  found  it  necessary  to  remodel  the 
organization,  creating  such  offices  as  rikugun  bugyo  (minister  of 
war)  and  kaigun  bugyo  (minister  of  the  navy),  adopting  the 
European  system,  adding  cavalry,  artillery,  and  engineers,  to  the 
army,  and  establishing  iron  foundries  and  docks  for  the  use  of  the 
navy.  At  the  same  time,  the  restrictions  imposed  upon  shipbuilding 
were  removed,  and  official  encouragement  was  given  to  the  con- 
struction of  sea-going  vessels  and  to  the  art  of  navigation.  Thus 
the  foundations  of  the  present  army  and  navy  were  laid. 

In  this  connection,  a  brief  description  may  be  made  of  the 
regular  military  service  of  the  lord  and  vassal  under  the  Tokugawa. 
In  the  Edo  castle,  all  the  officials  from  the  rojiu  downward  served 
in  time  of  peace  in  civil  capacities,  but,  in  war,  held  military  com- 
mand, the  shogun  himself  sometimes  taking  the  field.  As  to  the 
feudal  barons  in  the  country,  those  whose  income  did  not  exceed 


148  JAPAN 

1651-183? 

ten  thousand  koku  of  rice  were  required  to  furnish  ten  horsemen 
and  two  hundred  and  thirty-five  foot-soldiers,  with  full  equipment 
of  bows,  guns,  spears,  banners,  and  so  forth;  while  those  who 
enjoyed  a  larger  revenue  were  under  obligation  to  furnish  more 
ample  contingents  in  proportion  to  their  income.  The  shogun  him- 
self had  a  large  body-guard,  consisting  of  30,000  men  or  upward, 
as  well  as  a  powerful  standing  force,  called  obangumi,  which  was 
prepared  to  take  the  field  first  in  the  event  of  an  emergency.  The 
samurai  of  these  troops  discharged  civil  duties  in  times  of  peace. 
Throughout  the  various  clans  a  military  system  closely  resembling 
that  of  the  shogunate  prevailed. 

To  Yoshimune's  initiative  belongs,  also,  the  establishment 
of  a  fire-brigade  in  Edo.  In  earlier  times,  during  the  period  of  the 
fourth  shogun,  Iyetsuna,  in  January,  1657,  a  conflagration  broke 
out  in  Edo,  reducing  nearly  one-half  of  the  city  to  ashes,  and  entail- 
ing the  loss  of  many  lives.  After  this  catastrophe,  Matsudaira 
Nobutsuna,  who  then  held  the  office  of  rojiu,  effected  great  im- 
provements in  the  division  of  the  city,  repaired  and  widened  the 
streets,  removed  the  great  Buddhist  temples  to  the  suburbs,  created 
large  spaces  to  which  the  citizens  could  fly  for  refuge  in  the  event 
of  fire,  and  built  embankments  to  prevent  the  overflow  of  the  rivers, 
thus  greatly  augmenting  the  prosperity  of  the  capital.  Prior  to 
this  three  aqueducts  had  been  constructed  in  the  Kanda,  Tama- 
gawa,  and  Senkawa  districts,  by  which  means  immense  facilities 
were  conferred  in  the  matter  of  water  supply.  After  the  fire  of 
1657,  however,  the  crime  of  incendiarism  became  common,  and 
owing  to  the  high  winds  so  often  prevailing  in  Edo,  fires  thus 
kindled  proved  very  destructive,  as  many  as  ten  thousand  houses 
being  sometimes  ruined  at  one  time.  Perpetual  exposure  to  such 
a  destructive  agency  naturally  exercised  an  injurious  effect  upon 
the  methods  of  house  construction.  The  citizens  contented  them- 
selves with  flimsy  dwellings,  in  many  cases  thatched,  not  tiled,  and 
the  decoration  of  the  nobles'  mansions  began  to  be  materially 
reduced.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prosperity  of  the  city  increased 
so  greatly  that  its  area  extended  over  twenty-five  square  miles  and 
its  population  aggregated  two  millions.  Conflagrations,  however, 
continued  as  frequent  as  ever.  Yoshimune,  therefore,  encouraged 
the  people  to  build  houses  of  stone  or  other  fireproof  materials, 
and  in  streets  of  prime  importance,  like  those  in  the  Kanda  and 
Nihonbashi  districts,  the  shogun  did  not  hesitate  to  have  the  houses 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  149 

1651-1837 

pulled  down  in  order  to  widen  the  thoroughfares.  At  the  same 
time,  Ooka  Tadasuke,  municipal  governor,  established  the  fire- 
brigade  system.  All  these  improvements  had  some  effect  in  re- 
ducing the  number  of  fires,  but  to  the  end  of  the  Tokugawa  dynasty 
their  ravages  continued  to  be  the  curse  of  the  capital. 

Yoshimune,  who  in  addition  to  military,  financial,  and  ad- 
ministrative aptitudes  had  a  strong  scientific  bias,  devoted  much 
of  his  spare  time  to  astronomy,  and  caused  instruments  to  be  con- 
structed for  the  purpose  of  taking  observations.  He  also  ordered 
surveys  to  be  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  map.  The 
encouragement  of  medicine  and  the  building  of  hospitals  were  also 
within  the  range  of  his  reforms,  and  even  the  promulgation  of  a 
law  of  copyright  was  not  neglected,  while  we  find  him  turning  to 
such  a  matter  as  the  planting  of  cherry,  willow,  and  peach  trees  at 
Asukayama,  along  the  banks  of  the  Sumida  River,  in  Kanda,  in 
Koganei,  in  Nakano,  and  other  parts  of  the  capital,  with  the  result 
that  the  citizens  are  to-day  in  possession  of  beautiful  pleasure  re- 
sorts both  in  the  suburbs  and  in  the  business  districts  of  Tokyo. 

Under  the  influence  of  these  wise  and  comprehensive  reforms, 
it  is  not  strange  that  throughout  the  period  of  the  rule  of  Yoshi- 
mune (1716-1745)  and  his  son  Iyeshige  (1745-1761)  the  country 
enjoyed  comparative  peace  and  order.  But  the  gradual  decline 
of  the  Tokugawa  power  which  had  previously  set  in  could  not  be 
checked  even  by  Yoshimune.  Under  the  tenth  shogun,  Iyeharu 
(1761-1787),  the  influence  of  his  unworthy  favorites,  the  Tanuma 
family,  introduced  evils  of  bribery  and  sycophancy,  while  the 
country  at  large  was  visited  by  droughts  and  inundations,  such  dis- 
content being  engendered  among  the  poorer  classes  that  mobs 
assembled  and  attacked  the  residences  of  wealthy  merchants. 

Fortunately  the  next  shogun,  Iyenari  (1787-1837),  and  his 
great  councilor,  Matsudaira  Sadanobu,  reverted  to  the  strict  policy 
of  Yoshimune  and  the  illustrious  founders  of  the  Tokugawa 
shogunate.  Many  an  able  official  was  appointed  for  service  in  the 
Edo  castle,  and  several  barons  in  the  country  vied  with  the  central 
administration  in  wisdom  and  efficiency  of  government.  Iyenari's 
shogunate  also  coincided  with  the  reign  of  the  noble  Emperor 
Kokaku  (1780-1817).  Iyenari  was  promoted  to  the  second  grade 
of  the  first  rank  and  to  the  post  of  chief  minister  of  state,  thus  en- 
joying the  distinction  of  reaching  the  highest  position  ever  attained 
by  a  shogun  of  the  Tokugawa  line  while  in  office.     His  long  rule 


150  JAPAN 

1651-1837 

of  fifty  years  may  be  said  to  have  effectually  stemmed  the  tide  of 
the  decline  of  the  Edo  government  which  otherwise  would  have 
swept  over  everything  long  before  it  did  in  the  next  period. 

We  shall  conclude  this  chapter  by  describing  various  phases  of 
the  society  and  the  life  of  the  people  of  this  period,  beginning  with 
the  upper  classes.  Nothing  was  deemed  of  greater  importance, 
politically  and  socially,  than  to  preserve  distinctions  of  birth. 
Throughout  the  Edo  period  the  lines  of  demarcation  were  clearly 
and  sharply  maintained  between  the  samurai,  farmers,  artisans,  and 
merchants,  the  four  classes  ranking  in  the  order  here  given.  Kyoto 
was  the  place  of  residence  of  the  imperial  princes,  among  whom 
Fushimi,  Arisugawa,  Katsura,  and  Kan-in  were  most  closely  con- 
nected with  the  imperial  house.  The  civil  nobles  aggregated  over 
130  families,  including  the  five  called  Sekka  from  which  the  prime 
ministers  were  appointed  and  empresses  chosen,  and  the  seven  Seika 
from  which  the  ministers  of  the  right  and  left  were  selected.  The 
real  administration  of  all  the  civil  and  military  affairs  of  the  state 
rested,  however,  under  the  authority  of  the  sovereign,  on  the  sho- 
gun,  who  controlled  the  feudal  barons  numbering  over  360.  At  the 
outset  large  tracts  of  territory  were  given  to  the  direct  descendants 
of  Iyeyasu,  on  whose  support  the  shogun  chiefly  relied,  but  subse- 
quently special  treatment  was  extended  to  the  feudal  barons  of 
Owari,  Kii,  and  Mito,  who  under  the  name  Sanke — Three  Families 
— were  authorized  to  act  in  the  capacity  of  advisers  to  the  shogun 
with  reference  to  the  principal  political  affairs  of  the  realm,  and 
they  were  invested  with  the  right  to  succeed  to  the  shogunate  in 
the  event  of  a  failure  in  the  direct  line  of  male  descent.  Besides 
these,  the  two  shoguns  Yoshimune  and  Iyeshige  founded  three  new 
families  at  the  head  of  which  they  placed  their  own  sons,  namely, 
the  houses  of  Tayasu,  Hitotsubashi,  and  Shimizu,  collectively  known 
as  the  Sankyo — Three  Barons — enjoying  the  same  special  privi- 
leges and  distinctions  as  the  Sanke.  Many  other  feudal  chiefs  were 
also  the  recipients  of  exceptional,  though  smaller,  favor  at  the 
hands  of  the  shogun. 

As  to  the  various  barons  in  the  land,  their  classification  into 
the  tozama  and  fudai  classes  has  already  been  explained.  If  classi- 
fied according  to  the  extent  of  their  holdings,  they  fall  into  the 
three  divisions  of  kokushi,  joshi,  and  ryoshi.  Lands  of  varying 
extent  were  granted  in  perpetuity,  such  estates  being  classed  into 
four  kinds,  namely,  those  yielding  10,000  koku  annually  and  up- 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  151 

1651-1837 

ward;  those  of  50,000  koku  and  upward;  those  of  100,000  koku 
and  upward,  and  those  of  300,000  koku  and  upward.  According 
to  these  property  qualifications  the  relative  ranks  of  the  feudal  nobles 
were  determined,  as  well  as  their  ceremonial  robes,  their  treatment 
at  the  Edo  castle,  and  the  places  assigned  to  them  there.  It  was 
prescribed  that,  whenever  the  feudal  barons  repaired  to  Edo  or 
visited  the  shogun's  palace,  they  had  to  be  attended  by  a  fixed 
retinue  of  retainers,  the  number  varying  with  their  rank.  On  these 
occasions  bows,  muskets,  spears,  and  halberds  were  borne  by  the 
retinue,  several  of  whom  were  mounted  on  horseback.  The  bag- 
gage was  carried  in  handsome  cases,  called  hasami-bako,  and  the 
utensils  used  en  route  were  also  enclosed  in  ornamented  coverings, 
so  that  the  whole  procession  formed  an  imposing  and  picturesque 
spectacle,  which  was  frequently  met  with  on  the  main  roads  con- 
verging in  Edo.  As  for  the  samurai  at  large,  they  derived  their 
means  of  support  from  lands  granted  them  for  life  or  in  perpetuity 
by  the  shogun's  government  or  the  feudal  nobles.  Their  duties 
were  to  master  all  branches  of  military  exercises  and  to  devote  them- 
selves faithfully  to  the  service  of  their  lords,  and  literature  was  also 
studied  with  assiduity.  Speaking  broadly,  they  were  divided  into 
two  classes.  Those  belonging  to  the  higher  class,  called  bajo-kaku, 
or  knightly  rank,  took  the  field  on  horseback  and  held  comparatively 
high  social  positions.  The  second  class,  keihai,  or  light  men,  went 
on  foot,  and  were  subdivided  into  various  grades,  as  kachi,  kobito, 
ashigaru.  The  samurai  who  directly  served  the  shogun's  gov- 
ernment were  called  jikisan,  and  occupied  the  most  respected 
position  among  their  class,  the  highest  among  them  being  hatamoto 
(bannerets)  and  the  lowest  kenin. 

In  order  to  maintain  the  demarcation  between  classes  and  to 
preserve  social  order,  strict  attention  was  paid  by  the  government 
to  etiquette  and  conventional  observances,  and  the  study  of  litera- 
ture by  men  of  position  was  encouraged.  Nevertheless,  instances 
of  rude  and  disorderly  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  people  were 
not  infrequent.  During  the  early  years  of  the  Tokugawa  period, 
the  memory  of  the  nation  being  still  freshly  imbued  with  inci- 
dents of  battle  and  bloodshed,  both  the  government  and  the  people 
regarded  the  military  spirit  with  the  utmost . reverence  and  con- 
sidered its  development  essential  to  the  well-being  of  the  state. 
Samurai  of  the  lowest  rank  wore  two  swords  whenever  they 
walked  abroad,  and,  one  and  all,  these  men  of  war  were  dis- 


152  JAPAN 

1651-1837 

ciples  of  a  cult  which  placed  honor  and  justice  at  the  head  of 
a  soldier's  characteristics  and  relegated  selfishness  to  the  low- 
est place.  It  was  a  common  practice  with  the  samurai  of  the 
time  to  take  their  own  lives  for  the  purpose  of  expiating  some  event 
which  they  considered  injurious  to  the  prestige  of  their  feudal 
lord. 

A  remarkable  example  of  the  vendetta  occurred  in  1702,  when 
forty-seven  ronin  killed  the  enemy  of  their  late  lord.  The  affair 
had  its  origin  in  an  act  of  violence  perpetrated  by  Asano  Naganori, 
feudal  chief  of  Ako,  who,  being  insulted  by  a  rear-vassal  Yoshinaka, 
drew  his  sword  within  the  precincts  of  the  palace  and  wounded  the 
offender,  for  which  breach  of  etiquette  he  was  condemned  to  take 
his  own  life,  and  his  family  estate  was  confiscated,  an  exceptionally 
severe  sentence,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  government  of  the  shogun 
was  just  then  exercising  every  effort  to  check  the  rough-and-ready 
habits  of  time.  Asano's  vassals,  forty-seven  in  number,  under 
the  leadership  of  Oishi  Kuranosuke,  after  a  long  period  of  patient 
watching  and  much  hardship,  succeeded  in  forcing  their  way  into 
Yoshinaka's  residence  in  Edo  and  decapitating  him.  Then  they 
surrendered  themselves  to  the  authorities  and  were  sentenced  to  die 
by  suicide.  But  their  achievement  excited  the  nation's  strong  ad- 
miration, who  bestowed  upon  them  the  name  of  gishi,  loyal  re- 
tainers. Their  act  was  later  dramatized  into  one  of  the  greatest 
of  Japanese  plays  called  "Chushigura,"  and  through  all  succeeding 
generations  theatrical  representations  of  their  loyal  conduct  never 
failed  to  attract  deeply  sympathetic  audiences.  Similar  deeds  were 
already  on  record.  Early  in  the  Kamakura  period,  the  Soga 
brothers,  Sukenari  and  Tokimune,  killed  their  father's  foe,  Kudo 
Suketsune;  and  under  the  Tokugawa  rule,  Araki  Matayemon,  the 
renowned  swordsman,  together  with  Watanabe  Kazuma,  put  to 
death  Kawai,  the  hereditary  enemy  of  his  family,  at  Ueno  in  Iga. 
These  and  other  achievements,  some  filial,  some  loyal,  fired  the  im- 
agination of  the  nation.  It  became  a  popular  creed  that  orphans, 
faithful  vassals,  and  even  widows  should  devote  their  lives  to  vin- 
dicating the  memory  or  avenging  the  death  of  parents,  chiefs,  or 
husbands,  and  this  conviction  was  constantly  translated  into  action 
during  the  early  years  of  the  Tokugawa  rule.  It  was  undoubt- 
edly a  custom  in  some  respects  worthy  only  of  a  military  feudal- 
ism, but  its  effect  in  fostering  a  spirit  of  chivalry  was  beyond 
question. 


EDO    GOVERNMENT  153 

1651-1837 

Even  the  inferior  classes  and  the  merchants  of  that  day,  living 
in  or  near  Kyoto,  attached  more  importance  to  the  dictates  of 
integrity  and  honor  than  to  questions  of  pecuniary  interest.  An 
evidence  of  the  spirit  that  governed  monetary  transactions  is  fur- 
nished in  the  form  of  promissory  notes  in  vogue  at  the  time,  which 
contained  such  clauses  as :  "  In  the  event  of  my  failure  to  repay  the 
money,  I  shall  have  no  objection  to  being  publicly  ridiculed,"  or, 
"  Should  I  fail  to  discharge  my  obligation  at  the  fixed  time,  I 
should  be  considered  as  no  man."  In  fact,  displays  of  courage  and 
resolution  and  heroic  contempt  of  difficulties  were  so  highly  prized 
that,  from  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century  such  a  habit 
of  thought  naturally  degenerated  in  the  case  of  the  unrefined  or 
illiterate  into  mere  truculence  and  roughness.  A  peculiar  class  of 
men  called  odokodate,  civilians  attired  half  like  the  samurai  and 
exercising  deeds  of  chivalry,  no  less  of  mere  roughness,  was  a 
product  of  this  period.  They  roamed  about  the  streets  in  bands, 
between  whom  bitter  quarrels  frequently  occurred.  The  proceed- 
ings of  these  affiliations  exercised  so  injurious  an  effect  on  the 
customs  and  morals  of  the  people  that  they  were  strictly  interdicted 
by  the  fifth  shogun,  and  their  leaders  were  put  to  death.  The  same 
ruler  forbade  the  wearing  of  swords  by  merchants  and  farmers,  and 
by  these  means  succeeded  in  correcting  the  rough  habits  of  the  lower 
orders,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  the  evils  removed  were  not 
replaced  by  others  still  greater. 

As  years  went  by  and  the  empire  continued  to  enjoy  pro- 
found tranquillity,  ostentation,  luxury,  and  effeminate  habits  began 
to  prevail.  Against  these  evil  practices  not  a  few  of  the  statesmen 
and  nobles  of  the  time  earnestly  counseled  the  people.  Dissipation 
and  vain  display  reached  their  height  in  the  time  of  Iyenari.  With 
this  irresistible  growth  of  superficial  and  licentious  habits  and  the 
corruption  and  the  demoralization  of  the  feudal  classes,  which  arose 
from  the  reign  of  an  unbroken  peace  and  prosperity,  and  which 
culminated  in  the  days  of  Iyenari,  the  definite  decline  of  the  Toku- 
gawa  shogunate  may  be  said  to  have  begun. 

Turning  to  the  common  people,  we  find  that  the  great  majority 
of  them  consisted  of  farmers,  artisans,  and  merchants.  Agriculture 
being  regarded  as  the  staple  national  industry,  farmers  ranked  above 
both  artisans  and  merchants,  the  low  place  assigned  to  the  mercantile 
class  being  due  to  the  consideration  that  they  worked  in  their  own 
interests  only.    Neither  farmers,  artisans,  nor  merchants  were  per- 


154  JAPAN 

1651-1837 

mitted  to  use  family  names,  so  they  called  themselves  simply  "  farmer 
this,"  or  "  tradesman  that,"  but  it  was  possible  to  acquire  the  privi- 
lege of  using  a  family  name  on  account  of  some  meritorious  public 
service,  and  many  farmers  were  so  privileged.  Lower  still  than 
any  of  the  classes  hitherto  mentioned  were  the  eta  and  hinin,  who 
were  not  deemed  worthy  to  be  included  in  any  of  the  above 
categories. 


Chapter  XIII 

THE   FALL   OF   THE   EDO    GOVERNMENT.     1837-1868 

IN  1837  the  first  armed  rebellion  against  the  Tokugawa  gov- 
ernment since  the  battle  of  Amakusa,  which  took  place  just 
two  hundred  years  before,  occurred  in  Osaka  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Oshio  Heihachiro.  Erudite  and  energetic,  he  had  found 
himself  unable  to  use  his  ability  owing  to  his  mean  birth,  and 
took  advantage  of  the  popular  discontent  caused  by  a  famine  to 
raise  the  standard  of  revolt.  He  with  his  followers  attacked 
the  castle  of  Osaka,  but  failed,  and  in  consequence  died  by  his 
own  hand.  The  government  was  yet  far  too  powerful  to  be  shaken 
by  such  a  small  uprising,  but  the  revolt  of  Oshio  has  gained 
its  place  in  history  as  a  sign  of  the  growing  decay  and  unpopularity 
of  the  Edo  administration.  A  far  more  decisive  event,  however, 
was  soon  to  follow. 

On  July  8,  1853,  Commodore  Matthew  C.  Perry,  envoy  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  entered  the  Bay  of  Uraga  with  a 
squadron  consisting  of  two  frigates,  the  Susquehanna  and  the 
Mississippi,  and  two  sloops-of-war,  the  Plymouth  and  the  Sara- 
toga, and  sought  to  open  commercial  relations  with  Japan.  His 
visit  exercised  a  powerful  influence,  entirely  unknown  to  himself,  on 
the  domestic  affairs  of  the  country.  Ever  since  the  early  part  of 
the  seventeenth  century  anti-foreign  feeling  had  been  so  intense 
that  only  the  Chinese  and  the  Dutch  had  been  allowed  to  carry  on 
trade  at  Nagasaki,  and  other  European  nations,  owing  to  various 
circumstances,  gave  themselves  little,  if  any,  concern  about  Japan. 
But  from  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  spirit  of 
aggrandizement  made  itself  felt  in  the  Occident,  and  Western  states 
began  to  vie  with  one  another  in  attempts  to  extend  their  territories 
and  commerce.  Eastward  of  Japan  across  the  Pacific  lay  the  United 
States  of  America,  which  had  shaken  off  the  yoke  of  Great  Britain, 
and  the  latter,  deprived  of  this  flourishing  colony,  sought  compensa- 
tion in  India  and  farther  eastward,  while  France  also,  as  well  as 
Russia,  turned  covetous  eyes  to  the  Orient.    Nine  years  before  the 

155 


156  JAPAN 

1837-1868 

arrival  of  the  American  squadron  in  Uraga  Bay,  or  in  1844,  the 
Dutch  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Tokugawa  government  advising 
that  Japan  be  opened  to  all  foreign  nations,  and  subsequently  they 
often  repeated  this  counsel,  at  the  same  time  explaining  the  con- 
ditions of  the  various  states  of  Europe.  Among  the  Japanese,  many 
who  had  studied  the  Dutch  language  and  acquired  some  knowledge 
of  Western  affairs  were  in  favor  of  a  liberal  foreign  policy,  but 
among  the  bulk  of  the  nation  the  prejudices  engendered  by  the 
violent  and  lawless  conduct  of  the  early  Christian  propagandists 
remained  as  strong  as  ever.  Moreover,  fresh  reasons  for  resent- 
ment had  been  furnished  by  various  encroachments  of  the  Russians 
between  the  Kwansei  (1789-1800)  and  Bunka  (1804-1817)  eras, 
and  by  disorderly  conduct  of  English  sailors  in  Nagasaki.  Indeed, 
the  Tokugawa  government  had  once  gone  so  far  as  to  order  that 
any  foreign  ship  approaching  the  coast  of  Japan  should  be  fired  on, 
and  any  Japanese  whose  studies  of  Dutch  led  them  to  advocate 
the  opening  of  the  country  were  deprived  of  their  official  positions 
or  otherwise  punished. 

In  the  last  years  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  councilors 
of  Edo  strongly  advocated  complete  national  seclusion,  and  at 
the  time  when  the  American  squadron  visited  Japan,  Tokugawa 
Nariakira,  commonly  called  Rekko,  the  feudal  chief  of  Mito,  a 
noble  of  statesman-like  qualities,  ardently  urged  the  policy  of 
holding  aloof  from  all  foreign  intercourse.  In  1846  two  Ameri- 
can men-of-war  had  come  to  Uraga  and  sought  to  open  trade  re- 
lations, but  their  proposals  were  not  entertained,  and  they  had  to 
leave  the  country  without  accomplishing  anything.  Commodore 
Perry's  visit  occurred  seven  years  later;  he  came  with  credentials 
from  President  Fillmore,  as  well  as  specimens  of  the  products  of 
the  United  States,  and  made  formal  application  that  commerce 
be  opened  between  his  country  and  Japan.  The  government  replied 
that  the  matter  being  of  the  gravest  importance,  no  immediate  reply 
could  be  given,  but  that  an  answer  would  be  ready  the  following 
year,  whereupon  Perry  sailed  away,  declaring  that  he  would  return 
the  next  year  without  fail.  Thereafter  the  Tokugawa  government 
invited  a  council  of  the  feudal  barons,  including  the  lord  of  Mito, 
the  matter  being  at  the  same  time  reported  to  the  emperor.  During 
the  general  confusion  incidental  to  this  event,  the  Shogun  Iyeyoshi 
died  suddenly,  his  demise  taking  place  in  the  very  month  of  Perry's 
coming.    He  was  succeeded  by  hfs  son  Iyesada.    The  year  passed 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  157 

1837-1868 

without  any  definite  step  being  taken,  and  in  February,  1854,  Perry 
once  more  made  his  appearance  at  Uraga  and  urgently  asked  for 
a  reply  to  the  proposals  he  had  submitted  the  preceding  year.  All 
the  feudal  barons,  including  the  Mito  chief,  united  in  advocating  a 
policy  of  seclusion,  but  the  rojiu,  Abe  Masahiro,  and  other  chief 
officials  of  the  Edo  castle  were  astute  enough  to  see  that  such  a 
policy  would  be  impracticable.  They  therefore  insisted  on  conclud- 
ing a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  without  paying  due  attention 
to  its  terms.  Repeated  conferences  were  held  with  the  American 
envoy,  and  finally  a  treaty  was  signed  on  March  31,  providing  that 
all  American  citizens  driven  to  Japan  by  stress  of  weather  should 
be  kindly  treated;  that  American  ships  of  war  should  be  supplied 
in  Japanese  ports  with  fuel,  coal,  provisions,  and  other  necessaries ; 
and  that  the  two  ports  of  Shimoda  and  Hakodate  should  be  opened 
to  American  vessels.  Subsequently  ambassadors  came  from  Russia, 
France,  and  England,  and  conventions  were  concluded  with  them 
in  terms  virtually  the  same  as  those  of  the  American  treaty.  The 
government  pretended  that  they  had  concluded  the  treaties  merely 
in  order  to  gain  time  for  warlike  preparations,  but  in  truth  they 
had  been  taken  by  surprise.  Moreover,  natural  calamities  of  a  most 
disastrous  character  visited  the  nation,  to  increase  the  financial  em- 
barrassment of  Edo.  In  the  year  of  Commodore  Perry's  second 
coming  violent  earthquakes  took  place  in  western  Japan,  only  to 
be  followed  in  the  next  year  by  a  severer  shock,  which  overthrew 
immense  numbers  of  the  dwellings  of  the  upper  and  lower  classes 
as  well  as  of  the  feudal  barons,  and  caused  in  Edo  a  terrific  fire  in 
which  100,000  persons  are  said  to  have  lost  their  lives. 

In  1856,  Townsend  Harris,  consul-general,  came  duly  ac- 
credited by  the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  proposed  that 
relations  of  friendship  should  be  established  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, at  the  same  time  asking  on  his  own  part  for  an  audience  with 
the  shogun.  The  Rojiu  Hotta  Masaatsu  (Bitchu-no-kami),  who 
had  taken  charge  of  foreign  affairs  in  place  of  Abe  Masahiro, 
allowed  Harris,  after  considerable  hesitation,  to  repair  to  the  Edo 
castle.  It  was,  however,  decided  not  to  give  a  favorable  answer 
to  the  American  proposal  without  the  sanction  of  the  emperor. 
Hitherto,  despite  the  great  importance  of  foreign  affairs,  the  To- 
kugawa  administration  had  been  allowed  to  take  any  steps  it 
pleased  with  reference  to  them  without  consulting  the  sovereign. 
But  despite  the  large  measure  of  power  enjoyed  by  the  Edo  gov- 


158  JAPAN 

1837-1868 

eminent,  it  was  no  longer  able  to  effectually  control  the  feudal 
barons.  Hence  it  resolved  to  consult  the  imperial  wishes,  and  also 
to  secure  the  advice  of  the  feudal  chiefs.  Such  a  vacillating  and 
dependent  method  of  procedure  was  entirely  opposed  to  the  policy 
pursued  by  the  Tokugawa  ever  since  the  days  of  Iyeyasu.  Now 
they  exposed  themselves  to  the  criticism  and  interference  of  both 
the  court  and  the  people,  so  that  in  this  question  of  foreign  inter- 
course is  to  be  sought  the  proximate  cause  of  the  downfall  of  the 
Tokugawa. 

At  that  time  the  throne  was  occupied  by  Komei,  father  of  the 
present  emperor,  who  was  in  favor  of  keeping  the  country  closed 
against  the  ingress  of  foreigners.  He  therefore  withheld  his  sanc- 
tion when  the  shogun's  representative  came  to  Kyoto  to  seek  it. 
At  the  same  time,  the  American  envoy  continually  pressed  the 
government  to  sign  a  treaty,  and,  to  make  the  matter  worse,  another 
trouble  simultaneously  presented  itself,  namely,  that,  the  shogun 
having  no  son,  friction  arose  about  the  succession.  Several  of  the 
most  influential  feudal  barons  desired  that  Yoshinobu,  son  of  Nari- 
akira  of  Mito,  who  represented  the  Hitotsubashi  branch  of  the 
Tokugawa,  should  become  heir  in  consideration  of  his  high  abilities ; 
but  many  of  the  principal  officers  and  the  court  ladies  were  opposed 
to  the  policy  of  Nariakira.  The  shogun  himself  was  not  desirous 
of  making  Yoshinobu  his  successor,  but  the  steadily  increasing  in- 
fluence of  the  anti-foreign  party  in  Kyoto,  the  recognized  head  of 
which  was  Nariakira,  gave  new  force  to  the  claims  of  the  latter. 
Meanwhile,  as  the  need  of  coming  to  some  terms  with  the  United 
States  became  more  urgent,  the  shogun  appointed  to  the  post  of 
tairo  the  courageous  Ii  Naosuke  (Kamon-no-Kami).  Ii  was  not 
a  man  to  be  guided  by  others  whose  opinions  he  did  not  share. 
Under  his  counsel,  it  was  now  agreed  that  the  five  ports  of  Naga- 
saki, Hakodate,  Hyogo,  Kanagawa,  and  Niigata  should  be  opened 
to  foreign  trade,  a  convention  in  that  sense  being  concluded  with- 
out reference  to  the  emperor.  This  took  place  in  June  of  1858, 
and  a  little  later  treaties  of  similar  import  were  signed  with  Russia, 
England,  the  Netherlands,  and  France,  a  report  being  sent  to 
Kyoto,  after  the  event,  to  the  effect  that  these  measures  had  been 
unavoidable.  In  the  matter  of  the  succession,  Ii  overrode  the 
advice  of  the  feudal  barons,  and  Iyemochi,  then  little  more  than 
a  child,  son  of  the  lord  of  Kii,  became  the  fourteenth  shogun.  The 
Tokugawa  government  thus  disposed  finally  of  the  question  of 


EDO     GOVERNMENT 


159 


1837-1868 

foreign  intercourse,  but  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  country  grew 
more  complicated  than  ever. 

The  officials  of  Edo  who  were  opposed  to  foreign  intercourse 
claimed  that  the  country  had  been  subjected  to  the  shame  of  con- 
cluding a  commercial  treaty  under  duress.  The  spread  of  this  idea 
aroused  indignation  against  the  Tokugawa  government,  and  many 
of  the  barons,  especially  Nariakira  of  Mito,  addressed  memorials  to 


Kyoto,  complaining  that  the  opening  of  the  country  to  foreign  trade 
and  intercourse  was  contrary  to  the  best  interests  of  the  nation. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  relations  between  the  courts  in  Kyoto 
and  Edo  were  of  the  least  intimate  character.  Presently  it  began 
to  be  alleged  against  the  shogun's  councilors,  even  by  men  of  Owari, 
Mito,  and  Echizen,  who  stood  in  a  position  of  close  relationship 
and  intimacy  with  the  Tokugawa,  that  by  concluding  treaties  with 
five  foreign  countries  without  reference  to  the  emperor,  the  sovereign 


160  JAPAN 

1837-1868 

had  been  directly  insulted.  Loyalty  to  the  throne  and  the  expulsion 
of  aliens  became  rallying  cries  of  the  exclusive  party,  and  conflicts 
occurred  in  various  places  between  the  people  who  would  close  the 
country  and  those  who  advocated  its  opening.  Loyalty  to  the 
throne  was  no  new  thought  to  the  nation,  but  it  now  acquired  a  new 
significance  under  new  circumstances.  The  Tokugawa  shoguns 
had,  like  all  other  great  military  families  that  acquired  administrative 
control  in  Japan,  asserted  their  authority  largely  at  the  expense  of 
that  of  the  emperor,  and  the  fact  had  begun  to  cause  keen  regret 
to  many  among  the  samurai.  Already,  when  Iyeshige  was  shogun 
a  ronin  named  Takeuchi  Shikibu,  lamenting  the  decline  of  the  im- 
perial power,  urged  the  officials  of  Kyoto  to  devote  themselves  to 
military  and  literary  pursuits,  so  as  to  be  able  some  day  to  overthrow 
the  shogunate.  He  was  exiled  by  the  Tokugawa,  who  also  arrested 
and  put  to  death  several  others  of  the  same  party. 

With  the  growth  of  a  taste  for  pure  Japanese  literature  rever- 
ence for  the  sovereign  was  intensified  and  propagated.  Its  influence 
was  most  potent  in  Mito,  the  lord  of  which  edited  the  "  Dai  Nihon 
Shi"  (History  of  Great  Japan),  which  as  scripture  of  loyalty  was 
widely  read.  Another  work  which  exercised  a  similar  influence  was 
the  "Nihon-gaishi "  by  Rai  Sanyo.  Various  motives  so  largely  con- 
tributed to  the  growth  of  loyal  sentiment  that  ultimately  a  secret 
imperial  rescript  was  issued  to  the  Mito  vassals,  instructing  them 
to  unite  with  the  tozama  barons  and  assist  the  shogun  to  expel 
foreigners  from  the  country.  The  Tairo  Ii,  vehemently  attacked 
for  exceeding  the  powers  that  properly  belonged  to  him,  now  took 
another  resolute  and  decisive  step.  He  dismissed  all  the  senior 
officials  who  opposed  his  policy,  and  retained  in  office  only  those 
in  harmony  with  him.  He  further  announced  that  any  person  plac- 
ing obstacles  in  the  way  of  measures  adopted  by  the  government 
should  be  severely  dealt  with,  and  in  pursuance  of  this  declaration 
he  placed  in  confinement  or  dismissed  from  office  civil  nobles  of 
highest  distinction,  and  inflicted  penalties  on  six  feudal  barons  of 
the  greatest  magnitude.  An  equally  drastic  course  was  adopted  in 
the  case  of  the  leading  Edo  officials,  and  more  than  fifty  prominent 
retainers  of  noblemen,  as  well  as  ronin,  scholars,  priests,  and  even 
women,  were  seized  and  sent  into  exile.  These  decisive  proceedings 
procured  for  the  period  the  name  of  the  "  Ansei  Jail,"  but  the  tairo 
had  at  least  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  he  had  shown  his 
courage  and  competence  to  deal  summarily  with  his  opponents. 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  161 

1837-1868 

Great  excitement  prevailed,  however,  among  all  classes  of  the  people, 
above  all,  the  Mito  samurai.  On  the  snowy  morning  of  the  3d  of 
the  third  month,  i860,  as  the  Tairo  Ii  was  en  route  for  the  palace 
of  the  shogun,  he  was  attacked  and  killed  by  eighteen  Mito  ronin 
under  the  leadership  of  Sano  Takenosuke,  and  a  year  later  the 
Rojiu  Ando  Nobumasa,  was  attacked  near  the  Sakashita  gate  of 
the  castle.  In  order  to  restore  harmony  between  the  courts  of 
Kyoto  and  Edo,  the  latter  now  arranged  a  marriage  between  the 
Shogun  Iyemochi  and  the  emperor's  sister,  but  though  the  sovereign 
sanctioned  this  union,  it  brought  no  peace  for  the  country.  Not 
only  did  the  anti-Tokugawa  agitation  continue  in  noble  and  official 
circles,  but  also  ronin,  partly  in  obedience  to  the  exclusion  policy, 
but  chiefly  seeking  to  increase  the  embarrassments  of  Edo,  attacked 
foreigners  and  burned  their  houses,  the  shogun's  administration 
showing  itself  powerless  to  check  these  outrages.  By  degrees 
the  samurai,  who  had  separated  themselves  from  their  clans  in  order 
to  carry  on  the  agitation,  assembled  in  Kyoto,  where  were  already 
gathered  great  numbers  of  influential  persons  interested  in  the 
burning  question  of  the  day,  and  where  the  emperor  himself  lent  the 
sanction  of  his  indorsement  to  the  doings  of  the  malcontents.  To 
the  two  most  powerful  among  all  the  barons,  Shimazu  Narishige, 
lord  of  Satsuma,  and  Mori  Yoshichika,  lord  of  Gioshu,  secret 
commissions  were  specially  given  by  the  emperor.  Before  anything 
decisive  could  be  accomplished,  however,  Narishige  died  and  was 
succeeded  by  his  younger  brother,  Hisamitsu,  who,  together  with 
the  Choshu  chief,  remained  in  Kyoto  at  the  head  of  a  large  force  of 
samurai,  with  the  avowed  intention  of  restoring  tranquillity  to  the 
country.  There  they  were  joined  by  Yamanouchi  Toyonobu,  lord 
of  Tosa,  and  this  triumvirate  of  puissant  barons,  Satsuma,  Choshu, 
and  Tosa,  began  to  be  spoken  of  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  land  as  the  certain  saviors  of  the  situation. 

The  imperial  court,  in  accordance  with  the  advice  of  these 
three  powerful  councilors,  now  dispatched  an  envoy  to  Edo 
conveying  a  command  that  the  shogun  should  repair  to  Kyoto, 
that  order  should  be  established  in  the  affairs  of  the  adminis- 
tration, and  that  foreigners  should  be  expelled  from  Japan. 
Prior  to  the  receipt  of  this  rescript  the  Tokugawa  government 
had  released  the  persons  then  in  confinement,  had  dismissed 
all  officials  of  proved  incompetence,  and  had  effected  various  re- 
forms in  the  state  organization.    After  the  arrival  of  the  imperial 


162  JAPAN 

1837-1868 

rescript  these  measures  were  supplemented  by  other  changes,  and 
punishments  were  meted  out  to  Ando  and  other  officials  who  had 
been  removed  from  office.  At  the  same  period  a  most  significant 
step  was  taken  by  the  shogun's  government :  the  system  that  required 
the  presence  of  the  feudal  barons  in  Edo  was  abolished — a  step  in- 
dicative of  the  marked  decadence  of  the  Tokugawa  power.  For 
the  first  time  in  two  centuries  and  a  half  the  power  of  the  imperial 
court  overshadowed  that  of  the  castle  in  Edo.  An  event  now 
occurred  that  tended  to  precipitate  the  impending  crisis.  As  the 
Satsuma  chief,  Shimazu  Hisamitsu,  was  escorting  the  imperial 
envoy  on  his  return  journey  from  Edo  to  Kyoto,  a  party  of  four 
English  equestrians  met  the  procession  near  the  village  of  Namamugi 
in  Musashi,  and  attempted  to  break  through  its  ranks.  This  viola- 
tion of  Japanese  official  etiquette,  an  act  unpardonable  in  the  eyes 
of  the  siunurai,  was  violently  resented.  Two  of  the  foreigners  were 
severely  wounded,  one  of  them  shortly  afterward  falling  from  his 
horse  and  dying  by  the  roadside.  Incensed  by  this  affair,  the 
British  government  demanded  that  the  men  who  had  perpetrated 
the  deed  and  the  personage  under  whose  direction  it  had  been 
carried  out  should  be  arrested,  and  that  an  idemnity  of  a  hundred 
thousand  dollars  should  be  paid  as  blood-money,  a  demand  that 
greatly  embarrassed  the  shogun's  ministers,  who  knew  that,  even  if 
they  had  possessed  the  power  to  comply  in  full,  the  attempt  must 
lead  to  the  gravest  domestic  troubles. 

In  1863  the  Shogun  Iyemochi  repaired  to  Kyoto.  This  was 
the  first  visit  paid  to  the  imperial  capital  by  a  Tokugawa  shogun 
since  the  days  of  Iyemitsu,  two  hundred  years  previously,  and  the 
event  naturally  produced  a  strong  impression  upon  the  nation.  At 
that  time  the  numerous  and  constantly  increasing  body  of  sumurai 
whose  motto  was  "  sonno  joi"  (revere  the  sovereign  and  expel  the 
foreigner)  were  exerting  all  their  energies,  going  hither  and  thither 
to  popularize  their  views,  and  not  hesitating  even  to  use  the  sword 
against  those  who  opposed  them.  When  the  shogun  arrived  in 
Kyoto  they  brought  strong  pressure  to  bear  on  him  with  the 
object  of  inducing  him  to  adopt  their  policy,  and  after  long  dis- 
cussion he  finally  agreed  to  do  so.  Notice  of  this  important  decision 
was  given  to  the  feudal  barons  on  May  15  in  the  same  year  (1863). 
The  shogun  then  returned  without  loss  of  time  to  Edo,  apprehend- 
ing that  his  presence  in  Kyoto  might  lead  to  fresh  complications 
and  being  further  advised  that  affairs  in  Edo  needed  his  presence. 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  163 

1837-1868 

The  Edo  government  now  found  itself  in  a  dilemma.  At 
once  unwilling  and  unable  to  give  effect  to  its  anti-foreign  policy, 
it  had  nevertheless  received  and  accepted  the  imperial  order  to  that 
effect.  The  ministers,  therefore,  adopted  the  only  course  opened  to 
them,  namely,  conveyed  to  the  foreign  representatives  an  intimation 
that  it  would  be  necessary  to  close  the  ports  and  put  an  end  to  for- 
eign commerce,  and,  at  the  same  time,  dispatched  ambassadors  di- 
rectly to  the  Occident  to  explain  the  state  of  affairs  in  Japan.  These 
measures,  however,  proved  of  course  abortive.  The  anti-foreign 
sentiment  was  still  further  inflamed  a  few  months  later  by  openly 
hostile  acts  committed  by  the  feudal  baron  of  Choshu,  who  fired 
upon  foreign  vessels  attempting  to  pass  the  Strait  of  Shimono- 
seki.  Nevertheless,  even  in  Kyoto  there  were  some  influential  men 
who  boldly  espoused  the  Tokugawa  cause  and  placed  themselves 
in  opposition  to  the  party  working  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Edo 
government.  A  serious  obstacle  to  the  success  of  that  party  still 
existed  in  the  fact  that  no  effective  union  had  yet  been  brought 
about  between  the  powerful  fiefs  of  Satsuma  and  Choshu.  The 
former  advocated  reconciliation  between  the  courts  of  Kyoto  and 
Edo,  and  urged  that  both  should  cooperate  for  the  expulsion  of 
foreigners;  whereas  the  Choshu  folks  were  in  favor  of  more  pre- 
cipitate measures,  involving  the  downfall  of  the  Tokugawa.  In 
Kyoto  the  partisans  of  the  extreme  view  urged  the  emperor  to 
honor  the  Choshu  chief  by  visiting  him  in  his  own  fief,  subsequently 
worshiping  at  the  sepulcher  of  Jimmu  Tennd,  and  then,  after  a 
visit  to  the  shrine  of  Ise,  to  openly  declare  war  against  the  shogun. 
But  the  programme  encountered  strong  opposition  in  Kyoto  at 
the  hands  of  a  few  other  barons  who  regarded  with  deep  regret 
and  apprehension  the  strong  course  to  which  the  imperial  court 
seemed  in  danger  of  being  committed.  These  nobles,  forming  a 
union  with  certain  princes,  zealously  opposed  the  court  view;  and 
finally  succeeded  so  far  as  to  procure  the  expulsion  from  Kyoto 
of  the  Choshu  lord,  who,  on  his  return  to  his  fief,  was  accompanied 
by  Sanjo  Sanetomi,  afterward  destined  to  play  a  prominent  part 
in  the  events  of  the  restoration,  and  six  other  court  nobles.  The 
policy  of  the  court  was  now  directed  to  the  reestablishment  of 
friendly  relations  with  Edo,  and  the  dissatisfaction  engendered  by 
this  attitude  led  to  ententes  by  ronin  at  Yamato,  Tajima,  and 
other  places,  but  they  were  speedily  reduced  to  order.  In  the  fol- 
lowing year,  1864,  the  Shogun  Iyemochi  again  proceeded  to  Kyoto, 


164  JAPAN 

1837-1868 

where  his  reception  by  the  emperor  was  much  more  gracious  than 
it  had  been  on  the  previous  occasion,  various  commissions  being 
given  to  him,  with  the  result  that  harmony  was  for  the  time  restored 
between  the  two  courts.  Prior  to  this  a  British  squadron  had 
proceeded  to  Kagoshima  to  exact  an  indemnity  on  account  of  the 
Namamugi  affair,  and  a  sharp  engagement  had  taken  place  between 
the  ships  and  the  Satsuma  forts.  The  Edo  government,  however, 
paid  the  indemnity  demanded  by  the  foreign  representatives.  The 
affair  was  thus  brought  to  an  amicable  issue,  and  foreign  intercourse 
continued  as  before,  though  the  policy  of  the  shogun's  government 
toward  it  remained  apparently  as  undecided  as  ever. 

In  Mito  "  Rekko  "  Nariakira  had  died,  and  the  samurai  of 
the  fief  were  divided  into  two  parties,  one  following  the  late  lord's 
policy  and  the  other  dissenting  from  it,  which  carried  their  enmity 
to  such  an  extent  that  great  numbers  of  persons  fell  victims  to 
the  sword.  Finally  in  April,  1864,  some  of  the  ultra-conserva- 
tive men  of  Mito  renounced  their  service  to  their  lord,  and 
assembled  in  arms  at  Mount  Tsukuba,  where  they  were  joined 
by  a  number  of  other  malcontents,  and  became  the  center  of  a 
widespread  disorder.  It  was  quickly  subdued  by  the  Toku- 
gawa  forces,  but  while  the  Tsukuba  insurgents  were  still  in  the 
field  the  Edo  government  found  itself  involved  in  an  open  quarrel 
with  a  vastly  more  formidable  rival,  the  fief  of  Choshu.  The 
lord  of  Choshu  had  been  forbidden  to  enter  Kyoto  in  consequence 
of  his  obdurate  hostility  to  the  policy  of  the  Tokugawa,  and  the 
issue  of  such  a  mandate  naturally  caused  great  umbrage  to  his 
lieges.  In  June,  1864,  they  presented  a  memorial  to  the  throne, 
setting  forth  their  loyalty  and  praying  that  the  ban  of  exclusion 
from  the  capital  might  be  removed  from  their  feudal  chief  and 
his  son,  as  well  as  from  San  jo  and  the  six  other  court  nobles  who 
had  fled  with  him  to  Choshu  for  refuge.  By  degrees  ronin  from 
Choshu  assembled  in  the  environs  of  the  imperial  city,  and  after 
some  collisions  they  entered  Kyoto.  But  they  were  totally  defeated 
by  the  troops  of  Aidzu  and  Satsuma,  who  guarded  the  city.  This 
act  of  contumacy  provoked  an  imperial  edict  depriving  the  elder  and 
younger  lords  of  Choshu  of  their  rank  and  commissioning  the 
Shogun  Iyemochi  to  chastise  Choshu.  An  expedition  was  organized 
in  obedience  to  this  edict,  a  very  powerful  army  being  raised  in 
western  Japan.  Just  at  this  time  a  squadron  composed  of  British, 
American,  French,  and  Dutch  vessels  of  war  entered  the  Straits 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  165 

1837-1868 

of  Shimonoseki  to  exact  reparation  from  the  men  of  Ch5shu  who 
had,  as  has  already  been  related,  fired  upon  foreign  vessels  passing 
through  the  strait.  Attempts  to  avert  hostilities  by  negotiation 
having  proved  abortive,  the  Choshu  forts  were  bombarded  and 
dismantled  by  the  foreign  vessels,  and  a  peace  was  afterward  con- 
cluded, the  Choshu  folks  pledging  themselves  to  give  free  passage 
to  foreign  ships,  and  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  three  million  dollars. 
This  large  sum,  though  subsequently  paid  by  the  Tokugawa  gov- 
ernment, was  denounced  as  excessive  by  foreign  jurists  as  well  as 
Japanese  statesmen,  and  the  portion  that  fell  to  the  share  of  the 
United  States  of  America  was  returned  to  Japan  more  than  twenty 
years  afterward. 

Pending  the  settlement  of  this  Shimonoseki  affair  the  Toku- 
gawa military  operations  against  Choshu  were  delayed,  and  as  the 
latter  put  to  death  three  of  the  leaders  of  the  disturbance  in  Kyoto, 
and  made  ample  apologies  for  their  offense,  the  force  destined  for 
the  invasion  of  their  fief  was  disbanded.  There  were,  however,  two 
parties  in  Choshu ;  the  one  in  favor  of  submitting  to  the  shogun  so 
as  to  avert  misfortunes  otherwise  apparently  threatening  the  fief, 
and  the  other  advocating  determined  resistance  to  the  Tokugawa. 
At  the  head  of  the  latter  party  was  Takasugi  Shinsaku,  and  he, 
having  established  relations  with  Sanjo  and  the  other  court  nobles 
then  refugees  in  Choshu,  succeeded  in  completely  overcoming  the 
pacific  faction  and  obtaining  ascendency  in  the  fief.  The  Edo  gov- 
ernment now  found  itself  openly  defied  by  Choshu,  and  a  strong 
agitation  arose  in  favor  of  inflicting  summary  punishment  by  send- 
ing another  large  expedition.  Against  this  counsel  dissenting  voices 
were  not  unheard,  but  finally  an  expeditionary  force  was  organized 
and  moved  southward,  the  shogun  himself  accompanying  it.  A 
marked  incident  of  this  occasion  was  the  refusal  of  the  great 
Satsuma  baron  to  send  a  quota  of  troops  for  service  with  the  shogun. 
His  fief  and  Choshu,  whose  mutual  rivalry  had  at  times  amounted 
to  bitter  enmity,  had  concluded  at  last  that  in  their  union  lay  the 
only  hope  of  accomplishing  the  purpose  of  unifying  and  consolidat- 
ing the  empire.  Foremost  among  the  far-seeing  statesmen  was 
Saigo  Takamori  of  Satsuma,  who  never  wavered  in  his  conviction 
that  no  lasting  amity  could  be  established  between  the  courts  of 
Kyoto  and  Edo,  and  that  the  only  solution  of  the  national  difficul- 
ties lay  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Tokugawa.  To  this  view  his  fellow- 
clansmen  subscribed,  and  relations  were  opened  with  Choshu  which 


166  JAPAN 

1837-1868 

finally  led  to  the  hearty  cooperation  of  the  two  clans.  En  route 
for  Choshii  the  shogun  stopped  at  Osaka,  where  he  was  approached 
by  the  representatives  of  Great  Britain,  the  Netherlands,  and  the 
United  States,  who  insisted  that  Hyogo  should  be  opened  for  trade 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Edo  treaties,  and  that  the  treaties 
should  be  ratified  by  the  emperor.  The  shogun,  after  reference  to 
the  sovereign,  declined  to  entertain  this  demand,  and  the  foreign 
representatives  thereupon  threatened  to  prefer  it  in  person  to  the 
throne.  The  emperor,  much  incensed  at  the  course  events  were 
taking,  severely  punished  the  chief  officials  of  the  shogun  who  were 
directly  responsible  for  the  treaties,  and  this  having  been  done 
without  reference  to  the  shogun  himself,  placed  the  latter  in  such 
an  embarrassing  position  that  he  laid  his  resignation  at  the  foot 
of  the  throne  and  asked  that  Hitotsubashi  Yoshinobu,  of  Mito,  be 
appointed  in  his  stead.  He  accompanied  this  document  with  a 
memorial  praying  for  the  imperial  sanction  to  the  treaties  with 
foreign  powers.  The  emperor  declined  to  accept  the  shogun's 
resignation,  but  gave  his  sanction  to  the  treaties,  the  immediate 
opening  of  Hyogo  to  foreign  trade  being,  however,  refused.  Sub- 
sequent to  these  events  the  expedition  against  Choshii  was  again 
put  in  motion,  but  the  Choshu  men  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon 
it,  inasmuch  as  this  was  the  first  occasion  of  a  shogun's  taking 
the  field  in  person  since  two  hundred  and  fifty  years  before,  the  con- 
sequences were  disastrous  to  the  prestige  of  the  Tokugawa,  many 
of  the  feudal  barons  openly  renouncing  allegiance  to  them.  While 
the  campaign  was  still  in  progress  the  Shogun  Iyemochi  died  in  the 
castle  of  Osaka,  August,  1866,  and  was  succeeded  by  Yoshinobu 
in  December  of  the  same  year.  The  Emperor  Komei  also  died 
shortly  after.  Owing  to  this  sad  event  the  expedition  against 
Choshu  was  finally  abandoned.  Thereafter  the  shogun  found  him- 
self confronted  by  such  difficulties  both  at  home  and  abroad  that 
further  tenure  of  office  became  impossible,  and  finally,  acting  on 
the  advice  of  the  lord  of  Tosa,  resigned  the  office  as  the  feudal 
overlord  of  Japan,  and  restored  the  administrative  power  into  the 
hands  of  the  sovereign.  This  memorable  event  occurred  on  Oc- 
tober 14,  1867. 

Feudalism,  which  had  for  nearly  seven  centuries  controlled 
the  administration  of  the  empire,  seemed  now  to  have  come  to  an 
end,  but  institutions  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  life  of  the  nation  and 
so  long  upheld  by  persons  whose  vital  interests  were  interwoven 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  167 

1837-1868 

therewith  were  not  to  die  away  without  a  struggle.  It  was  mortify- 
ing to  the  supporters  of  the  shogun,  who  had  so  recently  renounced 
his  office  from  disinterested  motives,  to  see  his  policy  reversed,  his 
old  enemies  raised  to  the  highest  posts  of  the  new  government,  and 
he  and  his  late  councilors  completely  excluded  from  official  life. 
The  Choshu  baron  and  his  son  received  the  imperial  pardon  and 
reentered  Kyoto,  while  they  as  well  as  Sanjo  Sanetomi  were  re- 
stored to  their  former  ranks ;  the  soldiers  of  Satsuma,  Choshu,  Aki, 
Owari,  and  Echizen  displaced  the  men  of  Aidzu  and  Kuwana  as 
guards  of  Kyoto;  and  radical  changes  were  made  in  official  posts 
and  emoluments,  the  offices  of  sosai,  gijo,  and  sanyo  being  newly 
established  under  the  presidency  of  Prince  Arisugawa.  The  first 
gijo  were  Princes  Yoshiaki  and  Akira,  together  with  Sanjo  Sane- 
tomi, Iwakura  Tomomi,  and  the  barons  of  Satsuma,  Echizen,  and 
Tosa.  The  sanyo  were  Ohara  Shigenori,  Saigo  Takamori,  and 
Okubo  Toshimichi.  More  than  twenty  court  nobles  were  removed 
from  office  and  the  administrative  power  was  assumed  in  effect  by 
a  government  under  the  direct  control  of  the  sovereign. 

On  December  10  it  was  announced  to  the  late  shogun, 
by  order  of  the  emperor  through  the  medium  of  the  barons  of 
Owari  and  Echizen,  that  his  administrative  functions  had  been 
transferred  to  the  emperor,  and  he  was  at  the  same  time  privately 
instructed  to  resign  his  post  of  lord  keeper  of  the  privy  seal  and 
to  surrender  the  provinces  hitherto  forming  his  fief.  The  news  of 
these  instructions  produced  great  excitement  among  the  fudai 
barons,  and  the  shogun,  apprehending  that  they  might  resort  to 
violence  on  his  behalf,  petitioned  the  sovereign  to  allow  him  tem- 
porarily to  retain  the  post  of  lord  keeper  of  the  seal  as  well  as 
to  hold  the  provinces  of  his  fief,  though  he  repeated  his  expression 
of  resolve  to  divest  himself  of  all  administrative  authority.  This 
course  did  not,  however,  entirely  allay  the  umbrage  of  the  fndai 
barons,  especially  the  lords  of  Aidzu  and  Kuwana.  The  shogun  him- 
self, suspecting  that  the  order  stripping  him  of  his  dignities  and 
possessions  had  been  issued  at  the  instigation  of  the  chiefs  of 
Satsuma  and  Choshu,  withdrew  from  the  Nijo  palace  and  shut 
himself  up  in  the  castle  of  Osaka.  There,  however,  he  was  urgently 
counseled  by  the  barons  of  Owari  and  Echizen  to  abandon  all 
resistance  to  the  throne  and  to  present  himself  peacefully  at  the 
imperial  court,  and  in  obedience  to  this  advice  he  was  about  to 
enter    Kyoto   guarded   by    a   powerful   escort,    when   intelligence 


168 


JAPAN 


1837-1868 

reached  him  from  Edo  to  the  effect  that  a  number  of  Satsuma 
ronin,  having  assembled  at  the  Satsuma  mansion  in  the  city,  had 
fired  on  a  barrack  occupied  by  Tokugawa  troops,  and  that  the  latter 
had  consequently  attacked  the  mansion  and  driven  out  its  occupants, 
who  had  taken  refuge  in  a  warship  anchored  in  Shinagawa  Bay. 
Incensed  by  this  news,  the  shogun,  on  January  3  in  the  first  year 
of  the  Meiji  era,  1868,  issued  orders  to  the  various  clans  to  combine 


for  the  purpose  of  chastising  Satsuma.  He  commenced  the  cam- 
paign by  mustering  the  troops  of  Aidzu  and  Kuwana  in  Kyoto 
and  marching  to  attack  the  forces  of  Satsuma  and  Choshii.  But 
in  the  engagements  that  ensued  at  Fushimi  and  Toba  the  shogun's 
army  was  completely  defeated,  and  Prince  Yoshiaki  was  formally 
ordered  by  the  imperial  court  to  lead  a  punitory  expedition  against 
Tokugawa,  now  an  open  rebel.  The  latter  retired  to  Edo  by  sea, 
accompanied  by  the  forces  of  Aidzu  and  Kuwana,  when  they  and 


EDO     GOVERNMENT  169 

1837-1868 

twenty-seven  other  feudal  chiefs  were  deprived  by  the  emperor  of 
all  their  ranks  and  offices,  the  duty  of  breaking  their  power  by 
force  of  arms  being  intrusted  to  the  barons  of  Aki,  Choshu,  and 
Tosa.  Also,  special  officers  were  dispatched  to  the  various  prov- 
inces to  restore  peace,  and  their  presence  impressed  the  feudal 
barons  so  strongly  that  no  resistance  was  offered,  and  the  prov- 
inces to  the  west  of  Kyoto  and  Osaka  surrendered  without  hesi- 
tation to  the  imperial  government.  On  February  9  Prince 
Arisugawa  received  the  commission  of  commander  in  chief,  with 
instructions  to  bring  the  east  under  control,  and  under  his  orders 
the  imperial  forces  moved  upon  Tokai,  Tosan,  and  Hokuriku. 
The  prince  entered  Sumpu  on  March  5  and  made  preparations  for 
the  assault  of  Edo.  Before  the  attack  took  place,  however,  the 
shogun  retired  to  a  temple  in  Edo,  and  dispatched  Okubo  Tadahiro, 
Katsu  Awa  Yoshikuni,  and  others  to  open  negotiations  with  Saigo 
Takamori,  general  of  the  imperial  forces  then  about  to  move  on 
the  eastern  capital.  Both  armies,  the  imperial  and  the  feudal, 
were  animated  with  an  uncontrollable  desire  to  fight  to  the  last,  and 
the  imminent  clash  was  barely  averted  by  the  word  of  honor  ex- 
changed between  two  individuals,  General  Saigo  of  the  emperor's 
army  and  Katsu,  a  vassal  of  the  shogun.  They  had  met  each  other 
only  once,  years  before,  but,  although  circumstances  had  placed 
them  in  hostile  camps,  had  entertained  so  unbounded  an  admiration 
and  confidence  in  each  other's  noble  character  that  now  only  a  few 
words  sufficed  for  them  to  pledge,  on  their  honor  as  samurai,  to 
effect  the  surrender  of  the  Tokugawa  with  their  dignity  unimpaired, 
and  to  save  Edo  from  an  unnecessary  destruction  of  the  lives  and 
properties  of  its  two  million  inhabitants.  On  March  4  the  van  of  the 
imperial  army  entered  Edo  and  occupied  the  castle,  the  Shogun 
Yoshinobu  being  granted  his  life  and  confined  in  Mito.  On  the 
1 5th  the  prince  entered  Edo,  and  in  May  a  grant  of  lands  yielding 
annually  700,000  koku  of  rice  in  Suruga,  Totomi,  and  Mutsu  was 
made  to  the  Tokugawa  family  for  its  maintenance. 

When  the  imperial  forces  took  possession  of  Edo  castle, 
Enomoto  Takeaki,  a  naval  officer  of  the  Tokugawa  government, 
fled  to  the  northern  Island  of  Ezo,  taking  with  him  eight  war 
vessels,  and  Otori  Keisuke  retired  to  Kazusa  and  Shimosa.  Fur- 
ther, a  number  of  the  Tokugawa  vassals,  calling  themselves  the 
shogitai  (loyal  band),  took  refuge  in  Uyeno,  northeast  of  Edo, 
and  placing  Prince   Kozenbo,   the  lord  abbot  of  Kwanyei-ji,   at 


170  JAPAN 

1837-1868 

their  head,  refused  to  surrender  to  the  imperial  government.  They 
were  attacked  by  his  majesty's  forces  and  defeated  after  a  sharp 
engagement,  while  Otori  and  his  comrades,  routed  at  Utsunomiya 
and  Nikko,  fled  to  Aidzu,  the  feudal  lord  of  which  place  had  already 
returned  thither,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  barons  of  Mutsu  and 
Dewa  had  made  preparations  to  uphold  the  Tokugawa  cause  by 
force  of  arms.  But  the  imperial  troops,  advancing  from  Tosan, 
Tokai,  and  Hokuriku,  brought  into  subjection  the  two  clans  of 
Sendai  and  Yonezawa,  and  entering  Aidzu,  took  the  Wakamatsu 
castle  on  September  22,  thus  completely  breaking  the  resistance  of 
the  rebels  and  restoring  tranquillity  throughout  the  northern  re- 
gions. In  December  Matsudaira  Katamori,  the  Aidzu  lord,  was 
sentenced  to  perpetual  confinement,  and  the  fiefs  of  Sendai,  Shonai, 
and  Morioka,  which  had  made  act  of  submission  after  the  fall 
of  Wakamatsu,  were  confiscated,  and  their  lords  confined.  As  for 
the  Yonezawa  fief,  its  territory  was  reduced  and  its  lord  ordered  to 
surrender  the  management  of  affairs  to  his  heir,  while  the  fiefs  of 
Mutsu  and  Dewa  were  divided  into  five  and  two  provinces,  re- 
spectively. Meanwhile,  Enomoto  and  his  followers,  alleging  the 
intention  of  reclaiming  lands  in  Ezo,  had  occupied  the  fortress  at 
Hakodate  and  obtained  possession  of  a  great  part  of  the  island. 
But  they  also  finally  in  May,  1868,  surrendered  to  the  imperial 
forces.  In  August  the  name  Ezo  was  changed  to  Hokkaido, 
and  it  was  divided  into  eleven  provinces.  The  entire  land  of  Japan 
thus  passed  under  the  sway  of  the  imperial  government.  Although 
some  of  the  feudal  institutions  still  persisted,  the  Edo  rule  had  in 
1868  at  last  come  to  an  end — 682  years  since  Minamoto  Yoritomo 
organized  the  feudal  government  of  the  empire. 


PART  III 
THE  NEW  JAPAN.    1868-1893 


Chapter  XIV 

INTERNAL   AFFAIRS.     1868- 1893 

THE  organization  of  the  new  government  had  been  started 
and  pushed  with  vigor  even  before  the  final  deposition  of 
the  Tokugawa  power  took  place.  In  January,  1868,  the 
daijokwan,  council  of  the  state,  was  created,  which  was  soon 
divided  into  seven  sections,  namely,  religion,  home  affairs,  for- 
eign affairs,  army  and  navy,  treasury,  justice,  and  law.  The 
ablest  men  of  the  various  fiefs  were  selected  to  fill  the  posts 
of  councilors  and  legislative  officials,  and  by  degrees  the  gov- 
ernment was  so  organized  as  to  put  an  end  to  the  old  system  of 
hereditary  office,  samurai  of  comparatively  low  rank  being  nom- 
inated for  high  positions  according  to  their  merits.  On  March  4 
of  that  year  the  emperor  proceeded  to  the  Shishinden  palace,  where, 
in  the  presence  of  the  court  nobles  and  feudal  barons,  he  solemnly 
pronounced  the  famous  oath  in  five  articles,  which  has  become  the 
foundation  of  the  constitutional  government  of  new  Japan,  that 
henceforth  administrative  affairs  should  be  decided  by  general  de- 
liberation ;  that  both  the  government  and  the  people  should  labor  for 
the  good  of  the  nation;  that  encouragement  should  be  given  to 
industrial  pursuits ;  that  the  evil  customs  hitherto  prevailing  should 
be  corrected ;  and  that  the  country  should  be  strengthened  by  adopt- 
ing the  systems  of  defense  employed  in  foreign  lands.  Shortly 
afterward  the  administrative  organization  was  recast,  with  the 
rule  that  no  official  should  be  appointed  at  the  same  time  to 
legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  posts.  The  term  of  office  was 
also  fixed  at  four  years,  and  the  system  of  appointment  by  merit 
received  further  development.  Officials,  however,  who  showed 
themselves  able  and  obtained  popularity  were  allowed  to  remain 
in  office  after  the  expiration  of  their  first  term  of  service.  On 
August  27  the  coronation  rites  were  duly  performed  at  the  Shi- 
shinden palace.  In  accordance  with  the  custom  of  changing  the 
year-name  on  the  accession  of  an  emperor,  the  era  was  called 

173 


174  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

Meiji  (enlightened  government).  The  emperor  removed  the  capi- 
tal to  Tokyo,  formerly  Edo,  and  took  up  his  residence  in  the  castle 
there. 

As  regards  local  administration,  the  first  division  of  the 
country  after  the  abolition  of  the  shogunate  was  into  28  fu, 
273  han,  and  21  ken,  the  fu  and  ken  being  governed  by  officials 
appointed  by  the  sovereign.  The  han,  however,  being  still  under 
the  government  of  their  former  feudal  chiefs,  no  uniformity  of 
administration  was  possible.  Moreover,  of  the  total  revenue  of 
the  state,  namely,  eleven  million  koku  of  rice,  only  1  4/5  millions 
belonged  to  the  fu  and  ken,  which  were  under  the  direct  control 
of  the  central  government,  the  remainder  constituting  the  income 
of  the  han.  The  resources  of  the  imperial  treasury  proved  quite 
inadequate  to  meet  the  heavy  calls  made  upon  them,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  some  of  the  barons  contributed  liberally.  Kido 
Takakoto,  a  distinguished  samurai  of  Choshu,  then  holding  the 
post  of  councilor  of  state,  appreciating  the  fundamental  necessity  of 
the  time,  made  such  powerful  representations  to  his  liege  lord  that 
the  latter  agreed  to  surrender  his  feudal  domains  and  their  revenues 
to  the  sovereign.  Kido  subsequently  took  council  on  the  same 
subject  with  Okubo  Toshimichi,  a  not  less  distinguished  retainer 
of  Satsuma,  and  by  the  latter's  advice  the  Satsuma  lord  was  in- 
duced to  follow  the  course  taken  by  Mori  of  Choshu.  The  barons 
of  Hizen  and  Tosa  followed  the  example,  and  on  January  20, 
1868,  these  four  great  nobles  addressed  to  the  throne  a  memorial 
over  their  joint  signatures,  declaring  their  desire  to  restore  their 
territories  to  the  sovereign,  and  their  conviction  that  all  the  lands 
in  the  empire  should  come  under  the  direct  control  of  the  central 
government.  Thereafter  the  various  other  barons  signified  their 
wish  to  follow  the  same  course,  and  in  the  sequel  of  a  consultation 
held  with  all  the  feudal  chiefs,  whom  the  emperor  summoned  to 
Tokyo  for  the  purpose,  an  imperial  edict  was  issued,  directing  that 
all  the  fiefs  should  be  restored  to  the  sovereign,  appointing  the 
feudal  lords  to  the  post  of  governor,  and  remodeling  the  adminis- 
trative organization  of  the  han  so  as  to  bring  it  into  conformity 
with  that  of  the  fu  and  ken.  One-tenth  of  the  revenue  accruing  from 
the  fief  lands  was  apportioned  as  the  salary  of  the  governors. 
The  distinctive  terms  of  "court  noble  "  (kuge)  and  "  feudal  lord  " 
(shoko)  were  abolished,  and  all  the  nobles  were  included  in  the 
general  appellation  of  kwazoku.     Relatives  of  the  kwazoku  and 


INTERNAL     AFFAIRS  175 

1868-1893 

samurai  were  all  classed  as  shizoku,  their  pensions  being  at  the 
same  time  duly  fixed. 

Although  the  organization  of  the  local  government  had  been 
placed  on  a  fairly  complete  footing  and  uniformity  of  method  had 
begun  to  be  discernible,  both  the  military  classes  and  the  commoners 
in  the  various  fiefs  were  still  disposed  to  pay  more  respect  to  their 
former  lords  than  to  the  new  officials  appointed  by  the  central 
authorities.  Under  these  circumstances  it  was  suggested  by  a 
governor,  who  had  himself  been  a  great  feudal  baron,  that  the 
military  monopoly  of  the  samurai  should  be  abolished  and  their 
pensions  commuted,  and  that  the  army  should  be  recruited  alike 
from  the  shizoku  and  commoners.  The  versatile  Kido  again 
recommended  that  the  han  (fiefs)  should  be  replaced  by  ken  (pre- 
fectures), so  as  to  thoroughly  centralize  the  administrative  power. 
It  is  remarkable  that  the  view  was  at  once  seconded  by  many 
barons,  who  memorialized  the  throne  begging  the  latter  to  reor- 
ganize all  their  fiefs  into  prefectures.  The  policy  was  finally  adopted 
in  1 87 1,  when  the  263  han  were  completely  abolished  and  replaced 
by  372  new  ken,  and  ample  rewards  at  the  same  time  given 
to  the  few  baron-governors  who  had  taken  the  lead  in  urging  this 
change.  Thus  the  central  government  came  into  full  control  of  the 
lands  and  people  that  had  been  under  the  sway  of  feudal  chiefs  ever 
since  the  Kamakura  epoch.  Subsequently,  various  changes  of 
boundaries  were  made,  until  in  1890  there  were  43  prefectures 
(ken)  and  3  cities  (fu),  besides  one  board  of  administration 
(cho)  of  Hokkaido. 

The  abolition  of  the  han  had  its  grave  financial  problem, 
for  it  now  became  necessary  for  the  central  government  to  assume 
the  responsibility  of  the  fiduciary  notes  previously  issued  by  the 
various  feudal  lords.  To  meet  this  liability  the  government  issued, 
in  lieu  of  the  fiduciary  notes,  bonds  redeemable  within  fifty  years, 
and  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  the  claims  of  the  shizoku  an 
envoy  was  sent  to  England  to  raise  a  sum  of  ten  million  yen.  This, 
Japan's  first  foreign  debt,  was  contracted  in  1872.  In  the  fol- 
lowing year  the  system  of  commuting  annuities  was  fixed,  those 
whose  incomes  ranged  from  100  koku  downward  being  allowed, 
on  application,  to  commute  at  six  years'  purchase,  half  of  the  com- 
mutation money  being  paid  in  cash  and  the  remainder  in  public 
bonds.  The  system  was  subsequently  extended  to  larger  incomes, 
and  in  August,  1876,  the  method  of  commutation  was  made  com- 


176  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

pulsory,  applicable  to  the  income  of  all  the  shizoku,  bonds  being 
handed  to  them  in  the  following  year.  These  bonds,  carrying 
interest  at  different  rates,  were  to  be  liquidated  annually  by  lot, 
their  total  redemption  to  be  effected  in  thirty  years.  At  the  same 
time,  the  shizoku,  who  from  ancient  times  had  devoted  themselves 
to  military  and  literary  pursuits,  despising  industry  and  trade,  now 
found  themselves  detached  from  their  feudal  lords  on  whom  they 
had  relied,  and  deprived  of  their  lands  and  pensions.  Receiving 
sums  of  money  in  commutation  of  their  hereditary  incomes,  many 
of  them,  without  training  or  experience,  turned  at  once  to  com- 
merce and  agriculture,  and  in  numerous  instances  those  who  had 
become  merchants  fell  victims  to  their  own  want  of  knowledge 
and  to  the  craft  of  others,  losing  everything  they  possessed  and 
incurring  the  contempt  of  the  mercantile  classes  whom  they  had 
so  long  counted  their  inferiors. 

The  overthrow  of  the  feudal  tenure  naturally  affected  the 
military  organization  of  the  nation.  Hitherto  soldiers  to  form  the 
imperial  guard  had  been  raised  in  Satsuma,  Choshu,  and  Tosa,  and 
the  remaining  force  had  consisted  of  five  garrison  corps  (chindai), 
quartered  at  different  places  and  recruited  from  cities  and  pre- 
fectures in  the  proportion  of  five  men  per  10,000  koku  of  rice 
crop. 

In  1872  the  military  department  (hydbusho)  was  replaced 
by  two  separate  departments  of  war  and  the  navy,  and  an  im- 
perial ordinance  provided  that  soldiers  should  be  recruited  from 
all  parts  of  the  empire  and  all  classes  of  the  people,  the  mo- 
nopoly of  military  service  held  by  the  samurai  being  thus  abolished 
and  the  method  existing  a  thousand  years  previously  restored.  At 
the  same  time  it  was  clearly  indicated  that  the  command  in  chief 
of  all  the  forces  devolved  on  the  sovereign.  All  persons  of  twenty 
years  or  upward  were  liable  for  conscription,  and  the  army  was 
divided  into  troops  with  the  colors  (jobi-hei),  the  reserve  (kobi- 
hei),  and  the  militia  (kokumin-gun).  Subsequently  all  of  the 
castles  in  the  fiefs  were  dismantled  with  the  exception  of  fifty-five, 
which  were  handed  over  to  the  war  department,  and  the  number  of 
the  garrison  corps  was  increased  to  six,  their  headquarters  being 
Tokyo,  Sendai,  Nagoya,  Osaka,  Hiroshima,  and  Kumamoto. 
Various  new  regulations  relating  to  military  matters  were  afterward 
issued  from  time  to  time,  or  revisions  of  the  old  effected,  a  colonial 
militia  for  Hokkaido  being  among  the  new  measures.    Meanwhile, 


INTERNAL     AFFAIRS  177 

1868-1893 

the  naval  department  established  naval  stations,  built  dockyards  and 
ships  of  war,  and  opened  colleges,  so  that  the  organizations  of  the 
two  branches  of  the  military  service  were  placed  on  a  satisfactory 
footing. 

All  these  changes  were  radical  in  nature,  and  it  was  inevitable 
that  the  conservative  instincts  educated  among  the  people  through 
centuries  of  feudal  training  should  often  burst  forth  in  opposition 
to  the  drastic  social  revolution.  Men  conspicuous  as  advocates  of 
innovation  were  sometimes  attacked  and  assassinated,  and  armed 
resistance  was  occasionally  planned.  Sakuma  Shozan,  Councilor 
Yokoi  Heishiro,  and  Senior  Vice  Minister  of  the  Army  Omura 
Masujiro  all  fell  under  the  swords  of  assassins  in  consequence  of 
their  ardent  liberalism;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  Kumoi  Tatsuo 
of  Yonezawa  plotted  with  the  old  samurai  of  Aidzu  and  Shizuoka 
to  restore  the  feudal  system  by  force.  But  this  as  well  as  some 
minor  attempts  of  a  similar  character  in  other  parts  of  the  empire 
were  quickly  dealt  with,  the  nation  as  a  whole  being  emphatically 
favorable  to  the  new  order  of  things.  It  was  not  so  easy,  however, 
to  pacify  some  of  the  larger  insurrections  which  occurred  in  the 
southern  part  of  Japan.  In  January,  1874,  Eto  Shimpei,  a  member 
of  the  cabinet,  being  opposed  by  the  majority  of  his  colleagues  with 
respect  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued  toward  Korea,  retired  from  the 
government  and  gathered  about  him  in  Saga,  in  Hizen,  a  number 
of  discontented  people  who  were  desirous  of  restoring  feudalism 
and  attacking  Korea.  They  plundered  a  sum  of  200,000  yen  from 
the  Ono  Company,  and  made  a  successful  raid  upon  the  prefectural 
offices  of  Kumamoto.  The  garrison  corps  of  the  latter  place  re- 
ceived orders  to  subdue  the  rebels — Okubo  Toshimichi,  minister 
of  home  affairs,  being  dispatched  by  the  sovereign  to  direct  the 
operations.  The  insurgents  suffered  several  defeats,  and  were 
finally  imprisoned  in  Saga  castle,  but  they  managed  to  effect  their 
escape  thence  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  to  cross  the  sea  to 
Kagoshima,  where  they  landed,  with  the  intention  of  striking  a 
second  blow  by  the  aid  of  Saigo  Takamori,  whose  rebellion  will 
presently  receive  our  attention.  Failing  in  their  purpose,  however, 
they  were  unable  to  offer  any  further  resistance.  Eto  and  the  other 
ringleaders  were  executed  in  April,  and  when  Prince  Yoshiaki 
arrived,  who  had  been  dispatched  from  Tokyo  at  the  head  of  a 
considerable  naval  and  military  force  to  crush  the  rebellion,  he 
found  that  order  had  been  restored.     Two  years  later  there  were 


178  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

simultaneous  uprisings  in  Kumamoto  and  in  Hagi  of  Nagato,  which 
were  quickly  subdued  by  the  imperial  forces. 

No  rebellion,  however,  proved  more  serious  and  more  dif- 
ficult to  repress  than  the  revolt  of  Saigo  in  Satsuma.  The  genesis 
of  this  insurrection  must  be  traced  to  complex  circumstances  under 
which  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  new  government  had  been 
split  into  two  factions,  one  of  which  had  its  central  figure  in  Saigd. 
The  occasion  for  the  rupture  was  the  dispute  which  arose  among  the 
ministers  of  the  crown  in  regard  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued  by 
Japan  toward  Korea.  Throughout  the  Tokugawa  period  it  had 
been  customary  for  Korea,  on  each  occasion  of  a  coronation  in  that 
country,  to  send  an  ambassador  to  confirm  the  friendly  relations 
between  the  two  states.  When  the  restoration  took  place  in  Japan 
her  government  dispatched  an  envoy  to  Korea  to  convey  intelligence 
of  the  fact  and  to  renew  expressions  of  amity,  but  the  Koreans 
refused  to  recognize  the  envoy  or  accept  his  message,  owing  osten- 
sibly to  the  fact  that  the  new  term  "  Great  Empire  of  Japan  "  was 
employed  in  the  imperial  letter.  At  a  later  date  the  Japanese  sent 
home  certain  Koreans  who  had  been  shipwrecked  on  the  coast  of 
Japan,  and  took  the  opportunity  of  renewing  expressions  of  friend- 
ship by  the  mouths  of  the  officials  who  escorted  the  castaways. 
Korea  received  the  shipwrecked  sailors,  but  declined  to  receive  the 
officials  accompanying  them.  The  youthful  government  contained 
men,  particularly  the  Councilors  Saigo  Takamori,  Soyeshima 
Taneomi,  Itagaki  Taisuke,  Goto  Shojiro,  and  Eto  Shimpei,  who 
deeply  resented  the  conduct  of  Korea,  and  counseled  the  opening 
of  the  peninsular  kingdom  by  force  of  arms.  Other  chief  officials 
of  the  government,  headed  by  Okubo  Toshimichi,  opposed  this  view, 
and  being  supported  by  the  minister  of  the  left,  Iwakura.  who  had 
just  returned  from  his  travels  through  Europe  and  America,  the 
peace  party  carried  the  day.  The  advocates  of  recourse  to  arms 
resigned,  and  a  new  cabinet  was  organized,  under  Iwakura  and 
Okubo,  which  was  the  first  cabinet  change  in  Japan  since  the 
restoration.  The  immediate  effects  of  this  change  were  important. 
The  revolt  of  Eto  has  already  been  related,  and  the  case  of  Itagaki 
and  Goto  will  soon  be  heard  of.  The  name  of  Saigo  has  been 
mentioned  as  one  of  the  two  heroes  whose  mutual  trust  had  resulted 
in  averting  the  great  battle  imminent  in  Edo.  A  man  of  over- 
mastering sincerity,  his  position  in  the  Tokyo  government,  in  which 
he  was  commander  in  chief  of  the  army,  had  been  unique.    When 


INTERNAL     AFFAIRS  179 

1868-1893 

he  resigned  and  retired  to  Kagoshima  in  Satsuma,  and  established 
a  private  military  school,  nearly  all  the  ambitious  young  men  of 
the  province  flocked  to  the  school.  Many  came  from  other  prefec- 
tures also,  for  Saigo's  reputation  as  the  chief  agent  in  bringing 
about  the  restoration  was  immense,  and  his  simple,  great  personality 
commanded  universal  love  and  respect.  These  students,  little  intent 
on  studies,  where  animated  by  a  desire  to  raise  Saigd  to  the  leader- 
ship of  a  colossal  opposition  to  the  new  cabinet,  whose  policy  and 
conduct  they  honestly  abhorred.  When  the  Hagi  and  Kumamoto 
insurrections  broke  out  in  1876  these  truculent  students  main- 
tained correspondence  with  the  rebels,  but  refrained  from  openly 
imitating  their  example.  By  and  by,  some  officials  of  the  imperial 
government  who  visited  the  province  were  seized  by  the  students 
and  tortured  into  a  false  confession  that  they  had  come  with  a 
secret  commission  to  assassinate  Saigo.  The  war  department,  ap- 
prehending dangerous  contingencies,  now  ordered  that  the  powder 
stored  in  Kagoshima  should  be  transferred  to  Osaka,  but  the 
powder  was  seized  en  route  by  the  students,  who  also  managed 
to  possess  themselves  of  the  arsenal  and  implements  of  war  be- 
longing to  the  naval  department  in  Kagoshima.  Saigo  earnestly 
endeavored  at  first  to  restore  order  and  discipline  among  these 
turbulent  disciples,  but  he  finally  yielded  to  the  persuasion  of  his 
chief  followers,  who  represented  that  on  him  devolved  the  patriotic 
duty  of  clearing  away  disloyal  and  crafty  subjects  from  the  foot 
of  the  throne,  and  who  showed  him,  at  the  same  time,  the  false 
confession  extorted  by  torture  from  government  officials.  Saigo 
thereupon  circulated  a  letter  throughout  the  adjacent  provinces 
explaining  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  arms.  News  of  these 
events  reached  the  emperor  in  Kyoto,  whither  he  had  temporarily 
gone.  He  made  that  city  his  headquarters,  and  gave  to  Prince 
Arisugawa  a  commission  to  quell  the  rebellion,  Yamagata  Aritomo, 
minister  of  war,  and  Kawamura  Sumiyoshi,  vice  minister  of  the 
navy,  being  appointed  chiefs  of  staff.  The  brigades  dispatched  to 
the  scene  of  disturbance  were  commanded  by  Major  Generals 
Nozu,  Miyoshi,  and  Miura,  and  Saigo  and  his  fellow-conspirators 
were  stripped  of  all  their  ranks  and  honors. 

The  insurgents  assembled  in  Kagoshima  now  numbered  some 
15,000  picked  samurai  of  desperate  courage  and  great  skill  in  the 
use  of  their  weapons.  At  the  head  of  this  force  Saigo  set  out  for 
Kumamoto  on  February  15,  1876,  and  on  the  226.  of  that  month 


180  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

he  sat  down  with  his  whole  army  before  Kumamoto  castle,  an  error 
of  strategy  which  ultimately  enabled  the  government  to  confine  the 
insurrection  to  the  Island  of  Kiushu.  Major  General  Tani  Tateki, 
who  held  command  of  the  garrison,  made  a  stubborn  resistance, 
though  many  of  the  samurai  among  his  troops  went  over  to  the 
rebels.  The  imperial  army  arriving  in  the  province  of  Higo,  en- 
deavored to  reach  Kumamoto  from  the  northwest  via  Takase. 
Severe  fighting  took  place,  but  the  forces  of  the  government  pushed 
steadily  on.  At  point  after  point  the  rebels  made  obstinate  stands, 
especially  in  the  strong  position  of  Tawara-saka,  where  a  great 
number  of  lives  were  lost  by  both  sides,  and  the  whole  district  was 
devastated.  The  government  troops,  though  victorious,  found 
themselves  seriously  weakened,  and  the  insurgents  fought  with  un- 
diminished desperation.  Shortly  before  this,  Yanagiwara  Sakimitsu, 
a  senator,  was  sent  by  the  emperor  to  Kagoshima  to  warn  Shimazu 
Hisamitsu,  the  former  feudal  chief  of  Satsuma,  and  his  son,  Taday- 
oshi,  against  connecting  themselves  with  the  insurgents.  He  was 
accompanied  on  this  mission  by  Lieutenant  General  Kuroda  Kiyo- 
taka,  an  influential  member  of  the  Satsuma  clan,  and  the  two  labored 
so  successfully  that  the  dockyard  and  arsenal,  which  had  been  dis- 
mantled by  the  rebels,  were  restored  to  a  defensible  condition.  It 
now  became  possible  to  advance  upon  the  rear  of  the  rebels,  and 
General  Kuroda,  being  appointed  chief  of  the  staff,  landed  a  body 
of  troops  at  Yatsushiro  in  order  to  attack  Saigd  from  the  south. 
The  insurgents  were  now  assaulted  from  two  directions,  but  they 
fought  so  well  that  the  imperial  army  could  not  yet  effect  the  relief 
of  Kumamoto  castle,  which,  having  been  besieged  for  over  fifty  days, 
was  being  reduced  to  straits  for  want  of  provisions.  The  com- 
mander of  the  garrison  now  managed  to  send  an  officer  through  the 
besieging  army  with  intelligence  of  his  perilous  condition,  and  on 
receipt  of  the  message  General  Kuroda  set  all  his  troops  in  rapid 
motion,  and  forced  his  way  to  Kumamoto  on  April  14,  the  insur- 
gents breaking  up  into  two  bodies,  one  of  which  retreated  into  the 
province  of  Bungo  and  the  other  into  the  Hitoyoshi  valley  in  Higo, 
where  the  country  offered  excellent  facilities  for  resistance.  Upon 
the  retreat  of  the  rebels  from  Kumamoto,  Vice  Minister  Kawamura 
Sumiyoshi  was  sent  to  Kagoshima,  at  the  head  of  8000  men,  to 
attack  the  rebellion  at  its  root,  whereupon  Saigo,  who  was  with  the 
Hitoyoshi  branch  of  the  rebels,  learning  that  Kagoshima  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  government's  troops,  issued  orders  for  a  re- 


INTERNAL     AFFAIRS 


181 


1868-1893 

treat  in  the  directions  of  Satsuma  and  Osumi.  The  Hitoyoshi  in- 
surgents then  effected  their  escape  with  much  adroitness  into  Hiuga 
province,  following  three  different  routes,  and  the  imperial  army 
occupied  the  Hitoyoshi  position  on  June  i.  The  Bungo  body  of 
insurgents,  meanwhile,  being  hard  pressed  by  the  government  forces, 
retired  to  a  strong  position  at  Nobeoka,  in  Hiuga,  and  opened  com- 


munications with  the  other  body,  which  had  fortified  itself  at  Miyaz- 
aki  in  the  same  province.  Several  battles  and  skirmishes  ensued, 
and  it  was  not  till  the  end  of  July  that  Miyazaki  was  reduced, 
Nobeoka  falling  on  August  14.  The  rebels  now  retreated  north- 
ward to  Enotake,  where  they  were  closely  besieged  by  the  imperial 
army,  but  on  the  18th  of  the  same  month  they  succeeded,  with 


182  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

extraordinary  celerity  and  address,  in  effecting  a  retreat  right 
through  the  besieging  lines,  and  pushing  rapidly  on  to  Kagoshima, 
which  place  they  suddenly  attacked  and  took.  The  imperial  forces 
were  now  concentrated  about  Kagoshima,  and  after  a  sanguinary 
engagement,  lasting  ten  days,  the  rebels  were  driven  to  Shiroyama, 
where  their  last  fight  was  fought  on  September  24.  Saigo  Taka- 
mori  committed  suicide,  and  Toshiaki  and  the  other  rebel  chiefs 
fell  on  the  field  of  battle,  the  rebellion  being  thus  finally  crushed. 
A  provisional  court  was  organized  in  Kiushu,  under  the  presidency 
of  Kono  Tokama,  a  secretary  of  the  senate,  for  the  trial  of  those 
taken  in  the  fighting,  seventeen  of  whom  were  sentenced  to  death. 
In  this  sanguinary  struggle  the  whole  of  the  army  and  navy  had 
been  engaged,  the  old  imperial  bodyguard  reorganized,  a  band  of 
swordsmen  volunteers  enrolled,  and  a  company  of  policemen,  also 
for  sword  service,  sent  to  the  scene  of  the  fighting.  The  Japanese 
sword  was  used  by  both  armies  with  great  skill  and  deadly  effect. 
The  total  number  of  men  engaged  on  the  government  side  was 
60,000,  and  the  entire  outlay  involved  was  416  million  yen.  At  one 
time,  indeed,  the  affair  had  threatened  to  assume  almost  uncon- 
trollable dimensions,  for  in  the  early  days  of  the  rebels'  valiant 
fighting  ominous  signs  of  disaffection  made  themselves  apparent 
in  the  prefectures  of  Yamaguchi,  Kochi,  Fukuoka,  and  elsewhere. 
Much  as  the  trouble  cost,  however,  in  blood  and  treasure,  its  national 
uses  were  very  great.  By  it  the  army  and  navy  gained  invaluable 
experience,  and  all  the  institutions  of  the  central  government  were 
subjected  to  the  test  of  severe  practice,  while  the  people  learned, 
once  for  all,  that  armed  efforts  to  disturb  the  new  order  of  things 
were  utterly  hopeless,  and  that  adverse  opinion  must  be  limited  to 
the  channels  of  speech  and  pen.  The  treasury,  however,  found 
itself  seriously  embarrassed.  It  had  been  obliged  to  borrow  fifteen 
million  yen  from  the  Fifteenth  National  Bank,  and  also,  most 
reluctantly,  to  issue  fiduciary  notes  aggregating  270,000,000  yen  in 
addition  to  those  already  issued  for  the  purpose  of  redeeming  the 
fiat  paper  of  the  daijokwan,  the  mimbusho,  and  the  former  feudal 
barons. 

While  the  rupture  of  the  cabinet  had  occasioned  the  immense 
rebellion  of  Kagoshima  and  the  tragic  end  of  the  great  Saigo,  his 
former  colleagues,  Itagaki  and  Goto,  also  did  not  accept  the  political 
defeat  of  their  faction  without  a  struggle.  Their  struggle,  how- 
ever, produced  widely  different  results  from  those  of  Saigo's  up- 


INTERNAL     AFFAIRS  183 

1868-1893 

rising.  Itagaki  and  Goto  addressed  to  the  government  a  memorial 
urging  the  expediency  of  at  once  establishing  a  national  assembly  in 
Japan.  But  the  government  rejected  the  memorial  on  the  ground 
that  the  time  was  not  ripe  for  so  radical  a  measure.  Nevertheless, 
the  embryo  of  a  deliberate  assembly  was  in  truth  formed  about  this 
time,  for  the  local  governors  were  all  summoned  to  Tokyo,  and  in- 
vited to  discuss  together  questions  relating  to  roads,  rivers,  bridges, 
the  relief  of  the  destitute,  public  meetings,  and  other  matters 
connected  with  their  jurisdictions.  Moreover,  in  1875  a  senate 
(genro-in)  was  organized  for  legislative  purposes,  its  members 
being  appointed  from  among  men  conspicuous  for  merit  and  ca- 
pacity. In  1876  and  1877,  owing  to  rebellious  disturbances  fo- 
mented by  the  seceding  councilors  of  state,  the  local  governors  were 
not  summoned  to  Tokyo  for  consultation,  but  in  1878  they  assem- 
bled in  the  capital  and  discussed  questions  relating  to  local  re-, 
organization,  to  city  and  prefectural  assemblies — the  bases  of  a 
future  parliament — and  to  local  taxes.  Subsequent  to  this  meeting 
rules  relating  to  the  organization  of  towns,  villages,  districts,  and 
divisions  were  promulgated,  as  well  as  rules  relating  to  the  collection 
of  taxes,  while  in  1879  the  system  of  local  assemblies  was  established 
in  each  city  and  prefecture.  The  members  of  these  assemblies  were 
elected  by  the  people  from  among  themselves,  and  were  invested  with 
extensive  deliberative  functions  in  relation  to  local  administration. 
In  the  following  years  the  governors  were  again  summoned  to 
Tokyo  for  the  purpose  of  deliberating  about  relief  funds  and  re- 
vising the  rules  discussed  at  their  previous  meeting,  these  rules 
being  supplemented  by  others  relating  to  the  organization  of  divi- 
sions, towns,  and  villages.  Meanwhile,  the  advocates  of  popular 
rights  increased  in  number  and  influence  day  by  day.  A  news- 
paper press  had  arisen  which  made  this  subject  a  favorite  topic 
of  discussion,  and  political  associations  were  formed  agitating  the 
establishment  of  a  diet  or  petitioning  the  government  in  that  sense. 
In  view  of  this  growing  excitement  and  to  avert  contingencies  inci- 
dental to  it,  regulations  were  issued  for  the  better  control  of  news- 
papers and  political  meetings.  In  1880  a  political  party,  the  Jiyu-to 
(Liberals),  destined  subsequently  to  play  a  prominent  part  in  na- 
tional affairs,  was  organized,  under  the  leadership  of  Itagaki  Tai- 
suke,  while  within  the  government  Okuma  Shigenobu,  a  councilor 
of  state,  advocated  the  opening  of  a  national  assembly  without  delay. 
The  ministers  of  the  crown,  however,  adhered  to  their  former 


184  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

decision  that  the  time  was  not  ripe.  Not  discouraged  by  this  refusal, 
the  advocates  of  a  parliamentary  system  continued  their  agitation, 
and  spared  no  pains  to  injure  the  credit  of  the  cabinet  with  the 
nation.  The  sovereign,  therefore,  judging  it  expedient  to  announce 
publicly  the  intentions  entertained  by  him,  issued  with  the  advice 
of  his  ministers,  in  October,  1881,  a  rescript  declaring  that  in  the 
23d  year  of  Meiji  (1890)  a  constitutional  government  should  be 
established.  Okuma  Shigenobu,  together  with  Kono  Hironaka  and 
others,  now  resigned  their  official  positions  and  organized  a  political 
party,  the  Kaishin-to  (Progressives),  which,  though  occupying  a 
common  platform  with  the  Jiyu-to  in  respect  of  a  national  assembly, 
worked  in  general  opposition  to  the  latter.  At  a  much  later  date 
a  third  party,  hostile  to  both  of  the  above,  was  formed,  namely,  the 
Kokumin  Kyokai,  or  National  Unionists. 

Immediately  after  the  issue  of  the  rescript  fixing  the  date  for 
opening  the  diet,  the  government  set  about  drafting  the  constitution, 
the  utmost  care  and  research  being  brought  to  bear  on  this  im- 
portant work.  In  the  spring  of  1882  ltd  Hirobumi  was  dispatched 
on  a  special  mission  to  Europe  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  the 
constitutional  law  of  the  various  states  and  its  practical  applications, 
and  on  his  return  a  legislative  bureau,  charged  with  the  functions 
of  drafting  the  constitution,  revising  the  laws,  and  remodeling  the 
official  organization,  was  established.  In  1884  titles  of  nobility — 
prince,  marquis,  count,  viscount,  and  baron — were  created,  patents 
being  granted  to  over  five  hundred  of  the  former  territorial  and 
court  nobles,  as  well  as  to  officials  distinguished  for  services  rendered 
to  the  state.  In  February  of  the  following  year  great  changes  were 
effected  in  the  administrative  organization.  The  offices  of  daijo 
daijin,  sadaijin,  udaijin,  sangi,  and  ministers  of  departments  were 
abolished,  and  in  their  stead  were  created  ministers  of  state  for  home 
affairs,  foreign  affairs,  finance,  war,  the  navy,  education,  justice, 
agriculture  and  commerce,  and  communications,  these  ministers 
constituting  a  cabinet  under  the  leadership  of  the  minister  president 
and  the  presidency  of  the  emperor  himself.  Outside  the  cabinet  were 
the  minister  of  the  imperial  household,  the  lord  keeper  of  the  privy 
seal,  and  a  number  of  court  councilors,  while  in  each  department 
there  was  a  vice  minister,  as  well  as  a  director  and  vice  directors  of 
each  of  its  bureaus,  together  with  councilors  and  secretaries.  These 
changes  were  much  more  radical  than  anything  previously  effected 
during  the  Meiji  era,  all  other  reforms  having  been  mere  modifica- 


INTERNAL     AFFAIRS  185 

1868-1893 

tions  of  the  old  system  prescribed  in  the  Taiho  Code  of  701  a.  d. 
At  the  same  time  regulations  providing  for  the  appointment  of  civil 
officials  by  competitive  examination  were  promulgated,  and  various 
new  laws  and  ordinances  were  issued.  One  of  the  most  important 
effects  of  this  great  reform  was  that  it  put  an  end  completely  to  the 
pernicious  system  of  selecting  officials  from  personal  considerations 
without  regard  to  competence.  No  changes  of  a  radical  character 
have  since  that  time  been  effected  in  the  administration.  Count  Ito 
Hirobumi,  the  chief  author  of  these  reforms,  became  the  first 
minister  president  of  state.  In  1888  a  privy  council  was  established, 
its  members  being  selected  from  among  old  and  distinguished 
officials,  and  its  function  being  to  advise  the  sovereign  with  respect 
to  any  matter  submitted  by  his  majesty  for  its  deliberation.  Count 
Ito  became  its  president,  resigning  his  post  of  minister  president  of 
state  to  Count  Kuroda  Kiyotaka.  In  the  same  year  a  large  body 
of  laws  for  the  reorganization  of  cities,  towns,  and  villages  was  pro- 
mulgated, to  go  into  effect  from  the  year  1891,  and  these  laws  were 
followed  in  1890  by  similar  statutes  for  the  organization  of  pre- 
fectures and  districts,  the  general  purport  of  all  this  legislation  being 
local  autonomy. 

The  nth  of  February  in  the  226.  year  of  Meiji  (1889)  saw 
the  promulgation  of  the  imperial  Constitution.  On  this  memorable 
occasion  the  emperor  delivered  from  the  throne  the  following 
speech:  "  Whereas  We  make  it  the  joy  and  glory  of  Our  heart  to 
behold  the  prosperity  of  Our  country,  and  the  welfare  of  Our  sub- 
jects, We  do  hereby,  in  virtue  of  the  supreme  power  We  inherit 
from  Our  Imperial  Ancestors,  promulgate  the  present  immutable 
fundamental  law,  for  the  sake  of  Our  present  subjects  and  their 
descendants.  The  Imperial  Founder  of  Our  House  and  Our  other 
Imperial  Ancestors,  by  the  help  and  support  of  the  forefathers  of 
Our  subjects,  laid  the  foundation  of  Our  Empire  upon  a  basis  which 
is  to  last  forever.  That  this  brilliant  achievement  embellishes  the 
annals  of  Our  country,  is  due  to  the  glorious  virtues  of  Our  Sacred 
Imperial  Ancestors,  and  the  loyalty  and  bravery  of  Our  subjects, 
their  love  of  their  country,  and  their  public  spirit.  Considering  that 
Our  subjects  are  the  descendants  of  the  loyal  and  good  subjects  of 
Our  Imperial  Ancestors,  We  doubt  not  but  that  Our  subjects  will  be 
guided  by  Our  views,  and  will  sympathize  with  all  Our  endeavors, 
and  that,  harmoniously  cooperating  together,  they  will  share  with 
Us  Our  hope  of  making  manifest  the  glory  of  Our  country,  both 


186  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

at  home  and  abroad,  and  of  securing  forever  the  stability  of  the  work 
bequeathed  to  Us  by  Our  Imperial  Ancestors." 

The  promulgation  of  the  Constitution  took  place  in  the  throne 
room  of  the  Tokyo  palace,  the  princes  of  the  blood,  ministers  of 
state,  peers,  governors  of  cities  and  prefectures,  presidents  of  city 
and  prefecture  assemblies,  the  foreign  representatives,  and  all  officials 
of  and  above  chokunin  rank  being  present.  The  Constitution  con- 
sisted of  seventy-six  articles  contained  in  seven  chapters.  It  pro- 
vided for  the  perpetuity  of  the  imperial  succession;  defined  the 
imperial  prerogatives  and  the  privileges  granted  to  the  people;  de- 
clared the  latter's  obligation  to  pay  taxes  and  serve  as  soldiers,  but 
guaranteed  them  against  being  arrested,  imprisoned,  tried,  or 
punished  except  by  due  process  of  law;  decreed  the  inviolability  of 
person  and  property;  granted  freedom  of  residence  and  conscience, 
and  declared  that  no  man's  house  could  be  officially  entered  without 
a  legal  warrant.  The  law  of  the  houses,  promulgated  simultane- 
ously, created  a  bicameral  diet — a  house  of  peers  and  a  house  of 
representatives — to  be  convened  every  year,  and  in  this  diet  was 
vested  legislative  power  without  recourse  to  which  no  law  could  be 
enacted  or  altered,  and  financial  authority  without  the  exercise  of 
which  the  annual  budget  could  not  become  existent.  The  law  of 
election,  which  also  formed  one  of  the  appended  statutes  of  the 
Constitution,  provided  for  all  affairs  relating  to  the  franchise  and 
its  exercise ;  the  law  of  finance  regulated  fiscal  matters ;  and  the  im- 
perial house  law  determined  affairs  connected  with  the  succession, 
the  household,  the  princes  of  the  blood,  and  the  like.  The  day  of 
the  promulgation  of  the  Constitution  was  observed  as  a  grand  na- 
tional fete,  amnesty  was  proclaimed  in  the  case  of  all  political  offend- 
ers, and  largess  was  freely  distributed  to  the  aged  and  indigent.  It 
was  certainly  a  subject  for  national  rejoicing  and  congratulation 
that  this  advanced  stage  of  governmental  progress  was  reached  in 
Japan  without  any  of  the  scenes  of  bloodshed  and  violence  which 
had  disfigured  such  changes  in  many  other  countries. 

The  establishment  of  a  constitutional  form  of  government 
having  long  been  an  object  of  ardent  desire  of  the  people,  all  classes, 
official  and  private  alike,  had  been  preparing  themselves  for  the 
welcome  event.  In  addition  to  the  Liberal  and  Progressive  par- 
ties mentioned,  Count  Goto  Shojiro  had  formed  a  third,  the 
Daido  Danketsu  (Great  Affiliation),  which,  however,  after  a  brief 
existence,  split  up  into  two  or  three  insignificant  bodies.     When  the 


INTERNAL     AFFAIRS  187 

1868-1893 

first  general  election  for  the  new  national  diet  took  place  in  July, 
1890,  there  were  several  rival  parties  and  much  political  ardor,  but 
everything  passed  off  in  an  orderly  and  quiet  manner.  In  view  of 
the  assembly  of  the  diet  the  old  senate  (genro-in)  was  abolished, 
most  of  its  members  being  nominated  members  of  the  upper  house. 
By  imperial  edict  the  two  houses  were  convoked  in  Tokyo  on 
November  25  of  the  same  year,  and  his  majesty  the  emperor 
opened  the  diet  in  person  on  November  29.  The  house  of  rep- 
resentatives consisted  of  300  members  elected  by  the  people  in  the 
various  localities;  the  house  of  peers,  of  the  princes  of  the  blood, 
the  princes  and  marquises,  all  of  whom  sat  in  their  own  right,  a 
certain  number  of  counts,  viscounts,  and  barons  elected  by  their 
respective  orders,  highest  taxpayers  elected  by  the  prefectures,  one 
for  each,  and  a  proportion  of  members  nominated  by  the  sovereign 
in  consideration  of  meritorious  services  or  proficiency  in  learning. 
So  with  1890  began  the  new  regime  of  Japan. 


Chapter  XV 

FOREIGN    RELATIONS.     1868-1893 

UNDER  the  Tokugawa  rule  a  treaty  was  concluded  between 
Japan  and  Russia  recognizing  Karafuto  (Sakhalin)  as 
a  joint  possession  of  the  two  empires.  Later  the  Edo 
government  sent  an  envoy  to  St.  Petersburg  with  a  proposal  that 
the  50th  parallel  of  north  latitude  should  be  the  boundary  between 
the  two  countries.  No  final  decision  was  arrived  at,  however,  on 
that  occasion,  and  it  was  resolved  that  each  country  should  send 
an  ambassador  to  Karafuto  the  following  year  to  survey  the  island 
and  determine  the  boundary.  But  domestic  embarrassments  so 
beset  the  shogun's  government  that  the  promised  envoy  was  not 
sent  from  Japan.  In  1866  there  was  talk  of  dispatching  an  am- 
bassador for  the  purpose,  but  nothing  was  done,  while  Russia  was 
gradually  pushing  southward,  until  she  finally  encroached  upon  the 
region  indisputably  recognized  as  Japanese  territory.  The  govern- 
ment of  the  shogun  was  powerless  at  the  time  to  offer  any  oppo- 
sition, and  shortly  afterward  it  had  to  surrender  the  administration 
to  the  emperor.  His  majesty's  ministers  now  proposed,  through 
the  intermediary  of  the  United  States,  that  the  parallel  of  50  ° 
north  latitude  should  be  taken  as  the  boundary,  but  the  Russian 
government  rejected  the  proposal.  Subsequently,  Admiral  Eno- 
moto  was  sent  as  Japanese  representative  to  St.  Petersburg,  and 
after  much  discussion  it  was  decided,  by  a  convention  concluded 
in  1875,  that  the  whole  of  Sakhalin  should  become  Russian  prop- 
erty, Japan  receiving  in  exchange  the  Chishima  Islands  (the 
Kuriles). 

When  in  1858  the  first  treaties  were  concluded  by  the  shogun's 
government  with  five  foreign  powers,  the  Japanese  plenipotentiaries, 
being  entirely  ignorant  of  foreign  affairs,  intrusted  the  drafting  of 
the  articles  to  the  American  minister,  and  merely  indorsed  the  pro- 
visions proposed  by  him.  A  clause  was  added,  however,  providing 
for  revision  after  the  lapse  of  fourteen  years,  and  when  it  was  found 
that  the  treaties  contained  much  which  was  injurious  to  Japan's 

188 


FOREIGN     RELATIONS  189 

1868-1893 

dignity  and  embarrassing  to  her  independence,  a  strong  desire  to 
effect  revision  began  to  be  generally  felt.  Moreover,  as  a  result 
of  the  firing  upon  foreign  ships  by  the  forts  at  Shimonoseki,  Eng- 
land and  France,  in  addition  to  exacting  an  indemnity  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  injury  suffered  by  the  ships,  took  advantage  of 
Japan's  internal  dissensions  to  impose  upon  her  greatly  lowered 
tariff  rates.  At  subsequent  dates  treaties  were  concluded,  neces- 
sarily on  the  same  lines,  with  Portugal,  Prussia,  Switzerland, 
Belgium,  Italy,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Spain,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Hawaii,  and  ministers  plenipotentiary  were  accredited  to  most  of 
these  countries.  The  knowledge  thus  gradually  acquired  of 
Western  states  and  of  the  international  usages  prevailing  among 
them,  served  to  increase  Japan's  impatience  against  the  unequal 
conventional  conditions  to  which  she  was  herself  compelled  to  sub- 
mit. The  government,  not  less  swayed  by  this  sentiment,  did  every- 
thing in  its  power  to  remove  obstacles  which  foreigners  alleged  to 
be  fatal  to  equal  international  treatment  of  Japan.  The  penal  laws 
were  radically  altered,  and  codes  consistent  with  the  principles  of 
Western  jurisprudence  were  promulgated.  Meanwhile,  the  term  of 
fourteen  years  fixed  by  the  treaties  had  elapsed,  and  the  time  for 
revision  having  arrived  it  was  resolved  to  dispatch  an  embassy  to 
Europe  and  America  for  the  purpose  of  making  known  Japan's 
real  condition  and  acquiring  knowledge  of  foreign  affairs.  In 
October,  1871,  Iwakura  Tomomi,  minister  of  the  right,  was  sent 
upon  this  mission,  together  with  a  number  of  other  prominent 
officials.  In  the  United  States  of  America  he  met  with  a  cordial 
reception,  the  president  promising  to  consider  favorably  the  ques- 
tion of  revision,  and  Congress  showing  a  disposition  to  return 
America's,  share  of  the  indemnity  unjustly  exacted  from  Japan  in 
connection  with  the  Shimonoseki  affair.  (The  indemnity  was 
actually  returned  twelve  years  later.)  In  European  countries,  also, 
the  ambassador  was  courteously  received,  but  failed  to  obtain  any 
serious  attention  for  the  subject  of  treaty  revision.  The  embassy 
returned  to  Japan  in  1873.  During  the  next  years  domestic  affairs 
engrossed  the  attention  of  the  government  to  the  virtual  exclusion 
of  everything  else,  and  it  was  not  until  after  the  termination  of  the 
Satsuma  rebellion  in  1877  that  the  government  found  itself  in  a 
position  to  approach  foreign  powers  with  the  object  of  recovering 
tariff  autonomy  and  reserving  the  coastwise  trade.  The  effort 
again  proved  abortive.     In  1879,  however,  an  agreement  was  con- 


190  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

eluded  with  the  United  States  of  America,  the  latter  agreeing  to 
a  revised  treaty  by  which  Japan's  tariff  and  judicial  autonomy  was 
to  be  restored  and  her  coastwise  trade  reserved,  with  the  proviso, 
however,  that  the  revised  treaty  should  not  go  into  force  until  a 
similar  instrument  had  been  concluded  with  the  other  powers.  In 
1880  Inouye  Kaoru,  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  opened  nego- 
tiations with  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  European  powers  in 
Tokyo,  but  the  proposed  revision  having  been  improperly  disclosed 
to  the  public,  the  negotiations  were  suspended.  Renewed  shortly 
afterward,  they  were  brought  within  apparent  reach  of  conclusion 
in  1887,  after  long  and  weary  discussions.  But  in  the  meanwhile 
public  opinion  in  Japan  had  been  growing  more  and  more  impatient 
of  the  treatment  meted  out  to  the  empire  by  foreign  states,  and 
more  and  more  sensible  of  the  rights  appertaining  to  an  independent 
country.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rivalry  of  foreign  powers,  the 
diversity  of  their  interests,  and  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  them 
all  together,  had  involved  the  introduction  of  many  irksome  and 
humiliating  conditions  into  the  draft  of  the  revised  treaty,  and 
when  it  was  published  in  1887  it  provoked  opposition  that  caused 
its  abandonment,  Count  Inouye  retiring  from  office.  He  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Count  Okuma  Shigenobu,  who  reopened  the  negotia- 
tions, but  was  enabled,  owing  to  Japan's  improved  position  vis  a  vis 
the  outer  world,  to  insist  on  conducting  them  independently  with 
each  power,  thus  avoiding  the  insuperable  difficulty  of  simultane- 
ously placating  seventeen  states  all  influenced  by  more  or  less 
divergent  interests.  A  revised  treaty,  on  lines  more  favorable  to 
Japan  than  the  former  draft  had  been,  was  now  concluded  and 
signed  by  America  and  Germany.  But  no  sooner  were  it  provisions 
published  than  the  nation  again  became  excited,  especially  on 
account  of  an  article  providing  that  foreigners,  as  well  as  natives, 
should  be  appointed  to  the  Japanese  judiciary.  The  cabinet  decided 
to  again  suspend  the  negotiations,  and  a  fanatic  threw  a  bomb  at 
Count  Okuma  which  wounded  him  severely,  necessitating  the  am- 
putation of  his  right  leg.  Some  time  afterward  he  retired  from 
office,  together  with  the  minister  president,  Count  Kuroda,  and  in 
1889  Count  Yamagata  became  minister  president,  Viscount  Aoki 
taking  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs.  The  latter,  together  with 
Count  Goto,  minister  of  communications,  and  Count  Saigo 
Tsugumichi,  minister  of  home  affairs,  were  appointed  joint  pleni- 
potentiaries for  the  purposes  of  treaty  revision.    But  in  1891   Count 


FOREIGN     RELATIONS  191 

1868-1893 

Yamagata  and  Viscount  Aoki  retired,  the  latter  being  succeeded 
by  Viscount  Enomoto,  who,  in  1892,  gave  place  to  Mutsu 
Munemitsu.  It  was  under  the  foreign  ministry  of  the  latter  that, 
in  1894,  Great  Britain  took  the  lead  of  all  other  powers  to  con- 
clude a  revised  treaty  with  Japan,  which  went  into  effect  on  July 
17,  1899,  and  which  removed  the  consular  jurisdiction  from  the 
open  ports  of  Japan,  in  return  for  the  throwing  open  of  the  whole 
empire  to  the  travel  and  traffic  of  all  foreigners.  Coasting  trade  was 
also  recognized  as  properly  belonging  to  the  domain  where  Japan 
had  the  sovereign  right  of  making  regulations.  Tariff  autonomy 
was  largely  recovered,  and  new  import  duties  were  drawn  up, 
export  duties  being  entirely  abolished.  Japan  thus  became,  at 
length,  not  only  a  sovereign  state  free  to  look  after  its  own  internal 
and  external  affairs,  but  also  a  member  of  the  family  of  nations 
whose  legal  status  was  considered  on  the  basis  of  parity. 

Meanwhile,  the  intercourse  with  foreign  nations  had  grown 
more  and  more  intimate.  Many  princes,  nobles,  and  celebrities 
came  from  the  West  to  visit  Japan,  and  many  Japanese  statesmen 
and  students  traveled  or  sojourned  in  Europe  and  America.  No 
vestige  seemed  to  remain  of  the  old  sentiment  of  national  seclusion. 
It  may  be  interesting  to  say  a  word  here  about  some  of  the  dis- 
tinguished foreigners  who  visited  Japan  during  the  Meiji  era. 
Shortly  after  the  restoration,  the  duke  of  Edinburgh,  second  son 
of  the  queen  of  England,  came,  and  was  followed,  in  1872,  by 
Prince  Alexis  of  Russia,  who  was  received  by  the  emperor  and  was 
present  at  naval  and  military  reviews.  In  February,  1879,  the 
future  William  II.  of  Germany  came  to  Tokyo.  In  July  of  the  same 
year  General  Grant,  ex-president  of  the  United  States,  arrived, 
and  was  hospitably  entertained,  the  citizens  of  Tokyo  showing  their 
appreciation  of  America's  sympathetic  attitude  toward  Japan  by 
entertaining  him  at  an  evening  party,  as  well  as  at  a  garden-party 
in  Uyeno  Park,  at  which  the  emperor  was  present  and  various 
kinds  of  Japanese  sports  were  shown.  At  later  dates  Japan  was 
visited  by  the  nephew  of  King  Humbert  of  Italy,  the  czarevitch, 
afterward  Nicholas  II.  of  Russia,  King  Kalakaua  of  Hawaii,  a 
Grecian  prince,  and  other  distinguished  personages. 

Japan's  relations  with  Asiatic  countries  were  not  always  as 
cordial  as  those  with  European  and  American  states.  In  the  year 
1866,  owing  to  the  misconduct  of  Chinese  settlers,  it  became  nec- 
essary to  enact  special  regulations  for  their  control  and  to  restrict 


192  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

the  limits  of  their  residence  at  the  open  ports.  When  the  war 
between  the  emperor  and  the  shogun  broke  out  all  the  foreign 
powers  declared  and  maintained  neutrality  except  the  Chinese,  who 
secretly  sold  arms  to  the  Tokugawa.  Hence  their  access  to  non- 
treaty  ports  was  strictly  prohibited.  They  also  contrived  to  kid- 
nap and  sell  the  children  of  indigent  Japanese,  and  instructions  were 
consequently  issued  to  local  governments  to  guard  strictly  against 
this  outrage.  In  July,  1871,  however,  a  treaty  of  friendship  and 
amity  was  concluded  between  the  two  empires. 

In  the  winter  of  1872  some  inhabitants  of  the  Loochoo 
Islands  were  cast  away  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Formosa  and  mur- 
dered by  the  natives,  and  in  the  following  year  some  shipwrecked 
sailors  from  the  province  of  Bitchu  experienced  the  same  fate. 
Soyeshima  Taneomi  was  sent  by  the  government  as  plenipotentiary 
to  Peking  to  complain  of  these  outrages  against  Japanese  subjects, 
but  the  Chinese  government  made  no  satisfactory  reply  and  de- 
clined to  acknowledge  its  responsibility  for  the  acts  of  the  natives 
of  Formosa.  The  Japanese  government  was  thus  compelled  to  take 
into  his  own  hands  the  task  of  exacting  reparation.  In  April,  1874, 
Lieutenant  General  Saigo  Tsugumichi  was  appointed  to  the  com- 
mand of  a  punitory  expedition  to  Formosa.  No  serious  opposition 
was  encountered  except  at  the  hands  of  one  tribe,  which,  however, 
was  overcome  after  some  fighting.  On  the  eve  of  sending  this 
expedition,  Yanagiwara  Sakimitsu  was  dispatched  by  the  Japanese 
government  as  ambassador  to  China,  but  as  he  found  the  Chinese 
much  incensed  about  Japan's  action  and  very  anxious  that  her 
troops  should  at  once  leave  Formosa,  Okubo  Toshimichi,  a  leading 
member  of  the  cabinet,  was  dispatched  as  plenipotentiary  to  Peking. 
Meeting  only  with  procrastination  and  inconsistency  on  the  part 
of  the  Chinese,  he  broke  off  the  negotiations  and  announced  his 
intention  of  returning  to  Japan.  But  at  this  stage  the  British  min- 
ister in  Peking  mediated  between  the  two  empires,  and  the  Chinese 
finally  agreed  to  pay  100,000  taels  to  the  families  of  the  murdered 
Japanese  subjects  and  400,000  taels  indemnity  to  Japan  for  the  cost 
of  the  expedition,  undertaking  at  the  same  time  to  prevent  the 
recurrence  of  similar  outrages  in  Formosa. 

After  the  Formosan  trouble  another  complication  arose  be- 
tween Japan  and  China  with  regard  to  the  Islands  of  Loochoo. 
These  had  long  been  a  dependency  of  Japan.  In  the  middle  of  the 
twelfth  century    the  Minamoto  leader,  Tametomo,  driven  to  the 


FOREIGN     RELATIONS 


193 


1868-1893 

province  of  Izu,  made  his  way  thence  to  Loochoo,  and,  having 
quelled  a  civil  war  raging  in  the  islands,  placed  his  son  Shunten  on 
the  throne.  Afterward,  the  Ashikaga  shogun,  Yoshinori,  gave  the 
islands  to  the  Shimazu  family  as  an  adjunct  of  the  Satsuma  fief, 
but  from  the  time  of  Hideyoshi's  Korean  expedition,  Loochoo 
having  neglected  to  discharge  its  duties  as  a  dependency,  the  Sat- 
suma chief  sent  a  force  to  the  islands  in  1609,  took  the  king  pris- 


oner and  conveyed  him  to  Edo,  whence  he  was  soon  after  restored 
to  his  country.  Shimazu  then  sent  officials  to  superintend  the  affairs 
of  Loochoo,  and  from  that  time  forth  the  revenue  of  the  islands 
was  included  in  the  yearly  income  of  the  Shimazu  family.  In 
1873  Sho  Tai,  king  of  Loochoo,  came  to  Japan  and  was  formally 
invested  with  the  title  of  feudal  chief  of  Loochoo,  a  residence  in 
Tokyo  being  assigned  to  him  at  the  same  time.  Shortly  afterward  the 
name  of  the  year  period  and  the  Loochooan  calendar  were  changed 


194  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

for  those  in  use  in  Japan,  and  the  laws  of  the  empire  were  declared 
operative  in  Loochoo.  Finally,  in  April,  1879,  the  feudal  title  of 
the  ex-king  of  Loochoo  was  abolished  and  the  islands  were  turned 
into  the  prefecture  of  Okinawa.  The  Chinese  government  there- 
upon advanced  a  claim  that  Loochoo  had  once  been  a  tributary  of 
the  Middle  Kingdom,  and  that  it  therefore  belonged  not  less  to 
China  than  to  Japan.  The  weight  of  evidence  was  on  Japan's 
side,  however,  and  by  the  arbitration  of  General  Grant,  ex-president 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  who  happened  to  be  on  a  visit  to 
the  East  at  the  time,  the  question  was  settled  in  Japan's  favor. 

Turning  now  to  Korean  affairs,  it  has  already  been  related 
that  an  envoy  was  sent  from  Japan  at  the  time  of  the  restoration, 
but  that  Korea  refused  to  receive  him.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that 
Saigo  Takamori  proposed  that  he  himself  would  proceed  thither 
in  the  capacity  of  ambassador,  and  that  if  Korea  persisted  in  her 
unfriendly  attitude,  an  armed  force  should  be  sent  against  her. 
But,  as  has  been  related,  this  proposal  did  not  meet  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  cabinet.  In  1875  Japan  sent  another  envoy,  but 
again  Korea  declined  to  open  amicable  relations.  An  event  then 
occurred  which  nearly  involved  the  two  countries  in  war.  A 
Japanese  man-of-war,  en  route  for  China,  whither  she  was  carrying 
a  Japanese  plenipotentiary,  called  at  Chemulpo,  in  August,  1875,  to 
obtain  fuel  and  water,  but  her  boats  were  fired  on  by  the  Koreans  and 
two  of  her  men  were  wounded.  Incensed  at  this  outrage,  the  crew 
of  the  vessel  attacked  and  burned  the  Korean  fortress.  When 
the  matter  was  reported  in  Tokyo,  the  government  sent  Lieutenant 
General  Kuroda,  a  member  of  the  cabinet,  and  Inouye  Kaoru 
to  Korea,  in  the  capacity  of  ambassador  and  vice  ambassador,  re- 
spectively. This  mission  met  with  success.  Korea  sent  a  letter 
of  apology  to  Japan  and  declared  her  desire  to  contract  friendly 
relations.  Lieutenant  General  Kuroda  accordingly  concluded  a 
treaty  of  commerce  and  amity,  in  which  Korea's  independence  was 
recognized  by  Japan,  and  in  May,  1876,  Korea  sent  an  envoy  to 
Japan,  opened  the  ports  of  Gensan  and  Chemulpo,  and  agreed  that 
each  country  should  be  represented  at  the  court  of  the  other. 
Thenceforth  the  Korean  government  began  to  adopt  some  of  the 
appliances  of  Western  civilization.  She  improved  her  adminis- 
trative organization,  established  a  military  training  school  where 
Japanese  instructors  were  employed,  and  sent  youths  to  Japan  to 
be  educated.     These  innovations,  however,  proved  very  distaste- 


FOREIGN     RELATIONS  195 

1868-1893 

ful  to  many  conservatives  in  Korea,  especially  to  the  Taivvon-kun, 
father  of  the  king,  who  had  always  been  on  bad  terms  with  the 
Bin  family,  to  which  the  queen  belonged,  and  which  was  at  the  time 
favorable  to  reform.  Affairs  were  precipitated  by  discontent  among 
the  soldiery  with  reference  to  the  removal  of  a  minister,  and  being 
incited  by  the  Taiwon-kun,  the  troops  attacked  the  palace  in  July, 
1882,  and  killed  many  of  the  Bin  family,  as  well  as  several  Japanese 
military  officers.  The  same  night  the  Japanese  legation  was  at- 
tacked by  a  mob,  and  the  minister,  Hanabusa  Yoshimoto,  had 
to  force  his  way  through  the  city,  escorting  the  women  and  chil- 
dren of  the  legation,  and  push  on  through  the  darkness  to  Che- 
mulpo, where  he  escaped  by  boat,  and  being  picked  up  by  an 
English  man-of-war,  the  Flying  Fish,  returned  to  Nagasaki  on 
board  her.  He  was  speedily  sent  back  by  his  government  in  a 
vessel-of-war,  and  entering  Seul,  demanded  an  explanation  from 
Korea.  China,  meanwhile,  had  dispatched  a  squadron  to  the  scene, 
seized  the  Taiwon-kun,  and  carried  him  prisoner  to  Tientsin. 
Hanabusa  subsequently  concluded  with  Korea  a  convention  pro- 
viding for  the  punishment  of  the  malefactors,  the  payment  of  an 
indemnity  of  50,000  yen  to  the  sufferers  and  their  families,  and  of 
500,000  yen  to  the  Japanese  empire,  the  guarding  of  the  Japanese 
legation  by  Korean  troops,  and  the  dispatch  of  an  ambassador  to 
apologize  for  the  outrage.  (Japan  afterward  returned  to  Korea 
400,000  yen  of  this  indemnity.)  China  and  Japan  both  stationed 
bodies  of  men  in  the  Korean  capital,  and  Korea  divided  her  forces 
into  two  bodies,  one  of  which  was  trained  according  to  Japanese 
tactics,  the  other  according  to  Chinese.  There  were  then  two 
parties  in  the  peninsular  kingdom,  the  Independents  and  the  Con- 
servatives, between  whom  a  state  of  strained  relations  constantly 
existed.  In  December,  1884,  they  resorted  to  open  hostilities,  and 
the  king,  finding  himself  in  danger,  sent  an  autograph  letter  to 
the  Japanese  legation,  asking  for  help.  The  Japanese  charge 
d'affaires  thereupon  proceeded  to  the  palace  with  a  small  body  of 
men.  There  he  was  attacked  by  a  combined  force  of  Chinese  and 
Koreans.  During  the  fighting  the  king's  mother  was  seized  by 
the  Chinese  soldiers,  and  the  king  having  declared  his  intention 
of  placing  himself  in  the  hands  of  the  Chinese  in  order  to  be  with 
her,  the  Japanese  retired  to  their  legation,  which  was  afterward 
assaulted  by  a  Korean  mob  and  set  on  fire.  The  charge  d'affaires 
made  his  way  to  Chemulpo  and  once  more  Japan  was  obliged  to 


196  JAPAN 

1868-1893 

demand  reparation  from  Korea.  This  time  the  task  of  effecting 
an  arrangement  was  intrusted  to  Count  Inouye  Kaoru,  who,  pro- 
ceeding to  Korea  as  ambassador,  escorted  by  two  men-of-war, 
concluded  a  treaty  providing  that  Korea  should  send  an  envoy  to 
Japan  to  tender  apologies;  that  the  Koreans  who  had  injured 
Japanese  persons  and  property  should  be  duly  punished;  and  that 
an  indemnity  of  110,000  yen,  together  with  20,000  yen  for  the 
rebuilding  of  the  legation,  should  be  paid.  In  March  of  the  same 
year  Count  Ito  Hirobumi,  a  member  of  the  cabinet,  accompanied 
by  Lieutenant  General  Saigo,  proceeded  to  China,  and  concluded 
with  Viceroy  Li  at  Tientsin  a  convention  providing  that  China 
and  Japan  should  withdraw  their  troops  from  Korea;  that  neither 
power  should  thereafter  send  a  force  thither  without  giving  previ- 
ous notice  to  the  other,  and  that  the  Chinese  soldiers  who  had  taken 
part  in  the  attack  on  the  Japanese  in  Seul  should  be  punished. 
Thus  friendly  relations  were  reestablished  between  Japan  and  China. 


PART  IV 
CONSTITUTIONAL  JAPAN.    1893  1910 


Chapter    XVI 

THE  CONSTITUTION  IN  THEORY  AND  IN  PRACTICE 

i 893-1906 

THE  "  History  of  the  Empire  of  Japan  "  was  compiled  in 
1893,  and  it  is  needless  to  say  that  since  that  time  the 
empire  has  experienced  a  remarkable  development  in  all 
aspects  of  its  national  activity.  The  war  with  China  occurred  in 
1894-1895,  the  North  China  campaign  in  1900,  and  the  great  con- 
flict with  Russia  in  1904-1905.  Through  these  important  events  the 
Japanese  nation  has  undergone  an  immense  change  in  the  last 
dozen  years,  in  the  position  it  occupies  in  the  comity  of  nations,  as 
well  as  in  its  attitude  toward  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  industrial 
and  financial  life  of  the  people  has  also  made  a  change  hardly 
anticipated  in  1893.  Their  normal  national  budget,  aside  from  ex- 
traordinary war  expenditures,  has  grown  260  per  cent,  as  large 
as  it  then  was,  and  their  foreign  trade  in  commodities  alone  has 
increased  nearly  fourfold.  The  state  of  internal  politics  also  has 
taken  an  evolution  correspondingly  significant.  With  this  last  sub- 
ject we  shall  begin  our  brief  survey  of  Japan's  national  life  during 
the  thirteen  years  between  1893  and  1906. 

Before  entering  into  the  narrative  of  the  political  life  of  recent 
Japan,  it  would  be  well  to  acquire  a  fuller  view  of  the  formal,  or 
constitutional,  side  of  that  life.  The  reader  will  remember  that 
the  organization  of  the  two  political  parties,  the  JiyU-to  (1880) 
and  the  Kaishin-to  (1881),  or,  as  generally  translated,  the 
Liberals  and  the  Progressives,  preceded  the  promulgation  of  the 
Constitution,  which  occurred  in  1889.  The  latter  was  not  granted 
by  the  government  until  the  agitation  of  the  parties  for  its 
speedy  promulgation  had  run  to  a  considerable  height.  From 
this  fact,  however,  it  does  not  follow,  as  has  been  asserted  by 
some  writers,  that  the  Constitution  was  wrested  by  the  enlight- 
ened nation  from  the  hands  of  its  reluctant  ruler.  Such  a  view  is 
apt  to  be  easily  formed  by  the  superficial  observer,  but  hardly  ac- 
cords with  the  facts  that  stand  recorded  in  history.     The  agitation 

199 


200  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

of  the  parties  may,  to  some  extent,  have  caused  the  Constitution  to 
appear  at  the  particular  time  it  did,  but  it  is  evident  that  the 
enlightenment  had  dawned  earlier  among  the  authorities  than 
among  the  parties,  for  it  was  in  1867  that  the  famous  Five-Article 
Oath  was  pronounced  by  the  emperor,  the  first  two  articles  of 
which  read  as  follows :  "  Assemblies  and  councils  shall  be  widely 
established,  and  all  national  affairs  shall  be  decided  by  public  dis- 
cussion; the  government  and  the  people  shall  be  of  one  mind  and 
vigorously  prosecute  the  policy  of  the  nation."  If  these  words 
may  be  proven  not  to  imply  exactly  the  future  establishment  of  a 
regular  system  of  national  representation,  no  student  will  deny  that 
their  author  sincerely  entertained  the  desire  of  consulting  by  some 
effective  means  the  intelligent  section  of  the  nation  at  every  im- 
portant step  to  be  taken  in  the  government  of  the  country.  Only 
a  detailed  knowledge  of  the  modern  constitutional  form  of  govern- 
ment seems  to  have  been  lacking  for  the  above  desire  to  take  a 
definite  shape.  Such  knowledge  was,  however,  soon  acquired,  as 
we  are  told  by  Ito  himself,  when  the  Japanese  embassy,  of  which 
he  was  a  member,  visited  the  principal  constitutional  countries  of 
Europe  and  America,  and  saw  with  their  observant  eyes  and  were 
convinced  that  the  comparative  progress  of  these  nations  and  the 
relative  backwardness  of  their  own  were  in  a  large  measure  due 
to  the  presence  in  the  former  and  absence  in  the  latter  of  a  regular 
constitutional  machinery  of  government.  The  imperial  oath  pre- 
ceded by  at  least  ten  years,  and  the  journey  of  the  embassy  by  seven 
years,  the  inauguration  of  party  life  in  Japan.  Nor  should  it  be 
forgotten  that,  during  the  long  centuries  of  its  existence,  the 
imperial  house  of  Japan  had  seldom  proved  to  be  despotic,  and, 
when  its  real  authority  was  restored  in  1867  from  the  hands  of  the 
feudal  overlord,  the  movement  had  been  started,  not  by  a  powerful 
imperial  army,  which  did  not  exist,  but  by  the  combined  strength 
of  men  rising  from  all  ranks  of  the  nation  at  large.  While  it  is 
true  that  without  the  awakening  of  the  nation  the  Constitution 
would  never  have  seen  light,  it  was  more  truly  granted  by  the 
emperor  and  his  advisers  than  wrested  from  them. 

This  fact,  that  the  Constitution  was  granted  by  the  em- 
peror, may  be  said  to  be  the  keynote  of  that  remarkable  document. 
It  was  hardly  the  result  of  a  compromise  between  the  emperor  and 
the  nation.  Still  less  did  it  delegate  to  the  former  a  part  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  latter.    The  emperor,  in  the  Japanese  Constitu- 


THE     CONSTITUTION  201 

1893-1906 

tion,  assumes  full  sovereignty,  and  graciously  associates  with  him 
representatives  of  the  nation  in  the  government  of  the  country. 
The  people  are,  therefore,  not  givers,  but  receivers,  of  certain  rights, 
the  concession  of  which,  however,  does  not  diminish  the  sovereignty 
vested  in  the  emperor.  This  fundamental  notion  clearly  charac- 
terizes from  beginning  to  end  this  document  of  1889,  which, 
as  we  shall  see  later  on,  otherwise  contains  ambiguous  and  expan- 
sive passages  at  a  few  critical  points.  "  The  emperor  is  the  head 
of  the  empire,  combining  in  himself  the  rights  of  sovereignty,  and 
exercises  them  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  present  Constitu- 
tion." (Article  IV.)  Whence  does  he  derive  his  power?  He  is 
"sacred  and  inviolable"  (Article  III.),  as  he  is — says  Ito,  the 
framer  and  commentator  of  the  Constitution — Heaven-descended, 
divine,  and  sacred,  and,  though  he  indeed  has  to  pay  due  respect  to 
the  law,  the  law  has  no  power  to  hold  him  accountable  to  it.  "  The 
rights  of  sovereignty  of  the  state,"  says  the  emperor  himself  in 
the  Preamble  of  the  Constitution,  "  We  have  inherited  from  Our 
Ancestors,"  who,  according  to  tradition,  charged  their  descendants 
to  reign  over  and  govern  the  country  for  eternity.  Upon  this 
peculiar  Japanese  theory  of  the  divine  right  of  the  emperor  is  based 
the  noted  Article  I.  of  the  Constitution,  which  merely  states  in 
words  the  principle  which  has  been  upheld  in  history  and  is  uni- 
versally and  enthusiastically  supported  by  the  people,  that  "  the 
empire  of  Japan  shall  be  reigned  over  and  governed  by  a  line 
of  emperors  unbroken  for  ages  eternal."  From  his  sovereign 
powers  it  follows  that  the  emperor  sanctions  laws  and  orders  them 
to  be  promulgated  and  executed  (VI.),  convokes,  opens,  closes, 
and  prorogues  the  imperial  diet,  and  dissolves  the  house  of  rep- 
resentatives (VII.),  issues  imperial  ordinances  in  the  place  of  laws, 
in  case  of  emergency,  even  about  financial  matters,  and  also  ad- 
ministrative ordinances,  which  shall  not  alter  the  existing  laws 
(VIII.,  XXXI.,  and  IX.),  appoints  and  dismisses  civil  and  military 
officers  (X.),  has  the  supreme  command  of  the  army  and  navy, 
and  determines  the  organization  of  their  peace  standing  (XL,  XII.), 
declares  war,  makes  peace,  and  concludes  treaties  (XIII.),  con- 
fers titles  of  nobility,  rank,  orders,  and  other  marks  of  honor 
(XV.),  and  orders  amnesty,  pardon,  commutation  of  punishments 
and  rehabilitation  (XVI.),  and  no  amendment  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  shall  be  attempted  by  the  diet  except  by  imperial 
order  (LXXIIL). 


202  JAPAN 

,  1893-1906 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  enumeration  of  these  extensive 
prerogatives  by  no  means  indicates  a  limitation  to  the  rights  of  the 
emperor.  Whatever  rights  he  does  not  name  he  as  sovereign  may, 
in  theory,  exercise.  Yet  he  is  assisted  by  other  institutions,  the 
privy  council,  the  cabinet,  and  the  diet,  to  which  he  has  made  im- 
portant concessions.  While  the  emperor  controls  the  appointment, 
dismissal,  and  payment  of  officers  (X.),  determines  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  peace  standing  of  the  army  and  navy  (XII.),  and 
declares  war  and  makes  peace  (XIIL),  how  could  he  exercise  these 
powers  if  the  consent  of  the  diet,  which  is  required  for  the  ex- 
penditure and  revenue  of  the  state  (LXIV.),  were  withheld?  The 
diet  controls  not  only  the  purse,  but  also  legislation,  for  while  it 
is  stated  that  the  emperor  exercises  the  legislative  power  with  the 
consent  of  the  diet  (V.),  the  residuum  of  that  power  vested  in  him 
independently  of  the  diet  is  reduced  almost  to  nil  when  it  is  said, 
in  Article  XXXI.,  that  every  law  requires  the  consent  of  the  im- 
perial diet.  He  may,  indeed,  if  the  diet  is  not  sitting,  issue  imperial 
ordinances  for  emergency,  but  they  lose  their  legal  force  as  soon  as 
the  diet  disapproves  them  at  its  next  session  (VIII.).  As  against 
the  article  that  the  emperor  convokes,  opens,  closes,  and  prorogues 
the  diet,  and  dissolves  the  lower  house  (VII.),  stands  the  provi- 
sion that  the  diet  shall  be  convoked  annually  for  three  months 
(XLI.  and  XLII.).  Nor  is  the  emperor's  executive  power  un- 
limited, for  all  laws,  imperial  ordinances  and  imperial  rescripts, 
that  relate  to  the  affairs  of  the  state,  require  the  countersignature 
of  a  minister  of  state  (LV.).  The  share  of  the  emperor  is  least 
in  the  business  of  the  judiciary,  the  entire  judicature  being  exercised 
by  the  courts  of  law,  the  procedure  and  organization  of  which  are 
determined  by  law  (LVIL).  To  these  and  other  principles  of  the 
Constitution  the  emperor  pledges  himself  and  his  descendants,  in 
the  wielding  of  their  sovereign  rights,  always  to  conform  (Pre- 
amble). In  law,  the  full  sovereignty  is  vested  in  the  emperor  alone, 
and  yet,  also  in  law,  the  sovereignty  is  as  divided  as  in  the  subtle 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity  by  his  voluntary  association  with  the  other 
great  institutions  of  the  state. 

Behind  these  peculiar  principles  of  the  Japanese  sovereignty 
should  be  discerned  the  intense  loyalty  of  the  nation  to  the  reign- 
ing house,  which  during  the  last  few  decades  has  again  and  again 
startled  the  foreign  observers  who  had  not  comprehended  it.  It 
is  not  possible  for  us  here  to  discuss  how  this  sentiment  has  de- 


THE     CONSTITUTION  203 

1893-1906 

veloped,  and  how  the  emperor  has  proved  to  be  the  strongest  and 
the  only  permanent  political  institution  in  the  past  history  of 
Japan.  To-day  the  precise  position  which  he  occupies  in  the 
organism  of  the  Japanese  nation  may  perhaps  be  defined  as  that 
of  the  gracious  central  figure  of  the  social  life  and  the  inspiring 
personification  of  the  profound  unity  and  absorbing  ambition  of 
the  people.  It  is  not  difficult  to  fancy  that,  but  for  the  presence 
in  their  midst  of  this  commanding  institution  of  the  emperor,  the 
national  career  of  the  people  would  end  itself  abruptly  under  the 
pressure  of  the  excessive  competitions  abroad  and  untrained,  blun- 
dering struggles  at  home. 

The  new  constitutional  regime,  which  began  in  1890,  has  not 
been  without  a  few  interesting  incidents  illustrative  of  the  political 
functions  of  the  emperor  as  an  actual  organ  of  the  state.  One  of 
these  incidents  follows:  In  March,  1901,  the  house  of  peers  had 
unexpectedly  and  for  the  first  time  rejected  a  bill,  already  passed 
by  the  other  house,  for  increasing  the  rates  of  certain  taxes  in 
order  to  meet  necessary  expenditures  of  the  state.  All  efforts  of 
persuasion  and  mediation  miscarried,  and  the  house  of  peers  could 
not,  in  law,  be  dissolved.  The  deadlock  was  finally  removed  by 
the  appearance  of  an  imperial  word  intimating  that  the  urgent 
circumstances  of  the  nation  made  it  desirable  for  the  measures 
of  the  proposed  bill  to  receive  the  concurrence  of  the  peers,  who  now 
immediately  and  unanimously  passed  the  bill.  Thereupon  the  op- 
position in  the  lower  house  seized  the  opportunity  to  bring  forward 
a  resolution  censuring  the  cabinet  for  having  thus  necessitated  the 
pronouncement  of  the  imperial  word.  The  speeches  of  the  sup- 
porters of  the  resolution  seemed  to  imply  that  the  cabinet  should  be 
held  responsible  for  creating  a  situation  in  which  the  emperor  was 
obliged  to  resort  to  a  perhaps  transconstitutional  act  on  a  matter 
so  plainly  political,  and  thus  compromise  even  in  the  slightest 
degree  his  serene  dignity,  which  should  stand  unsullied  and  express 
itself  through  the  normal  constitutional  channels.  The  late  astute 
Hoshi,  then  the  house  leader  of  the  Liberals,  who  were  sup- 
porting the  cabinet,  quickly  seized  upon  the  carefully  guarded  im- 
plications of  the  opposition,  and  triumphantly  pointed  out  that  the 
real  issue  contained  in  the  resolution  was  the  question  whether 
the  imperial  word  was  proper  or  not.  He  proceeded  to  say  that  the 
Constitution  was  the  manifestation  of  a  part  of  the  full  imperial 
sovereignty,  the  exercise  of  which  should  therefore  not  be  ob- 


204  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

structed  by  the  Constitution,  and  that  the  imperial  word  had  issued 
from  the  emperor  through  his  special  sovereign  rights,  and  was 
proper  and  legal.  No  exposure  of  the  opponents'  logic  could  be 
more  ruthless,  nor  a  bolder  enunciation  of  the  emperor's  "  special 
sovereign  rights  "  could  be  imagined,  than  the  trenchant  argument 
of  Hoshi.  It  would  seem  that  in  this  debate  both  parties  conceded 
that  the  imperial  act  was  transconstitutional.  Seen  in  this  light,  the 
statement  made  in  this  connection  by  Premier  Ito  to  the  president 
of  the  upper  house  is  highly  significant.  Although  the  recent  im- 
perial word,  said  he,  should  not  be  regarded  as  an  imperial 
rescript,  as  it  bore  no  countersignatures  of  the  ministers  of 
state,  it  had  been  issued  after  a  personal  conference  between  the 
emperor  and  the  premier.  The  latter  was,  Marquis  Ito  went  on 
to  declare,  responsible  for  the  act  of  the  emperor,  for,  constitution- 
ally, the  premier  is  held  responsible  for  all  the  political  conduct  of 
the  sovereign.  Coming  from  the  very  framer  and  commentator 
of  the  Constitution,  these  words  may  be  construed  as  establishing 
an  important  precedent.  The  emperor  is  happily  relieved  of  the 
responsibility  for  his  political  conduct,  but  may  he,  under  extraor- 
dinary necessity,  resort  to  a  transconstitutional  measure  at  will,  or, 
in  other  words,  may  the  premier  request  the  emperor  to  employ  such 
a  measure  by  the  simple  assumption  by  the  former  of  the  respon- 
sibility therefor?  The  marquis  appears  to  answer  the  question  in 
the  affirmative.  The  future  political  development  of  this  point 
will  be  a  matter  of  great  interest. 

The  fundamental  conception  of  the  Constitution  being  such 
as  we  have  described,  it  would  appear  as  if  the  political  life  of  Japan 
must  in  a  large  measure  depend  upon  the  personal  views  and  in- 
clinations of  the  emperor,  to  say  nothing  of  those  of  his  ministers. 
Such  a  conception,  however,  ignores  two  considerations  of  utmost 
importance,  namely,  that  under  the  new  regime  are  being  created 
regular  channels  through  which  the  life  of  the  state  will  more  and 
more  habitually  run,  and  that  the  tradition,  whose  force  has  ac- 
cumulated through  the  long  history  of  Japan  since  her  foundation 
as  a  state,  is  the  spirit  of  conciliation  on  the  part  of  the  subject 
and  the  habit  of  assuming  political  impersonality  on  the  part  of  the 
supreme  ruler.  Individual  idiosyncrasies  of  the  sovereign  will  prob- 
ably prove  to  be  the  least  important  factor  of  the  future  political 
life  of  the  Japanese  nation. 

Now,  passing  on  to  the  imperial  diet,   it  is  observed  that 


THE     CONSTITUTION  205 

1893-1908 

the  theoretical  view  of  its  legislative  capacity  is  that  with  its  con- 
sent the  emperor  exercises  his  legislative  power  (V.),  or,  in  the 
words  of  the  commentator,  that  the  diet  "  takes  part  in  legislation, 
but  has  no  share  in  the  sovereign  power ;  it  has  power  to  deliberate 
upon  laws,  but  none  to  determine  them."  This  theoretical  defini- 
tion, however,  should  not  be  taken  as  a  practical  limitation  im- 
posed upon  the  legislative  power  of  the  diet,  for,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, every  law  of  the  state  must  have  its  consent  (XXXIII. ),  and 
it  may  disapprove  imperial  ordinances  issued  while  it  was  not  in 
session  (VIII.).  Over  and  above  its  legislative  faculty,  also,  the 
diet  enjoys  four  important  rights:  the  right  to  receive  petitions  di- 
rectly from  the  people,  the  right  to  put  questions  to  the  govern- 
ment and  demand  explanations,  the  right  to  address  the  throne  over 
the  heads  of  the  cabinet  ministers,  and,  the  most  effective  of  all, 
the  right  to  control  the  management  of  the  finances.  It  is  needless 
to  say  that  the  practical  issue  of  conflict  must  always  lie,  not  be- 
tween the  diet  and  the  emperor,  but  between  the  diet  and  the 
government. 

The  diet  consists  of  two  houses,  namely,  of  the  peers  and  of 
the  representatives.  The  importance  of  the  bicameral  system  is 
strongly  insisted  upon  by  the  commentator  of  the  Constitution.  The 
house  of  peers  is  composed  of  the  members  of  the  imperial  family 
and  princes  and  marquises,  who  sit  of  their  own  right;  counts, 
viscounts,  and  barons,  who  have  been  elected  by  their  respective 
peers;  persons  who  have  been  specially  nominated  by  the  emperor 
on  account  of  the  meritorious  services  they  have  rendered  to  the 
state  or  on  account  of  their  erudition ;  and,  finally,  wealthy  persons 
who  have  been  elected,  one  member  for  each  city  or  prefecture,  by 
the  people  of  their  own  class.  All  hold  their  seats  for  life,  except 
the  elected  members,  whose  term  is  seven  years. 

It  would  seem  that  this  upper  house  was  created  to  serve  as 
a  powerful  shield  of  the  government.  It  contains  men  of  wisdom 
and  weight,  and  is  comparatively  free  from  party  affiliations.  While 
no  financial  bill  can  originate  there,  the  house  is  above  the  fear  of 
dissolution,  and  its  actions  may  be  characterized  by  a  greater  con- 
tinuity of  policy  than  those  of  the  other  house.  "  If  the  house  of 
peers  fulfills  its  functions,"  writes  Marquis  Ito  in  his  "  Commen- 
taries," "  it  will  serve  in  a  remarkable  degree  to  preserve  an 
equilibrium  between  political  powers,  to  restrain  the  undue  influ- 
ence of  political  parties,  to  check  the  evil  tendencies  of  irresponsible 


206  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

discussions,  to  secure  the  stability  of  the  Constitution,  to  be  an 
instrument  for  maintaining  harmony  between  the  governing  and 
the  governed,  and  to  permanently  sustain  the  prosperity  of  the 
country  and  the  happiness  of  the  people."  It  was  an  irony  of  fate 
that  a  dozen  years  after  these  words  were  written  their  author, 
at  that  time  the  premier,  should  find  in  this  very  organ  the 
most  stubborn  opposition  to  his  measures  that  any  constitutional 
cabinet  of  Japan  has  ever  experienced.  The  anomaly  of  the  situa- 
tion consisted  in  the  fact  that  these  measures  had  already  been 
passed  through  the  lower  house,  so  that  the  traditionally  pro-gov- 
ernment peers  were  now  found  opposed  to  the  combined  front  of 
the  cabinet  and  the  representatives.  Nothing  of  the  sort  could  have 
been  imagined  by  the  marquis  when  he  first  framed  the  great  docu- 
ment which  brought  the  house  of  peers  into  existence.  How  the 
deadlock  thus  caused  was  removed  by  a  resort  to  another  anomaly 
has  already  been  described.  As  to  the  reasons  for  the  unexpect- 
edly determined  opposition  of  the  peers,  they  will  be  told  in  the  next 
chapter. 

The  house  of  representatives  is  made  up  of  persons  elected  for 
the  term  of  four  years  from  the  electoral  districts  in  accordance  with 
the  law  of  election,  which  was  originally  promulgated  simultane- 
ously with  the  Constitution  in  1889  and  was  revised  in  1900.  The 
revised  law  provided  that  the  electoral  district  should  be  coextensive 
with  the  administrative  division,  city,  or  prefecture,  and  defined  the 
number  of  members  to  be  elected  from  each  district.  Under  the 
earlier  arrangement  the  city  or  prefecture  had  been  divided  into 
smaller  districts,  each  of  which  returned  one,  sometimes  two,  mem- 
bers. The  new  larger  districts  were  calculated  to  do  away  with 
some  of  the  evils  of  sectionalism  which  had  previously  been  un- 
avoidable. The  revised  law  also  separated  a  certain  number  of  cities 
from  rural  districts,  to  which  some  of  the  former  had  hitherto 
been  connected  to  form  single  districts,  the  change  signifying  the 
intention  of  the  law  to  give  the  urban  population  a  freer  voice  in 
the  house  than  was  possible  under  the  old  system.  The  aggre- 
gate number  of  the  representatives  was  also  materially  increased 
from  300  to  369,  the  cities  claiming  61  members,  instead  of  less 
than  twenty,  as  heretofore.  Another  important  feature  of  the  law 
was  the  voting  by  ballot  and  the  provision  that  each  elector  should 
vote  for  only  one  candidate,  irrespective  of  the  number  of  members 
returnable  from  the  same  district.     The  obvious  intention  was  to 


THE     CONSTITUTION  207 

1893-1906 

protect  the  rights  of  the  elector  from  the  abuses  of  the  political 
party,  whose  orderly  and  organized  action  was  also  indirectly 
encouraged  by  this  measure,  and  to  give  a  chance  to  the  minorities 
to  be  represented.  Again,  while  the  property  qualifications  of  the 
voter  and  the  candidate  had  been  measured  by  the  payment  of 
direct  taxes  of  not  less  than  ten  yen  by  the  former  and  fifteen  yen 
by  the  latter,  the  amount  was  now  reduced  to  ten  yen  for  the 
elector  and  altogether  removed  from  the  eligible  person.  The 
numbers  of  the  electors  in  the  country  accordingly  rose  from  some 
460,000  to  about  800,000.  It  is  curious  to  note  that  the  original 
bill  of  the  revised  election  law  introduced  by  the  government  was 
considerably  more  liberal  than  the  amended  and  finally  passed 
articles  of  the  lower  house.  Thus  it  would  appear  that  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people  showed  themselves  reluctant  to  accept  the 
premium  offered  by  the  government  whose  conservatism  they  had 
been  wont  to  attack,  but  the  real  situation  will  be  understood  only 
when  we  come  to  study  in  the  next  section  the  political  maneuvers 
of  the  period.  We  may  simply  note  here  in  passing  that  800,000 
electors  among  the  population  of  more  than  46,000,000  cannot  be 
considered  adequate,  even  when  allowance  is  made  for  the  still 
comparatively  untrained  political  condition  of  the  people.  Al- 
though an  agitation  for  an  enlarged  electorate  has  not  yet  assumed 
a  definite  form,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  progress  will  be 
made  in  this  respect  in  a  not  distant  future. 

The  house  elects  its  president  and  vice  president,  and  submits 
to  the  imperial  decision  the  names  of  the  three  candidates  for  each 
position  who  have  received  the  highest  votes  for  it,  of  whom  the 
sovereign  invariably  selects  the  first.  The  members  then  divide 
themselves  into  committees,  each  with  an  elected  chairman,  which 
transact  the  more  important  part  of  the  business  of  the  house  before 
it  reaches  the  general  session.  The  seats  are  decided  by  lot  and 
without  regard  to  the  division  of  parties.  Disorderly  scenes  on  the 
floor  are  said  to  be  as  rare  as  specimens  of  grand  oratory.  Thrilling 
incidents  are  not,  however,  wanting,  particularly  when  an  important 
interpellation  of  the  government  or  an  address  to  the  throne  is 
under  discussion,  or  on  any  occasion  when  the  concerted  move  of 
a  large  party  is  directed  by  its  leaders  against  the  government,  or 
against  another  party.  The  sentiment  of  the  house  rises  to  its 
height  when,  as  in  October,  1894,  and  on  March  25,  1904,  the 
partisan  spirit  is  for  the  moment  sunk,  opposition  to  the  govern- 


208  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

nient  is  laid  aside,  and  the  members,  unanimously  and  enthusias- 
tically, voice  the  urgent  wishes  of  the  entire  nation,  the  latter  itself 
being  eminently  capable  at  critical  times  of  standing  like  one  man. 
The  gallery  is  on  such  occasions  thronged  by  interested  spectators, 
and  the  debate  and  its  report  arrest  the  attention  of  the  whole 
country. 

Most  of  the  officers  of  state,  including  cabinet  members,  are 
eligible  for  seats  in  the  lower  house,  but  the  ministers  seldom  ap- 
pear as  candidates,  and,  in  one  solitary  case,  when  one  of  them 
was  elected  representative,  he  nearly  always  absented  himself  from 
the  house.  The  cabinet  members  may,  however,  voluntarily  or 
on  request  make  their  appearance  to  present  the  views  of  the  ad- 
ministration on  questions  under  deliberation,  and  on  such  occasions 
they  occupy  seats  assigned  for  government  officials.  The  presence, 
in  this  manner,  of  the  various  ministers,  as  well  as  premier,  is 
usually  a  sign  of  an  important,  or  perhaps  exciting,  session. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  the  representatives  are  not  in  theory 
regarded  as  delegates  from  their  constituencies,  and  the  local  in- 
terests have  not  been  found  particularly  engrossing.  As  to  the 
practical  position  which  the  house  occupies  in  the  national  life  of  the 
people — that  is,  as  to  the  questions :  What  are  the  preponderant  in- 
terests represented  therein,  and  in  what  way;  what  have  been  the 
watchwords  of  the  opposition,  and  how  are  the  party  lines  drawn; 
how  much  has  the  existence  of  the  house  helped  or  hindered  the 
progress  of  the  nation  during  the  past  decade;  what  have  been 
the  effects  of  the  continual  struggle  between  the  house  and  the 
government  on  the  tactics  and  discipline  of  each,  and  which  has 
shown  the  higher  ability  and  greater  continuity  of  purpose;  and 
what  have  been  the  mutual  effects  of  the  action  of  the  house  and  the 
more  important  domestic  and  foreign  problems  of  the  empire — these 
queries  may  be  only  imperfectly  answered  after  the  actual  political 
history  since  the  promulgation  of  the  Constitution  is  thoroughly 
mastered.  The  more  direct  and  practical  question  concerns  the  re- 
lation between  the  house  or  the  diet  in  general  and  the  cabinet. 
Is  the  latter  responsible  to  the  former  for  its  political  conduct? 

Perhaps  nothing  in  the  fundamental  law  of  Japan  can  be 
of  greater  interest  and  importance  than  the  question  just  stated,  all 
the  more  so  because  the  text  of  the  Constitution  and  Marquis  Ito's 
"  Commentaries "  on  it,  as  well  as  his  public  utterances,  seem, 
when  closely  examined,  significantly  to  leave  much  room  for  future 


THE     CONSTITUTION  209 

1893-1906 

development.  Nor  are  the  eight  changes  of  the  cabinet  which  have 
taken  place  since  the  birth  of  the  diet  all  of  a  character  to  decide 
this  momentous  question.  "  The  respective  ministers  of  state," 
says  Article  LV.  of  the  Constitution,  "  shall  give  their  advice  to 
the  emperor,  and  be  responsible  for  it."  What  the  last  clause  sig- 
nifies is  by  no  means  made  perfectly  clear  by  the  commentator,  who 
says :  "  He  alone  can  dismiss  a  minister,  who  has  appointed 
him.  .  .  .  The  appointment  and  dismissal  of  them  [*.  e.,  the  minis- 
ters] having  been  included  by  the  Constitution  in  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  emperor,  it  is  only  a  legitimate  consequence  that  the 
power  of  deciding  as  to  the  responsibility  of  ministers  is  withheld 
from  the  diet.  But  the  diet  may  put  questions  to  the  ministers  and 
demand  open  answers  from  them  before  the  public,  and  it  may  also 
present  addresses  to  the  sovereign  setting  forth  its  opinions.  More- 
over, although  the  emperor  reserves  to  himself  in  the  Constitution 
the  right  of  appointing  his  ministers  at  his  pleasure,  in  making  an 
appointment,  the  susceptibilities  of  the  public  mind  must  also  be 
taken  into  consideration.  This  may  be  regarded  as  an  indirect 
method  of  controlling  the  responsibility  of  ministers.  Thus,  in  the 
Constitution  the  following  conclusions  have  been  arrived  at : 

"  First,  that  the  ministers  of  state  are  charged  with  the  duty  of 
giving  advice  to  the  emperor,  which  is  their  proper  function,  and 
that  they  are  not  held  responsible  on  his  behalf;  second,  that 
ministers  are  directly  responsible  to  the  emperor  and  indirectly  to 
the  people;  third,  that  it  is  the  sovereign  and  not  the  people 
that  can  decide  as  to  the  responsibility  of  ministers,  because  the 
sovereign  possesses  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  the  state;  fourth, 
that  the  responsibility  of  ministers  is  a  political  one  and  has  no 
relation  to  criminal  or  civil  responsibility,  nor  can  it  conflict  there- 
with, neither  can  the  one  affect  the  other.  Save  that  all  criminal 
or  civil  cases  must  be  brought  before  the  ordinary  courts  of  law, 
and  that  suits  arising  out  of  administrative  matters  must  be  brought 
before  a  court  of  administrative  litigation,  the  cases  of  political 
responsibility  are  left  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  sovereign  as  dis- 
ciplinary measures."  The  marquis  further  emphatically  repudiates 
the  theory  of  joint  responsibility  of  the  cabinet  as  a  state  of  things 
that  can  never  be  approved  of  according  to  the  Japanese  Consti- 
tution. The  argument  here  again  is  that  the  ministers  are  indi- 
vidually appointed  by  the  sovereign,  to  whom  they  are  individually 
responsible  for  the  business  of  their  respective  departments,  and 


210  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

that  for  the  same  reason  the  minister  president,  or  premier,  cannot 
have  control  over  the  post  of  each  minister,  nor  shall  the  latter  be 
dependent  upon  the  former.  The  reader  will  readily  see  that  the 
whole  line  of  Ito's  argument  is  consistent  with  the  fundamental 
theory  of  the  Japanese  body  politic,  that  is,  the  full  sovereignty 
of  the  emperor.  No  one  can,  however,  fail  to  perceive  between 
the  lines  here  quoted  a  great  latitude  for  the  future  growth  of 
another  theory  whose  gradual  expansion  might,  imperceptibly,  per- 
haps, but  none  the  less  steadily,  reduce  the  political  responsibility 
of  the  minister  to  the  throne  to  the  position  of  a  mere  legal  fiction. 
As  has  already  been  intimated,  the  past  changes  of  the  cabinet  have 
not  always  been  directly  occasioned  by  the  opposition  of  the  diet, 
nor  has  the  majority  of  the  opposition  in  the  lower  house  newly 
elected  after  its  dissolution  always  forced  the  ministers  from  their 
chairs.  As  will  be  seen  in  the  next  chapter,  the  second  Yamagata 
cabinet  (1898- 1900)  resigned  despite  its  commanding  a  majority 
in  the  diet,  and  was  succeeded  by  the  fourth  ltd  cabinet  (1900- 
1901),  which  also  retired  for  reasons  quite  independent  of  the  con- 
ditions of  the  legislative  chambers,  where  it  had  the  following  of 
an  absolute  majority  of  the  representatives.  On  the  other  hand, 
nearly  all  of  the  eight  changes  of  the  cabinet  have  been  caused  by 
difficulties  more  or  less  financial  in  nature,  and  these  are,  it  will  be 
remembered,  under  the  effective  control  of  the  lower  house,  so  that 
the  "  indirect "  responsibility  of  the  cabinet  to  the  diet  already  bids 
fair  to  become  more  logical  and  perhaps  less  indirect.  Moreover, 
the  sovereign  has  never  appointed  individual  ministers  of  state  at 
his  pleasure,  but  at  the  resignation  of  a  cabinet  he  invariably  sum- 
mons the  statesman  whose  succession  to  the  premiership  is  the  most 
logical,  though  not  always  desired  by  the  latter  himself,  arid  leaves 
to  him  the  task  of  forming  a  new  cabinet.  It  would  not  be  too 
much  to  suppose  that  if  in  the  future  a  cabinet  was  compelled  to 
resign  under  the  powerful  and  reasonable  opposition  of  a  great  popu- 
lar party  in  the  lower  house,  the  leader  of  the  party  would  receive 
the  imperial  mandate  to  form  a  new  cabinet.  We  feel  almost  safe  in 
predicting  that  with  the  growth  of  an  adequate  party  system,  which 
in  Japan  is  still  in  its  formative  stage,  the  ministerial  responsibility 
to  the  diet  will  have  become  an  established  usage. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Marquis  Ito  himself  remarked,  in 
his  address,  in  February,  1899,  to  the  delegates  from  the  cities,  that 
the  English  cabinet  and  party  system  must  be  more  or  less  adopted 


THE     CONSTITUTION  211 

1893-1906 

in  Japan  if  a  harmonious  cooperation  were  to  be  secured  between 
the  cabinet  and  the  diet,  and  that  the  practice  of  government  by 
party  would  in  no  way  impair  the  authority  of  the  throne.  The 
same  statesman  had  an  occasion  two  years  later  to  declare  in 
the  lower  house,  when  an  already  mentioned  resolution  censuring  the 
cabinet  for  having  caused  an  imperial  word  to  be  pronounced  was 
under  discussion,  that  the  passage  of  a  resolution  would  not  shake 
his  position  as  premier,  which  he  owed  to  the  confidence  of  his 
majesty.  "  If  the  aim  of  the  resolution  is  my  resignation,"  ex- 
claimed he,  "  why  do  you  not  propose  an  address  to  the  throne, 
instead  of  a  resolution  ?  "  These  statements  made  by  the  same 
framer  of  the  Constitution  at  two  different  occasions  may  not  be 
interpreted  as  necessarily  contradictory  to  one  another,  for,  if  in 
1 90 1,  an  address  had  been  made  to  the  throne,  and  if  the  throne 
had  seemed  still  to  uphold  the  premier  in  spite  of  the  diet,  it  is  not 
impossible  to  imagine  that  Ito  would  have  quietly  resigned.  Weigh- 
ing his  statements  side  by  side,  might  it  not  be  surmised  that  in 
the  mind  of  the  veteran, statesman  the  responsibility  of  the  cabinet 
to  the  people  must  be  commensurate  with  the  political  training  of 
the  latter,  especially  in  the  form  of  a  well-organized  and  trained 
party  system  ?  At  any  rate,  it  would  seem  inevitable  that  the  actual 
state  of  things  under  the  present  regime  should  move  in  that  di- 
rection. As  to  the  state  of  party  politics  in  Japan,  to  whose  develop- 
ment the  marquis  himself  has  made  a  notable  contribution,  we  shall 
discuss  it  at  length  in  the  following  chapter. 

Finally,  a  reference  should  be  made  to  the  privy  council, 
whose  members,  twenty-five  more  or  less  in  number,  are  appointed 
by  the  emperor,  in  order  to  deliberate  upon  important  matters  of 
state.  The  ministers  are  ex  officio  privy  councilors,  but  the  cabinet 
is  an  administrative  body,  while  the  privy  council  is  a  deliberative 
one.  To  the  latter  is  assigned  the  "  task  of  planning  far-sighted 
schemes  of  statecraft  and  of  effectuating  new  enactments,  by  lei- 
surely meditation  and  calm  reflection,  by  thorough  investigation 
into  ancient  and  modern  history,  and  by  consulting  scientific  prin- 
ciples "  according  to  Ito's  "  Commentaries."  The  councilors,  there- 
fore, must  be  men  above  party  and  of  wide  experience  and 
knowledge,  and  so  conservative  and  impartial  as  to  be  "  the  palla- 
dium of  the  Constitution  and  the  law."  Its  opinions  are  not  given 
publicity,  but  when  they  are  embodied  in  an  imperial  ordinance,  the 
latter  states  the  fact  in  its  preamble.     The  emperor  in  theory  may 


212  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

accept  or  reject  at  will  the  recommendations  of  the  council,  but  in 
practice  has  in  no  case  overridden  them,  nor  even  shown  his  per- 
sonal preferences. 

Those  who  are  at  all  familiar  with  the  political  conditions  of 
Japan  cannot  fail  to  see  through  this  institution  of  the  privy  council 
a  group  of  men  who  have  in  a  large  measure  molded  the  destiny  of 
new  Japan.  They  are  collectively  termed  Genro,  or  Elder  States- 
men, and  include  those  who  were  prominent  about  the  time  of  the 
revolution  of  1868,  and  also  those  who  have  since  rendered  eminent 
services  to  the  state.  At  one  time  they  numbered  among  them 
the  great  Katsu,  the  most  heroic  and  dramatic  figure  of  the 
revolution  and  the  most  sage-like  statesman  of  modern  Japan. 
Marquis  Ito  now  stands  head  and  shoulders  above  the  rest  of  the 
veteran  statesmen,  and  beside  him  are  found  Field  Marshal  Yama- 
gata,  Count  Matsukata,  and  others  of  equal  note.  It  is  highly  sig- 
nificant that  the  Constitution  has  created  an  institution  by  means 
of  which  those  very  men  whose  wisdom  and  energy  have  tended 
to  make  Japan  what  she  is  were  attracted  together  around  the  per- 
son of  the  emperor.  The  ship  of  the  state  is  piloted  by  their  far- 
sighted  loyalty  and  patriotism,  and  the  influence  these  statesmen 
exercise  over  the  fundamental  policy  of  the  empire  cannot  easily 
be  overestimated.  The  latest  example  of  this  influence  was  the  ad- 
vice of  the  council  to  the  throne  to  instruct  the  peace  envoys  at 
Portsmouth  to  make  large  concessions  in  order  successfully  to  con- 
clude a  treaty  with  Russia.  These  concessions,  which  made  the 
restoration  of  peace  possible,  were  radically  opposed  to  the  wishes 
of  the  majority  of  the  people,  but  were  boldly  counseled  by  the 
Elder  Statesmen  regardless  of  personal  consequences  upon  them- 
selves. Neither  the  diet  nor  the  political  parties  could,  however, 
effectively  assail  the  position  of  the  council  as  such,  for  it  was  no 
executive  institution,  but  a  purely  deliberative  organ  closely  in 
touch  with  the  throne.  When  the  treaty  was  signed  by  the  envoys, 
the  council  approved  it  and  the  emperor  ratified  it,  despite  a  great 
popular  demonstation  for  its  rejection. 


Chapter  XVII 

PARTIES  AND  POLITICS.     1893-19061 

HAVING  examined  the  salient  features  of  the  machinery 
of  the  new  regime,  we  are  now  prepared  to  follow  the 
history  of  the  men  and  parties  that  have  operated  the 
machinery,  and  of  the  issues  which  have  in  turn  guided  the  action 
of  these  political  agents.  Law  and  constitution  are  products  of  his- 
tory and  legislation,  but  men  and  parties,  as  also  issues  at  stake, 
are  the  handiwork  of  mightier  powers  which  can  hardly  be  reduced 
into  syllogisms  or  molded  by  mere  force  of  traditions  and  prece- 
dents. Of  all  the  political  factors  of  a  nation,  the  progress  of  the 
party  and  the  individuality  of  the  man  seem  the  least  subject  to 
human  artifice  and  control,  while  the  problems,  which  must  largely 
decide  the  course  of  action  of  the  different  political  forces  at  work, 
appear  continually  to  baffle  one's  imagination  and  forecast.  It  must 
then  be  a  matter  of  great  interest  to  observe  the  conduct  of  the  most 
prominent  politicians  in  the  field  and  their  eventful  relations  to  the 
changing  parties,  and  the  history  of  the  issues,  domestic  and  for- 
eign, which  have  sometimes  astounded  the  actors  on  the  scene  by 
their  unexpected  emergence  and  sometimes  wearied  them  by  their 
persistent  and  unwelcome  reappearance.  What  follows  is  a  mere 
sketch  of  a  period  of  the  most  bewildering  political  vicissitudes 
that  have  ever  visited  a  nation  in  a  decade. 

The  period  between  1890  and  1904  might  be  divided  into  three 
epochs.  Down  to  1894,  when  the  war  with  China  broke  out,  the 
relation  between  the  government  and  the  parties  in  the  lower  house 
was  in  the  main  one  of  simple  difference  of  political  theories.  With 
the  war  the  nation  entered,  externally,  into  the  arena  of  world- 
politics,  while,  in  the  diet,  there  dawned  an  era  of  varied  coalitions 
among  the  parties  and  also  between  them  and  the  government.  De- 
sire for  power  seemed  to  begin  to  affect  the  minds  of  the  politicians 
whose  aspirations  had  heretofore  been  comparatively  more  ideal- 

1  The  editor  has  been  greatly  helped  in  preparing  this  chapter  by  I.  Tokti- 
tomi's  admirable  pamphlet  on  the  recent  political  life  of  Japan. 

213 


214  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

istic.  A  grand  party  was  finally  created  by  the  combined  influence 
of  Marquis  Ito,  on  the  one  hand,  who  apparently  aimed  at  organiz- 
ing a  model  constitutional  party,  and,  on  the  other,  of  an  enormous 
number  of  men  the  motives  of  some  of  whom  were  anything  but  a 
copy  of  those  of  their  leader.  When  the  whips  of  this  new  party, 
which  controlled  a  majority  in  the  diet,  began  to  manifest  unwill- 
ingness to  accept  the  discipline  and  to  override  the  wishes  of  its 
founder  and  leader,  Marquis  Ito,  the  politics  of  new  Japan  entered 
its  third  stage,  in  which  the  controlling  factors  are  found  to  be 
even  more  personal  and  partisan  and  a  matter  of  interests  and 
feeling,  than  even  in  the  second  period.  As  soon  as  the  nation  en- 
tered upon  the  war  with  Russia,  however,  the  political  atmosphere  at 
once  changed:  the  party  lines  and  the  traditional  differences  be- 
tween the  diet  and  the  government  were  temporarily  obliterated, 
and  the  nation — the  cabinet,  the  two  houses,  and  the  people — seemed 
to  think  and  feel  as  one  mind.  The  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of 
peace  with  Russia,  the  terms  of  which  displeased  many  Japanese, 
has  suddenly  terminated  this  union  and  alienated  the  cabinet  and 
the  privy  council  from  some  people,  while  the  dividing  lines  be- 
tween the  various  parties  are  being  again  drawn  on  .changed  issues. 
When  this  critical  stage  passes  away,  the  political  life  of  consti- 
tutional Japan  must  inevitably  enter  its  fourth  epoch,  but  what  its 
nature  will  be  remains  to  be  seen.  At  this  moment  the  future  prog- 
ress of  the  party  life  of  the  Japanese  nation  appears  to  be  as  difficult 
to  forecast  as  it  was  in  1890,  when  the  first  diet  was  convened. 

The  first  period,  then,  opens  with  the  existence  of  two  popu- 
lar parties,  the  Literals  and  Progressives,  led,  respectively,  by 
Count  Itagaki  and  Count  Okuma.  The  members  of  the  parties 
who  sat  in  the  first  lower  house  represented  an  overwhelmingly 
preponderant  interest  of  the  landowning  class  of  the  country,  so 
that  a  revision  of  land  values  and  consequently  a  reduction  of  the 
land  tax  were  among  their  rallying  cries.  At  the  same  time  they 
aimed  at  overthrowing  the  existing  cabinet,  which  they  consid- 
ered under  the  exclusive  control  of  men  of  certain  provinces  of 
the  south,  principally  Satsuma  and  Nagato  (Choshu),  which  had 
once  been  instrumental  in  upsetting  the  feudal  regime  and  restoring 
the  imperial  government.  It  is  remarkable  that  the  party  men 
almost  identified  the  future  downfall  of  sectionalism,  as  they 
deemed  the  foundation  of  the  administration  to  be,  with  the  cause 
of  the  establishment  of  a  responsible  cabinet,  or  a  cabinet  responsi- 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  215 

1893-1906 

ble  to  the  throne  as  well  as  to  the  diet.  Needless  to  say  that,  from 
the  party  standpoint,  a  responsible  cabinet  was  ipso  facto  a  party 
cabinet.  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Constitution,  which  had  recently 
been  promulgated  and  according  to  whose  provisions  the  diet  had 
been  called  into  being,  defined,  so  far  as  the  explicit  verbal  meaning 
was  concerned,  that  the  government  was  answerable  for  its  political 
conduct  to  the  emperor.  The  theory  of  the  full  sovereignty  of  the 
throne  was  loyally  and  enthusiastically  supported  by  the  entire  na- 
tion, but  the  parties  did  not  fail  to  see  the  apparent  possibility  of 
reconciling  it  with  a  practical  control  of  the  cabinet  by  the  diet.  It 
is  little  wonder  that  they  straightway  crystallized  their  principle  into 
the  phrase,  "  a  responsible  cabinet,"  which  they  at  once  conceived 
as  merely  the  positive  side  of  another  of  their  mottoes,  "  the  down- 
fall of  sectionalism."  The  government  and  the  Elder  Statesmen,  it 
is  not  improbable,  possessed  a  clearer  vision  of  the  foibles  of  the 
young  parties,  and  consequently  a  more  conservative  but  truer  fore- 
sight of  the  future  progress  of  the  political  training  of  the  nation. 
The  question  between  the  parties  and  the  government  appears,  in 
the  last  analysis,  to  have  been  largely  a  question  of  time,  the  former 
harassing  the  latter  for  not  giving  them  at  once  what  they  prob- 
ably knew  it  would  cheerfully  surrender  when  the  proper  time  came. 
Yet,  by  the  law  of  reaction,  the  parties  rashly  attacked  the  govern- 
ment, and  the  latter  not  infrequently  resorted  to  measures  of 
self-defense  which  appeared  to  the  partisan  opponents  unwarranted 
and  even  arbitrary.  Bitter  feelings  were  not  seldom  aroused,  and 
the  sentiment  of  the  people  at  large  was  at  times  so  highly  wrought 
that  it  was  by  no  means  uncommon  to  see  neighbors  in  a  village 
range  themselves  according  to  their  sympathy  with  either  the  gov- 
ernment or  the  party  side  in  their  heated  controversies  by  the  fire- 
side. Election  scenes  often  presented  exciting  incidents.  It  should 
be  noted  that  the  majority  of  the  rural  population  sided  with  the 
anti-government  candidates,  but  that  the  two  parties,  the  Liberals 
and  Progressives,  seldom  failed  to  struggle  against  each  other  in 
the  election.  Things  went  on  mainly  in  this  condition  until  Count 
(now  Marquis)  ltd  became  premier  of  the  famous  ltd  cabinet,  which 
lasted  for  an  unusual  period  of  four  years,  during  which,  moreover, 
the  victorious  war  with  China  took  place. 

At  first  the  count  found  the  opposition  of  the  lower  house  to 
his  so-called  sectional  government  so  powerful  that  he  even  con- 
templated the  advisability  of  creating  a  new  political  party  of  his 


216  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

own.  Early  in  1894  the  diet  was  dissolved;  the  March  election  re- 
turned a  majority  of  the  opposition  and  was  followed  by  a  second 
dissolution.  Under  such  circumstances  it  was  no  wonder  that  the 
late  Chinese  statesman,  Li  Hung  Chang,  is  alleged  to  have  fancied 
at  the  time  that  Japan's  hands  were  too  closely  tied  by  the  strife  be- 
tween the  diet  and  the  government  to  resort  to  a  decisive  measure 
against  China  over  Korea,  which  was  then  the  bone  of  contention 
between  the  two  empires.  But  the  war  did  come,  for  the  successful 
conduct  of  which  the  nation  sank  their  party  considerations  and 
supported  with  one  mind  the  government  and  the  army.  An  ac- 
count of  this  important  warfare  will  be  found  in  its  proper  place, 
and  it  suffices  here  to  point  out  its  interesting  effect  on  the  parlia- 
mentary politics  of  Japan.  The  new  position  in  the  comity  of 
nations  which  the  world  accorded  her  after  the  war  naturally 
brought  with  it  new  problems  of  unexpected  importance.  One  of 
them  was  an  enormous  increase  of  state  expenditures  caused  by 
an  increased  armament  and  by  the  plans  for  the  development  of  the 
resources  of  the  country.  Hereafter  financial  questions  became 
the  central  issue  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  succeeding  houses  and 
cabinets,  and  their  practical  and  urgent  character  made  it  impos- 
sible for  the  cabinet  to  carry  out  its  proposed  measures  without 
the  cooperation  of  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  parties  in  the  house. 
Naturally  an  era  of  political  coalitions  dawned.  It  may  also  be  sur- 
mised that  the  parties,  at  least  some  of  their  leaders,  had  been  tired 
of  a  long  fruitless  struggle  with  the  government.  However  that 
may  be,  no  one  will  deny  that  henceforth  the  desire  for  power  began 
to  be  manifested  by  the  parties  which,  whatever  their  faults,  had  in 
the  main  fought  for  a  few  abstract  principles  which  had  originally 
brought  them  together.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  only  just  to  point 
out  the  important  fact  that  the  so  loudly  denounced  sectionalism  had 
in  reality  become  a  phantom,  particularly  after  the  inception  of  the 
constitutional  regime  in  1890  and  the  Chinese  war  in  1894- 1895, 
both  of  which  had  a  tremendous  influence  in  arousing  the  interest 
of  the  nation  at  large  in  its  own  affairs.  The  southern  provinces 
could  still  furnish  men  of  experience  and  wisdom,  but  it  was  less 
because  the  so-called  sectionalism  was  still  rampant  than  because 
these  men,  who  possessed  the  prestige  of  service  and  age,  could  not 
well  be  replaced  by  the  less  experienced  men  of  other  localities.  The 
Elder  Statesmen  could  no  longer  control  the  political  situation  of 
the  country,  nor  could  they  reasonably  be  charged  with  being  ani- 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  217 

1893-1906 

mated  with  any  degree  of  provincialism.  It  would  be  no  political 
apostasy  for  either  party  to  support  a  non-partisan  cabinet  whose 
policy  appealed  to  its  cherished  principles.  Thus  various  circum- 
stances seem  to  have  conspired  to  produce  an  epoch  of  political 
coalitions. 

The  ninth  diet  opened  early  in  December,  1895,  to  which  the 
Ito  cabinet  proposed  the  first  so-called  post-bellum  measures  to  be 
carried  out  within  the  ensuing  ten  years.  Briefly  stated,  the  addi- 
tional requirements  on  account  of  "  ordinary "  expenditures  of 
states  were  to  be  met  by  an  increased  taxation  aggregating  the  sum 
of  more  than  thirty-three  and  one-half  million  yen;  the  expansion 
of  the  armament  and  the  establishment  of  an  iron  foundry  were  to 
be  paid  out  of  the  Chinese  indemnity  and  other  "  extraordinary  " 
items  of  revenue,  which  altogether  amounted  to  over  365  millions ; 
and  the  improvement  and  extension  of  railroads,  telephone,  and  the 
like  were  calculated  to  be  covered  by  the  issuance  of  public  bonds. 
It  is  essential  in  our  discussion  to  keep  in  our  minds  the  three  sources 
of  increased  revenue.  As  to  the  first,  that  is,  the  increased  taxa- 
tion, we  must  note  as  a  matter  of  great  importance  that  many  of 
the  most  interesting  features  of  the  political  history  from  this  time 
on  have  been  determined  by  whether  it  was  the  landowners  or  the 
urban  population  who  were  called  upon  to  bear  the  bulk  of  the  added 
imposition.  In  the  present  case  the  burden  fell  on  the  latter 
class  of  people,  and  this  fact  was  fortunate  for  the  reception  of 
the  bill  in  the  house,  which  consisted  almost  wholly  of  representa- 
tives of  the  landowning  interest.  The  passage  of  the  measure  was, 
however,  entirely  owing  to  the  alliance  between  the  government  and 
the  Liberal  Party.  Unfortunately,  some  of  the  financial  schemes  of 
the  Ito  cabinet  were  soon  found  to  be  falling  short  of  the  expecta- 
tions of  their  authors,  and  a  large  deficit  of  the  revenue  for  the 
next  fiscal  year,  amounting  to  nearly  ninety-three  millions  of  yen, 
brought  about  the  downfall  of  the  cabinet,  which  had  otherwise 
proved  the  most  brilliant  and  powerful  that  had  yet  guided  the 
affairs  of  the  state  under  the  new  regime. 

The  succeeding  cabinet  was  headed  by  the  great  financier, 
Count  Matsukata,  and  was  for  a  time  supported  by  the  Progres- 
sives, whose  leader,  Count  Okuma,  occupied  the  portfolio  of  for- 
eign affairs.  The  tenth  diet  (1896-1897)  ran  its  course  smoothly, 
as  there  appeared  no  important  financial  measure  to  stir  up  the  parti- 
san blood  in  the  lower  house,  but  the  next  diet,  which  met  in  De- 


218  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

cember,  1897,  witnessed  an  altogether  different  scene.  In  spite  of 
the  painful  manipulations  of  the  items  of  the  budget,  and  of  the  fact 
that  the  issues  of  the  recently  raised  taxes  had  reached  the  ex- 
chequer, a  large  deficit  of  over  fourteen  million  yen  stared  the 
Matsukata  cabinet  in  the  face,  and,  moreover,  promised  to  rise 
considerably  higher  the  next  year.  Count  Matsukata  now  resolved 
to  increase  the  revenue  by  twenty-five  millions  by  raising  the  rates 
of  certain  taxes,  one  of  which,  the  land  tax,  was  probably  among 
the  fairest  sources  of  an  increased  income,  but  was  destined  to 
arouse  a  stormy  opposition  of  the  representatives.  No  sooner  was 
the  count's  design  known  than  the  Progressives,  with  their  versatile 
leader,  deserted  the  cabinet.  This  was  the  first  time  that  the  lower 
house,  one  of  whose  old  cries  had  been  to  revise  land  values  and 
reduce  the  land  tax,  was  called  upon  to  discuss  a  financial  measure 
to  which  the  interest  of  the  constituencies  of  their  overwhelming 
majority  was  diametrically  opposed.  We  might  perhaps  consider 
the  eleventh  diet,  for  this  reason,  as  marking  a  new  stage  in  which 
the  question  of  class  interests,  so  promising  of  ominous  conse- 
quences, began  to  manifest  itself.  The  determined  opposition  of 
the  house  against  the  cabinet  was  quickly  followed  by  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  former  and  the  fall  of  the  latter. 

The  year  1898  witnessed  the  most  surprising  political  changes 
that  have  taken  place  in  any  single  year  since  the  beginning  of  the 
constitutional  regime  of  Japan.  In  January  Marquis  Ito  again 
held  the  reins  of  the  cabinet.  The  Liberals  would  not  support  him, 
nor  would  Count  Okuma  leave  his  lieutenants  behind  in  order 
to  join  the  cabinet.  The  government  thus  declaring  itself  clear  of 
entangling  alliances,  the  parties  hastened  to  their  constituencies  to 
prepare  for  the  general  election  of  March.  The  nation  had  never 
seen  such  peculiar  political  conditions  as  then  prevailed  all  over  the 
country.  The  new  "  transcendental "  cabinet  had  committed  itself 
to  no  definite  policy.  There  were  practically  no  issues  on  which 
the  parties  could  address  themselves  to  the  people,  who  had  not 
been  without  some  misgivings  as  to  the  conduct  of  their  former 
representatives  in  the  lower  house,  and  who  could  no  longer  be 
blinded  by  the  specter  of  the  so-called  sectionalism.  The  election  re- 
sulted in  giving  an  absolute  majority  to  neither  the  party  members 
nor  the  supporters  of  the  government.  After  the  election,  how- 
ever, political  issues  quickly  crystallized  themselves  as  soon  as  it 
was  known  that  the  cabinet  would  propose  an  increase  of  taxes, 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  219 

1893-1906 

mainly  the  land  tax,  by  more  than  thirty-five  millions  of  yen.  The 
Liberals  and  the  Progressives,  hitherto  so  jealous  of  each  other, 
joined  hands  to  reject  the  proposition,  for  which  act  the  house 
earned  another  dissolution,  on  June  10.  With  an  amazing  celerity 
the  two  parties  voluntarily  amalgamated  themselves  into  the  colossal 
"  Constitutional  Party,"  with  the  realization  of  a  party  cabinet  as 
its  motto. 

It  will  easily  be  seen  that  this  precipitous  move  had  been 
caused  by  the  common  landed  interest  which  the  two  former  par- 
ties represented  in  the  house,  and  which  had  risen  to  its  height 
of  intensity  at  the  repeated  appearance  of  the  land  tax  bill,  and 
by  the  plain  fact  that  power  and  spoil  would  fall  into  their  hands 
the  more  readily  by  their  combined  warfare  with  the  authorities. 
In  order  to  meet  this  united  front  of  the  opposition,  Marquis 
ltd  again  had  a  mind  to  organize  a  party  of  his  own,  but  was 
strenuously  opposed  in  this  desire  by  the  other  Elder  States- 
men, particularly  Count  Yamagata,  who,  together  with  the  majority 
of  the  peers,  were  stanch  supporters  of  the  literal  interpreta- 
tion of  the  Constitution  in  respect  to  its  theory  of  ministerial 
responsibility.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  significant  and  char- 
acteristic of  Marquis  ltd  than  his  action  at  this  critical  juncture 
of  the  history  of  the  Constitution  and  of  his  own  career.  The 
organization  of  the  Constitutional  Party  had  been  publicly  an- 
nounced on  June  22,  and  on  the  24th  the  premier  tendered  his 
resignation,  together  with  an  earnest  recommendation  to  the  throne 
that  the  leaders  of  the  new  party  be  summoned  to  form  a  cabinet. 
This  stroke  was  natural  when  we  consider  that  the  quick  vision  of 
the  marquis  must  have  seen  the  impossibility  of  building  between 
the  two  fires  of  the  party  and  the  Elders.  He,  however,  could  not 
have  foreseen  all  the  momentous  consequences  of  this  adroit  coup. 
The  lightning  speed  of  his  act  stunned  friend  and  foe  alike.  The 
party  found  itself  utterly  unprepared  to  grasp  the  opportunity  so 
suddenly  thrust  upon  it.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  inverse  pro- 
portion that  his  conduct  gratified  the  party,  it  was  galling  to 
his  numerous  friends  in  the  house  of  peers,  in  the  privy  council,  and 
in  the  government  and  the  court,  many  of  whom  owed  their 
training  and  advancement  to  the  veteran  statesman,  but  who  must 
now  have  felt  as  if  they  had  been  deserted  by  him  at  the  critical 
moment.  The  deep-seated  resentment  against  the  marquis  which 
was  created  among  the  peers,  who  had  always  regarded  him  as  the 


220  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

living  exponent  of  the  theory  of  the  non-partisan  cabinet  hereafter 
must  be  particularly  borne  in  mind.  Would  it  not  appear  plain 
that  they  would  oppose  him  if  he  should  again  become  premier 
with  the  aid  of  a  party,  and  would  it  not  be  equally  clear  that  if 
another  cabinet  should  be  formed  from  among  themselves,  the 
party  politicians  would  present  an  obstinate  opposition  to  it?  It 
will  be  seen  later  that  all  these  things  have  since  actually  taken 
place.  If  we  may  regard  the  first  introduction  of  the  land  tax  ques- 
tion into  the  house  in  1897  as  the  beginning  of  the  controlling 
influence  of  a  class-interest,  the  abrupt  resignation  of  Marquis  Ito 
in  1898  may  be  said  to  mark  the  dawn  of  an  era  in  which  human 
feelings  not  altogether  expressible  in  words  began  to  play  an  im- 
portant role  in  parliamentary  politics.  When  feelings  and  interests, 
independent  of  principles  and  issues,  come  to  influence  the  course 
of  events,  the  conflicts  of  their  agents  must  inevitably  become  at 
times  bitter.  As  to  the  marquis  himself,  however,  June  24,  1898, 
was  perhaps  another  of  the  turning  points  of  his  life,  through 
which  he  successfully  extricated  himself  from  a  groove  and  made 
a  leap  forward. 

The  most  melodramatic  spectacles  of  the  year  were  yet  to 
come.  The  new  Janus-like  Constitutional  Party,  whose  political 
composition  was  as  incongruous  as  its  two  masters,  the  idealistic 
Count  Itagaki  of  the  Liberals  and  the  nimble-witted  Count  Okuma 
of  the  Progressives,  suddenly  found  itself  face  to  face  with  an  op- 
portunity which  had  for  years  been  its  cherished  goal,  but  which 
it  was  at  this  moment  hardly  prepared  to  accept  with  alacrity.  A 
mongrel  cabinet  was  at  last  organized,  with  Okuma  as  premier 
and  foreign  minister,  Itagaki  as  home  minister,  two  more  for- 
mer Progressives  and  three  Liberals  receiving  other  portfolios, 
and,  finally,  Marquis  Saigo  and  Viscount  Katsura  as  ministers 
of  army  and  navy.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  marquis  was 
one  of  the  Elder  Statesmen,  under  whose  wings  the  viscount  also 
had  shaped  his  political  career.  The  party  thus  failed  to  form 
a  cabinet  of  purely  its  own  complexion,  which  fact  must  have  been 
especially  disheartening  in  showing  that  the  powerful  military  in- 
stitutions of  the  empire  could  not  be  controlled  by  the  inexperienced 
politicians  emerging  from  the  lower  house  of  the  diet.  Such  a  mat- 
ter, however,  weighed  little  by  the  side  of  the  grave  internal  diffi- 
culties that  beset  the  new  party  from  its  start.  The  traditional 
sympathies  of  its  two  component  parts  proved  too  different  from 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  221 

1893-1906 

one  another,  and  the  individual  sense  of  honor  and  also  interest 
too  little  subservient  to  the  common  cause,  for  the  members  of  the 
new  government  to  hold  together  for  half  a  year.  Moreover,  the 
executive  authorities  of  the  party  at  large  instituted  a  shameless 
movement  of  systematic  office-hunting,  in  which  the  old  Liberals 
and  Progressives  vied  against  each  other  and  among  themselves. 
The  same  disorganized  condition  characterized  the  general  election 
of  August  when  a  concerted  action  of  the  party  could  hardly  be 
found  anywhere  in  the  country.  What  finally  precipitated  the 
downfall  of  the  cabinet  was  a  speech  of  Ozaki,  the  Progressive 
minister  of  education,  which  roundly  denounced  the  material- 
istic tendencies  of  the  age,  and  declared  that  if  Japan  should 
become  a  republic  her  people  probably  would  not  hesitate  to  elect 
a  Vanderbilt  or  an  Astor  for  president.  The  former  Liberals 
adroitly  chimed  in  with  those  chauvinists  who  pretended  to  have 
discovered  in  the  speech  a  sinister,  disloyal  motive,  on  the  part 
of  the  speaker,  against  the  reigning  family.  When  Ozaki's  res- 
ignation was  thus  forced,  the  premier,  without  listening  to  the 
overtures  of  the  Liberals,  appointed  another  Progressive  to  the 
vacant  post.  At  the  end  of  October  the  dissolution  of  the  party 
began  openly  amid  considerable  bickerings,  and  the  cabinet,  which 
had  already  been  deserted  by  the  non-partisan  ministers  of  army 
and  of  navy,  and  could  no  longer  maintain  itself,  tendered  its  resig- 
nation. Thus  the  first  attempt  at  a  party  cabinet  in  Japan  came  to 
an  ignominious  failure  under  extremely  untoward  circumstances. 
The  old  parties  parted  more  widely  than  before,  and  the  unfortunate 
ministry  passed  out  of  existence  before  it  could  face  the  unfriendly 
house  of  peers  and  tackle  the  enormous  national  deficit  amounting 
to  thirty-seven  millions  of  yen. 

Field  Marshal  Count  Yamagata,  who  received  an  imperial 
summons,  formed  a  cabinet,  on  the  eve  of  a  new  diet,  in  November, 
1898,  which  consisted  entirely  of  Elder  Statesmen  and  their  sym- 
pathizers. The  duty  of  carrying  out  the  post-bellum  measures  had 
devolved  upon  the  new  cabinet.  The  support  of  the  peers  could  be 
safely  relied  upon,  but  in  the  lower  chamber  nothing  could  be  ef- 
fected without  the  aid  of  some  party.  Perhaps  nothing  could  show 
more  clearly  the  possibility  of  the  ultimate  ministerial  responsibility 
to  the  diet  than  the  conduct  of  the  field  marshal  at  this  juncture. 
He  and  some  of  his  colleagues,  as  well  as  the  majority  of  the 
peers,  had  been  known  as  the  most  persistent  believers  in  the  non- 


222  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

partisan  government  and  in  the  responsibility  of  the  cabinet  to  the 
crown,  and  yet  they  could  see  absolutely  no  hope  of  performing 
their  official  duties  but  by  allying  themselves  with  the  party  which 
once  supported  Marquis  Ito's  post-bellum  measures.  That  party 
was  the  Liberal,  which  now  monopolized  the  name  Constitutional- 
ist. It  demanded  certain  portfolios,  not  from  the  spirit  of  office- 
hunting,  but,  as  it  was  explained,  for  the  sake  of  establishing 
the  principle  that  no  cabinet  can  be  "  transcendental,"  or  absolutely 
non-partisan.  According,  however,  to  an  agreement  arrived  at  be- 
tween the  cabinet  and  the  Constitutionalists,  the  latter  satisfied 
themselves  with  a  manifesto  made  by  Count  Yamagata  at  a  social 
gathering,  to  the  effect  that  he  believed  the  cooperation  of  a  party 
or  parties  commanding  a  majority  in  the  diet  was  essential  for  the 
discharge  of  the  business  of  the  state.  It  was  significant  enough 
to  hear  these  words  from  the  mouth  of  the  premier  from  whom  they 
could  otherwise  have  been  least  expected,  and  yet  it  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  no  cabinet,  not  excluding  partisan  cabinets,  has  suc- 
ceeded in  making  a  greater  use  of  a  party  than  his.  The  success 
was  in  no  small  measure  due  to  Toru  Hoshi,  formerly  Japanese 
minister  at  Washington,  and  at  the  time  under  discussion  the 
house  leader  of  the  Constitutionalists,  who,  with  his  wonderful 
talent  for  political  tactics,  acted  for  the  government  as  the  trust- 
worthy foreman  of  his  party.  By  his  skillful  maneuvers,  an  in- 
crease of  the  land  tax,  which  had,  as  we  saw,  failed  after  causing 
within  half  a  year  the  dissolution  of  two  successive  houses  of  repre- 
sentatives, was  now,  despite  the  preponderant  sympathy  in  the 
house  with  the  landowning  class  of  the  country,  agreed  to  by  a 
majority  of  161  to  134.  But  for  its  passage,  the  deficit  of  the  next 
fiscal  year  would  have  reached  beyond  forty-six  millions  of  yen. 

Let  us  pause  a  moment  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  Japanese 
land  tax,  without  an  understanding  of  which  neither  the  past  nor 
the  future  of  the  parlimentary  politics  will  be  comprehended  with 
sufficient  clearness.  The  reader  will  recall  how  before  the  fall  of 
feudalism  most  of  the  arable  land  in  the  country  was  held  in  fief, 
and  how  the  tenants  paid  to  their  lords  onerous  rents,  ranging  be- 
tween thirty  and  seventy  per  cent,  of  the  product  of  the  soil.  When 
the  imperial  government  assumed  the  control  of  the  state  in  1868, 
it  found  itself  confronted  with  the  colossal  task  of  reorganizing 
the  machinery  of  the  state  in  nearly  all  of  its  parts,  and  intro- 
ducing new,  urgent  measures,   some  of  which  were  on  a  large 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  223 

1893-1906 

scale,  and  all  of  which  demanded  a  considerable  outlay  of  funds. 
To  do  this  they  were  supplied  with  a  miserably  small  income, 
which  hardly  covered  one-tenth  of  the  necessary  expenditures.  It 
was  essential  above  all  to  institute  a  sound  system  of  taxation, 
whose  basis,  in  those  days  of  an  insignificant  foreign  trade,  could 
not  but  consist  in  a  reorganized  land  tax.  Nothing  could,  however, 
be  done  in  that  direction,  so  long  as  the  local  daimios  still  held 
their  fiefs,  to  which  the  authority  of  the  new  government  could  not 
penetrate.  It  was  only  when  the  fiefs  were,  in  the  manner  already 
described  in  a  previous  chapter,  surrendered  to  the  state  that  any- 
thing toward  the  establishment  of  a  secure  system  of  taxation  could 
be  attempted.  Pending  the  assessing  of  the  values  of  the  arable 
land,  which  naturally  required  time,  the  government  resorted  to  the 
issuance  of  inconvertible  notes  and  other  measures  of  purely  tem- 
porary and  irregular  nature.  The  land  tax  itself  was,  however, 
conceived  and  finally  established  in  the  most  remarkable  manner, 
its  principle  being,  in  the  first  place,  a  complete  nationalization  of 
land,  and,  then,  the  transferring  of  the  ownership  to  the  individual 
holders  who  were  actually  tilling  it.  The  duty  of  the  new  owner 
to  pay  a  tax  to  the  state  for  his  landed  property  was  evidently  con- 
ceived by  the  government  as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  owner- 
ship so  bountifully  and  so  completely  conferred  upon  him  on  their 
initiative.  With  the  land  tax  securely  installed,  the  main  structure 
of  the  new  system  of  national  taxation  had  been  finished,  for  the 
issue  of  this  new  tax  at  its  first  complete  return  amounted  to  more 
than  two-thirds  of  the  entire  revenue  of  the  state.  It  now  remains 
to  be  told  how  the  value  of  each  piece  of  land  was  assessed  and  its 
tax  determined.  The  assessment  of  value  consisted,  first,  in  taking 
the  average  of  the  harvest  for  five  years,  then  converting  it  into 
money  at  the  basis  of  the  average  price  of  rice  ruling  in  the  same 
period,  and,  finally,  estimating  the  amount  of  the  capital  which 
would  be  necessary  to  yield  an  interest  equal  to  the  price  just  calcu- 
lated. The  estimated  capitalization  was  considered  the  value  of  the 
land  in  question.  The  assessment  of  land  throughout  the  country 
was  completed  in  1881.  As  to  the  tax  itself,  its  rate  was  fixed  at 
three  per  cent,  of  the  official  value,  and  later  reduced  to  two  and 
a  half  per  cent.  It  would  be  difficult  to  overestimate  the  benefit  that 
accrued  to  the  farmer  under  the  new  law.  He  passed  at  once  from 
the  position  of  a  tenant  to  that  of  an  absolute  owner,  his  former 
lord  being  at  the  same  time  recompensed  by  the  state  with  public 


224,  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

bonds  for  the  fiefs  he  had  surrendered.  Thus  the  emancipation  of 
the  cultivator  from  the  feudal  bondage  of  land,  which  still  has  a 
considerable  hold  upon  some  of  the  former  feudal  communities 
in  Europe,  was  in  Japan  definite  and  final.  Nor  did  the  new  owner 
find  himself  under  such  restrictions  as  had  existed  under  the  feudal 
regime,  either  in  the  alienation  of  his  estate  or  in  its  utilization  to 
the  best  advantage  by  raising  upon  it  whatever  crop  he  liked.  In 
return,  his  due  to  the  state  was  only  a  sum,  no  longer  arbitrary  or 
in  kind,  but  fixed  and  in  money,  which,  as  has  been  pointed  out  by 
some  writers,  was  no  more  than  one  and  one-fourth  per  cent,  of  the 
market  value  of  the  land,  or  equal  to  a  rent  assessed  on  the  basis  of 
an  eighty-year  purchase,  which  is  less  than  a  quarter  of  the  ordinary 
tenant's  rent.2  Add  to  this  the  important  consideration  that  between 
the  time  when  the  land  tax  law  went  into  effect  and  the  year  1898 
the  price  of  rice  rose  nearly  threefold,  so  that  the  real  burden  of  the 
tax  lessened  correspondingly  by  two-thirds.  The  market  value  of 
land,  also,  had  increased,  even  as  early  as  1888,  on  the  average  of 
five  or  sixfold.  If  it  be  said  that  the  farmer's  quota  in  the  expendi- 
tures of  the  local  government  had  in  the  meantime  considerably  in- 
creased, there  still  remains  the  fact  that  the  increase  was  hardly 
commensurate  with  the  growth  of  cultivated  area  and  general  land 
value  and  the  rise  in  both  quantity  and  price  of  the  crops. 

To  say,  however,  that  the  land  tax  was  lenient  is  not  equiva- 
lent to  saying  that  it  was  the  most  reasonable  source  for  an  increased 
imposition.  That  it  was  so,  in  the  opinion  of  the  fair-minded  peo- 
ple, remains  now  to  be  shown.  It  should  be  remembered,  in  the  first 
place,  that  although  in  1881  the  income  of  the  land  tax  amounted 
to  more  than  four-sevenths  of  the  total  revenue  of  the  government, 
it  had  not  since  increased,  but  rather  fallen  from  over  forty-two 
millions  of  yen  to  less  than  forty,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ex- 
penditures of  the  state  had  risen  from  seventy-one  and  one-half 
millions  in  1881  to  eighty-five  and  three-tenths  in  1895,  and  then, 
so  rapidly  after  the  advent  of  the  post-bellum  measures  that  in  1899 
they  stood  at  254  millions,  or  more  than  three  and  one-half  times 
as  large  as  they  were  less  than  two  decades  before.  Such  items  of 
taxes  as  had  been  created  or  increased  to  meet  a  part  of  these  enor- 
mously swollen  expenditures  had  nearly  all  fallen  on  the  urban 
population.  The  public  bonds  which  were  issued  from  time  to  time 
and  could  not  be  much  multiplied  by  fresh  issues  were  also  absorbed 
mainly  by  the  merchants  and  manufacturers,  and  the  burden  of 

2  Brinkley's  "  Oriental  Series,"  vol.  V.  p.  16-17. 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  225 

1893-1906 

the  indirect  taxes,  which  in  1899  brought  in  the  considerable  sum 
of  sixteen  millions,  was  borne  by  the  consumers  of  foreign  goods, 
who  for  the  most  part  lived  in  the  cities.  This  increased  assess- 
ment of  the  urban  population  can  be  appreciated  in  contrast  with 
the  greatly  lightened  land  tax  of  the  landowners,  who  gained  much 
and  lost  little  by  the  rapid  development  of  the  economic  resources 
of  the  country.  Their  interests  were  further  strengthened  by  the 
new  regime,  under  which  the  lower  house  of  the  imperial  diet  cham- 
pioned their  cause  with  such  a  decisive  majority  of  its  members  that 
no  dissolution  could  change  the  situation.  Some  of  the  peers  may 
have  represented  urban  interests,  but  their  voice  in  financial  meas- 
ures was  as  small  as  the  control  over  them  by  the  representatives 
was  secure. 

By  the  magnitude  of  these  difficulties  should  be  measured  the 
signal  success  of  the  Yamagata  cabinet  in  obtaining  the  passage  in 
the  lower  house  of  the  land  tax  bill,  on  December  20,  1898,  by  the 
majority  of  161  to  134.  It  was,  however,  bought  with  a  heavy  cost 
both  to  the  cabinet  and  to  its  allies,  the  Constitutionalists.  The 
former  had  been  compelled  to  relinquish  its  "  transcendentalism," 
and  the  latter  risked  the  displeasure  of  their  constituencies.  Nor 
was  the  bill  passed  without  a  hard  struggle  and  serious  amend- 
ments. The  original  proposition  of  the  government  contemplated 
a  permanent  increase  of  the  tax  rate  to  four  per  cent.,  but  the  bill 
as  it  was  adopted  fixed  it  at  3.3  per  cent,  (the  rate  of  the  house 
land  in  the  cities  being,  however,  5  per  cent.),  and  limited  its  valid- 
ity to  the  short  period  of  five  years,  so  that  the  estimated  increase 
in  the  income  of  the  tax,  after  its  going  into  plenary  force,  was 
only  over  eight  million  yen,  or  less  than  half  the  originally  intended 
increase.  Even  this  reduced  measure  was  not  agreed  to  until  the 
government  yielded  to  the  demands  to  revise  the  land  valuation  in 
the  country  in  such  a  way  as  to  cut  the  total  assessed  value  by 
3,200,000  yen,  and,  what  is  more,  to  transfer  the  charge  of  the 
prison  expenditures,  amounting  to  four  millions,  from  the  local  to 
the  central  exchequer.  The  net  gain  by  the  increased  tax  measure 
would  hardly  rise  above  four  million  yen  annually,  and  this  slight 
gain  would  be  temporary,  while  the  losses  entailed  on  the  govern- 
ment from  the  reassessment  and  prison  expenditure  would  be  per- 
manent. After  the  expiration  of  the  five  years  the  government 
would  be  left  worse  off  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  term. 

In  spite  of  these  drawbacks,  the  credit  of  raising  the  income  of 


226  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

the  land,  income,  and  sake  taxes  by  forty-six  millions  of  yen,  and 
thus  enabling  the  post-bellum  measures  to  be  carried  out  to  any  real 
extent,  belongs  justly  to  the  Yamagata  cabinet.  If  we  add  to  this 
remarkable  success  the  establishment  of  the  gold  standard  in  1898 
and  the  passage  of  the  new  election  law  in  1900,  and  also  remember 
that  the  cabinet  possessed  a  strong  unity,  it  becomes  difficult  to 
understand  why  it  resigned  in  September,  1900,  at  the  prime  of  its 
success.  The  reason  was  probably  the  characteristic  modesty  and 
prudence  of  the  field  marshal,  who  saw  that  he  had  attained  to  a 
success  large  enough  to  satisfy  any  premier,  while  the  prolongation 
of  his  office  might  involve  him  in  embarrassing  relations  with  the 
new  party  just  formed  by  Marquis  ltd,  with  which  the  retiring 
premier  had  little  sympathy. 

The  attitude  of  Marquis  Ito  toward  the  Yamagata  cabinet  dur- 
ing the  latter's  tenure  of  office  was  one  of  a  cordial  adviser  to  a 
modest  inquirer.  When  the  late  Okuma  cabinet  fell,  the  marquis 
was  summoned  by  the  emperor  to  hasten  back  from  China,  where 
he  had  been  traveling,  but  before  he  touched  the  shores  of  the  main 
island  of  Japan  the  organization  of  the  Yamagata  cabinet  had  prac- 
tically been  completed.  Ito  may  have  been  somewhat  chagrined, 
but  it  goes  to  the  credit  of  himself  and  of  the  field  marshal  that 
they  maintained  all  through  the  twenty-two  months  of  the  latter's 
administration  the  utmost  mutual  respect  and  good-will  that  ever 
could  exist  between  two  men  of  temperaments  so  widely  different 
from  each  other.  But  the  time  came  when  Ito  at  last  found  favor- 
able opportunities  to  organize  a  large  model  party,  which  the 
former  Liberals  (lately  styled  Constitutionalists)  joined  in  a  body. 
He  had  seen  too  well  in  his  tours  round  the  country  to  what  abuses 
the  existing  party  system  had  everywhere  led,  and  how  far  the 
nation  stood,  mainly  owing  to  the  flagrant  defects  of  the  present 
parties,  from  an  ideal  constitutional  government,  the  legal  foun- 
dation for  which  he  had  himself  designed.  Gradually  and  with  in- 
creasing force  he  seems  to  have  convinced  himself  that  there  should 
exist  a  party  powerful  enough  to  counteract  the  present  evils,  suffi- 
ciently organized  and  disciplined  to  possess  a  distinct  unity  of  con- 
duct, and  actuated  solely  by  the  best  and  most  logical  motives  of 
national  progress.  The  patriotic  intention  of  the  marquis  himself 
in  these  ideas  cannot  for  a  moment  be  doubted :  it  must  have  seemed 
plain  to  him  that  his  assumption  of  leadership  in  a  party  must  mean 
a  radical  severance  of  himself  from  his  past  career  and  friends,  and 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  227 

1893-1906 

even  the  silent  resentment  of  the  latter,  while  his  disciplinary  meas- ' 
ures  would,  even  with  his  imposing  prestige  and  influence,  become 
less  binding  on  the  party  as  the  latter  grew  in  size.  As  soon,  how- 
ever, as  his  desires  of  organizing  a  new  party  were  made  known, 
on  August  25,  men  of  all  classes  and  motives  flocked  under  his 
standard  in  irresistible  numbers.  The  public  inauguration  of  the 
party,  under  the  name  Constitutional  Political  Association  (Rik- 
ken  Seiyu  Kwai),  took  place  on  September  15,  and  eleven  days 
later  was  followed  by  the  sudden  resignation  of  the  Yamagata 
cabinet.  Upon  Ito  now  logically  devolved  the  duty  of  taking  the 
reins  of  the  state  in  hand,  but  it  was  only  after  a  considerable  hesi- 
tation and  some  unexpected  difficulties  that  the  fourth  Ito  cabinet 
was  finally  organized  on  October  19.  Who  can  deny  that  this  was 
a  genuine  party  cabinet,  in  an  even  fuller  sense  than  the  late  Okuma 
cabinet,  and  that  Marquis  ltd  was  after  all  deeply  convinced  of  the 
futility  of  a  "  transcendental "  cabinet,  which  owes  everything  to 
the  crown  and  nothing  to  the  diet  ? 

The  new  cabinet,  with  its  illustrious  leader,  its  absolute  ma- 
jority in  the  lower  house,  and  its  immense  following  in  the  country, 
seems  to  have  been  attended  from  its  beginning  by  no  inconsider- 
able difficulties,  some  of  which,  indeed,  proved  more  serious  than 
could  have  been  expected.  Foremost  among  them  stood  the  financial 
ghost,  which  would  never  down,  but  which  now,  with  the  dispatch 
of  troops  to  North  China,  made  an  unusually  ominous  appearance 
before  the  inchoate  government.  The  increased  tax  measures, 
mainly  in  sugar  and  sake  taxes  and  customs  duties,  intended  to  raise 
twenty-one  million  yen,  readily  passed  through  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, where  the  landed  interest  still  outweighed  the  urban,  but 
met  a  different  treatment  from  the  peers.  That  these  would  be  cool 
toward  the  cabinet  may  have  been  expected,  but  no  man  had  imag- 
ined that  they  would  present  so  stubborn  an  opposition  and  such 
adroit  tactics  as  they  did.  Their  stand  was  as  determined,  when  it 
was  taken,  as  it  had  previously  been  unsuspected.  Between  Febru- 
ary 25  and  March  12,  1901,  were  employed  in  vain  the  persuasion  of 
the  premier,  reconciliation  by  four  Elders,  and  two  successive  sus- 
pensions of  the  diet.  Never  before  in  the  history  of  the  Japanese 
Constitution  had  the  house  of  peers  so  seriously  opposed  the  gov- 
ernment, nor  had  its  action  ever  caused  a  suspension  of  the  imperial 
diet.  The  anomaly  of  the  situation  becomes  more  evident  when  one 
recalls  that  the   upper  chamber  was   now   wielding  its  weapons 


JAPAN 

1893-1906 

against  its  creator,  who  had  called  it  into  being  as  a  conservative 
force  to  check  the  radicalism  of  the  other  chamber.  Above  the  fear 
of  a  dissolution,  as  they  were,  the  peers  caused  a  complete  deadlock. 
How  it  was  removed  by  an  imperial  word,  and  how  unprecedented 
the  procedure  was,  has  been  described  in  connection  with  our  ac- 
count of  the  Constitution.  The  survival  of  the  ltd  cabinet  through 
this  crisis,  and  the  conduct  of  the  premier  in  allowing  his  trouble 
to  be  remedied  by  an  aid  from  the  throne,  were  not  unattended  by 
the  increased  ill-will  of  the  peers  and  even  by  some  significant  whis- 
pers among  the  rank  and  file  of  his  own  party. 

The  cabinet  did  not,  however,  live  much  longer,  as  it  resigned 
on  May  2  from  an  entirely  unforeseen  cause,  the  like  of  which  it  is 
highly  improbable  would  recur.  Within  a  week  after  the  proroga- 
tion of  the  imperial  diet,  which  had  passed  the  increased  tax 
measures,  Viscount  Watanabe,  minister  of  finance,  stunned  the  pre- 
mier by  declaring  that  the  only  possible  way  of  forestalling  the  im- 
pending financial  dangers  of  the  government  would  be  to  postpone 
the  public  works  contemplated  for  the  fiscal  year  of  1901,  mainly 
consisting  of  the  creation  or  the  extension  of  the  iron  foundry,  rail- 
roads, telegraphs,  and  Formosan  enterprises.  His  argument  was 
not  without  a  plausible  ground,  as  it  was  plain  that  the  issuing  of 
the  public  bonds  to  the  amount  of  more  than  sixty  millions  of 
yen,  part  of  which  had  been  planned  to  meet  the  expenditures  of 
the  public  works,  could  not  have  been  effected  without  drawing 
upon  the  too  scarce  productive  capital  of  the  nation.  But  the  abrupt 
proposition  of  the  viscount  caused  a  veritable  panic  in  the  cabinet, 
and  in  the  business  world,  and  was  agreed  to  by  his  colleagues  after 
a  considerable  discussion.  No  sooner,  however,  did  the  finance  min- 
ister carry  his  point  than  he  gave  everyone  a  fresh  surprise 
by  recommending  an  entire  suspension  of  public  works  for  the  en- 
suing fiscal  year  of  1902.  The  breach  thus  created  in  the  cabinet 
was  complete,  and  the  enigmatical  Watanabe  would  not  listen  to 
the  plaint  of  the  premier.  When  all  the  other  ministers  tendered 
their  resignation  it  was  seen  that  the  viscount  alone  was  holding 
to  his  post,  although  he  also  soon  joined  the  rest.  It  does  not  seem 
perfectly  clear  why  the  obstinacy  of  a  minister  was  deemed  a  suffi- 
cient cause  for  the  downfall  of  a  cabinet  which  commanded  an  abso- 
lute majority  in  the  lower  house,  and  which  had  survived  the  dead- 
lock and  anomaly  of  two  months  before. 

However  that  may  be,  the  party  cabinet,  for  such  it -was  in 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS 

1893-1906 

practice,  did  not  recede  from  the  government  service  without  re- 
ceiving deep  scars  on  the  prestige  of  the  party  itself.  The  internal 
inharmony  of  the  cabinet  so  unfortunately  caused  by  the  inexplic- 
able conduct  of  Viscount  Watanabe  seriously  reflected  upon  the 
credit  of  the  leaders  then  in  office.  For  the  cabinet  and  the  party 
at  large,  however,  perhaps  no  event  was  of  a  more  serious  import 
than  the  immense  power,  followed  by  the  assassination,  of  Toru 
Hoshi.  A  man  of  blameless  character  in  his  home  life  and  an  inde- 
fatigable student  of  the  world's  new  thought,  Hoshi,  with  un- 
daunted courage  and  consummate  talent  for  party  leadership,  not 
unattended  by  unscrupulous  conduct  in  money  matters,  had  become 
within  a  short  time  a  peerless  whip  of  the  old  Liberals.  He  was 
probably  the  greatest  instrument  in  their  secession  from  the  hasty 
union  with  the  Progressives.  During  the  Yamagata  administra- 
tion the  success  of  the  cabinet  was  mainly  due  to  his  efficient 
maneuvers  in  the  lower  house,  where  he  was  at  once  the  contractor 
and  the  foreman  of  his  party.  When  the  Liberals  joined  in  a  body 
Marquis  Ito's  new  party,  no  man  could  have  been  at  once  more  dan- 
gerous and  more  indispensable  to  its  president  than  Hoshi.  The 
latter's  word  was  as  reliable  and  his  success  as  assured  as  his  rule 
in  the  party  was  despotic  and  his  means  detested.  In  the  propor- 
tion that  the  new  association  was  proclaimed  by  its  founder  and 
expected  by  the  nation  to  be  a  model  party,  the  peers  and  other 
neutral  people  deprecated  Hoshi  for  his  corrupt  deeds  and  the  mar- 
quis for  allowing  them  to  pass  under  his  eye.  The  politician,  on 
his  part,  was  too  proud  to  condescend  to  explain  that  he  retained 
not  a  farthing  for  himself,  and  that  abuses  were  showered  on  him 
some  of  which  should  belong  to  others.  The  respectable  society 
looked  askance  at  him,  but  in  the  political  world  no  one  could  re- 
sist the  action  of  this  intrepid  and  clever  politician.  During  the 
first  months  of  the  ltd  cabinet  Hoshi  was  at  once  minister  of  state 
for  transportation  and  a  member  of  the  municipal  council  of  Tokyo, 
but  it  was  not  long  before  he  incurred  the  ire  of  the  peers  and  others 
and  resigned  his  former  post.  It  was  mainly  as  a  councilor  of 
Tokyo,  however,  that  his  influence  was  feared  to  contaminate  the 
municipal  government  in  all  its  branches.  Finally,  on  June  21, 
1 90 1,  he  fell  victim  at  the  age  of  forty-one  to  the  dagger  of 
an  assassin.  The  latter,  Sotard  Iba  by  name,  formerly  a  fencing 
master  and  now  a  man  of  respectable  social  standing,  and  of  the 
same  age  as  Hoshi,  had  been  actuated  by  the  simple  fear  of  the 


230  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

widespread  corruption  wrought  by  this  engrossing  enemy  of  the 
public,  on  whose  removal  he  staked  his  life.  He  was  later  sentenced 
to  life  imprisonment.  With  the  passing  of  Hoshi,  the  Constitu- 
tional Political  Association  and  its  president  lost  their  most  power- 
ful and  most  detested  figure.  Marquis  Ito  was  no  longer  subject  to 
the  calumny  which  had  fallen  upon  him  for  his  close  association  with 
the  deceased  politician,  nor  could  he  again  count  upon  the  coopera- 
tion of  one  whose  talent  and  tactics  had  been  the  badge  of  his  dis- 
cipline as  leader,  and  whose  concentration  of  censure  upon  himself 
had  relieved  the  marquis  from  the  share-  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  apportioned  him.  The  political  atmosphere  was  as  puri- 
fied, as  was  the  forecast  of  its  immediate  future  rendered  uncertain, 
by  the  resignation  of  the  Ito  cabinet  and  the  assassination  of  Toru 
Hoshi. 

In  the  meantime  the  imperial  mandate  to  organize  a  new  cabinet 
lingered  between  Marquis  Saionji,  Count  Inouye,  and  Viscount 
Katsura,  until  Katsura  succeeded,  a  month  after  the  fall  of  the  last 
cabinet,  in  forming  its  successor.  It  consisted  of  younger  men  of 
that  school  of  statesmen  whose  sympathy  was  with  the  Elders  and 
peers,  who,  like  their  typical  field  marshal,  Yamagata,  were  known 
to  be  skeptical  of  the  wisdom  of  the  party  government.  Hardly  a 
more  singular  spectacle  can  be  imagined  than  the  one  afforded  by 
this  new  cabinet,  which  was  at  once  as  little  respected  from  out- 
side as  internally  it  was  united  and  tactful,  and  which  was  as 
securely  supported  by  the  peers  as  its  relation  to  the  representatives 
was  precarious.  The  latter,  particularly  Marquis  Ito's  followers, 
could  not  have  loved  the  successor  who  seemed  to  have  stolen  into 
the  post  vacated  by  their  leader,  whose  untimely  downfall  from  the 
cabinet  had  embittered  them.  Nor  could  the  feeling  be  suppressed 
that,  emerging  from  the  house  of  peers,  the  new  cabinet  now  had 
the  use  of  the  very  twenty-one  millions  of  increased  taxes  to  which 
its  members  were  so  recently  and  so  stubbornly  opposed. 

Again  it  was  through  the  financial  question  that  the  struggle 
opened  between  the  government  and  the  diet.  The  accounts  of  the 
fiscal  year  1901  showed  a  deficit  of  44  millions,  and  the  proposed 
war  loan  of  50  millions  to  be  floated  in  the  United  States  failing 
at  the  eleventh  hour,  the  difficulty  was  tided  over  by  ingenious  ma- 
nipulations. In  the  budget  for  the  next  year,  however,  it  was  pro- 
posed to  transfer  from  the  "  extraordinary  "  to  the  "  ordinary  " 
class  of  accounts  the  works  to  be  defrayed  by  public  bonds,  repre- 


PARTIES     AND    POLITICS  231 

1893-1906 

senting  18  millions,  as  well  as  the  net  income  to  the  government 
from  the  Chinese  indemnity,  amounting  to  38  millions.  The  As- 
sociationists  opposed  this  budget  on  rather  unimportant  grounds, 
but,  at  Ito's  advice,  consented  to  its  passage  with  the  pledge  of  the 
cabinet  to  reorganize  the  official  system  of  the  government  with  a 
view  to  eliminating  spurious  posts  and  retrenching  administrative 
expenditures.  The  marquis  had,  however,  started,  on  September 
18,  on  his  tour  round  the  world,  leaving  an  advice  to  his  party  that 
a  friendly  neutrality  should  characterize  its  attitude  toward  the 
cabinet.  He  attended  the  bicentennial  celebration  of  Yale  Universi- 
sity,  where  he  was  honored  with  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Laws. 
Thence  he  sailed  to  Europe,  receiving  warm  greetings  from  the 
governments  of  the  countries  through  which  he  passed.  Shortly 
before  he  returned  home  on  February  25,  1902,  however,  an  event 
took  place  which  for  the  time  being  arrested  the  attention  of  the 
whole  world — the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  agreed  on  January  30 
and  published  February  11. 

The  full  contents  and  import  of  the  agreement  of  this  alliance 
will  be  discussed  later  in  connection  with  the  diplomatic  history  of 
Japan.  In  short,  it  declared  unequivocally  that  the  two  govern- 
ments were  for  peace  and  order  and  against  territorial  aggressions 
in  China  and  Korea ;  and  that,  if  one  of  them  should  be  compelled 
to  go  to  war  with  a  third  power  in  order  to  protect  its  now  vested 
interests  in  those  countries  against  the  threatening  conduct  of  the 
enemy,  the  other  party  would  be  neutral  and  make  efforts  to  prevent 
other  powers  from  joining  in  hostilities  against  its  ally ;  but  that  if 
any  other  power  or  powers  should  join  in  war  against  the  ally, 
then  the  other  party  should  come  to  its  assistance,  and  conduct  the 
war  in  common.  It  may  well  be  imagined  with  what  enthusiasm 
the  news  was  received  by  both  friends  and  foes  of  the  cabinet  in 
the  two  houses  of  the  diet,  as  it  was  there  for  the  first  time  made 
known  to  the  world  on  February  11,  when  even  the  peers  broke 
their  usual  decorum  and  applauded.  Nothing  could  have  strength- 
ened the  position  of  the  Katsura  cabinet  more  than  this  successful 
culmination  of  a  series  of  negotiations  carried  on  in  absolute  secrecy 
with  a  great  power  whose  policy  of  "  splendid  isolation "  had 
seemed  to  be  traditional.  It  would  be  only  fair  to  say,  however, 
that  but  for  the  international  fame  which  Japan  had  won  for  her- 
self in  the  Chinese  war  of  1894-1895  and  latterly  in  the  North  China 
campaign  of  1900,  coupled  with  the  tact  and  influence  of  Viscount 


U%  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

Aoki  and  Mr.  Kato,  former  Japanese  ministers  at  London,  even  the 
increased  common  interests  of  the  two  powers  in  the  East  and  the 
combined  effort  of  Baron  Komura,  the  foreign  minister,  and  Vis- 
count Hayashi  and  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  the  respective  repre- 
sentatives of  the  two  governments  at  London  and  Tokyo,  would 
not  perhaps  have  been  sufficient  to  bring  about  the  consummation 
of  the  great  diplomatic  enterprise.  It  was  even  suspected  in  some 
quarters  that  Germany  also  may  have  been  instrumental  in  promot- 
ing the  new  alliance,  as  her  well-known  policy  of  setting  England 
and  Russia  against  each  other  for  her  own  benefit  would  be  best 
served  in  the  Far  East  by  wedding  England  to  the  inveterate  object 
of  Russia's  jealousy.  A  more  interesting  question  for  us  here 
regards  the  position  in  this  affair  of  Marquis  Ito,  who  had  recently 
held  conferences  with  the  Russian  foreign  minister,  Count  Lams- 
dorf,  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  had  just  been  honored  by  Edward  VII. 
of  England  with  a  Grand  Cross  of  Bath.  Whether  the  former  fact 
indicated  his  preference  for  a  Russian  entente,  or  whether  the  latter 
was  a  conclusive  evidence  of  an  eminent  service  he  had  rendered 
toward  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  British  agreement,  has 
been  a  matter  of  much  speculation.  There  exists  authoritative  evi- 
dence to  show  as  conclusively  that  his  negotiations  with  Lams- 
dorf  had  been  carried  out  with  the  full  knowledge  of  the  Katsura 
cabinet,  as  to  prove  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  latter's  pourparlers 
with  the  British  government  were  also  continually  intimated  to  the 
marquis  during  his  tour.  Probably  his  negotiations  at  St.  Peters- 
burg were  less  successful,  while  the  cabinet's  agreement  with  Great 
Britain  was  more  readily  concluded  than  he  had  expected.  Imme- 
diately after  his  return  to  Japan  the  tactful  statesman  somewhat 
checked  political  gossip  by  intimating  his  agreement  with  the  cabi- 
net in  its  British  policy. 

The  formation  of  the  alliance  must  have  had  some  bearing  on 
the  success  of  the  Japanese  government  in  floating  the  fifty  million 
yen  ($25,000,000)  public  bonds  at  London  in  the  autumn  of  1902, 
which  had  been  rejected  a  year  before  from  the  financial  market  of 
New  York.  The  income  of  this  foreign  loan  was  not  devoted  to 
new  public  works,  but  employed  to  refill  the  deficiencies  of  the  old 
accounts. 

Aside  from  these  successes,  the  path  of  the  Katsura  cabinet 
was  thorny.  It  could  count  upon  no  partisan  support  in  the  lower 
house,  nor  could  its  personnel  and  prestige  command  high  respect. 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  233 

1893-1906 

Its  main  strength  lay  in  its  remarkable  unity,  silence,  tact,  and  ap- 
parent fairness.  The  last  quality  was  manifested  anew  in  its  im- 
partial attitude  during  the  general  election  for  the  seventeenth  diet. 
The  previous  diet  was  the  first  in  its  history  that  had  served  its  full 
term  of  four  years  without  dissolution,  and  the  present  election 
saw  the  first  operation  of  the  new  election  law.  Of  the  376  elected 
representatives,  the  Constitutional  Political  Association  returned 
the  absolute  majority  of  192,  while  the  Progressives  numbered 
about  80.  The  house  contained  entirely  new  members  to  the  num- 
ber of  227,  but  aside  from  this  one  fact,  no  particular  faction  had 
made  any  appreciable  gain  or  loss,  so  that  the  status  quo  of  all  the 
parties  was  in  fact  maintained.  Once  convened,  however,  the  con- 
duct of  the  house  demonstrated  how  precarious  therein  was  the  con- 
dition of  the  cabinet.  The  opposition  of  the  house  would  probably 
not  have  been  so  precipitate  had  not  the  interest  dear  to  eight- 
tenths  of  the  representatives  been  directly  assailed  by  the  govern- 
ment's proposition  to  retain  the  increased  rate  of  the  land  tax, 
which,  as  will  be  remembered,  had  been  intended  to  return  in  1904 
from  3.3  to  2.5  per  cent. 

Inasmuch  as  this  proposition  had  arisen  from  the  second  post- 
bellum  measure  of  naval  extension,  it  becomes  necessary  to  say  a  few 
words  concerning  the  status  of  the  Japanese  navy.  The  first  pro- 
gramme as  planned  by  the  second  ltd  cabinet  in  1895,  and  agreed  to 
by  the  diet,  contemplated  an  increase  of  Japan's  naval  force,  in  ten 
years,  from  33  war  vessels  and  26  torpedo  boats,  aggregating  the 
63,000  tons'  displacement  of  the  fleet  before  the  China  war,  to  67 
vessels,  besides  11  torpedo-boat  destroyers  and  115  torpedo  boats, 
with  a  total  displacement  of  258,000  tons,  at  the  end  of  1905.  Of 
this  tonnage  at  the  end  of  1902  there  was  252,180  tons,  represent- 
ing 72  vessels  of  all  kinds.  Formidable  as  these  figures  would  seem, 
it  had  long  been  plain  to  the  statesmen  of  the  empire  that  deductions 
must  be  made  for  vessels  built  more  than  twenty  years  before  and 
for  others  whose  terms  of  usefulness  must  shortly  expire  one  after 
another.  Even  if  the  present  force  were  maintained,  each  of  the  six 
great  naval  powers  of  the  world, — Great  Britain,  France,  Russia, 
the  United  States,  Germany,  and  Italy, — would  have  completely 
outrun  Japan  by  the  end  of  1908;  while  the  Japanese,  after  deduct- 
ing vessels  older  than  twenty  years,  would  hardly  possess  more  than 
145,000  tons.  Japan's  naval  ambition  was  animated,  not  so  much 
by  an  inordinate  elation  as  a  civilized  power   as  by  the  necessity  of 


234  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

maintaining  her  position  in  East  Asia  and  guaranteeing  her  own 
independence.  When  these  matters  are  considered,  the  new  pro- 
gramme of  naval  expansion,  as  at  last  set  forth  by  the  Katsura  cab- 
inet, rather  surprises  one  with  its  modesty.  It,  in  short,  contemplated 
the  construction,  in  the  course  of  eleven  years,  of  three  battleships 
each  of  15,000  tons'  displacement,  three  armored  cruisers  each  of 
10,000  tons,  and  two  second-class  cruisers  each  of  5000  tons,  total- 
ing 85,000  tons'  displacement,  besides  fifteen  torpedo-boat  destroyers 
and  fifty  torpedo  boats.  No  one  could  have  seriously  opposed  this 
programme  had  it  not  been  for  its  financial  side.  The  source  of  the 
estimated  annual  outlay  of  11.5  million  yen  which  the  proposed 
plan  entailed  upon  the  government  could,  according  to  its  opinion, 
be  found  nowhere  but  in  the  retention  of  the  increased  rate  of  the 
land  tax,  augmented  by  other  slight  items  of  revenue.  To  the 
seventy  or  eighty  per  cent.,  however,  of  the  members  of  the  lower 
house,  who  had  pledged  their  word  to  their  constituencies  to  restore 
by  all  means  the  old  rate  of  the  tax,  it  was  no  argument  to  say  that 
the  landowners  had  been  inequitably  lightly  taxed  by  the  side  of 
the  urban  population,  nor  to  prove  the  impossibility  of  raising  the 
necessary  expenditure  by  any  other  safe  means  than  the  retention  of 
the  increased  rate.  Into  their  hands  no  sharper  weapon  against  the 
government  could  have  fallen  than  the  one  which  the  helpless  cabinet 
gratuitously  furnished  them  under  the  pressure  of  an  apparent 
necessity.  Upon  this  juncture,  what  was  the  attitude  of  Marquis  ltd 
and  his  party,  which  controlled  an  absolute  majority  in  the  lower 
house? 

To  answer  this  question  is  again  to  describe  another  turning 
point  in  the  remarkable  career  of  this  statesman.  It  was  made  known 
early  in  the  season,  and  no  partisan  view  could  well  refute,  that  the 
marquis  was  in  sympathy  with  the  cabinet  so  far  as  its  naval  pro- 
gramme was  concerned,  which  he  was  reported  to  have  deemed 
even  too  moderate.  As  regarded  the  land  tax  question,  however, 
which  he  had  once  in  the  past  years  considered  it  wise  to  increase 
even  to  four  per  cent.,  he  now,  either  from  conviction  or  from  policy, 
assumed  an  attitude  of  unusual  deliberation.  Nothing  could  have 
been  more  disastrous  to  the  cabinet,  and  more  decisive  for  the 
termination  of  his  career  as  a  party  leader,  than  his  studied  reticence 
about  this  important  problem.  The  "  whips  "  of  his  party  deliber- 
ately overrode  him,  and  ordered  its  long  expectant  local  branches, 
soon  after  the  general  election,  to  forward  to  the  headquarters 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  235 

1893-1906 

resolutions  against  both  the  naval  extension  and  the  retention  of  the 
increased  land  tax.  Resolutions  accordingly  poured  in  thick  and 
fast.  At  the  same  time,  the  marquis  was  flooded  with  personal 
appeals  to  him  to  come  out  squarely  against  the  unpopular  govern- 
ment. It  is  plain  that  the  action  of  his  subordinates  was  calculated 
to  intimidate  him  more  than  the  cabinet.  His  authority  as  the 
president  of  the  Constitutional  Political  Association  had  been  ig- 
nored, and  he  yielded,  perhaps  in  order  to  save  others'  and  his  own 
dignity.  Shortly  before  the  opening  of  the  diet,  on  November  26, 
the  marquis,  after  a  deliberation  lasting  four  weeks,  conveyed  to 
Premier  Katsura  his  opinion,  reiterating  that  the  naval  expansion 
was  necessary,  that  the  burden  of  the  increased  land  tax  was  not 
particularly  onerous,  but  that  he  did  not  think  it  politic  at  present 
to  prolong  the  term  of  the  increase,  and,  finally,  that  the  naval 
expenditure  might  be  met  by  postponing  or  suspending  some  of  the 
less  urgent  public  works.  After  further  conferences,  the  premier, 
on  December  3,  personally  assured  the  marquis  of  his  sense  of 
gratitude  for  his  counsel,  but  firmly  announced  that,  inasmuch  as 
the  budget  had  been  sanctioned  by  his  majesty,  and  as  it  would  be 
unwise  for  the  cabinet  to  resign  on  the  eve  of  the  meeting  of  the  diet, 
it  remained  for  him  to  make  an  effort  to  carry  through  his  proposed 
plan.  After  this  friendly  ultimatum  was  pronounced  the  outcome 
of  the  measure  could  hardly  be  doubted,  for  the  presence  of  the 
common  enemy  speedily  brought  about  a  temporary  alliance  of  the 
Associationists  and  the  Progressives.  The  irresistible  coalition 
found  its  first  opportunity  to  assail  the  cabinet  when  the  latter  made 
an  imprudent  but  sincere  move  to  connect  three  things — the  budget, 
the  navy  bill,  and  the  land  tax  measure — declaring  the  absolute 
necessity  of  upholding  them  together  and  the  impossibility  of  an 
alternative  course  of  action.  The  allied  parties  in  the  lower  house 
found  herein  a  justification  for  modifying  Marquis  Ito's  suggestion 
to  carefully  study  the  budget  with  a  view  to  discovering  adequate 
means  to  balance  the  naval  expenditure  without  resorting  to  the 
increased  land  tax.  The  committee  on  finance  straightway  nega- 
tived the  land  tax  bill,  and  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  Decem- 
ber 16,  when  it  came  before  the  house,  the  chair  read  an  imperial 
mandate  suspending  the  diet  for  five  days.  This  was  followed  by 
another  suspension,  and  during  this  interval  Prince  Konoye,  pres- 
ident of  the  peers,  and  Baron  Kodama,  military  governor  of  For- 
mosa, sought  in  vain  to  effect  a  compromise  between  the  truculent 


2S6  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

lower  house  and  the  cabinet.  The  latter,  however,  having  ex- 
pressed willingness  to  make  reasonable  concessions,  two  representa- 
tives of  each  of  the  opposition  parties  met  the  premier  and  the 
ministers  of  finance  and  navy,  on  December  25,  to  discuss  the 
compromise  measure  proposed  by  the  latter.  This  compromise 
reduced  the  tax  rate  to  three  per  cent,  and  agreed  to  make  up  the 
balance  by  postponing  some  public  works  and  retrenching  general 
administrative  expenses.  When  this  new  plan  was  submitted  to  the 
parties  at  large,  the  latter  roundly  rejected  it,  Count  Okuma,  the 
Progressive  leader,  going  so  far  as  to  intimate  that  his  party  was 
fundamentally  opposed  to  the  cabinet,  which  it  considered  uncon- 
stitutional. Under  these  circumstances  it  was  no  longer  possible 
for  the  government  to  cooperate  with  the  house,  which  was  accord- 
ingly dissolved  on  December  28. 

When  the  year  1903  dawned  upon  Japan  it  found  her  political 
conditions  extremely  unstable.  The  alliance  of  the  Associationists 
and  Progressives  seemed  unnatural,  and  the  discipline  of  Marquis 
ltd  over  the  former  appeared  no  longer  tenable.  The  coalition  had 
been  based  on  no  positive  political  principle,  nor  could  the  bulk  of 
the  Association  be  successfully  controlled  by  one,  however  personally 
respected,  whose  double  capacity  as  trusted  Elder  Statesman  and  an 
opposition  leader  was  ever  liable  to  lead  him  into  positions  highly 
repugnant  to  those  who  preferred  an  open  and  relentless  warfare 
with  the  cabinet.  The  two  parties  had  already  parted  hands  when 
the  eighteenth  diet  was  convened  for  an  extra  session  in  May.  As 
to  the  impossible  situation  of  Marquis  Ito,  to  which  reference  has 
just  been  made,  it  was  not  long  before  it  was  demonstrated  anew 
and  with  a  decisive  effect.  The  occasion  was  again  in  connection 
with  the  naval  extension  measure,  the  urgent  character  of  which  was 
freshly  brought  home  to  the  thoughtful  people  by  the  partial  failure 
of  Russia  to  effect  the  second  evacuation  of  Manchuria  and  her 
simultaneous  pressure  upon  the  Peking  court  and  the  Korean  fron- 
tier. The  cabinet  presented  to  the  house  some  supplementary  esti- 
mates to  the  budget  for  the  fiscal  year  of  1903,  together  with  eight 
bills,  two  of  which  related  to  the  navy  and  the  new  three  per  cent, 
land  tax.  The  manifest  hostility  of  the  house  again  called  forth  on 
May  21  a  suspension  of  the  diet.  On  the  23d,  at  a  general  meeting 
of  the  Association,  Marquis  Ito  made  an  earnest  appeal  to  his  party 
to  accept  the  compromise  measure  which  he,  as  an  Elder  Statesman, 
and  under  the  entreaties  of  his  non-partisan  friends,  had  agreed 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  237 

1893-1906 

with  the  cabinet  to  support.  Under  the  terms  of  this  agreement  the 
government  was  understood  to  reintroduce  the  land  tax  bill  for 
show,  but  to  consent  finally  to  raise  the  required  annual  naval 
expenditure  of  eleven  and  a  half  millions  by  a  yearly  flotation  of 
public  bonds  for  six  millions,  retrenchment  in  administrative  ex- 
penses to  the  extent  of  one  million,  and  deflection  from  the  outlay 
for  railroads  and  other  works  to  the  sum  of  four  and  a  half  millions. 
The  appeal  of  the  marquis  was  not  accepted  by  his  party  without  a 
powerful  opposition  and  a  great  sacrifice,  which  we  shall  presently 
see.  The  painful  compromise  measure  was  further  mangled  when 
the  house  cut  the  supplementary  budget  estimates  by  five  millions, 
covering  the  cost  of  a  few  important  undertakings,  and,  in  return 
for  the  passage  of  the  naval  programme,  exacted  from  the  govern- 
ment pledges  to  effect  a  drastic  reorganization  of  finance  and  admin- 
istration, and  to  place  the  railroad  accounts  under  the  "  extraordi- 
nary "  class  of  national  expenditures.  The  climax  was  reached 
when  the  defeat  of  an  address  to  the  throne  proposed  by  the  Pro- 
gressive members,  censuring  the  cabinet,  was  quickly  followed  by 
the  passage  of  a  resolution  of  similar  censure  which  was  proposed 
by  the  Associationists  themselves.  It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  the 
last  act  was  no  less  a  blow  to  Marquis  Ito  than  to  the  Katsura 
cabinet.  The  latter  had,  moreover,  to  endure  the  displeasure  of  its 
best  friends,  the  peers,  who  passed  a  petition  to  the  government  to 
desist  from  the  highly  unwise  policy  of  resorting  to  a  national  loan, 
and  a  minority  of  whom  even  had  contemplated  proposing  an  address 
to  the  throne  deprecating  the  same  policy. 

The  eighteenth  diet,  which  was  prorogued  on  June  5,  left  the 
politics  of  Japan  in  an  even  more  confused  state  than  before  its 
opening.  The  humiliation  of  the  cabinet  was  only  matched  by  the 
internal  injuries  which  the  parties  had  suffered  for  their  conduct. 
The  former,  whose  diplomatic  duties  in  Korea  and  Manchuria  were 
threatening  to  rise  to  a  hitherto  unknown  degree  of  difficulty,  had 
been  forced  by  the  merciless  diet  not  only  to  retreat  from  the  stand 
it  originally  took  in  regard  to  the  most  important  problem  of  the 
nation,  but  also  to  bear  the  burden  of  the  imposed  responsibility  of 
reorganizing  the  financial  and  administrative  machinery  on  an  almost 
impossible  basis.  The  Progressives  could  scarcely  conceal  the  inhar- 
mony  of  their  leaders  in  regard  to  the  immediate  policy  the  party 
should  pursue.  Far  more  demoralized  was  the  Association,  which 
had  been  born  under  too  favorable  auspices,  and  possessed  too 


238  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

absorbing  a  desire  for  power,  to  maintain  its  mental  poise  when  it 
found  itself  as  an  opposition  party.  It  had  then  appeared  to  lack 
the  tried  perseverance  of  the  Progressives,  while  its  irritation  had 
been  greatly  intensified  by  the  double  position  of  Marquis  Ito,  who 
would  on  the  one  hand  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  cabinet  in 
his  independent  capacity  as  an  Elder  Statesman,  and  on  the  other 
maintain  his  disciplinarian  leadership  of  the  opposition  party.  Nor 
can  it  be  concealed  that  the  marquis,  dignified  statesman  and  bril- 
liant counselor  as  he  is,  hardly  possesses  attributes  which  appeal  to 
the  hearts  of  the  people  and  inspire  the  enthusiastic  loyalty  of  his 
followers.  It  seemed  evident  that  the  majority  of  the  party  from 
the  beginning  respected  his  prestige  and  influence,  which  was  con- 
sidered as  a  political  asset,  more  than  either  his  constitutional  ideals 
or  his  personality.  Since  they  saw  that  the  shortest  road  to  power 
would  lie  in  the  direction  of  unequivocally  upholding  the  proprietary 
interest  of  the  country,  nothing  could  have  seemed  more  galling 
to  some  of  them  than  a  compromise  which  would  deprive  their 
parliamentary  warfare  of  these  essential  tactics.  Around  this  senti- 
ment as  a  center  there  seem  to  have  clustered  various  other  motives 
for  disloyalty.  Some  Associationists  resented  the  autocratic  rule 
of  the  president,  and  advocated  a  more  republican  form  of  party 
organization,  and  others  denounced  the  marquis  for  sacrificing  the 
dignity  of  the  party  for  his  position  as  an  Elder.  Desertion  of 
several  members,  including  the  late  lamented  president  of  the  lower 
house,  Kataoka,  and  the  present  mayor  of  Tokyo,  Ozaki,  was 
followed  by  the  dissolution  of  a  few  local  branches.  The  culmina- 
tion, however,  was  the  resignation  of  the  president  himself,  which 
occurred  on  July  13.  The  marquis  had  at  length  yielded  to  the 
arguments  of  his  fellow-Elders,  which  had  long  been  becoming 
more  and  more  solicitous,  that  his  proper  mission  was  rather  that 
of  a  trusted  councilor  to  the  throne  than  one  of  party  leadership. 
The  Manchurian  question  was  assuming  a  more  serious  character 
than  before,  and  the  resumption  by  the  marquis  of  the  presidency 
of  the  privy  council  appeared  to  the  Elders,  and  perhaps  also  to  the 
emperor,  as  the  most  natural  course  of  events.  The  appointment 
was  finally  made  on  July  13,  after  Ito  had  given  the  matter  his 
characteristically  careful  consideration.  His  severance  from  the 
party  naturally  followed,  as  no  privy  councilor  might  entertain 
partisan  connections.  In  the  leadership  of  the  Association  he  was 
succeeded,  at  his  own  suggestion,  by  Marquis  Saionji,  his  friend 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  239 

1893-1906 

and  also  one  of  the  most  promising  statesmen  of  the  day.  Thus 
after  a  wandering  of  nearly  three  years  the  prodigal  son,  with  per- 
haps a  valuable  experience  but  scarcely  an  added  prestige,  returned 
to  the  fold  of  the  council  and  the  court.  In  accepting  the  post  of 
the  chief  councilor,  he  said  to  the  emperor  that  it  was  his  desire  of 
seeing  the  perfect  operation  of  the  Constitution,  which  he  had  had 
the  honor  of  framing,  that  had  induced  him  to  descend  to  a  political 
party  and  lead  it;  but  that,  as  he  was  now,  even  before  his  work 
with  the  party  had  barely  begun,  graciously  called  by  his  majesty 
to  resume  the  chair  of  the  council,  he  convinced  himself  that  it  would 
be  as  much  a  contribution  toward  the  realization  of  the  constitutional 
regime  to  "  stand  near  the  throne  and  reverently  answer  imperial 
questions  regarding  important  affairs  of  the  state,"  as  to  "  move 
among  the  people  as  a  party  leader."  No  student  of  the  Japanese 
politics  of  to-day  can  fail  to  observe  the  large  place  Marquis  ltd 
occupies  therein  as  the  pilot  of  the  state,  and  also  his  full  conscious- 
ness of  the  fact.  His  apparent  failure  as  a  partisan  seems  to  have 
brought  him  back  to  his  normal  position.  It  will  soon  be  seen  that 
he  returned  thither  in  an  opportune  season.  Her  foreign  affairs 
were  just  drifting  Japan  toward  an  ocean  of  unknown  difficulties. 

In  the  meanwhile,  Premier  Katsura  had  tendered  his  resignation 
on  the  just  plea  that  an  adequate  conduct  of  the  government  was 
incompatible  with  the  slender  means  in  which  the  diet  had  left  the 
exchequer.  Neither  this  argument  nor  the  somewhat  reduced  physi- 
cal condition  of  the  viscount  would,  however,  induce  the  throne  to 
relinquish  its  confidence  in  him.  Thereupon  the  premier  reminded 
the  emperor,  and  it  was  agreed  to  by  his  majesty,  that  his  retention 
of  the  portfolio  could  mean  nothing  else  than  a  drastic  retrenchment 
of  the  administrative  and  financial  expenditures  of  the  state.  This 
colossal  task  the  cabinet  set  about  with  characteristically  quiet 
determination. 

The  arduous  and  cheerless  life  of  the  cabinet  was  somewhat 
brightened  when  it  received  into  its  community,  in  July,  General 
Baron  Kocama,  military  governor  of  Formosa,  and  latterly  the 
able  chief  of  Field  Marshal  Oyama's  staff,  and,  in  September,  three 
other  able  young  men.  Nothing,  however,  could  have  been  more 
gratifying  to  the  cabinet  than  the  fact  that,  while  its  hold  upon  the 
lower  house  of  the  diet  was  next  to  nothing,  its  apparent  patriotism 
and  sincerity,  as  well  as  its  fair  degree  of  ability,  had  begun  to  be 
appreciated  by  the  throne,  the  Elders,  and  the  peers,  and  perhaps 


240  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

somewhat  by  the  people  at  large.  The  confidence  with  which  its 
general  purpose  was  regarded  by  the  nation  was  best  demonstrated 
in  1 903- 1 904,  during  its  protracted  and  otherwise  exasperating  ne- 
gotiations with  Russia  regarding  Manchuria  and  Korea.  It  was  re- 
markable that,  in  spite  of  the  increasing  irritation  which  one  report 
after  another  of  the  Russian  aggression  in  these  territories  caused 
in  the  national  mind,  the  Katsura  cabinet  appeared  so  little  inclined 
to  stray  from  its  policy  of  a  firm  but  fair  treatment  of  the  question, 
as  did  the  people  to  force  its  hands  to  a  rash  action.  If  this  remark- 
able phenomenon  was,  in  part,  due  to  the  deeper  and  more  mature 
feeling  which  was  now  inspiring  the  nation  than  had  been  experi- 
enced before,  it  none  the  less  redounded  to  the  honest  purpose  of 
the  cabinet.  Nor  were  its  care  and  precision  in  all  lines  of  its  policy 
less  remarkable  than  its  general  sincerity. 

The  crisis  in  Korea  and  Manchuria  was,  in  the  meanwhile, 
advancing  with  tragic  certainty,  until  the  apparently  insignificant 
cabinet  was  called  upon  to  lead  the  nation  through  the  greatest  trial 
of  its  life.  The  war  with  Russia,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  later  chapter, 
broke  out  in  February,  1904,  followed  by  nineteen  months  of  the 
vast  campaign  and  the  brilliant  victories  of  the  Japanese  army  and 
navy.  The  existence  of  the  war,  of  course,  again  united  the  entire 
nation,  and  completely  changed  the  conditions  of  Japan's  domestic 
politics,  which  might  otherwise  have  made  a  prolonged  life  unen- 
durable to  the  cabinet.  Its  financial  measures  were  supported  by 
the  diet,  not  without  amendments,  but  on  the  whole  with  practical 
unanimity.  The  156  million  yen  of  the  extraordinary  war  expendi- 
tures disbursed  under  an  imperial  ordinance  of  December  28,  1903, 
were  willingly  sanctioned  by  the  twentieth  session  of  the  diet  in 
March,  1904.  It  also  passed  the  new  tobacco  manufacture  monopoly 
law  elaborately  drafted  by  the  government,  and  approved  the  ex- 
traordinary war  expenditures  for  the  fiscal  year  1904- 1905,  amount- 
ing to  420  million  yen.  This  last  act  not  only  involved  the  rais- 
ing of  the  public  and  temporary  loans  and  exchequer  bonds  to 
the  amount  of  131  millions,  but  also  an  increase  in  tax  rates  and  the 
imposition  of  new  consumption  taxes  on  woolen  textiles  and  kero- 
sene oil.  The  next  session  of  the  diet  also  met  the  requisitions  of 
the  government  by  further  increasing  the  tax  rates  and  creating 
newer  taxes,  and  approving  571  millions  of  new  national  loans  and 
63  millions  to  be  transferred  from  funds  under  the  so-called  special 
accounts,  making  the  total  war  expenditures  of  the  second  period 


PARTIES     AND     POLITICS  241 

1893-1906 

780  million  yen.  The  grand  total  of  the  war  cost  approved  by  the 
diet  in  the  two  sessions  thus  aggregated  1356  millions.  This  amount 
became  inadequate,  as  the  army  in  the  field,  especially  after  the  battle 
of  Mukden,  in  February-March,  1905,  was  increased  to  an  unprece- 
dented magnitude.  A  new  foreign  loan  for  30  million  pounds 
floated,  in  July,  in  London,  New  York,  and  Berlin,  brought  the 
figure  up  to  1656  million  yen.  Fortunately,  the  rice  crop  for  1904 
was  unusually  good ;  an  early  control  of  the  sea  held  open  the  high- 
ways of  Japan's  Eastern  trade;  the  reduction  of  local  impositions 
and  expenditures  counterbalanced  the  rise  in  national  taxes ;  and  the 
savings  and  general  financial  endurance  of  the  people  at  large  proved 
unexpectedly  great.  The  unforeseen  successes  of  Japan's  arms 
also  contributed  to  the  temporary  prestige  of  the  cabinet. 

The  spell  was  broken  the  moment  peace  was  restored.  The 
broad  concessions  made  through  the  peace  envoys  at  Portsmouth 
for  the  conclusion  of  the  Russo-Japanese  treaty  of  September  5 
brought  upon  the  cabinet  (and  the  privy  council)  the  greatest 
popular  resentment  ever  experienced  by  any  constitutional  govern- 
ment of  Japan.  Various  motives  and  circumstances  combined  to 
make  the  sentiment  for  a  time  almost  unanimous  among  the  nation. 
The  conclusion,  on  August  12,  of  the  agreement  of  a  renewed  and 
much  extended  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  which  was  published 
on  September  27,  somewhat  relieved  the  strained  situation,  and  the 
Constitutional  Political  Association,  under  the  leadership  of  Mar- 
quis Saionji,  showed  an  inclination  for  a  moderate  policy  toward 
the  treaty  and  the  government.  The  relative  position  of  the  differ- 
ent parties  was  again  rendered  uncertain,  so  that  their  conduct  in 
the  coming  session  of  the  diet  could  hardly  be  forecast.  As  to  the 
cabinet,  it  must  either  succumb  to  an  attack  from  the  majority  in  the 
lower  house,  or  survive  it  only  to  be  confronted  by  colossal  finan- 
cial difficulties. 

On  January  6,  1906,  after  five  years  of  existence,  the  cabinet 
resigned,  and  Count  Katsura  was  immediately  followed  by  Marquis 
Kin-Mochi  Saionji,  leader  of  the  Constitutional  party.  The  first 
problem  to  confront  the  new  ministry  was  a  famine  in  northern 
Japan  affecting  nearly  a  million  people.  This  was  caused  by  the 
partial  failure  of  the  rice  crop  in  1905  and  by  the  withdrawal  of 
many  thousands  of  agricultural  workers.  During  March  there  was 
before  the  diet  a  bill  for  the  government  ownership  of  railroads, 
which  was  finally  passed  March  27,  1906. 


Chapter  XVIII 

ECONOMIC  PROGRESS.     1 893-1906 

ONE  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  the  economic  evolu- 
tion of  Japan  since  1868  has  been  the  slow  increase  of  her 
rural  population  as  compared  with  the  urban — a  fact 
which  at  once  indicates  that  the  agriculture  of  Japan  can  offer  little 
to  compare  with  the  phenomenal  growth  of  her  manufactures  and 
commerce.  Nor  will  a  closer  examination  establish  an  optimistic 
view  regarding  the  future  status  of  the  Japanese  farmer.  Although 
a  sedimentary  soil  admirably  suited  for  the  culture  of  cereals 
abounds  in  the  country,  and  often  yields  in  warmer  regions  two, 
three,  or  even  four  different  crops  during  the  year,  and  although 
Japan  is  blessed  with  a  copious  rainfall,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  arable  area  is  extremely  limited,  and  can  hardly  be  extended 
commensurately  with  the  fast  growth  of  the  population.  Of  the 
94.5  million  acres  of  land  of  Japan  exclusive  of  Formosa,  only  12.4 
million  acres,  or  thirteen  per  cent.,  are  under  cultivation,  while,  as 
is  well  known,  there  exists  little  or  no  pasture  land  in  Japan.  Even 
if  all  sorts  of  land  under  fifteen  degrees  of  the  angle  of  inclination 
were  arbitrarily  considered  as  reclaimable,  they  could  not  add  to 
the  arable  area  more  than  10.5  million  acres.  The  actual  reclama- 
tion outside  of  the  colony  of  Hokkaido  amounts  annually  to  only 
twenty  thousand  acres  more  or  less.  It  seems  evident  that  the 
future  increase  of  the  agricultural  resources  of  the  country  may  be 
effected  less  by  extensive  breaking  of  the  soil  than  by  intensive 
improvement.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  rice  culture,  the  area 
of  which  has  scarcely  been  increased  during  the  last  twenty  years, 
but  the  actual  product  of  which  has  in  the  meantime  risen  nearly 
eighty  per  cent.  The  production  of  other  cereals,  beans,  and  pota- 
toes has  grown  even  more  appreciably,  while  the  area  of  the  cotton, 
indigo,  and  sugar  culture  has,  for  commercial  reasons,  remarkably 
declined.  No  illustration,  however,  of  the  limited  agricultural 
resources  of  the  country  is  more  impressive  than  the  ratio  which 


ECONOMIC     PROGRESS  243 

1S93-1906 

her  arable  area  bears  to  her  population.  The  per  capita  distribution 
would  fall  below  half  an  acre.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is 
natural  that  the  cultivated  lots  are  diminutive,  more  than  half  of  the 
rice  fields  of  the  country  being  each  less  than  one-eighth  of  an  acre. 
The  farmer  is  obliged  to  exercise  the  utmost  care  in  utilizing  every 
scrap  of  his  land  and  every  grain  of  its  yield.  A  great  majority  of 
the  tenants,  moreover,  lack  a  sufficient  fund,  after  the  high  rents 
and  interest  are  paid,  even  to  buy  manure,  much  less  to  make  any 
improvement  on  the  land.  The  implements  are  as  meager  and  prim- 
itive— the  outfit  for  the  cultivation  of  an  acre  of  field  costing  proba- 
bly less  than  eight  and  a  half  dollars  in  gold — as  their  wages  are 
low,  seldom  rising  above  thirty-five  cents  per  day  for  the  male  and 
twenty  cents  for  the  female.  The  government  is  making  efforts  to 
develop  the  agriculture  of  the  country  by  all  possible  means  of 
education  and  encouragement,  not  the  least  important  of  which 
has  been  the  creation  of  the  central  and  local  Hypothec  Banks  and 
the  Credit  Guilds.  How  much,  however,  these  methods  will  really 
reach  the  needy  villagers  is  yet  to  be  seen.  On  the  other  hand, 
Japan  cannot  help  realizing  that  her  agriculture,  while  it  still  con- 
stitutes the  staple  industry  of  the  nation,  has  already  ceased  either 
to  supply  her  with  all  the  necessary  raw  products  for  the  manufac- 
tures or  to  support  the  new  population,  which  is  growing  annually  at 
the  rate  of  more  than  half  a  million.  Probably  this  serious  problem 
lies  behind  many  an  event  of  recent  years  that  characterizes  the 
activities  at  home  and  abroad  of  the  Japanese  people. 

The  difference  between  the  condition  of  agriculture  and  that  of 
manufactures  and  trade  not  only  is  clear,  but  also  becomes  increas- 
ingly decisive  as  time  advances.  Until  we  realize  this  significant 
difference  we  fail  to  grasp  the  most  fundamental  cause,  excepting 
perhaps  her  growing  ambition  as  a  nation,  that  impels  Japan  onward 
with  an  irresistible  force  into  a  controlling  position  in  the  Far  East. 
In  proceeding  to  explain  the  situation,  manufactures  and  trade  will 
be  considered  together,  as  their  influence  is  in  a  large  measure 
mutual. 

It  must  be  noted,  in  the  first  place,  that  when  the  country 
was  thrown  open  to  the  world's  trade,  her  industrial  conditions  were 
altogether  inadequate  to  meet  the  marvelously  rapid  increase  of  the 
consumption  of  new  goods.  The  original  five  per  cent,  import  duty, 
which  peculiar  circumstances  made  almost  equal  to  no  duty,  accel- 
erated the  impetuous  advance  of  imports  over  exports.     Thus  the 


244  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

first  decade  and  more  of  the  new  regime  found  the  nation  in  a 
state  of  almost  complete  economic  dependence  upon  foreign  coun- 
tries. Old  industries  were  largely  paralyzed,  while  capital  and 
labor  were  not  forthcoming  for  the  new.  It  was  at  this  juncture 
that  the  government  began  to  extend  a  helping  hand,  by  subsidies 
and  by  example,  to  the  more  important  economic  enterprises,  and 
not  until  then  could  the  people  begin  to  take  an  active  interest  in 
railroads,  industries,  and  export  trade.  The  fact  that  the  low 
import  tariff  had  been  forced  by  the  powers  upon  the  Japanese 
government,  whose  right  of  tariff  autonomy  they  had  thus  ignored, 
was  galling  to  the  nation  in  its  ardent  desire  to  regain  its  economic 
independence,  and  tended  powerfully  to  confirm  its  determination 
to  effect  a  revision  of  the  treaties.  These  were  revised  in  1894, 
and  the  new  treaties  which  emancipated  Japan  from  the  consular 
jurisdiction  of  the  foreign  residents  and  gave  her  a  partial  tariff 
autonomy  came  into  force  in  1899.  It  is  unnecessary  to  examine 
the  process  of  this  revision,  but  it  suffices  here  to  repeat  that  while 
consumption  had  advanced  marvelously  under  a  virtual  free  trade, 
production  began  to  grow  only  after  the  government  was  com- 
pelled to  aid  it.  From  this  point  on  trade  and  industry  have  helped 
each  other's  progress  by  mutual  reaction.  The  tremendous  expan- 
sion of  economic  resources  thus  rapidly  opened  in  the  two  great 
fields,  manufactures  and  commerce,  was  clearly  measured  by  the 
enormous  increase  of  population,  which  numbered  less  than  thirty 
millions  in  1830,  thirty-four  millions  in  1875,  forty-two  and  a 
quarter  in  1895,  and  more  than  forty-seven  to-day.  At  the  same 
time,  foreign  trade  itself  has  grown  from  40  million  yen  in  1871 
to  690  million  yen  in  1904,  the  per  capita  share  of  the  people  in  the 
growth  rising  more  than  twelvefold.  During  the  first  half  of  1905 
the  total  foreign  trade  in  merchandise  amounted  to  over  429 
million  yen,  as  compared  with  320  millions  during  the  correspond- 
ing period  in  1904.  In  other  words,  Japan  is  changing  from  an 
agricultural  to  an  increasingly  industrial  and  commercial  nation, 
and  her  commerce  is  expanding  mainly  abroad,  as  her  domestic 
market  has  well-nigh  reached  its  "  saturation  point."  This  fact 
is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  rapid  growth  of  the  exportation  of 
manufactured  goods,  as  well  as  the  importation  of  raw  material, 
as  compared  with  the  relatively  slow  increase  in  the  importation  of 
foreign  manufactures.  The  exports  of  manufactured  goods  in 
1890  amounted  to  10  million  yen  of  the  total  export  trade  of  55.7 


ECONOMIC     PROGRESS  245 

1893-1906 

millions,  while  ten  years  later  the  corresponding  rate  changed  to 
74.7  out  of  193.8  millions.  If  raw  silk,  straw-plaits,  and  the  like 
were  classed  under  agricultural,  instead  of  manufactured,  goods, 
the  rate  of  increase  between  1890  and  1900  of  different  kinds  of 
exports  would  run  as  follows : 

1890  1900 

Per  Cent.  Per  Cent. 

Manufactured 18.0  38.0 

Agricultural         51.6  37.8 

Fishing 6.6  3.5 

Mining 20.0  14.2 

Miscellaneous 3.8  6.5 


If  the  enumerated  goods  were  transferred  from  the  agricultural  to 
the  manufactured  list,  the  rate  would  be  thus: 


1898 
Per  Cent. 

Manufactured 70.9 

Agricultural 11.9 

Others 17.2 


While  the  rate  of  the  manufactured  exports  seems  to  have  fallen 
between  1898  and  1900,  their  absolute  figures  show  that  some  new 
items  appeared  in  the  list  during  the  interval  and  that  the  total 
volume  enormously  advanced.  On  the  other  hand,  the  imports, 
which  increased  together  with  the  purchasing  power  of  the  people, 
show  more  rapid  growth  in  raw  goods  and  machinery  than  in 
manufactured  articles.  These  changes  have  been  pointed  out  here 
in  order  to  indicate  the  general  nature  of  the  economic  transition 
of  the  Japanese  people.  They  will  be  found  to  possess  a  far  greater 
significance  than  we  have  seen  when  we  come  to  examine  further 
the  character  of  the  trade  tendencies  of  Japan. 

Let  us  for  a  moment  consider  the  qualifications  of  the  Japanese 
as  a  manufacturing  nation,  for  upon  them  must  ultimately  depend 
their  economic  as  well  as  general  national  success.  It  would  be 
impossible  to  conceal  from  our  view  certain  serious  disadvantages 
which  confront  industrial  Japan,  particularly  in  her  want  of 
the  new  form  of  labor  and  experience  and  lack  of  certain  raw 
materials  and  of  capital.  Regarding  labor,  the  old  manual  dex- 
terity and  individual  apprenticeship  have  hardly  had  time  to  be 


1899 

1900 

Per  Cent. 

Per  Cent. 

69.4 

66.0 

1 1.9 

10.5 

18.7 

23-5 

246  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

sufficiently  converted  into  an  organized  and  specialized  mechanical 
training,  so  that  the  foreign  visitors  report  continually  the  apparent 
inefficiency  and  ill  discipline  of  the  Japanese  mill-hand.  On  the 
other  hand,  Japan  cannot  forever  count  on  the  cheapness  of  her 
labor,  whose  cost  is  still  low,  the  average  daily  wage  of  twenty-six 
principal  classes  of  laborers  being  not  more  than  one-quarter  of  an 
American  dollar,  but  it  has  risen  more  than  twice  within  the  last 
fifteen  years,  and  will  continue  to  rise  along  with  the  cost  of  living. 
The  shortage  of  capital  is  natural  when  it  is  remembered  that  Japan 
is  just  passing  from  an  agricultural  to  a  manufacturing  stage,  but 
none  the  less  constitutes  the  most  serious  drawback  to  her  indus- 
trial growth.  Ingenuity  and  enterprise  are  not  wanting,  but  owing 
to  the  scarcity  of  capital  Japan's  exploitation  of  resources,  both  at 
home  and  in  Korea  and  China,  is  handicapped  to  an  extent  which 
is  exasperating.  Latterly,  however,  particularly  after  the  war, 
foreign  capitalists  have  been  seeking  investment  in  Japan,  and  they 
may  be  expected  to  aid  Japanese  enterprise  on  the  mainland.  The 
lack  of  proper  business  experience  of  the  Japanese  manufacturers 
is  natural  from  their  comparatively  recent  appearance.  They  have 
been  accused  of  over-eagerness  to  rid  themselves  of  foreign  advisers 
and  middlemen,  who  could  have  supplied  them  with  a  better  under- 
standing and  control  of  the  outside  market  than  they  themselves 
could  command.  The  native  maker,  however,  will  learn  deeper  by 
blundering  more.  A  graver  charge  has  continually  been  made  of 
the  slack  commercial  veracity  of  the  Japanese,  which  is  admitted 
by  themselves  to  be  real,  but  which  has  for  certain  reasons  been 
unduly  magnified,  while  it  is  naturally  being  remedied  by  expe- 
rience. Another  grave  disadvantage  of  the  Japanese  manufacturer 
consists  in  his  want  of  such  important  raw  materials  as  cotton, 
wool,  and  iron.  The  growth  of  cotton  in  Japan  is  insignificant, 
while  its  importation  from  India,  China,  and  the  United  States 
amounts  to  more  than  seventy  million  yen  annually.  Wool  has 
to  be  entirely  supplied  from  abroad,  as  pastures  for  sheep  do  not 
exist  in  Japan,  while  the  total  annual  output  of  iron  is  less  than 
eighty  thousand  short  tons. 

Reflection  will  show,  as  experience  has  proven,  that  the 
enumerated  disadvantages  are  neither  permanent  nor  irremediable. 
Labor  and  practical  wisdom  will  gain  by  time,  and  capital  and  raw 
material  will  come  in  with  greater  ease  and  in  larger  quantities. 
Over  against  these  diminishing  disadvantages  Japan  possesses  an 


ECONOMIC     PROGRESS  247 

1893-1906 

unrivaled  geographical  position  between  the  great  Pacific  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  teeming  millions  of  the  East  Asiatic  population 
on  the  other,  the  commercial  importance  of  both  of  which  must 
grow  wonderfully  with  the  development  of  canals  and  railroads  in 
various  parts  of  the  world  and  the  opening  of  new  markets  in  the 
yet  slightly  explored  East.  This  superb  Phoenicia-like  situation  of 
Japan  toward  the  outside  world  is  supported  internally  by  a  richly 
endowed  soil  and  an  eager  and  ambitious  race.  The  soil  possesses 
an  abundant  water  supply  and  extensive  coal  beds,  the  latter  already 
yielding  well-nigh  ten  million  tons,  and  produces  tea  and  silk  the 
peculiar  quality  of  which  is  hardly  matched  by  the  product  of 
another  land.  The  ambition  and  docility  of  the  people  would  seem 
to  be  well  exemplified  by  the  phenomenal  growth  of  silk  and  cotton 
textile  industries,  which  have  risen  twenty-fold  in  value  during  the 
last  two  decades,  and  by  the  creation  of  certain  new,  prosperous 
industries,  particularly  in  matting,  lucifer  matches,  straw  braids, 
and  cotton  yarns.  The  exportation  of  the  six  principal  branches 
of  manufactures  above  enumerated  amounted  in  1888  to  less  than 
31  million  yen,  and  nearly  195  millions  in  1904.  It  should  be 
remembered  that  none  of  these  articles  have  won  their  position 
without  encountering  embarrassing  difficulties  at  home  and  a  sharp 
competition  abroad,  and  that  with  a  relaxation  of  effort  they  would 
at  once  sink  into  insignificance. 

Considering  the  foreign  trade  .of  Japan  apart  from  her  manu- 
factures, it  is  seen  that  its  growth  during  the  last  eleven  years  has 
been  rapid  and  on  the  whole  regular.  During  this  space  of  time 
the  exports  in  1904  reached  3i9i  million  yen,  which  means  a  gain 
of  256  per  cent,  over  1893,  and  the  imports  371!  millions,  or  a 
gain  of  320  per  cent.,  while  the  total  volume  of  trade  amounted  to 
6ox)f  millions,  that  is,  nearly  three  times  as  much  as  it  was  a  decade 
ago.  The  figures  for  1905  will  possibly  exceed  the  850-million 
mark.  This  remarkable  growth  of  trade  has  advanced  hand  in 
hand  with  an  even  more  striking  development  of  Japan's  shipping 
industry.  At  the  end  of  1891  she  owned  607  steam  vessels  with  a 
total  tonnage  of  95,588,  while  in  1903  her  vessels  numbered  1088 
and  their  capacity  totaled  657,269  tons,  so  that  Japan  stood  in  1902 
in  the  ninth  place  in  tonnage  in  the  world's  merchant  marine,  and 
the  speed  and  general  improvement  of  her  ships  were  behind  only 
those  of  the  four  greatest  shipping  nations  on  the  globe.  The 
gross  income  from  freight  and  passengers  in   1902  amounted  to 


248  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

12$  million  yen.  Japanese  steamDoats  now  ply  regularly  between 
her  shores  and  the  ports  in  Siberia,  Australia,  India,  Europe,  and 
on  the  Pacific  coast  of  America,  and,  in  Korea  and  China,  they  play 
an  active  part  in  the  coasting  and  inland  navigation. 

We  conclude  this  section  by  briefly  pointing  out  what  appear 
to  be  the  most  significant  tendencies  of  Japan's  trade  and  of  her 
national  growth  in  general.  The  growth  of  imports,  which  have 
risen  from  23^  million  yen  in  1874  to  37$  millions  in  1904, 
is  mainly  due  to  causes  which  may  be  classified  as  follows :  First, 
the  progress  of  industries,  resulting  in  an  increasing  demand,  on 
the  one  hand,  for  machinery,  and,  on  the  other,  for  raw  mate- 
rials, particularly  cotton  and  iron;  second,  a  great  advance  in  the 
standard  of  living  among  the  people  at  large,  which  caused  a 
remarkable  growth  of  the  general  consumption  of  imported  articles, 
including  textiles,  woolens,  petroleum,  and  numerous  other  items; 
third,  the  rapid  increase  of  population,  coupled  with  the  transition 
of  the  new  nation  from  an  agricultural  to  a  manufacturing  state  of 
industry,  which,  besides  aiding  the  growth  of  general  consumption, 
necessitated  a  marked  development  of  the  importation  of  foodstuffs, 
such  as  rice,  beans,  flour,  and  sugar.  These  three  classes  of  causes 
have  all  stimulated  import  trade  to  grow  with  rapidity,  and  are  apt 
to  continue  to  do  so  in  the  future,  but,  as  the  figures  plainly  show, 
in  varying  degrees  from  one  another.  And  it  is  in  this  difference 
that  one  of  the  striking  indications  of  Japan's  call  in  the  East  is  to 
be  discovered.  The  increase  of  the  imports  due  to  the  growth  of 
the  general  consumption  of  foreign  goods  has  not  been  nearly  so 
fast  as  other  classes  of  imports,  as  Japan  is  able  to  supply  her 
people  more  and  more  with  the  fruits  of  her  own  manufacture, 
which  itself  is  progressing  rapidly.  While  the  future  increase  of 
this  class  of  imports  must  be  steady,  it  at  the  same  time  may  not  be 
rapid  save  in  a  few  exceptional  articles.  Nor  may  the  importation 
of  machinery,  excepting  the  most  advanced,  such  as  locomotives, 
be  expected  to  grow  more  rapidly,  the  reason  for  this  supposition 
being  again  the  increasing  activity  of  Japan's  manufacturing  life. 
The  other  two  classes  of  imports,  however,  that  is,  raw  material 
for  manufacture  and  foodstuff  for  the  growing  population,  have 
shown  a  wonderful  advance,  and  may  be  said  to  command  the  most 
assured  promise  for  the  future.  A  glance  at  the  following  table 
will  make  an  elaborate  demonstration  of  our  statement  super- 
fluous : 


ECONOMIC     PROGRESS  249 

1893-1906 

IMPORTATION  OF  RAW  MATERIAL  AND  FOODSTUFF 
(Unit  of  million  yen) 


1882 

1892 

1902 

1903 

1904 

Cotton 

.     0.46 

12.32 

7978 

69.52 

73-42 

Pig  iron 

.     0.09 

0.24 

0.98 

125 

2.24 

Wool    . 

0.30 

340 

4.81 

9-97 

Sugar  . 

•     3-84 

9-53 

1436 

20.96 

23.04 

Rice      . 

0.211 

1.861 

I3-561 

5196 

5970 

Flour    . 

0.27 

3-28 

10.32 

9.62 

Beans   . 

.... 

4-95 

6.37 

8.12 

Oil  cakes 

.     •     0.03 

0.82 

10.12 

10.73 

4.66 

This  remarkable  showing  of  figures  becomes  highly  significant 
when  we  consider  further  that  most  of  the  articles  the  importation 
of  which  increases  the  fastest  come  mainly  from  the  East  Asiatic 
countries.  India  furnishes  the  bulk  of  cotton,  China  supplies  some 
iron,  sugar,  and  rice,  as  well  as  some  cotton,  while  North  China 
and  Manchuria  send  their  beans  and  oil  cakes,  and  Korea  is  begin- 
ning to  be  a  great  supply  region  of  several  cereals.  Most  flour  and 
some  iron,  however,  come  from  the  United  States,  which,  as  we 
shall  see  presently,  occupies  a  unique  relation  to  Japan's  trade.  We 
have  thus  arrived  at  an  important  conclusion  that  Japan  is  obliged 
to  depend  in  an  increasing  degree  for  her  most  important  articles 
of  importation  on  East  Asia,  to  which  she  is  intimately  connected 
both  geographically  and  historically. 

An  analysis  of  the  export  figures  of  Japan  leads  us  to  a  similar 
conclusion  from  another  direction.  It  has  already  been  shown  that, 
as  contrary  to  the  tendency  of  her  import  trade,  Japan's  exportation 
consists  yearly  more  of  manufactured  articles  and  less  of  raw 
goods  than  before.  Here  again  a  deeper  significance  is  disclosed  by 
an  examination  of  the  destination  of  the  exports.  The  time,  if  ever, 
seems  very  remote  when  Japan  will  invade  Europe  and  America 
with  her  manufactures  and  compete  with  the  fruits  of  their  superior 
machinery  and  mechanical  experience.  Her  exportation  to  Western 
countries  already  has  a  clear  indication  of  settling  down  to  two  main 
classes  of  articles ;  such  unfinished  goods  as  raw  silk,  copper,  sulphur, 
and  others,  which  might  rather  be  finished  abroad  than  in  Japan; 
and  certain  goods  peculiar  to  the  soil  of  Japan,  as,  for  instance, 
tea,  habutai,  and  other  light  silk  fabrics,  porcelain,  matting,  camphor, 
and  the  like.  The  exportation  of  these  articles  must  increase  in 
varying  degrees,  according  to  the  state  of  the  several  determining 
factors  that  rule  the  domestic  and  foreign  markets,  but  its  future 

1  The  average  for  the  past  ten  years  inclusive. 


250  JAPAN 

1893-1906 

on  the  whole  may  be  said  to  be  much  more  limited  and  inelastic  than 
that  of  Japan's  exports  to  the  East  Asiatic  countries.  Her  close 
economic  relation  to  them  has  become  all  the  more  manifest  since 
she  began  to  be  a  manufacturing  nation,  while  they  remained 
agricultural;  she  buys  from  them  raw  products  and  foodstuff,  and 
supplies  them  with  her  manufactured  articles.  The  demand  for 
these  last-named  articles,  also,  by  a  fortunate  combination  of  cir- 
cumstances, is  at  present  what  the  still  inferior  skill  of  the  Japanese 
manufacturer  can  supply.  The  taste  of  the  Eastern  buyer  is  still 
low  and  his  wants  still  comparatively  few,  while  their  advance  will 
largely  coincide  with  Japan's  improvement  in  industries.  Her 
neighbors  in  Korea,  Siberia,  Manchuria,  North  and  South  China, 
India  and  Further  India,  and  the  Philippines  absorb  her  coal, 
matches,  marine  products,  cotton  yarns  and  coarse  cotton  fabrics, 
an'd  other  similar  goods,  to  the  amount  of  134.5  million  yen  (in 
1904),  while  eleven  years  before  they  consumed  23  millions  and  in 
1882  only  6  millions.  From  these  data,  the  conclusion  seems  tenable 
that  her  geographical  and  economical  conditions  render  it  natural 
for  Japan  to  interpret  the  new  Occidental  civilization  for  the  old 
Orient,  and  create  new  wants  in  the  latter  for  the  fruits  of  the  for- 
mer, herself  reaping  an  important  share  of  the  profits  that  accrue 
from  the  world-wide  exchange.  This  share  consists  in  an  even  closer 
economic  connection  of  East  Asia,  particularly  Korea  and  China, 
with  Japan  as  her  grand  supply  region  of  raw  goods  and  market 
for  made  articles.  In  comparison  with  this,  Japan's  trade  with 
countries  of  Western  civilization  may  become  more  and  more  a 
mere  complement  to  her  Eastern  trade. 

The  solitary  and  striking  exception  to  this  general  statement  is 
found  in  the  Japanese  trade  with  the  United  States,  which  is  still 
to-day,  as  she  was  twenty  years  ago,  the  largest  single  buyer  of 
Japanese  goods,  notably  tea,  raw  silk,  matting,  porcelain,  and 
camphor.  In  the  import  trade,  while  the  United  States  is  second  to 
Great  Britain,  the  former  advanced  in  twenty  years  between  1882 
to  1902  from  3  to  48.6  million  yen,  and  the  latter  only  from  14 
to  50.3  millions.  The  peculiar  features  of  Japan's  trade  with  the 
American  nation  which  are  not  found  in  her  European  commerce 
may  be  said  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  the  latter  buys  a  considerable 
amount  of  the  crude  or  unfinished  Japanese  manufacture,  and  sells 
increasing  quantities  of  raw  cotton  and  flour  and  other  food- 
stuffs, thus  participating  in  a  large  measure  in  the  peculiarities  of 


ECONOMIC     PROGRESS 


251 


1393-1906 

the  Japanese  trade  with  the  East.  The  United  States  also  furnishes 
Japan  more  cheaply  certain  products  of  modern  industries  which 
the  latter  formerly  bought  from  Europe. 

We  conclude  our  survey  of  Japan's  foreign  trade  by  appending 
a  table  showing  its  distribution  by  the  continents,  which  will  speak 
for  itself  without  our  comment : 

(Unit  of  million  yen.) 


1881     Exports, 

Imports, 
1891     Exports, 

Imports, 
1901     Exports, 

Imports, 
1003    Exports, 

Imports, 
1904    Exports, 

Imports, 


Europe, 

America, 

Asia, 

Australia, 
and  Others 

125 

1 1.0 

0.6 

0.9 

21.0 

1.8 

7.6 

05 

23-9 

311 

20.9 

1.8 

30.3 

6.8 

23-7 

1-9 

59-9 

75-6 

1 1 1.4 

5-2 

967 

42.9 

109.0 

7.0 

70.3. 

857 

126.7 

6.7 

96.1 

46.7 

169. 1 

5-0 

■     723 

104.6 

134-5 

7-7 

120.5 

58.9 

182.5 

9-3 

Chapter    XIX 

THE   CHINO-JAPANESE   WAR.     1 894-1 895 

SELDOM  does  history  offer  a  more  dramatic  unfolding  of 
international  relations  than  the  evolution  of  the  East  Asiatic 
question,  of  which  the  China-Japan  War  of  1894-1895,  the 
Boxer  campaign  of  1900,  and  the  Russo-Japanese  War  of  1904- 1905 
are  but  successive  stages  of  a  continuous  and  broadening  process. 
The  scene  of  this  development  now  covers  those  countries  which 
are  among  the  most  resourceful  in  the  world  and  which  comprise 
one-third  of  the  human  race.  The  future  is  unknown.  The  origin 
of  the  drama,  however,  may  at  least  in  part  be  traced  to  the  adop- 
tion of  a  new  career  by  Japan.  Having  been  singularly  well 
trained  by  her  long  history  in  the  past,  and  impelled  by  the  dictates 
of  her  vital  interests,  Japan  had  resolutely  entered  upon  the  new 
career,  and  had  step  by  step  committed  herself  to  an  open  and 
progressive  policy  from  which  there  could  be  no  return,  and  which 
had  to  be  carried  forward  against  all  obstacles,  if  she  would  exist 
and  grow  as  a  nation.  This  change  of  Japan's  course  of  life  was 
a  cause  of  her  wars  with  China  and  Russia;  by  it  the  history  of 
the  Far  East  radically  changed  its  character  and  opened  its  new 
volume.  At  first,  the  determined  attitude  of  new  Japan  imme- 
diately caused  a  breach  which  continued  to  widen  until  the  war 
of  1 894- 1 895  came  as  a  logical  result — for  it  at  once  appeared  that 
Japan  had  torn  herself  away  from  the  ancient  East  Asiatic  civiliza- 
tion, of  which  China  was  the  mentor  and  Korea  the  greatest  pupil, 
but  of  which  Japan  had  never  been  so  slavish  a  disciple  as  not  to 
develop  her  original  traits.  As  soon  as  Japan  proved  receptive 
of  Western  arts  and  sciences,  there  was  resentment  on  the  part  of 
China  and  Korea,  which  felt  as  if  Japan  had  deserted  the  historic 
community  of  the  East  and  turned  a  renegade  and  servile  imitator 
of  the  inferior  civilization  of  the  barbarian.  To  an  equal  extent 
Japan  desired,  even  unconsciously,  to -demonstrate  that  her  new 
career  not  only  was  not  misguided,  but  also  was  the  only  possible 

252 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  253 

1894 

way  to  preserve  herself  and  save  the  East.  Conflict  with  China 
became  acute  when  Japan  desired  to  open  to  the  world  the  tightly 
sealed  kingdom  of  Korea,  over  which  China  claimed  suzerainty. 
Japan's  attempt  to  open  Korea,  then,  should  be  taken  as  the  start- 
ing point  of  our  account  of  the  war  of  1894- 1895. 

To  complete  our  general  survey,  it  may  again  be  emphasized 
that  the  same  problem  which  caused  the  breach  of  1894  also  pro- 
duced the  conflict  of  1904.  The  interests  at  stake  had,  indeed, 
grown  wider  and  deeper  during  the  ten  intervening  years,  and 
Russia  was  a  far  more  powerful  and  aggressive  power  than  China, 
but  the  fact  still  remained  that,  from  Japan's  standpoint,  her  vital 
interests  were  at  issue  in  1904  as  they  were  in  1894,  and,  from 
that  of  the  world,  the  conflict  raged  now  as  it  did  then  between  an 
open  and  an  exclusive  policy. 

As  has  been  said  above,  Japan's  attempt  to  open  Korea  as  an 
independent  and  sovereign  nation  was  the  occasion  for  the  out- 
break of  the  Chinese  war  of  1894.  Why  did  Japan  desire  to  open 
Korea?  Was  it  because  Japan  would  apply  to  Korea  the  treat- 
ment she  herself  had  received  from  the  United  States  and  other 
powers?  Or  was  it  an  expression  of  the  vigor  of  a  newly  regen- 
erated nation?  Probably  the  motives  were  not  so  simple,  for  it 
should  be  remembered  that  from  the  prehistoric  ages  the  career  of 
Japan  and  of  Korea  had  been  so  vitally  entwined  that  their  close 
relationship  of  one  kind  or  another  was  as  inevitable  as  their  geo- 
graphical proximity  itself.  Moreover,  beyond  the  peninsula  stood 
two  other  powers,  China  and  Russia,  whose  friendship  Japan  could 
not  always  count  upon.  In  providing  against  any  possible  danger 
from  these  powers,  the  entire  question  seemed  to  hinge  upon  Korea, 
for  with  the  fall  of  the  latter  the  very  existence  of  Japan  would 
be  threatened.  It  seemed  essential  for  Japan,  in  order  to  protect 
her  own  life,  either  to  annex  Korea  before  it  fell  prey  to  another 
power  or  to  insure  its  effective  independence  by  opening  its  re- 
sources and  reforming  its  rotten  administration.  Japan  chose  the 
latter  alternative.  But  this  brought  her  to  a  conflict  with  the 
Koreans  themselves,  for  they  were  too  thoroughly  imbued  with 
Chinese  civilization  and  too  deeply  corroded  by  official  corruption 
not  to  resent  Japan's  eagerness  to  modernize  and  revivify  Korea. 
Korea  thus  presented  the  singular  spectacle  of  resisting  the  sug- 
gestion of  a  friendly  nation  to  insure  her  independence  and  power. 
Japan  was  confronted  with  the  colossal  task  of  overcoming  the 


254.  JAPAN 

1868-1876 

Korean  misapprehension  and  breaking  down  the  Chinese  suzerainty 
over  the  peninsula. 

This  double  conflict  began  almost  as  soon  as  the  imperial 
authority  was  restored  in  Japan.  In  1868  Japan  sent  a  message  to 
Korea  with  a  view  to  opening  friendly  relations  with  her.  Korea, 
however,  being  ill  informed  of  the  nature  of  the  political  change 
which  had  just  taken  place  in  Japan,  and  acting  under  the  false 
representation  by  China  of  Japan's  aggressive  pretensions,  reso- 
lutely declined  to  entertain  these  overtures.  Other  similar  at- 
tempts also  miscarried,  and,  in  1872,  a  Korean  magistrate  set  a 
placard  upon  the  gate  of  the  residence  of  a  Japanese  officer  at 
Fusan,  in  which  Japan  was  stigmatized  as  the  laughing  stock  of  the 
world  for  her  slavish  imitation  of  barbarous  customs.  The  taunt 
.ended  in  saying  that  Japan  had  been  so  insolent  as  to  impose  the 
shameless  policy  upon  Korea  also,  but  the  latter  had  too  high  a 
sense  of  propriety  to  be  so  deluded.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the 
objections  here  raised  were  characteristically  double,  that  Japan 
was  under  the  shadow  of  other  powers  and  was  losing  her  nation- 
ality, and  that  she  dared  to  force  Korea  to  follow  her  unwise 
example.  The  former  was  sufficiently  repugnant,  the  latter  made 
it  unendurable.  When  in  1873  Japan  demanded  China's  explana- 
tion for  the  repeated  insults  made  by  Korea  upon  Japan  in  the 
latter's  attempts  to  negotiate  with  her,  the  Chinese  government 
declared  that  it  was  not  answerable  for  Korea's  conduct,  for  she 
was  not  its  dependency.  This  aroused  an  outcry  in  Japan  that 
she  should  independently  force  Korea  open,  but  a  greater  insult 
from  Korea  was  still  to  come.  As  a  Japanese  war  vessel  on  its 
way  to  Niu-chwang  stopped  at  the  Kang-hwa  Island,  not  far  from 
Chemulpo,  in  August,  1875,  &  was  faed  upon  by  the  inhabitants 
and  two  marines  were  killed.  The  Japanese-Korean  treaty,  which 
was  concluded  as  a  result  of  this  incident,  deserves  a  special  note, 
not  only  because  it  was  the  first  modern  treaty  made  by  Korea 
with  a  foreign  power,  but  also  because  it  for  the  first  time  showed 
clearly  Japan's  fundamental  policy  regarding  Korea,  upon  which 
policy  has  depended  and  will  for  a  long  time  depend  many  a  serious 
event  in  the  history  of  the  Extreme  Orient.  By  this  treaty  Korea 
was  declared  independent,  the  two  parties  binding  themselves 
to  treat  each  other  on  the  basis  of  equality,  and  three  Korean  ports 
were  shortly  to  be  opened  to  foreign  trade.  This  epoch-making 
treaty  was  concluded  on  February  26,  1876,  at  which  date  Korea 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  255 

1876-1882 

was  at  last  conventionally  independent  and  partially  open  to  the 
outside  world. 

We  need  not  tarry  to  repeat  the  story  already  told  of  the  strong 
internal  opposition  that  the  moderate  Korean  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment had  aroused  in  Japan,  and  of  its  far-reaching  consequences 
in  her  domestic  politics.  What  mainly  interests  us  here  is  the 
question  as  to  what  effect  did  the  treaty  produce  upon  Korea  her- 
self, whose  sovereignty  it  recognized  in  unmistakable  terms.  This 
conventional  independence  of  Korea  had  hardly  altered  the  state 
of  her  political  mind.  Korea,  it  should  always  be  remembered, 
had  since  prehistoric  ages  been  trained  in  that  school  of  experience 
in  which  she  found  herself  eking  out  her  bare  existence  between 
stronger  surrounding  nations,  which  she  was  wont  either  to  pro- 
pitiate or  to  set  one  against  another  for  her  precarious  safety.  The 
Koreans  had  thus  by  habit  and  by  conviction  grown  up  an  opportu- 
nist nation.  They  gratified  Japan  by  complying  with  her  wish  to 
declare  them  independent,  while,  at  the  same  time,  they  courted 
China's  favor  by  maintaining  their  vague  dependency  upon  that 
empire.  As  indefinitely  did  China  support  her  contention  that 
Korea  at  once  was  and  was  not  dependent  upon  her. 

The  time  soon  came,  however,  when  China  was  obliged  to  de- 
fine her  position  toward  Korea,  for  the  more  apparent  Japan's 
policy  of  upholding  Korean  independence  became  to  China,  the  more 
urgent  was  it  for  the  latter  to  reassert  her  suzerainty  over  the 
peninsula.  The  ambiguous  phraseology  with  which  China  had 
masked  herself  was  suddenly  cast  aside  when  an  acute  crisis  came. 
In  1882  Tai-wen-kun,  the  father  of  the  Korean  king,  assumed  the 
administrative  power  at  Seul,  and  set  about  executing  with  great 
rigor  his  anti-foreign  policy.  The  old  patriot  believed,  like  many 
a  Japanese  before  the  restoration,  that  exclusion  and  independence 
were  synonymous.  On  April  23  the  Japanese  legation  was  at- 
tacked by  Korean  troops,  its  twenty-seven  members  barely  escaping 
to  Japan  by  way  of  Chemulpo  on  an  English  vessel.  With 
unusual  rapidity  the  Peking  government  sent  forces  to  Korea, 
who  captured  Tai-wen-kun  and  carried  him  off  to  China,  demon- 
strating in  this  way  the  latter's  assumed  right  of  forcible  inter- 
vention in  Korea.  China  thus  asserted  by  deed  her  suzerainty  over 
Korea,  and  herein  is  already  forecast  an  ultimate  conflict  between 
her  and  Japan,  although  neither  power  may  have  expected  it  as  yet. 
Japan,  on  her  part,   contented  herself  by  securing  the  punish- 


256  JAPAN 

1882-1885 

ment  of  the  guilty,  payment  of  50,000  yen  for  the  killed  and 
wounded,  and  also  an  indemnity  amounting  to  half  a  million  yen, 
four-fifths  of  which  were  remitted  the  next  year.  She  was,  be- 
sides, allowed  to  station  troops  at  Seul  for  protecting  her  residents 
against  future  emergencies. 

This  Korean  trouble  of  1882  was  followed  two  years  later  by 
a  greater  crisis,  and  again  the  occasion  was  a  political  disturbance 
at  Seul.  In  1884,  when  China  was  at  war  with  France  over  An- 
nam,  the  progressive  party  in  Korea,  which  had  been  inspired  by  the 
example  of  Japan,  took  advantage  of  the  situation  and  overthrew 
by  violent  force  the  pro-Chinese,  conservative  government.  Sud- 
denly the  defeated  party,  together  with  2000  Chinese  troops,  in- 
vaded the  palace,  murdered  several  members  of  the  new  cabinet, 
and  attacked  and  burned  the  Japanese  legation.  The  minister, 
Takezoye,  fled  for  his  life,  while  many  of  his  compatriots  residing  at 
Seul  were  outraged  or  killed.  The  king,  who  had  summoned 
Japanese  soldiers  to  guard  the  court,  now  threw  himself  on  the 
protection  of  the  Chinese.  In  Japan  the  cause  of  the  trouble  was 
attributed  to  the  mild  Korean  policy  of  the  government.  In  1885, 
accordingly,  an  agreement  was  made  with  Korea  whereby  the  latter 
again  promised  to  punish  the  guilty  and  indemnify  the  outrage. 
Korea  was  settled,  and  China  had  now  to  be  dealt  with.  To  allay 
the  censure  directed  at  himself  by  the  nation,  Ito  proceeded  in  person 
to  China,  where  he  concluded  with  the  Chinese  commissioner,  Li 
Hung  Chang,  the  famous  Tientsin  Convention  of  April  18,  1885, 
which  had  so  much  to  do  with  the  later  breach  with  China  in 
1894.  It  was  agreed  by  this  convention  that  Japan  and  China 
should  withdraw  troops  from  Korea,  that  they  should  not  furnish 
Korea  with  military  instructors,  and  that  if  it  should  become  nec- 
essary at  any  future  time  for  either  party  to  send  soldiers  to  Korea, 
it  should  notify  the  other  of  its  intention.  It  was  further  stated, 
in  a  supplement,  that  there  exised  no  definite  evidence  that  Chi- 
nese troops  had  killed  Japanese  residents  at  Seul,  and  punishment 
would  be  inflicted  on  the  guilty  only  when  sufficient  proof  was 
forthcoming.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  no  investigation  followed  and 
no  punishment  was  meted  out.  On  the  contrary,  the  Chinese 
resident  at  Seul,  Yuan  Shih-kai — now  the  powerful  pro-Japa- 
nese viceroy  of  Chihli,  but  then  an  astute  promoter  of  China's 
ascendency  over  Korea — who  was  considered  to  have  been  largely 
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  Chinese  forces,  not  only  was  not 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  257 

1885-1894 

recalled,  but  was  reinstated  as  Chinese  minister  at  Seul.  The 
greatest  displeasure  of  the  Japanese  nation,  however,  was  felt  over 
the  clause  in  the  convention  abrogating  Japan's  right,  gained  in 
1882,  of  stationing  troops  in  Seul  to  protect  her  citizens  and  their 
interests.  Ito  was  consequently  denounced  at  home  now  more 
loudly  than  before.  China,  on  her  part,  equally  resented  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  convention,  for  she  was  thereby  obliged  to  treat  Japan 
on  an  equal  footing  with  herself  in  Korea.  Both  countries  suf- 
fered equally,  for  while  Japan  forfeited  the  rights  she  had  previ- 
ously acquired,  China's  claim  of  suzerainty  was  seriously  impaired. 
Things  remained  in  this  strained  condition  until  nine  years  later, 
in  1894,  when  an  unforeseen  event  forced  them  to  a  breaking  point. 
It  was  the  Tonghak  rebellion,  which  brought  military  forces  of 
Japan  and  China  face  to  face  in  Korea. 

The  Tonghak  (or  "Learning  of  the  East")  party  was  a 
secret  organization,  whose  doctrines  were  embodied  in  a  collection  of 
tenets  based  upon  Confucianism,  Buddhism,  and  Taoism.  Both  the 
practical  aims  and  the  real  strength  of  the  party  were  then  little 
known.  Its  conduct  in  1894,  however,  led  to  an  international  crisis 
of  which  it  could  not  have  had  the  slightest  expectation.  In  May 
the  society  rose  in  insurrection  against  the  universal  corruption 
and  oppression  of  the  Korean  officials,  who  were  then  under  the 
powerful  control  of  the  family  of  the  queen,  the  Min.  The  Min, 
whose  safety  was  thus  threatened,  despite  an  opposition  in  the 
court  against  the  proceeding,  appealed,  on  their  initiative,  to  the 
assistance  of  China  through  the  minister  at  Seul,  who  had  really 
suggested  the  move.  Here  was  a  long-awaited  opportunity  for 
China  to  recover  her  lost  ground  in  Korea  and  once  more  assert 
her  suzerain  rights  over  the  peninsula.  The  Peking  government 
at  once  dispatched  forces  toward  Korea,  at  the  same  time  notifying 
Japan,  in  accordance  with  the  Tientsin  Convention,  that  China  had 
been  requested  by  Korea  to  send  troops  to  suppress  the  Tonghak 
rebellion,  and  that  she  had  consented  to  "  protect  the  tributary 
state."  On  the  same  day,  June  7,  Japan  replied  in  two  messages, 
one  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  China's  notice,  but  declining  to 
admit  that  Korea  was  tributary  to  her,  and  the  other  announcing 
that  Japan  also  would  send  soldiers  to  Korea.  To  this  China  re- 
torted, saying  that  as  Japan  had  not  been  requested  by  Korea  to 
dispatch  forces,  the  object  of  her  expedition  must  be  to  protect 
Japanese  subjects  in  the  peninsula,  which  circumstances  made  it 


258  JAPAN 

1894 

unnecessary  for  Japan  to  send  too  large  forces  or  to  allow  them  to 
go  too  far  into  the  interior.  Japan's  answer  was  that  the  sending 
of  the  troops  was  in  accordance  with  the  Korean-Japanese  conven- 
tion of  1882,  and  that  she  had  the  right  to  determine  the  number 
and  disposition  of  her  own  forces.  The  first  detachment  of  the 
Japanese  soldiers  escorting  Minister  Otori  reached  Seul  on  June 
10,  and  the  Chinese  troops  landed  at  Asan  the  next  day.  If  the 
order  had  been  reversed,  China  might  have  regained,  temporarily 
at  least,  her  control  over  the  Korean  kingdom,  and  Japan's  ardent 
wish  to  reform  and  strengthen  Korea  as  an  independent  state  might 
have  remained  unfulfilled.  From  her  vantage  ground,  however, 
Japan  made  a  move  which  in  fact  created  the  critical  point  of  the 
affair,  for,  on  June  17,  her  foreign  minister,  Mutsu,  proposed  to 
China  to  suppress  the  Tonghak  insurrection  by  joint  forces,  and 
then  reform  the  Korean  internal  government  also  by  joint  action, 
so  as  to  insure  stability  and  peace  in  the  kingdom.  It  now  rested 
with  China  to  avoid  all  danger  by  joining  hands  with  Japan  in 
eradicating  evils  in  the  Korean  administration,  but  she  would  hardly 
impose  a  reform  upon  Korea  which  she  would  not  tolerate  at  home. 
On  the  contrary,  the  more  corrupt  and  feeble  Korea  was,  the  more 
dependent  upon  China  she  would  be.  It  is  little  wonder,  there- 
fore, that  the  Peking  government  replied  that  a  joint  suppression 
of  the  insurrection  was  unnecessary,  as  the  latter  had  already  sub- 
sided, while  a  joint  reform  would  be  incompatible  with  the  sov- 
ereign right  of  Korea  over  her  own  affairs,  and  that  what  remained 
for  China  and  Japan  to  do  was  to  withdraw  their  forces  from 
the  peninsula. 

This  reply  by  the  Chinese  government  may  be  said  to  have 
decided  the  situation,  for  henceforth  Japan  felt  obliged  to  take  an 
independent  course  of  action  in  Korea.  Thus  she  wrote  to  China, 
on  June  22,  that  Korea  was  constantly  troubled  by  party  strifes 
and  disorders  and  was  unable  to  fulfill  obligations  as  an  independent 
state;  that  this  state  of  things  seriously  affected  the  interests  of 
Japan,  for  she  was  near  and  had  important  economic  relations  with 
Korea ;  that  to  discard  the  matter  would  be  not  only  against  Japan's 
friendly  attitude  toward  Korea,  but  also  against  her  own  self-pres- 
ervation; and  that,  therefore,  a  reform  could  not  be  stopped,  and 
evacuation  would  not  be  made  "  without  some  understanding  which 
would  guarantee  the  future  peace,  order,  and  good  government  of 
Korea." 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  259 

1894 

The  cooperation  with  China  having  miscarried,  Japan  proceeded 
to  act  alone  in  Korea  in  the  interest  of  the  reform  and  good  admin- 
istration of  the  latter.  The  Japanese  minister  at  Seul,  Otori,  opened 
the  arduous  execution  of  his  policy  by  putting  a  direct  question  to 
the  Korean  government,  on  June  28,  whether  or  not  it  considered 
the  kingdom  as  independent.  This  pointed  query  seemed  to  have 
deeply  disturbed  the  politicians  at  Seul,  for  they  at  once  found 
themselves  divided  between  three  opinions:  namely,  first,  that 
Korea  was  of  course  an  independent  nation,  and  Japan  was  the 
first  power  to  declare  the  fact  before  the  world;  second,  that  she 
was  an  historic  dependency  of  China;  and,  third,  that  the  dis- 
pleasure of  both  Japan  and  China  might  be  averted  by  not  giving 
a  definite  answer,  but  by  merely  referring  them  to  the  treaties. 
Nothing  reveals  more  clearly  the  fundamental  weakness  of  the 
political  consciousness  of  the  Korean  people  than  their  conduct 
at  this  critical  stage  of  their  existence.  A  message  was  sent  to  Li 
Hung  Chang  in  China  asking  his  instruction  as  to  what  answer 
should  be  given  the  Japanese  minister.  The  telegraph  line  toward 
Wiju  was  interrupted,  and  Li's  reply — recommending  again  the 
ambiguous  definition  that  Korea  was  at  once  dependent  and  inde- 
pendent— had  not  been  received  before  Korea  had  at  length  to  reply 
after  three  days'  deliberation  that  she  was  independent. 

This  first  question  had  been  asked  by  Japan  in  order  to  clear 
the  ground  for  all  subsequent  steps  in  her  diplomacy  in  the  penin- 
sula. Korea  had  technically  renounced  the  suzerainty  of  China, 
and  Otori  now  suggested,  on  July  3,  a  thorough  reform  in  the 
official  organization  and  the  financial,  judicial,  and  military  insti- 
tutions. The  king  and  the  government  not  only  concurred  with  the 
Japanese  minister,  but  also  issued  edicts  calling  for  a  reform.  Sud- 
denly a  change  came,  on  the  18th,  when  the  Seul  government 
declared  that  the  presence  of  the  Japanese  troops  would  hinder  the 
execution  of  the  necessary  reform.  It  was  of  course  plain  that,  as 
soon  as  these  troops  left,  all  hopes  of  reform  would  be  lost.  The 
change  had  apparently  been  caused  by  the  arrival  of  Li  Hung 
Chang's  telegram  that  an  overwhelmingly  large  army  was  coming 
from  China  to  crush  the  Japanese  forces  in  Seul.  Otori  at  once 
repaired  to  the  Korean  foreign  office,  where  he  expressed  his  sur- 
prise at  the  sudden  breach  of  faith  on  the  part  of  Korea,  and  urged 
her  answers  within  three  days  to  the  following  two  demands: 
an  order  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Chinese  troops  from  Asan,  whose 


260  JAPAN 

1894 

presence  had  become  unnecessary  since  the  Tonghak  insurrection 
died  away ;  and  a  declaration  that  the  existing  treaty  between  Korea 
and  China  which  contained  clauses  intimating  the  former's  de- 
pendence upon  the  latter  was  henceforth  null  and  void.  The  three- 
day  limit  expired  without  eliciting  any  answer  from  the  govern- 
ment. By  this  time — July  22 — the  city  of  Seul  was  in  a  state  of 
intense  excitement.  Otori  resolved  to  see  the  king  in  person,  and, 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  23d,  started  toward  the  palace  in  a 
palanquin  under  the  escort  of  his  guard.  Korean  soldiers  fired 
at  him,  the  Japanese  troops  responded,  and  within  fifteen  minutes 
the  Korean  guards  were  dispersed  and  the  city  gates  were  taken, 
followed  in  the  afternoon  by  a  complete  control  of  the  entire  cap- 
ital by  Japanese  forces.  This  was  the  first  bloodshed,  and  unfor- 
tunately it  was  Korean  blood  that  was  shed.  It  is  necessary,  how- 
ever, to  note  that  the  Korean  resistance  was  a  result  of  the  extremely 
unstable  politics  at  Seul  which  had  enabled  the  pro-Chinese,  cor- 
ruptionist  family  of  the  Min  temporarily  to  control  the  situation. 
With  their  fall  Korea  naturally  turned  about  and  allied  herself 
with  Japan  against  China.  The  old  patriot  Tai-wen-kun,  father  of 
the  king,  who  again  assumed  the  grand  councilorship,  with  his  un- 
abated rigor  ordered  punishment  of  the  Min,  commenced  a  radical 
official  reorganization,  nullified  the  Chinese  treaty,  and,  what  was 
more,  requested  the  Japanese  troops  to  drive  away  Chinese  soldiers 
from  Asan.  This  last  request  at  once  placed  the  forces  of  the  two 
empires  in  certain  hostilities  with  one  another.  It  was  carried  out 
on  July  29,  but  before  that,  on  the  25th,  the  first  act  of  war  took 
place  unexpectedly  on  sea. 

Before  relating  this  sea  fight  it  is  important  to  observe  that 
China  evidently  expected  a  war  with  Japan  as  early  as  July  16. 
It  appears  that  she  was  determined,  though  at  first  reluctantly,  to 
resist  by  force  of  arms  Japan's  efforts  to  realize  the  independence 
and  reform  of  Korea,  for  in  no  other  light  can  be  interpreted  her 
dispatch  by  land  and  by  sea  of  large  forces  destined  for  Korea. 
China  was  resolved  to  make  good  her  suzerainty  over  the  Korean 
peninsula  by  staking  a  conflict  with  Japan,  which  she  had  hoped 
to  overwhelm  by  superior  numbers.  It  was  generally  believed  in 
Japan  at  the  time  that  the  Chinese  statesmen  had  been  led  to  this 
miscalculation  of  Japan's  capacity  by  the  continous  feud  which  had 
seemed  to  characterize  the  relation  between  the  government  and  the 
national  diet.     Li  Hung  Chang  and  others  were  thought  to  have 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR 


261 


1894 

imagined  that  Japan's  hands  were  too  closely  tied  by  this  internal 
discord  to  embark  upon  an  undertaking  which  would  require  an 
intense  concentration  of  national  resources.  They  could  not  have 
foreseen  that  all  the  superficial  differences  would  be,  as  they  were, 
sunk  before  the  national  cause,  and  that  a  profound  patriotism 
would  unconsciously  and  without  premeditation  compel  the  entire 
nation — the  government,  parties,  and  all — to  stand  like  one  man. 

Between  July  21  and  23  ten  transports  conveying  Chinese 
troops  left  Taku  for  Korea.  Three  Japanese  cruisers,  the  Yoshino, 
Naniwa,  and  Akitsushima,  which  had  since  the  23d  been  cruising  in 


TIRST     ENGAGEMENTS 
OF  CHINO-JAPANESE  WAR 

C894 


the  Korean  waters,  met  at  7  a.  m.,  the  25th,  near  the  Phung-do  Is- 
land, not  far  from  Asan,  the  Chinese  cruiser  Tsi-ynen  and  gunboat 
Kwang-yi.  These  vessels  had  steamed  out  of  Asan  is  order  to  meet 
another  Chinese  gunboat,  the  Tsao-kiang,  which  was  convoying 
a  transport  toward  Asan.  The  two  Chinese  vessels  did  not  return 
the  salute  of  the  Japanese  ships,  and  when  the  latter  turned  to  the 
southwest  they  were  fired  upon  by  the  former.  After  a  brisk 
exchange  of  fire  for  over  an  hour  the  Tsi-yuen  effected  an  escape, 
and  the  Kwang-yi  was  stranded  south  of  Caroline  Bay,  where  its 
powder-magazine  exploded.  In  the  meantime  the  Tsao-kiang  and 
a  transport,  the  Kow-shing,  flying  a  British  flag  and  conveying 


262  JAPAN 

1894 

iioo  Chinese  troops  and  stores,  appeared  on  the  scene.  The 
Tsao-kiang  was  captured.  The  Kow-shing  was  ordered  to  follow 
the  Japanese  cruiser  Naniwa  to  the  main  squadron,  but  the  Chinese 
soldiers  on  board  desired  to  return  to  Taku,  and  threatened  to  kill 
the  English  captain,  Galsworthy,  who  advised  them  to  surrender 
and  himself  wished  to  leave  the  vessel  on  a  boat  which  the  Japanese 
would  send  to  him.  After  the  attempt  of  the  Naniwa  to  save  the 
English  mates  had  failed,  it  hoisted  a  red  flag  at  I  p.  m.,  or  nearly 
four  hours  after  it  had  stopped  the  Kow-shing.  Thereupon,  the 
captain  and  the  crew  jumped  overboard,  and  the  Chinese  soldiers 
fired  at  them,  killing  all  but  the  captain  and  two  others,  who  were 
rescued  by  the  Naniwa's  boats.  The  Kow-shing  was  then  sunk. 
Only  a  few  of  those  on  board  her,  including  a  German,  Major 
von  Hanneken,  escaped  by  swimming  ashore. 

On  the  very  day  when  the  naval  victory  near  Phung-do  was 
won  mixed  Japanese  brigades  numbering  about  4000  men,  under 
command  of  Major  General  Oshima,  started  Nfrom  Seul  on  their 
march  toward  Asan,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  commission  of  the 
Korean  government  to  drive  away  the  Chinese  forces  stationed 
there.  The  large  reinforcements  which  they  had  expected  from 
China  not  having  arrived,  the  Chinese  troops,  3500  in  number,  met 
the  enemy  at  the  strategic  point  Song-hwan,  east  of  Asan.  During 
a  sharp  engagement  lasting  from  3  till  7.30  a.  m.,  July  29,  the 
Chinese  gradually  lost  their  ground,  until  they  fled  toward  Ping- 
yang,  leaving  behind  500  killed  and  wounded.  The  Japanese  losses 
amounted  to  88  killed  and  wounded.  Asan  itself  had  been  com- 
pletely evacuated  by  the  Chinese.  The  victorious  army  returned 
to  Seul  early  in  the  morning  of  August  5,  where  a  warm  reception 
by  the  Korean  authorities  and  Japanese  residents  awaited  its  trium- 
phant arrival. 

These  hostile  acts  were  followed  by  the  formal  declarations  of 
war  of  the  emperors  of  China  and  Japan.  The  Japanese  procla- 
mation may  be  translated  as  follows : 

"  We,  by  the  grace  of  Heaven,  Emperor  of  Japan,  seated  on  a 
throne  occupied  by  the  same  dynasty  from  time  immemorial,  do 
hereby  make  proclamation  to  all  our  loyal  and  brave  subjects, 
as  follows: 

"  We  hereby  declare  war  against  China.  We  command  each 
and  all  of  our  competent  authorities,  in  obedience  to  our  wish, 
to  carry  on  hostilities  by  sea  and  land  against  China,  and  to  make 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  263 

1894 

effort  to  attain  the  national  aim.  We  command  them,  each  accord- 
ing to  his  power,  to  use  all  the  means  at  their  disposal,  consistently 
with  the  Law  of  Nations. 

"  During  the  more  than  twenty  years  of  our  reign,  our  constant 
aim  has  been  to  seek  the  progress  of  civilization  by  a  peaceful 
government;  and  being  sensible  of  the  evils  of  being  involved  in 
complications  with  foreign  states,  we  have  instructed  our  ministers 
always  to  labor  for  the  promotion  of  friendly  relations  with  the 
treaty  powers.  The  relations  with  those  powers  have  fortunately 
yearly  increased  in  good-will  and  friendship.  We  never  expected 
such  a  persistent  want  of  amity  and  of  good  faith  as  has  been 
manifested  by  China  in  her  conduct  toward  us  in  connection  with 
the  Korean  affair. 

"  Korea  is  an  independent  state  which  was  first  introduced  into 
the  family  of  nations  by  the  advice  of  Japan.  China  has,  however, 
habitually  called  Korea  her  dependency,  and  openly  and  secretly 
interfered  with  her  domestic  affairs.  At  the  time  of  the  recent 
insurrection  in  Korea,  China  dispatched  troops  thither,  alleging  that 
her  purpose  was  to  rescue  the  dependent  state  from  its  difficulties. 
We,  in  virtue  of  the  treaty  concluded  with  Korea  in  1882,  caused 
a  military  force  to  be  sent  to  that  country,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
meet  possible  emergencies.  Wishing  to  free  Korea  for  all  time 
from  disturbance  and  to  insure  her  security  for  the  future,  and 
thereby  to  maintain  the  general  peace  of  the  East,  Japan  invited 
China's  cooperation  for  the  accomplishment  of  that  object.  China, 
however,  advanced  several  pretexts  and  declined  Japan's  proposals. 
Thereupon,  Japan  advised  Korea  to  reform  her  administration,  so 
that  order  and  tranquillity  might  be  firmly  established  at  home  and 
the  rights  and  duties  of  an  independent  state  might  be  maintained 
abroad.  Korea  has  already  consented  thereto,  but  China  has  sur- 
reptitiously and  persistently  impeded  the  purpose.  She  has,  more- 
over, put  forward  various  pretenses  and  caused  delays,  while  at  the 
same  time  she  was  making  warlike  preparations  on  land  and  sea. 
When  those  preparations  were  completed,  China  sent  large  forces 
to  Korea,  with  a  view  to  the  forcible  attainment  of  her  ambitions, 
and  conducted  herself  so  arbitrarily  as  to  open  fire  upon  our  ships 
in  Korean  waters.  It  is  beyond  a  doubt  that  China's  plain  object 
is  to  make  it  uncertain  where  the  responsibility  of  preserving  peace 
and  order  in  Korea  resides ;  to  obscure  the  independent  international 
position  of  Korea  which  Japan  first  recognized,  as  well  as  the 


864  JAPAN 

1894 

treaties  declaring  that  position;  and  thereby  to  injure  the  rights 
and  interests  of  our  empire  and  to  deprive  the  tranquillity  of  the 
East  of  its  permanent  guarantee.  Carefully  judging  her  designs 
from  her  action,  it  must  be  concluded  that  China  has  from  the 
beginning  been  bent  upon  sacrificing  peace  to  the  attainment  of  her 
sinister  object.  In  this  situation,  ardent  as  our  wish  is  to  promote 
at  home  and  abroad  the  glory  of  our  empire  by  strictly  peaceful 
methods,  we  are  obliged  openly  to  declare  war  [against  China]. 
We  rely  upon  the  loyalty  and  valor  of  our  faithful  subjects,  and 
hope  permanently  to  restore  peace  and  to  complete  the  glory  of 
our  empire." 

The  Chinese  emperor's  proclamation  was  an  interesting  docu- 
ment, giving  an  inaccurate  statement  of  facts  and  revealing  some 
of  the  main  features  of  China's  warlike  plans  in  the  coming  cam- 
paign.   A  translation  of  this  edict  reads  as  follows : 

"  Korea  has  been  under  China's  suzerainty  for  more  than  two 
hundred  years,  and  has  rendered  us  annual  tributes,  as  is  well 
known  at  home  and  abroad.  For  over  a  decade  Korea  has  been 
troubled  by  repeated  insurrections.  We,  in  sympathy  with  our 
small  tributary,  have  often  sent  troops  to  her  aid,  and  suppressed 
the  rebels,  and  also  placed  a  resident  at  Seul  to  render  protec- 
tion as  needed.  In  the  fourth  moon  of  this  year  [May,  1894] 
another  rebellion  took  place  in  Korea,  for  the  suppression  of 
which  her  king  made  to  us  an  urgent  appeal  to  send  troops. 
We  then  ordered  Li  Hung  Chang  to  dispatch  troops  to  Korea. 
As  soon  as  they  reached  Asan  the  rebels  scattered.  But  the 
Wojen  [a  familiar  and  contemptuous  name  for  the  Japanese], 
without  cause,  sent  their  soldiers  suddenly  into  Seul,  and  reinforced 
them  with  more  than  ten  thousand  men.  Japan  then  forced  Korea 
to  change  her  system  of  administration,  and  unreasonably  made 
various  demands.  According  to  our  method  of  ruling  the  tribu- 
tary state  [Korea],  the  latter's  internal  affairs  are  left  to  its  self- 
government.  Japan's  treaty  with  Korea  was  as  one  country  with 
another;  there  is  no  law  for  sending  large  armies  to  intimidate  her 
and  compel  her  to  change  her  administrative  system.  The  public 
opinion  of  the  various  powers  considers  the  conduct  of  the  Japanese 
as  unjustifiable  and  unreasonable.  We  exhorted  them  to  withdraw 
their  troops,  but  they  paid  no  heed  and  offered  no  explanation.  On 
the  contrary,  Japan  has  continually  dispatched  more  soldiers,  until 
the  Korean  peasants  and  Chinese  merchants  were  every  day  more 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  265 

1894 

alarmed  than  before.  We  therefore  sent  more  troops  to  protect 
them.  Greatly  to  our  surprise,  a  number  of  the  Wojen  ships 
suddenly  appeared  and  taking  advantage  of  our  unpreparedness 
opened  fire  upon  our  transports  off  Asan,  thus  causing  us  to  suffer 
from  their  treacherous  conduct,  which  could  not  be  foretold  by  us. 
Japan  has  observed  neither  treaties  nor  international  law,  but  is  run- 
ning rampant  with  her  false-  and  treacherous  actions,  commencing 
hostilities  herself,  and  laying  herself  open  to  condemnation  by 
the  various  powers  at  large.  We  therefore  make  it  known  to  the 
world  that  throughout  the  whole  complications  we  have  observed 
the  utmost  benevolence  and  righteousness,  while  the  Wojen  have 
broken  pledges  and  opened  hostilities,  which  passes  our  patience  to 
bear  with.  Hence  we  command  Li  Hung  Chang  to  give  strict 
orders  to  our  various  armies  to  hasten  with  all  speed  to  exterminate 
the  foe;  to  send  successive  forces  of  valiant  men  in  order  to  save 
the  Koreans  from  the  dust  of  bondage.  We  also  command  the 
Tartar-generals,  viceroys,  and  governors  of  the  maritime  provinces, 
as  well  as  the  commanders  in  chief  of  the  various  armies,  to  prepare 
for  war  and  to  make  every  effort  to  fire  on  the  Wojen  ships  if  they 
come  into  our  ports,  and  utterly  destroy  them.  We  exhort  our 
generals  to  refrain  from  the  least  laxity  in  obeying  our  commands 
in  order  to  avoid  severe  punishment  at  our  hands.  Let  all  know 
this  edict  as  if  addressed  to  them  individually.    Respect  this !  " 

The  second  battle  on  land  took  place  at  Ping-yang,  on  Sep- 
tember 15,  or  fifty  days  after  the  encounter  at  Song-hwan,  between 
13,000  to  15,000  Chinese  and  16,000  Japanese.  The  former  had 
arrived  at  Ping-yang  on  August  4,  and  had  made  extensive  prep- 
arations to  defend  themselves  at  this  almost  impregnable  stronghold. 
The  offending  force  marched  against  the  walled  city  from  several 
directions,  and,  finally  converging  there  on  September  15,  gallantly 
attacked  it,  practically  under  no  cover,  from  the  north  and  from  the 
southeast.  The  defense  was  powerful,  but  was  finally  outma- 
neuvered  by  the  unexpected  attack  of  the  Japanese  from  the  rear. 
At  4.30  p.  M.  the  Chinese  hoisted  the  white  flag,  and,  taking 
advantage  of  a  heavy  rain  and  a  dark  night,  they  left  the  city  at  8 
o'clock,  moving  toward  the  coast  and  Wiju.  The  Chinese  losses 
were  estimated  at  2000  killed  and  about  twice  as  many  wounded, 
while  the  Japanese  side  numbered  102  killed,  433  wounded,  and  33 
missing.  The  whole  Japanese  army  entered  the  city  of  Ping-yang 
early  on  the  16th. 


S66  JAPAN 

1894 

On  the  day  of  this  decisive  battle  the  military  headquarters 
of  Japan  moved  forward  from  Tokyo  to  Hiroshima,  the  emperor 
himself  transferring  his  seat  thither,  and,  in  his  rude  temporary 
quarters,  attending  to  his  duties  as  the  commander  in  chief  of  the 
imperial  forces.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  moral  effect  of  this 
move  upon  the  Japanese  soldiers  in  the  field  of  action  was  thrilling. 

The  battle  of  Ping-yang  had  cleared  Chinese  troops  out  of 
Korea.  Two  days  after  a  naval  engagement  occurred  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Yalu,  which  opened  for  the  Japanese  the  sea-route 
along  the  northeastern  coast  of  the  Yellow  Sea.  Early  in  the 
morning  of  the  17th  the  Japanese  squadron,  consisting  of  the 
battleship  Fuso  (3709  tons'  displacement),  eight  cruisers  (between 
4278  and  2439  tons),  a  coast  defense  gunboat,  and  the  merchant- 
cruiser  Saikyo,  having  on  board  Rear  Admiral  Kabayama,  dis- 
covered columns  of  smoke  from  twelve  Chinese  war  vessels 
emerging  one  after  another  upon  the  horizon.  These  vessels,  which 
had  landed  troops  and  stores  at  Ta-tung-kau  on  the  preceding  day, 
consisted  of  the  two  armored  battleships  Ting-yuen  and  Chen-yuen 
(7430  tons  each),  the  battleships  Lai-yuen  and  King-yuen,  the  coast 
defender  Ping-yuen,  six  cruisers,  and  a  torpedo-boat  destroyer. 
The  Chinese  fleet  excelled  in  tonnage  and  the  size  of  the  guns,  while 
the  Japanese  had  the  advantage  of  the  comparatively  greater  speed 
of  their  vessels  and  a  larger  number  of  small  rapid-firing  guns. 
Fire  was  opened  by  the  Chinese  at  12.45  at  a  range  of  6000  meters, 
the  Japanese  replying  only  at  3000  meters,  and  lasted  till  near 
sunset.  The  -Chinese  flagship  Ting-yuen  had  her  flag-pole  shat- 
tered at  an  early  stage  of  the  battle,  and  consequently  the  fleet, 
stoutly  as  it  fought,  could  no  longer  maintain  a  concerted  move- 
ment. The  cruiser  Chao-yung  caught  fire  and  sunk,  the  cruisers 
Yang-wei  and  Chih-yuen  and  the  battleship  King-yuen  were  sunk, 
and  the  cruiser  Kwang-chia  was  stranded  near  Ta-lien-wan;  the 
battleship  Lai-yuen  also  caught  fire  and  barely  escaped  to  Port 
Arthur,  while  one  of  the  two  greatest  battleships,  Ting-yuen,  was 
severely  damaged.  Although  the  other  vessels  escaped  with  less 
serious  injuries,  the  Chinese  commanders  reported  to  Li  Hung 
Chang  that  not  a  single  ship  was  left  in  a  seaworthy  condition.  The 
Japanese  fleet  lost  no  vessel,  although  damages  were  suffered  by 
several,  all  of  which  were,  however,  soon  repaired. 

Again  to  return  to  the  operations  on  land.  After  the  battle 
of  Ping-yang  the  First  Army  Corps  was  definitely  organized  of  the 


CHINO-JAPANESE    WAR  267 

1894 

Fifth  Provincial  Division  from  the  district  of  Hiroshima,  under 
Lieutenant  General  Viscount  Nodzu,  and  of  the  Third  Provincial 
Division  from  the  district  of  Nagoya,  under  Lieutenant  General 
Katsura  (now  Viscount  Katsura,  premier).  The  Fifth  Division 
consisted  of  the  Ninth  and  Tenth  Brigades  under,  respectively, 
Major  Generals  Y.  Oshima,  and  Tatsumi ;  the  Third  Division  was 
divided  into  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Brigades,  under  Major  Generals 
Oseka  and  H.  Oshima.  The  command  of  the  entire  corps  rested 
with  Marshal  Count  Yamagata  (later  replaced,  on  account  of  his 
illness,  by  Viscount  Nodzu,  whose  position  as  commander  of  the 
Fifth  Division  was  rilled  by  Lieutenant  General  Oku). 

The  First  Army  Corps  advanced  toward  the  northern  frontier 
of  Korea.  The  Chinese  forces  offered  no  determined  resistance 
this  side  of  the  Yalu,  for  they  had  decided,  as  did  the  Russians  ten 
years  after,  to  abandon  the  indefensible  Wiju  but  to  defend 
Chiulien-cheng  on  the  Chinese  side  of  the  river.  For  about  ten 
miles  to  the  right  and  left  of  this  position,  or  from  An-tung  along 
the  stream  up  to  Hu-shan,  over  a  hundred  redoubts  and  trenches  had 
been  built,  behind  which  forts  had  been  constructed  on  eminences. 
General  Sung-ching,  commanding  about  23,000  troops,  stationed 
a  powerful  detachment  upon  Hu-shan,  an  important  outpost  across 
the  Ai  River,  which  flows  into  the  Yalu.  During  the  night  of 
October  24,  however,  the  Japanese  army  succeeded,  undiscovered 
by  the  enemy,  in  throwing  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Yalu  in 
front  of  Hu-shan.  A  severe  storming  of  the  outpost,  replied  to  by 
an  able  firing,  began  at  5  p.  m.,  on  the  25th,  continuing  until  it  was 
deserted  by  the  Chinese  at  10.30.  This  strategic  point  having  been 
captured,  the  main  quarters  at  Chiulien-cheng  were  vacated  without 
further  resistance  during  the  night.  An-tung  was  also  easily 
occupied  by  the  Japanese,  while  Feng-hwang-cheng  was  set  on 
fire  and  deserted  by  the  retreating  forces.  Thus  the  Japanese 
crossed  the  Korean  boundary  and  gained  an  entry  into  the  Chinese 
territory  with  the  comparatively  small  loss  of  4  killed  and  140 
wounded.  They  organized  a  provisional  civil  administration  at 
An-tung  to  govern  the  Chinese  population  in  the  seized  territory. 
Mr.  Komura  (now  Baron  Komura,  minister  of  foreign  affairs)  was 
appointed  the  temporary  director  of  the  administration,  to  be  later 
succeeded  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Fukushima. 

After  the  capture  of  Chiulien-cheng,  the  First  Army  Corps 
divided  itself  into  two  bodies,  one  under  the  command  of  Lieu- 


268 


JAPAN 


1894 

tenant  General  Katsura  following  the  Chinese  troops  that  had  fled 
toward  Ta-ku-shan  on  the  coast,  and  the  other  pointing  toward 
Mukden.  Katsura's  army  took  Ta-tung-kau  and  Ta-ku-shan  in 
succession,  the  latter  on  November  5,  and  then  turned  northward 
and  defeated  the  Chinese  at  Siu-yen  on  the  17th.  Tomu-cheng 
was  captured  on  December  12,  and  Hai-cheng  on  the  next  day, 
while  Kang-wa-seh,  where  10,000  Chinese  had  entrenched  them- 
selves, was  carried  on  the  18th.  Meanwhile,  the  second  division 
of  the  First  Army  Corps  had  swept  the  enemy  from  Sai-ma-tsi  and 


other  points,  and  marched  toward  Mukden  in  the  depth  of  a  severe 
Manchurian  winter. 

By  this  time  a  part  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  commanded 
by  Marshal  Count  Oyama  and  consisting  of  the  First  Provincial 
Division  from  the  district  of  Tokyo,  under  Lieutenant  General 
Baron  Yamaji,  and  of  the  Twelfth  Brigade  of  the  Sixth  Provincial 
Brigade  of  the  Kumamoto  district,  had  already  captured  the  great 
Port  Arthur.  Having  landed  at  a  point  near  Pi-tse-wo,  about 
ninety  miles  northeast  of  Port  Arthur,  on  October  24,  the  First 
Division  had  taken  Kin-chow  on  November  6  and  Ta-lien-wan  on 
the  following  day.  The  entire  section  then,  soon  after  midnight 
of  October  21,  as  soon  as  the  moon  rose,  opened  an  assault  from  the 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  269 

1894 

rear  upon  Port  Arthur,  which  was  defended  by  a  magnificent 
physical  position  and  strengthened  by  the  powerful  forts  and  guns 
that  had  made  the  port  celebrated  as  an  impregnable  stronghold. 
After  severe  onsets  under  terrific  fires,  all  the  important  landward 
defenses,  including  the  Itsu-shan  (Chair  Hill)  forts,  had  been  car- 
ried by  the  Japanese  by  noon.  Among  the  shore  forts,  those  on 
Hwang-chin-shan  (Golden  Hill)  resisted  most  stoutly,  and  did  not 
fall  till  5  p.  m.  During  the  night  the  Chinese  deserted  all  the  other 
forts,  leaving  behind  57  large-caliber  and  163  small-caliber  guns. 
When  the  Japanese  troops  entered  the  city  they  were  treacherously 
fired  upon  from  the  houses,  where  many  Chinese  soldiers  had  hidden 
themselves  and  put  on  civilian  dress,  so  as  to  be  able  to  shoot  the 
enemy  unawares.  The  Japanese,  on  their  part,  retorted  by  an  in- 
discriminate search  of  the  houses  and  killing  of  many  adult  males 
who  offered  resistance,  so  that  the  number  of  the  Chinese  slain 
amounted  to  almost  4000.  The  Japanese  lost  29  killed  and  233 
wounded.  At  the  same  time,  the  harbor  not  being  defended  by 
Chinese  war  vessels,  the  Japanese  men-of-war  removed  mines  and 
entered  Port  Arthur  on  the  night  of  October  24. 

The  Chinese  made  two  successive  attempts,  on  the  21st  and 
22d,  to  recover  Kin-chow,  but  were  repulsed.  A  part  of  the  Second 
Army  Corps  then  joined  Lieutenant  General  Katsura's  division 
of  the  First  Army  Corps  at  Kai-ping,  on  December  10,  and  carried 
that  town  by  charging  it  over  the  slippery  ice  of  the  Kai-ping  River. 

The  remainder  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  consisting  of  the 
Second  Provincial  Division  from  the  Sendai  district  under  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant  General  Sakuma  and  of  the  Sixth  Provincial 
Division  from  the  district  of  Kumamoto  (excepting  the  Twelfth 
Brigade,  which  had  already  gone  to  the  Liao-tung  peninsula)  under 
Lieutenant  General  Kuroki,  landed,  without  resistance,  at  Yung- 
cheng  in  the  Shan-tung  province,  between  January  20  and  24, 
1895.  The  object  of  this  expedition  was  to  effect  a  concerted  attack 
with  the  navy  upon  Wei-hai-Wei,  where  the  Northern  Fleet  of  the 
Chinese  navy  had  been  concentrated.  Leaving  Yung-cheng  on  the 
26th,  the  Japanese  army  marched  along  two  routes,  expecting  to 
converge  at  Wei-hai-Wei  early  in  February.  The  two  divisions 
met  vigorous  resistance  from  the  Chinese  on  the  way,  particularly 
at  Mo-tien-ling  on  the  northern  route,  opposite  the  strongly  forti- 
fied Liu-kung  Island,  where  the  enemy  poured  fire  upon  the  assail- 
ants from  the  68  guns  planted  on  twelve  land  forts  and  from  the 


270 


JAPAN 


1894 

war  vessels  anchored  only  2000  meters  away  from  the  forts. 
Major  General  Odera  fell  in  this  battle,  and  the  forts  were  carried 
only  after  nine  hours  of  ceaseless  fusillade.  The  town  of  Wei-hai- 
Wei  was  deserted  by  the  Chinese,  and  was  occupied  by  the  invaders 
on  February  2.  This  completed  the  work  of  the  army,  for  the  task 
of  reducing  the  forts  on  Jih  and  Liu-kung  Islands,  as  well  as  of 
dealing  with  the  Chinese  fleet,  had  been  assigned  to  the  navy. 

The  Chinese  fleet  at  Wei-hai-Wei  consisted  of  15  war  vessels, 
including  the  iron-clad  battleships  Ting-yuen  and  Chen-yuen,  be- 


sides 13  torpedo  boats,  as  against  25  men-of-war  and  16  torpedo 
boats  on  the  Japanese  side.  The  Japanese  forces  not  only  pos- 
sessing a  numerical  advantage  on  the  sea,  but  also  having  captured 
the  land  forts  from  which  the  army  could  cooperate  with  the  fleet, 
a  Chinese  defeat  appeared  a  foregone  conclusion.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, Admiral  S.  ltd,  commanding  the  Japanese  fleet,  sent 
to  Admiral  Ting  Ju-chang,  his  personal  friend,  who  held  supreme 
command  of  the  enemy's  squadron,  a  touching  letter  in  which  the 
former  expressed  his  regret  that  the  old  acquaintances  had  been 
obliged  to  meet  each  other  in  hostility,  appealed  to  the  latter's 
enlightened  patriotism  by  pointing  out  the  retrogressive  policy 
which  Ting  had  been  called  upon  to  defend  and  which  could  only 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  271 

1895 

end  in  disaster,  and  then  counseled  him  to  prevent  a  certain  defeat 
and  unnecessary  loss  of  life  by  capitulating.  ltd  further  advised 
Ting  to  become  Japan's  honored  guest  till  the  end  of  the  war,  and 
then  return  to  his  native  land  in  order  to  aid  China  in  setting  her 
policy  on  a  sound  basis.  When  Ting  read  this  message  he  was 
visibly  moved,  and  said  to  his  attendants :  "  Kill  me,"  meaning 
probably  that  he  wished  to  die  alone  and  let  all  others  surrender. 
Then  he  again  remarked :  "  I  am  thankful  for  the  admiral's  friend- 
ship, but  I  cannot  forsake  my  duties  to  the  state.  The  only  thing 
now  remaining  for  me  to  do  is  to  die."  The  Japanese  fleet,  which 
made  Yung-cheng  Bay  its  headquarters,  began  to  attack  the  forts 
of  Jih  and  Liu-kung  Islands  on  January  30,  1895,  continuing  with 
frequent  interruptions  till  February  7,  when  a  steady  general  at- 
tack began.  During  this  time,  the  daring  night  attacks  made  by 
Japanese  torpedo  boats  had  succeeded  in  sinking  the  Ting-yuen  and 
three  other  vessels,  and  the  thirteen  torpedo  boats  of  the  Chinese 
fleet  which  tried  to  escape  toward  Chifu  had  had  six  destroyed 
and  all  the  others  captured  by  the  Japanese.  The  Ching-yuen  was 
sunk  on  the  9th ;  soon  afterward  Jih  Island  fell  and  the  eastern  forts 
of  Liu-kung  Island  were  silenced.  On  the  morning  of  the  12th 
Ching,  commander  of  the  Kwang-ping,  approached  the  Japanese 
flagship  Matsushima  in  a  small  gunboat  flying  a  white  flag,  and 
delivered  a  letter  from  Admiral  Ting,  containing  a  formal  surrender 
of  all  the  war  vessels  in  the  harbor  and  the  forts  and  stores  of  Liu- 
kung  Island.  Ting  requested  that  the  Chinese  and  foreign  officers, 
troops,  and  civilians  on  land  and  sea  around  Wei-hai-Wei  be 
allowed  to  depart  unmolested,  and  proposed  that  the  commander  of 
the  British  China  squadron  should  guarantee  the  faithful  perform- 
ance of  the  conditions  of  surrender  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese.  On 
receipt  of  this  letter  Admiral  ltd  held  a  council  of  his  officers,  in 
which  many  of  the  latter  advised,  as  was  later  seconded  by  the  army 
officers,  that  the  men  should  not  be  allowed  to  leave,  but  be  taken 
prisoners.  The  admiral,  however,  had  so  high  an  estimate  of 
Ting's  personality  and  service  to  his  country  and  so  deep  a 
sympathy  with  his  difficult  position  that  he  insisted  that  Ting's 
request  should  be  cheerfully  granted.  In  his  reply,  therefore,  ltd 
again  advised  Ting,  for  the  sake  of  his  own  safety  and  of  the 
future  good  of  China,  to  become  Japan's  guest,  agreed  to  release  all 
the  men  on  parole,  and  declined  to  accept  the  proposed  guarantee 
by  the  British  commander  as  unnecessary,  for  ltd  rested  confidence 


272  JAPAN 

1895 

in  Ting's  honor  as  a  soldier.  The  admiral  also  sent  a  present  to 
Ting  and  Commander  Liu  of  the  Ting-yuen.  The  next  morning 
Ching  again  visited  the  Matsushima,  this  time  with  the  Chinese 
flag  at  half-mast,  and  brought  a  reply  from  Ting,  who,  Ching  sor- 
rowfully announced,  had  declined  to  accept  Ito's  present,  and,  with 
Liu  and  Commander  Chang  of  the  Liu-kung  Island,  had  committed 
suicide.  All  the  arrangements  regarding  the  capitulation  were  then 
made  with  the  utmost  honor  to  the  deceased  admiral,  and  his  body 
was  taken  ashore  in  one  of  the  captured  Chinese  cruisers.  The 
soldiers  in  the  army  and  navy  who  were  released  on  parole  aggre- 
gated 5124  men.  The  Japanese  flag  was  hoisted  on  the  surrendered 
battleship  Chen-yuen,  cruisers  Ping-yuen,  Tsi-yuen,  and  Kwang- 
ping,  and  six  gunboats.  With  this  pathetic  fall  of  Wei-hai-Wei 
the  Japanese  navy  completely  annihilated  the  Northern  Chinese 
Fleet,  and  gained  an  absolute  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Pechili.  Ad- 
miral ltd  returned  to  Hiroshima  on  March  3. 

With  the  expulsion  of  the  Chinese  from  Korea  and  the  capture 
of  Port  Arthur  and  Wei-hai-Wei,  Japan  had  accomplished  the 
major  part  of  the  work  which  she  had  proposed  to  herself.  The 
remainder  of  the  story  of  the  war  may  be  briefly  told.  Hai-cheng 
was  taken  by  the  Third  Division  (of  the  First  Army  Corps)  on 
December  13,  and  the  Chinese  made  in  January  and  February  three 
unsuccessful  attempts  to  retake  this  important  walled  city.  The 
First  Division  (of  the  Second  Army  Corps)  advanced  from  Kin- 
chow  on  February  10  toward  Ying-kow,  or  the  treaty  port  of 
"  Niu-chwang,"  while  the  First  Army  Corps  in  two  bodies  pressed 
northward  and  then  westward  with  the  town  of  Niu-chwang  as 
its  objective  point,  whence  it  intended  to  join  the  First  Division  at 
Ying-kau.  Niu-chwang  was  seized  on  March  4  after  a  sanguin- 
ary fight  on  the  streets  in  which  more  than  1880  Chinese  lost 
their  lives.  Two  days  later,  the  First  Division  captured  Ying-kau 
without  the  cooperation  of  the  First  Army  Corps  and  with  no  effec- 
tive resistance  from  the  enemy.  The  two  armies  then  joined  in  the 
cannonading  of  Tien-chwang-tai  on  the  other  side  of  the  Liao 
River,  which  was  razed  to  the  ground  in  order  to  prevent  the 
Chinese  from  returning  to  it. 

Toward  the  end  of  March  a  column  of  Japanese  troops  seized 
the  Pescadore  Islands  near  Formosa. 

The  Chinese  government,  which  had  already  twice  sent  abor- 
tive peace  envoys  with  insufficient  powers,  now  ordered  Viceroy 


CHINO-JAPANESE     WAR  273 

1895 

Li  Hung  Chang  to  sail  to  Japan  and  sue  for  peace.  He  arrived  at 
Shimonoseki  on  March  19,  where  he  was  met  by  the  Japanese  peace 
commissioners,  Premier  Count  (soon  to  be  Marquis)  I  to  and 
Foreign  Minister  Viscount  (soon  to  be  Count)  Mutsu.  Li  was 
later  joined  by  his  son-in-law,  Li  Ching  Fang,  as  plenipotentiary. 
Li  Hung  Chang  proposed  an  armistice,  but  the  conditions  de- 
manded by  Japan  appeared  to  him  too  onerous  to  accept.  On 
the  24th,  as  he  was  returning  from  a  conference  to  his  lodging, 
a  fanatic,  R.  Koyama,  who  had  led  himself  to  believe  that  Li 
was  the  disturber  of  the  peace  of  the  East,  shot  at  him  with  a 
revolver  and  wounded  him  on  the  left  cheek — an  incident  which 
plunged  the  entire  nation  into  profound  regret.  The  emperor  now 
almost  unconditionally  granted  an  armistice  for  three  weeks.  Li 
soon  recovered  from  his  wound,  and  resumed  negotiations  on  April 
10.  The  Japanese  terms  for  peace  had  on  his  request  been  shown  to 
him  April  1,  and  these  with  various  amendments  became  the  basis 
of  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  signed  on  April  17  and  ratified  on 
May  8.  By  this  treaty  the  absolute  independence  of  Korea  was  at 
last  assured ;  China  agreed  to  cede  to  Japan  the  Liao-tung  peninsula, 
Formosa,  and  the  Pescadores,  and  to  pay  200  million  taels  as  in- 
demnity ;  and  Kang-chow,  Su-chow,  Sha-shi,  and  Chung-king  were 
Opened  to  foreign  trade,  and  the  foreigners  were  granted  the  right 
of  engaging  in  manufacturing  enterprises  in  China.  The  war, 
which  had  lasted  for  more  than  seven  months  and  cost  Japan  nearly 
200  million  yen  and  the  loss  of  1005  killed  and  4922  wounded 
(besides  16,866  deaths  from  disease),  now  came  to  an  end.  Japan 
had  placed  on  the  field  120,000  men  in  two  armies  and  five  columns, 
and  carried  out  the  campaign  in  all  its  complexity  with  remarkable 
success. 

A  few  words  may  be  said  regarding  the  effects  of  the  war  upon 
China  and  Japan.  The  former's  reverses  were  in  a  large  measure  a 
blessing  in  disguise,  for  they  revealed,  as  nothing  else  would,  the 
radical  faults  of  her  policy  and  administrative  system,  and  con- 
vinced many  of  her  patriots  of  the  need  for  a  reform.  It  was 
largely  due  to  this  fact  that  the  two  nations  emerged  from  the  war 
with  no  ill-will  against  each  other.  On  the  contrary,  the  more 
thoughtful  among  the  Chinese  seemed  to  be  attracted  to  Japan  by 
her  success  in  the  same  proportion  that  they  became  alive  to  the 
causes  of  the  failure  of  their  own  government.  In  such  a  vast  and 
conservative  country  as  China   a  reform  must  come  slowly,  but  it 


274  JAPAN 

1895 

is  safe  to  say  that  some  of  its  seeds  were  sown  as  a  result  of  the  war 
of  1 894-1 895.  As  for  Japan  herself,  her  position  suddenly  rose  in 
the  eyes  of  the  nations  of  the  world.  Even  those  foreigners  who  had 
heard  little  of  her  great  progress  in  arts  and  sciences  and  still 
greater  hopes  of  further  growth  were  now  forced  to  admit  the  fore- 
sight, endurance,  courage,  and  power  of  organization  manifested 
by  the  Japanese  during  the  campaign.  The  more  one  knew  the 
practical  side  of  so  large  an  undertaking  the  more  he  realized  the 
magnitude  of  Japan's  success.  This  appreciation  of  the  world 
naturally  stimulated  the  Japanese  to  a  larger  ambition  for  future 
progress.  The  stimulus  after  the  war,  however,  came  as  well  from 
the  victory,  as  from  the  bitter  experience  which  closely  followed 
it — the  forcible  intervention  of  three  European  powers  against 
Japan,  which  at  once  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  Eastern 
question. 


Chapter    XX 

JAPAN  AND  RUSSIA  IN  KOREA  AND  MANCHURIA 

1 893- 1 904 

WHEN  the  peace  negotiations  between  the  Japanese  and 
Chinese  plenipotentiaries  were  in  progress  at  Shimono- 
seki,  Russia  and  France  had  been  preparing  themselves 
to  intervene,  and  Germany  had  for  diplomatic  reasons  consented  to 
aid  the  Russian  overtures,  while  Great  Britain,  which  had  once  be- 
fore made  a  fruitless  effort  to  bring  about  a  concerted  mediation  by 
the  powers,  declared  that  she  had  no  objections  to  Japan's  claims. 
The  plan  of  intervention  having  been  matured,  the  Russian,  French, 
and  German  representatives  at  Tokyo  called  at  the  foreign  office  on 
April  23,  1895,  and  on  their  separate  cordial  reception,  presented 
notes  from  their  governments  in  which  the  latter  counseled  Japan  to 
return  to  China  the  Liao-tung  peninsula  of  South  Manchuria,  for  its 
retention  by  Japan  would,  in  their  opinion,  not  only  endanger  the 
position  of  the  Chinese  capital,  but  also  render  the  independence  of 
Korea  illusory,  and  permanently  threaten  the  general  peace  of  the 
Far  East.  While  the  notes  were  couched  in  polite  terms,  the  East- 
ern squadrons  of  the  three  powers  manifested  such  an  activity  as  to 
demonstrate  the  determination  of  the  intervening  states  to  enforce 
their  demand,  if  necessary,  by  a  concerted  appeal  to  arms.  At  this 
grave  crisis  the  Japanese  authorities  agreed  among  themselves  that 
after  the  exhausting  war  of  the  last  eight  months  it  would  be  impos- 
sible for  Japan  to  fight  single-handed  with  the  three  European 
powers.  May  10,  1895,  found  the  Japanese  nation  eagerly  perusing 
the  imperial  decree  which  reiterated  the  unalterable  devotion  of  the 
emperor  to  the  cause  of  peace,  for  the  sake  of  which  the  three 
friendly  powers  had  advised,  and  his  own  sense  of  magnanimity 
also  counseled,  the  retrocession  to  China  of  the  entire  peninsula  of 
Liao-tung.  The  feeling  excited  among  all  ranks  of  the  people  by 
this  memorable  incident  was  intense.  It  seemed  plain  to  every- 
one that  the  conduct  of  the  powers  in  thus  depriving  Japan  of 
what  appeared  to  be  a  just  fruit  of  her  costly  war  could  not  have 
been  animated  by  a  genuine  respect  for  the  integrity  of  the  Chinese 

875 


276  JAPAN 

1895-1896 

empire.  None  wished  the  independence  of  Korea  and  the  progress 
of  China  more  deeply  than  did  the  Japanese,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  Russia,  the  central  figure  in  the  intervention,  probably  had 
a  design  upon  Port  Arthur  and  the  whole  of  Manchuria.  The 
fall  of  this  vast  territory  into  Russia's  hands  would  eventually 
threaten  the  independence  of  Korea,  and,  consequently,  the  safety 
of  Japan  herself.  The  Japanese  nation  naturally  awoke  to  the  con- 
viction that,  in  order  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  East  and  the  repose 
of  Japan,  the  latter  must  strengthen  and  enrich  herself,  so  that  the 
humiliation  of  1895  should  never  recur.  The  conviction  was  based, 
it  should  be  clearly  noted,  not  so  much  upon  a  desire  for  revenge 
as  upon  the  determination  to  safeguard  the  common  vital  interests 
of  Japan  and  the  general  Far  East  by  means  of  progress  and 
civilization.  From  1895,  therefore,  began  the  most  rapid  advance 
in  all  directions  of  Japan's  material  power  that  has  ever  taken  place 
in  any  period  of  the  same  length  in  her  past  history. 

In  China,  however,  the  clever  diplomacy  of  Russia  entered  a 
new  epoch  after  the  intervention  of  1895.  The  first  definitely 
known  understanding  between  the  two  powers  concerned  a  Chinese 
loan  of  four  hundred  million  francs,  $80,000,000,  guaranteed  by 
Russia  and  raised  mainly  at  Paris  in  July,  1895,  which  was  intended 
for  the  payment  of  one-half  of  the  indemnity  due  to  Japan.  Then, 
the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  was  organized  by  a  syndicate  of  capitalists 
of  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg,  with  its  headquarters  in  the  latter  city, 
where  the  intimate  friend  of  the  tsar,  Prince  Ukhtomsky,  was 
made  its  president.  An  important  agreement  was  entered  upon  on 
September  8,  1896,  between  this  bank  and  the  Chinese  minister  at  St. 
Petersburg,  which  has  since  proved  to  be  the  basis  of  many  another 
striking  document.  By  this  agreement  and  also  by  the  Russian 
statutes  based  upon  it,  it  was  provided  that  the  Russo-Chinese 
Bank  should  undertake  to  organize  the  Eastern  Chinese  Railway 
Company,  which  should  construct  a  branch  line  of  the  great 
Siberian  Railway  through  the  Hei-lung  and  Kirin  provinces  of 
Manchuria  and  connect  it  with  the  South  Ussuri  branch  railway. 
Only  Russian  and  Chinese  subjects  could  be  its  shareholders. 
The  Chinese  government  was  to  take  over  the  road  after  eighty 
years  without  payment,  or  with  a  due  payment  after  thirty-six 
years.  It  was  also  agreed  that  both  imports  and  exports  between 
China  and  Russia  carried  by  the  new  railway  should  pay  only  two- 
thirds  of  the  regular  tariff  rates  of  China. 


KOREA    AND     MANCHURIA  277 

1896-1898 

No  sooner  was  the  first  sod  of  the  railway  cut  on  its  eastern 
extremity  than  events  occurred  which  led  to  a  further  extension  by 
the  Russians  of  the  railroad  toward  the  most  strategic  points  in 
the  Liao-tung  peninsula  which  they  leased — points  which  had  so 
recently  been  retroceded  by  Japan,  on  Russia's  advice,  for  the  peace 
and  independence  of  China  and  Korea.  It  belongs  to  the  history  of 
China  to  recount  how,  at  the  murder  by  a  mob  of  two  German 
Catholic  missionaries  in  Shan-tung,  the  government  of  the  kaiser 
succeeded  in  March,  1898,  in  wresting  from  China  a  ninety-nine- 
year  lease  of  the  Bay  of  Kiao-chow  and  its  hinterland,  together 
with  railway  and  mining  concessions  between  the  shore  and  Tsi- 
nan-fu.  This  was  a  signal  for  the  advent  of  a  remarkable  series  of 
territorial  demarcations  to  be  made  by  the  rival  powers  of  Europe 
which  had  been  no  less  eager  than  Germany  to  seize  the  first  oppor- 
tunity to  carve  out  their  respective  "  spheres "  of  influence  or 
interest  on  the  soil  of  the  feeble  Chinese  empire.  The  act  of 
Germany  disturbed  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Far  East  which 
could  not  be  restored  until  the  aggressive  passions  of  all  competing 
powers  should  have  been  satiated.  Great  Britain  obtained  in 
February  a  pledge  never  to  alienate  to  any  other  power  any  portion 
of  the  extensive  provinces  adjoining  the  Yang-tse  River.  This  was 
followed  by  the  lease  to  Russia  for  twenty-five  years,  subject  to 
renewal,  of  Port  Arthur  and  Ta-lien-wan.  The  Russo-Chinese 
agreement  signed  on  March  27  declared  that  the  lease  constituted 
no  prejudice  against  the  Chinese  sovereignty  over  the  territory,  but 
was  designed  for  the  protection  of  the  Russian  navy  in  the  waters 
of  North  China.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Russia  with  her 
immense  dominion  of  Siberia  had  up  to  this  time  possessed  no 
adequate  naval  station  on  its  shores  which  was  not  bound  by  ice 
during  the  winter  months.  Now  at  length  she  secured  the  almost 
ice-free  Port  Arthur  and  Ta-lien-wan,  of  which  the  former  and  a 
portion  of  the  latter  were  agreed  to  be  used  exclusively  for  naval 
purposes,  while  the  remaining  portion  of  Ta-lien-wan  was  to  be 
opened  to  the  merchant  vessels  of  all  nations.  The  agreement 
further  provided  that  a  branch  line  might  be  built  by  Russia  from 
the  Manchurian  railway  to  Ta-lien-wan  and,  as  was  later  stipulated, 
to  Port  Arthur,  and,  if  necessary,  also  a  line  from  the  open  port  of 
Niu-chwang  to  the  Yalu  River  on  the  Korean  border.  A  special 
agreement  was  further  concluded  on  May  7  to  supplement  the  one 
of  March  27,  which  has  been  described.    The  Russian  lease  on  the 


278 


JAPAN 


1398 


tip  of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula  induced  Great  Britain,  on  July  i,  to 
obtain  under  similar  terms  on  the  opposite  promontory  of  Shan- 
tung the  lease  of  the  Bay  of  Wei-hai-wei.  This  port  had  still  been 
under  the  occupation  of  Japanese  troops,  pending  the  final  payment 
of  the  Chinese  indemnity,  but  was  now  cheerfully  evacuated  by 
them  to  be  replaced  by  the  forces  of  the  power  with  which  the  rela- 
tions of  Japan  had  already  begun  to  be  especially  amicable.  In 
South  China  the  rivalry  between  France  and  Great  Britain  was 
manifested  afresh  by  the  proposed  opening  of  the  West  River  and 
concessions  in  Yunnan  obtained  by  the  latter,  and  the  sphere  created 


FOKWH  SPHERES  OF  mfUKNCE 
CHIN*  AND  MANCHURU 


on  the  Kwang-chow  Bay  by  the  former.  Japan  also  secured  the 
pledge  of  non-alienation  of  the  province  of  Fuh-kien,  which  lies 
opposite  her  new  territory  of  Formosa. 

It  is  necessary,  in  order  to  comprehend  the  situation  with  any 
degree  of  clearness,  sharply  to  distinguish  the  nature  of  the  Russian 
concessions  in  Liao-tung  from  those  of  all  the  other  "  spheres  "  in 
North  and  South  China.  It  was  alone  in  the  former  instance  that 
new  naval  posts  of  great  moment  were  directly  connected  by  a  rail- 
road with  the  military  centers  of  an  enormous  and  contiguous 
dominion  which  represented  an  expansion  through  centuries.  The 
creation  of  naval  posts  on  the  strategic  points  of  the  peninsula 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  279 

1899-1900 

would  be  sufficient,  as  was  avowed  by  Russia  herself  three  years 
before,  to  threaten  Peking,  render  the  independence  of  Korea  illu- 
sory, and  continually  imperil  the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  and  its  dan- 
gers must  further  be  measured  by  the  immense  pressure  which  might 
be  exercised  with  the  military  resources  of  all  the  Russias  that  lay 
behind  Liao-tung  and  were  now  connected  thereto  by  rail. 

The  situation  was  made  worse  by  an  Anglo-Russian  railway 
agreement  of  April  28,  1899.  The  origin  of  this  document  belongs 
to  the  history  of  China.  It  suffices  here  to  point  out  that  it  provided 
that  Great  Britain  should  not  seek  any  railway  concession  north  of 
the  Great  Wall,  and  Russia  should  observe  the  same  principle  in 
the  Yang-tse  basin.  The  peculiarity  of  this  agreement  consists 
in  the  fact  that  one  of  its  signatories  was  not,  as  usual,  the  Chinese 
government,  but  that  two  European  powers  thereby  pledged  them- 
selves not  to  infringe  upon  each  other's  sphere  of  railroad  con- 
cession in  China.  Diplomatic  exigencies  might  (as  they  have  since 
done  beyond  the  wall)  induce  one  of  the  parties  to  interpret  the 
railroad  sphere  in  the  light  of  a  political  sphere. 

The  peculiarly  favorable  position  of  the  United  States  ren- 
dered it  both  possible  and  desirable  for  her  to  maintain  in  China 
the  principles  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  empire  and  of  the 
equal  opportunity  therein  for  the  economic  enterprise  of  all  nations 
— the  latter  principle  often  called  that  of  the  "  open  door." 
Between  the  end  of  1899  and  the  beginning  of  1900  Secretary  Hay 
induced  the  great  powers,  though  with  nominal  success,  to  declare 
anew  that  they  would  observe  the  avowed  policy  of  the  "  open 
door "  in  their  respective  spheres  in  China.  He  had,  however, 
hardly  received  the  replies  of  the  powers  when  the  reports  of  an 
anti-foreign  campaign  of  an  unusually  serious  character  began  to 
arrive  from  China.  The  story  of  the  so-called  Boxer  uprising,  with 
its  thrilling  episodes,  will  be  told  in  the  volume  on  China,  and  here 
it  is  enough  for  us  to  observe  its  two  features,  namely,  Japan's 
share  in  the  suppression  of  the  trouble,  and  the  bearing  of  the  latter 
upon  the  Manchurian  question. 

By  the  middle  of  June,  1900,  the  representatives  of  twelve 
powers,  as  well  as  many  other  foreigners  and  native  Christians, 
had  already  found  themselves  besieged  in  Peking  and  gallantly 
defending  themselves  against  the  frequent  attacks  of  the  Boxers 
and  imperial  troops;  Admiral  Seymour  and  his  twelve  hundred 
marines  had  already  found  it  impossible  to  force  their  way  to  the 


280  JAPAN 

1900 

relief  of  the  besieged  foreigners.  At  this  juncture  the  government 
of  Great  Britain  perceived  that  no  other  power  could  with  greater 
dispatch  and  success  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  legations  than 
Japan.  The  latter,  however,  had  resolved  to  act  only  in  concert 
with  other  powers,  or,  if  alone,  only  at  their  united  and  explicit 
request.  She  therefore  contented  herself  with  transporting  3000 
soldiers  for  Taku  to  move  strictly  in  unison  with  the  forces  of  the 
other  allies.  The  negotiation  carried  on  by  Lord  Salisbury  with  the 
continental  governments  in  relation  to  the  advisability  of  request- 
ing Japan  immediately  to  mobilize  25,000  or  30,000  troops  from 
her  shores  had  resulted,  early  in  July,  in  evoking  from  Germany 
a  dissent  from  the  proposition  so  long  as  the  allies  could  act  in 
harmony,  and  from  Russia  a  reply  that  she  deemed  it  unwise  to 
intrust  a  single  power  with  the  restoration  of  order  in  China,  but 
that  she  would  welcome  20,000  or  30,000  additional  troops  from 
any  one  of  the  powers  which  would  move  in  perfect  accord  with 
the  others.  Impatient  of  the  dilatory  and  indefinite  replies,  the 
British  government  went  so  far  as  to  guarantee  on  its  own  respon- 
sibility the  cost  of  mobilizing  the  desired  number  of  troops  from 
Japan.  This  was  on  July  6,  and  on  the  same  day  Japan  at  last 
resolved  to  dispatch,  with  no  condition  whatsoever  from  the  other 
powers,  troops  aggregating  22,000.  By  this  time  the  Japanese 
Chancellor  Sugiyama  and  the  German  Minister  von  Ketteler  had 
been  murdered  in  Peking,  the  Taku  forts  had  been  taken  by  the 
allies,  and  the  prospect  had  been  that  both  the  British  and  the 
German  forces  would  soon  aggregate  10,000  men.  Tientsin  fell 
before  the  allies  on  July  14,  three  days  before  the  arrival  of  the 
fresh  troops  from  Japan.  After  three  weeks  at  Tientsin  during 
which  nothing  could  be  done,  15,780  allied  forces,  of  which  8000 
were  the  Japanese,  began  to  march  toward  Peking  on  August  4. 
All  along  the  way  there  were  sanguinary  encounters  with  the 
Boxers  and  Chinese  troops,  so  that  the  allies  probably  lost  800  men 
before  they  reached  Peking  on  August  14.  The  Japanese  soldiers, 
after  a  terrible  battle  lasting  for  nearly  fifteen  hours  till  9.50  p.  m., 
bombarded  the  eastern  walls  at  two  of  the  gates  and  rushed  into 
the  Forbidden  City,  while  previously  a  column  dispatched  by  them 
had  led  the  rest  of  the  allied  forces  toward  the  British  legation 
through  the  gate  which  the  Russians  had  exploded  about  5  p.  m. 
With  what  wild  burst  of  joy  and  enthusiasm  the  foreigners,  who 
had  been  defending  themselves  under  unspeakable  difficulties  within 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  281 

1900 

the  walls  of  the  British  legation,  received  the  triumphant  entry  of 
the  allied  soldiers  may  better  be  imagined  than  told.  The  siege  had 
at  length  been  raised,  the  imperial  court  had  fled  toward  Si-ngan, 
and  the  capital  of  China  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  powers. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  remind  the  reader  that  all  during  this 
memorable  campaign  the  Japanese  soldiers  won  universal  praise 
for  their  dash  and  discipline.  With  no  less  admiration  were  their 
commissariat  system  and  method  of  transportation  regarded  by 
their  comrades.  Repeatedly  was  it  seen  by  impartial  observers  that 
even  in  orderliness  among  themselves  and  just  and  moderate  treat- 
ment of  the  non-combatants,  the  troops  of  the  non-Christian  Japan 
were  behind  those  of  no  Christian  country  then  represented  in 
North  China.  They  excelled  also  in  the  power  of  organization  and 
control  in  their  dealings  with  the  people  of  Peking,  who  had  come 
under  the  provisional  government  of  the  conquering  powers.  All 
these  merits  were  externally  visible,  but  only  the  Japanese  soldier 
himself  will  know  what  burning  love  of  his  country's  name,  which 
he  carried  deep  in  his  bosom,  animated  him  with  courage  and 
patience  and  bridled  his  animal  passion.  He  marched  shoulder  to 
shoulder  with  the  troops  of  the  powers,  three  of  which  had  five 
years  before  treated  his  country  with  indignity  and  forced  her  to 
forsake  the  price  of  the  blood  of  her  sons  only  to  appropriate  it  for 
themselves.  He  could  now  show  them  that  he  had  not  been  forever 
reduced  by  them  into  an  insignificant  position,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
had  advanced  beyond  his  former  degree  of  military  efficiency,  and 
could  vie  with  any  one  of  them  either  in  the  art  of  war  or  in  the 
moral  qualities  that  constitute  the  modern  soldier.  His  experience 
was  invaluable  both  in  training  his  mind  and  body  and  in  demon- 
strating anew  that,  after  all,  his  racial  identity  was  hardly  a  bar 
against  his  full  participation  in  the  arts  of  civilization.  As  precious 
for  his  country  may  be  regarded  the  fact  that  her  position  in  the 
East  rose,  through  the  North  China  campaign,  considerably  higher 
in  the  esteem  of  the  powers  than  even  after  the  Chinese  war  of 
1 894- 1 895.  Otherwise  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  of  1902  prob- 
ably would  not  have  been  so  soon  formed.  Nor  could  Japan 
have  since  proceeded  with  her  national  activities  with  such  a  calm 
confidence. 

How  far  Japan  had  outrun  in  the  march  of  national  progress 
her  neighboring  empire  of  China,  whose  disciple  she  once  was,  was 
strikingly  illustrated  by  the  telegraphic  messages  that  the  emperors 


282  JAPAN 

1900 

of  the  two  nations  exchanged  both  before  and  after  the  capture  of 
Peking.  Nor  can  a  stronger  refutation  of  the  oft-repeated  theory 
that  one  day  Japan  will  revive  the  moribund  China  and  form  with 
her  a  pan- "  yellow "  alliance  powerful  enough  to  exclude  the 
Caucasian  influence  from  the  Orient,  be  found  than  in  the  com- 
parison of  the  Chinese  epistles  and  the  Japanese  replies  in  which 
both  emperors  faithfully  expressed  the  attitude  of  their  respective 
nations.  On  July  3,  or  half  a  month  after  the  fall  of  the  Taku 
forts,  his  majesty  the  emperor  of  China  telegraphed  a  personal 
message  to  the  Japanese  emperor  in  which  he  laid  great  stress 
upon  the  idea  that  in  the  present  rivalry  between  the  East  and  the 
West,  the  former  was  supported  by  only  two  nations,  the  Chinese 
and  the  Japanese.  Could  it  be  China  alone  that  the  Occidental 
powers  covet  with  their  tiger's  eye  ?  "  If  China  should  fall,"  said 
his  majesty,  "  perhaps  your  country  would  be  unable  to  stand 
alone."  On  the  strength  of  this  argument,  the  Son  of  Heaven 
made  an  earnest  appeal  to  his  fellow-sovereign  to  sink  minor  dif- 
ferences and  rescue  the  Orient  from  the  impending  crisis.  To  this 
remarkable  communication  responded  the  emperor  of  Japan,  say- 
ing that  he  considered  it  incumbent  upon  China  immediately  to 
suppress  the  internal  disorder  and  save  the  foreign  envoys,  whose 
persons  were  inviolable,  and  that  after  the  restoration  of  normal 
order  by  China's  own  efforts  Japan  would,  during  the  negotiations 
of  the  powers,  safeguard  the  interests  of  the  great  empire.  The 
author  of  the  original  message  may  have  thought  Japan  a  renegade 
of  the  Orient,  but  the  reply  of  the  latter's  sovereign  implied  her 
irrevocable  policy  of  acting  upon  the  dictates  of  the  most  advanced 
standards  of  mankind — a  policy  which  is  infinitely  removed  from  the 
defensive  position  of  one  form  of  civilization  or  one  section  of  the 
earth's  surface  as  over  against  another.  Nearly  three  months  later, 
on  September  24,  the  Chinese  emperor  again  communicated  from 
Ta-yuan  to  the  Japanese  sovereign  his  sense  of  gratitude  for  the 
work  of  the  latter's  soldiers,  and  solicited  his  persuasion  of  the  other 
powers  to  expedite  the  conclusion  of  peace.  In  reply,  Japan's  ruler 
suggested  that  peace  would  follow  if  the  court  should  at  once 
return  to  Peking,  calm  the  minds  of  the  people,  and  manifest  to  the 
powers  its  sincere  regrets  for  the  recent  outrages,  and  also  if  the 
reactionary  ministers  were  removed  from  office  and  a  new  gov- 
ernment was  organized  of  men  whose  ability  was  universally 
recognized. 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  283 

1900 

It  was  after  a  number  of  conferences  that,  on  November  9, 
the  peace  commissioners  at  Peking  came  to  the  final  conclusion 
regarding  the  terms  of  peace,  which  were  reduced  into  an  identical 
note  two  months  later.  This  protracted  period  of  negotiation  was 
mainly  due  to  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  a  strict  harmony  between 
the  several  powers  on  all  points  under  discussion.  We  cannot  tarry 
over  the  details  of  the  discussion,  for  they  properly  belong  to  the 
history  of  China.  Nor  need  we  point  out  the  exact  contributions 
that  Japan  made  toward  the  peace  settlement,  which  were  in  the 
main  of  a  moderating  character.  Of  the  indemnity,  amounting  to 
450  million  Hai-kuan  taels  ($333,900,000),  Japan  shared  about 
7.73  per  cent.  Previous  to  the  conclusion  of  peace  an  incident  oc- 
curred at  Amoy  which  has  caused  misunderstanding  in  certain  quar- 
ters. On  August  24  a  mob  burned  a  Japanese  Buddhist  building  in 
the  city,  upon  which  some  Japanese  bluejackets  were  landed  to  pro- 
tect the  consulate  and  the  resident  subjects  of  Japan.  More  marines 
were  later  landed,  and  still  more  were  reported  to  be  coming  via 
Formosa.  A  widespread  rumor  ensued  that  Japan  was  bent  on  the 
occupation  of  Amoy,  and  the  consternation  among  the  citizens  ran 
so  high  that  the  local  taotai,  together  with  a  large  number  of  literati 
and  wealthy  merchants,  made  a  personal  appeal  to  the  Japanese  con- 
sul to  evacuate,  themselves  pleading  to  indemnify  the  burned  build- 
ing and  the  landing  of  the  marines.  In  the  meantime  a  British  and 
a  German  war  vessel  had  arrived,  and  the  Japanese  reinforcements 
bound  for  Amoy  had  been  recalled  from  Formosa.  The  people 
who  had  unnecessarily  dreaded  the  presence  of  the  Japanese  forces 
now  began  to  manifest  contempt  of  the  Japanese  residents  in  Amoy, 
whose  position  was  imagined  to  have  suddenly  fallen  at  the  coming 
of  the  foreign  marines.  A  general  evacuation  soon  followed  the 
restoration  of  order,  leaving  the  status  of  the  Japanese  in  the  city 
much  the  same  as  before  the  incident.  Although  it  can  hardly  be 
concealed  that  some  of  the  Japanese  residing  in  Fuh-kien  and 
Formosa  were  at  the  time  animated  by  a  certain  degree  of  chauvin- 
ism, the  intentions  of  the  government  at  Tokyo  could  not  have  been 
but  entirely  pacific. 

Perhaps  in  no  other  instance  have  the  powers  more  repeatedly 
and  unequivocally  given  expression  to  their  avowed  devotion  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  territorial  integrity  and  the  open  door  in  China 
than  during  and  after  the  Boxer  insurrection.  Not  the  least  clear 
declarations  came  from  Russia,  whose  conduct,  however,  could  at 


284  JAPAN 

1900 

least  as  well  be  explained  by  another  principle  which  she  has  per- 
sistently denied.  Facts  would  lead  one  to  suppose  that  she  at  first 
regarded  the  trouble  in  North  China  as  slight  enough  to  die  of  its 
own  inanity  or  be  readily  suppressed  by  the  assistance  of  herself 
alone.  Count  Muraviev,  the  Russian  foreign  minister,  even  prophe- 
sied that  order  would  be  restored  within  two  weeks.  The  serious 
nature  of  the  uprising,  however,  soon  made  it  evident  that  it 
hardly  was  an  occasion  for  any  single  power  thus  to  ingratiate  itself 
with  the  helpless  Chinese  government.  Russia  hence  joined  the 
concert  of  the  powers  in  the  march  toward  Peking,  but  at  least  some 
of  her  press  and  authors  continued  to  regard  her  joint  action  with 
the  allies  as  rather  incidental,  for,  according  to  their  opinion,  the 
trouble  had  been  caused  by  the  offensive  acts  of  the  other  powers 
in  China  in  which  Russia  had  had  no  share.  Subsequent  events 
show,  however,  that,  if  she  attached  a  relatively  small  importance 
to  the  conditions  in  North  China,  Russia  at  the  same  time  grasped 
the  Manchurian  situation  with  great  celerity  and  vigor.  It  is  im- 
possible to  judge  from  our  present  state  of  knowledge  whether  the 
aggressive  attitude  of  Russia  in  Manchuria  preceded  or  followed 
the  appearance  of  threatening  signs  of  danger  against  her  interests 
in  that  territory.  Most  of  the  actual  troubles,  however,  seem  to 
have  occurred  after  Russia  had  suddenly  assumed,  from  June  26 
on,  a  belligerent  movement  in  Manchuria  on  a  vast  scale  which  was 
to  cost  her  in  the  end  no  less  than  sixty-two  million  rubles.1  In  a 
few  days  adjoining  regions  in  Siberia  were  declared  as  in  a  state 
of  war,  and  troops  from  Vladivostok,  Khabarovsk,  Blagovest- 
chensk,  and  the  Trans-Baikalia,  as  well  as  from  European  Russia, 
began  to  press  into  Manchuria.  It  is  as  unnecessary  as  impossible 
to  mark  at  each  point  of  the  widespread  warfare  that  followed 
whether  the  initiative  was  taken  by  the  Chinese  or  by  the  Russians. 
It  is  evident  that  some  strategic  points  in  Manchuria  had  already 
been  infested  by  the  Boxers  and  their  sympathizers,  who  set  about, 
from  what  time  is  not  known,  obstructing  and  damaging  railroad 
construction,  attacking  the  churches,  and  persecuting  the  converts 
in  the  southern  region,  and,  on  July  16,  bombarding  the  Russian 
city  of  Blagovestchensk  across  the  Amur,  the  navigation  of  which 
was  consequently  stopped,  and  a  week  later  murdering  some  eighty 
Russians  in  An-tung  near  the  Korean  border.  Other  outrages  fol- 
lowed as  the  Russian  aggression  excited  more  resentment  among 
the  Chinese.     The  forces  of  the  tsar  occupied  the  open  port  of 

1  A  ruble  is  equivalent  to  51.5  cents. 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  285 

1900 

Niu-chwang,  where  on  August  5  they  organized  a  provisional 
government.  The  Russian  possession  of  Niu-chwang  was  followed, 
before  the  allies  entered  into  Peking,  by  that  of  Hun-chun,  Argun, 
Harbin,  Aigun,  San-sin,  and  other  centers  scattered  over  the  sur- 
face of  Manchuria,  while  in  July  the  dismissal  by  the  Chinese 
government  of  the  Chinese  manager  of  the  Manchurian  railroad 
which  had  hitherto  been  partly  under  the  nominal  control  of 
China,  left  the  Russians  in  full  and  sole  possession. 

Thus  far  Russia  had  no  more  subdued  all  Manchuria  than  the 
allies  had  restored  order  in  North  China,  and  the  tsar's  government 
surprised  the  other  powers,  on  August  25,  only  ten  days  after  the 
rescue  of  the  legations  in  Peking,  by  declaring  Russia's  intention 
to  withdraw  her  minister  and  troops  from  Peking.  It  was  thought 
by  observers,  and  freely  admitted  by  some  Russian  writers,  that  this 
unexpected  move  by  Russia  was  by  no  means  out  of  the  line  of 
her  traditional  policy  of  conferring  favor  upon  the  neighbor  whose 
house  should  as  long  as  possible  be  left  in  a  state  of  confusion  and 
disorder.  The  proposition  was  deemed  none  the  less  as  acceptable 
in  principle  as  impracticable  in  detail  at  that  early  date.  In  regard 
to  Manchuria,  the  same  Russian  circular  of  August  25  declared 
that  evacuation  would  occur  as  soon  as  peace  was  permanently  re- 
stored and  measures  were  taken  to  protect  the  railways,  and  other 
powers  threw  no  obstacle  in  the  way.  It  was  soon  seen,  however, 
that  the  armed  pacification  of  Manchuria  could  not  so  abruptly  stop. 
On  the  contrary,  the  occupation  of  many  strategic  points,  including 
Ninguta,  Tsitsihar,  Mukden,  Kin-chow,  and  An-tung,  was  yet  to 
come,  until  early  in  December  the  entire  three  eastern  provinces 
had  completely  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians. 

It  was  doubtless  with  a  grave  apprehension  of  this  Manchurian 
situation  that  Great  Britain  had  induced  Germany  to  sign,  on 
October  16,  1900,  the  ill-fated  Anglo-German  agreement.  It  sought 
to  effect  a  difficult  combination  of  three  principles  not  easily  recon- 
cilable with  one  another:  the  integrity  of  the  remaining  territory 
of  China,  an  open  door,  and  equal  advantage  to  men  of  all  nations 
in  the  trading  ports  and  marts,  and  the  protection  of  the  interest 
already  acquired  in  China  by  the  signatories.  The  strength  of  the 
combination  was  further  reduced  by  the  manner  in  which  the  first 
and  the  third  principles  were  upheld  in  the  agreement,  which  de- 
clared that  neither  power  would  make  use  of  the  present  compli- 
cation to  acquire  any  territorial  advantages,  but  that  if  another 


286  JAPAN 

1900-1901 

power  should  act  contrary  to  this  view,  then  the  signatories  might 
consult  together  as  to  the  measures  of  protecting  their  own  interests. 
At  their  invitation  to  accept  the  principles  of  the  agreement,  Rus- 
sia, as  well  as  France,  cleverly  replied  that  they  saw  therein  noth- 
ing other  than  the  same  old  principles  which  they  had  repeatedly 
advocated,  while  the  United  States  expressed  assent  to  the  first 
two  of  the  principles,  but  deemed  the  third  as  not  concerning 
her.  Japan  entered  the  agreement  as  a  signatory.  Judged  from 
the  very  purpose  for  which  the  document  had  been  framed  by  Great 
Britain,  the  agreement  may  be  said  to  have  ended  in  a  failure,  for 
what  was  the  use  of  reiterating  the  first  principle  if  Manchuria 
was  not  considered  a  part  of  the  Chinese  territory,  whose  integrity 
was  thereby  respected  ?  Yet  Count  von  Bulow,  imperial  chancellor 
of  Germany,  said  in  the  Reichstag  on  March  15,  1901,  as  he 
again  did  toward  the  end  of  1903,  that  the  Anglo-German  agree- 
ment had  no  reference  to  Manchuria.  "  I  can  imagine  nothing," 
he  was  reported  to  have  said,  "  which  we  regard  with  more  in- 
difference "  than  Manchuria.  "  The  Yang-tse  agreement "  was 
the  name  given  to  the  document  by  the  Germans,  who  were  pleased 
to  interpret  it  as  applying  with  particular  force,  not  to  Manchuria, 
but  to  the  British  sphere  in  the  basin  of  the  great  river  which 
had  always  been  an  eyesore  to  Germany.  With  one  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  at  variance  with  the  very  aim  of  the  agreement, 
it  was  useless  for  the  marquis  of  Lansdowne  to  declare,  on  August 
6,  1 90 1,  that  it  "  most  unquestionably  extended  to  Manchuria, 
which  was  part  of  the  Chinese  empire."  It  is  to  be  doubted  that 
the  convention  had  exerted  the  slightest  influence  in  staying  the 
hand  of  Russia  in  the  three  eastern  provinces. 

Toward  the  close  of  1900  appeared  in  the  London  Times  a 
dispatch  from  its  Peking  correspondent,  Dr.  George  E.  Morrison, 
containing  the  contracts  of  a  secret  treaty  alleged  to  have  been  con- 
cluded in  November  between  Tsang-chi,  the  Tartar-general  at  Muk- 
den, and  Admiral  Alexiev,  which  stipulated  that  Tsang  should 
pacify  Manchuria  and  then  report  the  detail  of  his  administration 
of  the  territory  to  a  Russian  resident  to  be  stationed  at  Mukden. 
This  convention  was  not  ratified  either  by  the  tsar  or  by  the  Son 
of  Heaven.  This  was  merely  a  prelude  to  a  more  serious  develop- 
ment. Early  in  190 1,  when  the  peace  commissioners  at  Peking  were 
discussing  the  matter  of  the  punishment  to  be  demanded  of  China 
for  the  local  officials  who  had  been  privy  to  the  Boxer  outrages, 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  287 

1901 

Russia  showed  signs  of  isolating  herself  from  the  concert  of  the 
powers  and  taking  side  with  the  Chinese  sentiment.  This  charac- 
teristic action  of  the  Russians  was  accompanied  by  the  rumor  of 
negotiations  for  a  secret  convention  carried  on  at  St.  Petersburg 
between  the  government  of  the  tsar  and  the  Chinese  minister.  Of 
this  supposed  convention  several  versions  were  afloat,  some  of 
which  would  have  one  believe  that  in  its  scope  were  comprised,  not 
only  Manchuria,  but  also  Hi,  the  New  Territory,  Mongolia,  and 
the  provinces  of  Kan-su,  Shen-si,  and  Shan-si,  as  Russian  spheres 
of  one  sort  or  another.  Either  in  its  truer  form  or  after  some 
concession  on  the  Russian  part,  the  secret  treaty,  as  it  was  more 
definitely  known,  was  said  to  have  contained  the  following  eight 
points,  which  are  worthy  of  enumeration  as  showing  at  least  some 
of  the  original  intentions  Russia  had  regarding  Manchuria: 
i,  that  Russia  should  continue  the  military  occupation  of  Man- 
churia pending  the  restoration  of  order  and  the  settlement  of  the 
question  of  war  indemnity;  2,  that  China  should  consult  Russia 
as  to  where  and  how  many  Chinese  troops  might  be  stationed  in 
Manchuria;  3,  that  China  should  at  any  time  dismiss  at  Russia's 
request  those  Manchurian  generals  and  other  officials  whose  conduct 
was  deemed  prejudicial  to  mutual  amity ;  4,  that  the  number  of  the 
Chinese  police  should  also  be  determined  by  consulting  Russia,  and 
the  use  of  artillery  should  be  forbidden;  5,  that  there  should  be 
organized  a  special  official  system  for  the  neutral  territory  already 
marked;  6,  that  no  railway  or  mining  concession  in  Manchuria 
should  be  granted  to  citizens  of  any  other  nation  without  consult- 
ing Russia ;  7,  that  the  railroad  indemnity  should,  through  an  agree- 
ment made  with  the  railway  company,  be  wholly  or  in  part  paid  by 
the  profit  of  the  roads;  and  8,  that  Russia  should  be  allowed  to 
construct  a  branch  line  from  the  Manchurian  railway  to  the  Great 
Wall.  The  result  of  these  demands,  were  they  real  and  had  China 
granted  them,  would  have  been  a  complete  Russian  protectorate 
over  Manchuria,  for  although  it  was  made  to  imply  that  the  military 
occupation  of  Manchuria  should  cease  with  the  restoration  of  peace, 
such  concessions  were  demanded  as  would  tend  to  perpetuate  the 
Russian  control  of  the  territory.  Japan  first  saw  the  gravity  of  the 
situation,  and  communicated  about  the  matter  with  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain.  The  last  power  consulted  other  powers. 
The  powers  thus  assumed  a  united  front  in  warning  China  of 
the  unwisdom  of  concluding  with  a  single  power  before  she  had 


288  JAPAN 

1901 

reached  a  common  agreement  with  all  the  allies.  The  protest, 
however,  bore  no  appreciable  effect  upon  Russia,  which  persisted 
in  avowing  that  the  intended  agreement  was  unlike  the  one  reported 
in  the  press,  but  was  merely  a  provisional  step  toward  the  evacua- 
tion of  Manchuria.  Before  the  end  of  March,  Japan  and  Great 
Britain  directly  communicated  with  Russia,  which  adroitly  retorted 
to  the  latter  that  it  was  not  customary,  with  the  tsar's  government 
to  show  to  a  third  power  a  treaty  to  be  concluded  with  an  independ- 
ent nation.  To  Japan's  request  to  submit  the  agreement  to  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  allied  powers'  commissioners  at  Peking,  with  whom 
all  matters  concerning  the  late  complication  should  rest,  Russia 
replied  that  the  intended  treaty  contained  injury  to  none  and  might 
well  be  made  public  after  conclusion.  This  reply  was  dated  March 
26.  On  April  5  Japan  forwarded  to  Russia  her  second  message, 
supported  by  a  firm  determination.  Russia  now  suddenly  withdrew 
her  demands,  declaring  at  the  same  time  that,  owing  to  the  ob- 
struction placed  in  the  way  of  effecting  the  first  move  preliminary 
to  the  eventual  evacuation  of  Manchuria,  she  was  obliged  to  main- 
tain for  the  present  the  military  occupation  of  its  provinces. 

It  was  again  rumored  in  June  that  another  secret  Manchurian 
convention  was  afoot,  which,  if  real,  however,  must  have  miscarried. 
No  more  successful  was  the  patriotic  effort  of  the  Viceroy  Chang 
Chih-tung  and  the  late  Viceroy  Liu  Kan-yi  to  create  among  the 
peace  commissioners  a  sentiment  for  the  opening  to  foreign  trade 
of  the  whole  of  Manchuria.  Toward  the  last  of  August  Paul  Les- 
sar  was  appointed  the  Russian  minister  at  Peking.  The  peace  pro- 
tocol agreed  upon  between  China  and  the  allied  powers  was  finally 
signed  on  September  7,  1901,  the  imperial  court  was  expected  shortly 
to  return  to  Peking,  and  the  Chinese  government  began  to  look  anx- 
iously for  the  withdrawal  of  foreign  troops  from  the  realm. 
Seizing  this  opportunity,  Russia  proposed  a  new  Manchurian  treaty 
whose  comparatively  mild  terms  made  it  appear  acceptable  at  this 
moment  to  the  Chinese  commissioners,  especially  to  the  pro- 
Russian,  Li  Hung  Chang.  According  to  the  reported  tenor  of 
this  treaty,  the  Manchurian  evacuation  was  to  be  completed  within 
two  or  three  years,  the  Chinese  troops  at  Mukden  were  to  be 
trained  by  Russian  officers,  and  their  numbers  to  be  determined  by 
consulting  Russia's  wishes,  and,  as  in  the  treaty  withdrawn  in 
April,  Chinese  artillery  was  forbidden.  Considering  the  feeble 
attitude  of  the  Chinese  commissioners,  it  would  have  been  extremely 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA 

1902 

difficult  for  Japan  and  Great  Britain  effectively  to  protest  against 
the  acceptance  of  the  Russian  demands  had  not  the  Viceroys  Liu 
and  Chang  strongly  reminded  the  emperor  and  the  empress  dow- 
ager of  the  direct  peril  to  the  dynasty  which  might  result  from 
virtually  forsaking  its  ancestral  home,  Manchuria,  to  a  foreign 
power  whose  ambition  knew  no  bounds.  In  accordance  with  the 
wishes  of  the  court,  the  dying  Li  Hung  Chang,  on  his  sick-bed, 
saw  Lessar  and  appealed  to  the  Russian  friendship  for  China  to 
modify  the  terms  of  the  proposed  agreement.  Li  Soon  passed  away, 
on  November  7,  leaving  the  gravest  problem  of  China  in  a  state  of 
extreme  uncertainty.  Prince  Ching  presented  a  counter-proposition, 
which  among  other  things  requested  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria 
within  one  year.  Russia's  reply  to  this  note  arrived  in  Peking  the 
last  of  January,  1902,  and  was  found  to  contain  a  demand  for 
an  exclusive  mining  concession  to  Russia  of  all  Manchuria,  which 
is  noted  for  its  untold  stores  of  minerals.  Against  this  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  Japan  entered  a  firm  protest.  Secretary 
Hay,  in  his  note  of  February  3,  reminded  the  Russian  and  Chinese 
governments  of  the  repeated  assurances  made  by  the  tsar's  foreign 
minister  of  his  devotion  to  the  principle  of  the  open  door  in  all 
parts  of  China,  and  said :  "  An  agreement  whereby  China  gives 
any  corporation  or  company  the  exclusive  right  or  privilege  of 
opening  mines,  establishing  railroads,  or  in  any  other  way  indus- 
trially developing  Manchuria,  can  but  be  viewed  with  the  gravest 
concern  by  the  government  of  the  United  States.  It  constitutes 
a  monopoly,  which  is  a  distinct  breach  of  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaties  concluded  between  China  and  foreign  powers,  and  thereby 
seriously  affects  the  rights  of  American  citizens."  As  usual,  Russia, 
in  her  reply,  so  strongly  reinforced  her  former  pledges  of  the 
principle  of  the  open  door  that  the  government  at  Washington 
found  it  impossible  to  dispute  them  without  questioning  Russia's 
integrity,  which  Hay  was  not  disposed  to  do.  By  this  time, 
however,  an  important  event  had  taken  place  in  the  diplomatic 
world  which  was  popularly  regarded  as  a  virtual  protest  against 
what  was  considered  the  Eastern  policy  of  Russia — namely,  the 
conclusion  of  the  agreement  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  signed 
at  London  on  January  30,  1902. 

The  fair  and  open  principles  of  this  agreement  may  best  be 
seen  from  its  text,  which  was  as  follows: 

"  The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  actuated  solely 


290  JAPAN 

1902 

by  a  desire  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and  general  peace  in  the 
extreme  East,  being  moreover  specially  interested  in  maintaining 
the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China 
and  the  Empire  of  Korea,  and  in  securing  equal  opportunities  in 
those  countries  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations,  hereby 
agree  as  follows : 

Article  I. 

"  The  High  Contracting  Parties  having  mutually  recognized 
the  independence  of  China  and  Korea,  declare  themselves  to  be 
entirely  uninfluenced  by  any  aggressive  tendencies  in  either  country. 
Having  in  view,  however,  their  special  interests,  of  which  those  of 
Great  Britain  relate  principally  to  China,  while  Japan,  in  addition 
to  the  interests  which  she  possesses  in  China,  is  interested  in  a 
peculiar  degree  politically  as  well  as  commercially  and  industrially 
in  Korea,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  recognize  that  it  will  be 
admissible  for  either  of  them  to  take  such  measures  as  may  be  in- 
dispensable in  order  to  safeguard  those  interests  if  threatened  either 
by  the  aggressive  action  of  any  other  power,  or  by  disturbances 
arising  in  China  or  Korea,  and  necessitating  the  intervention  of 
either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  for  the  protection  of  the 
lives  and  property  of  its  subjects. 

Article  II. 

"  If  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan,  in  the  defense  of  their 
respective  interests  as  above  described,  should  become  involved  in 
war  with  another  power,  the  other  High  Contracting  Party  will 
maintain  a  strict  neutrality,  and  use  its  efforts  to  prevent  other 
powers  from  joining  in  hostilities  against  its  ally. 

Article  III. 

"  If,  in  the  above  event,  any  other  power  or  powers  should 
join  in  hostilities  against  that  ally,  the  other  High  Contracting 
Party  will  come  to  its  assistance,  and  will  conduct  the  war  in  com- 
mon, and  will  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement  with  it. 

Article  IV. 

"The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  neither  of  them 
will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into  separate  arrangements 
with  another  power  to  the  prejudice  of  the  interests  above  described. 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  291 

1902 

Article  V. 

"  Whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan, 
the  above-mentioned  interests  are  in  jeopardy,  the  two  governments 
will  communicate  with  one  another  fully  and  frankly. 

Article  VI. 

"  The  present  agreement  shall  come  into  effect  immediately 
after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and  remain  in  force  for  five  years 
from  that  date. 

"  In  case  neither  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  should  have 
notified  twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  the  said  five  years 
the  intention  of  terminating  it,  it  shall  remain  binding  until  the 
expiration  of  one  year  from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  shall  have  denounced  it.  But  if,  when  the  date 
fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either  ally  is  actually  engaged  in 
war,  the  alliance  shall,  ipso  facto,  continue  until  peace  is  concluded." 

To  the  Anglo-Japanese  agreement  Russia  and  her  ally  France 
retorted  in  the  following  declaration  of  March  16: 

"  The  allied  Russo-French  Governments  are  wholly  pleased  to 
discern  that  the  Anglo- Japanese  convention  supports  the  essential 
principles  which,  according  to  the  reiterated  statement  of  France 
and  Russia,  constituted  and  still  constitute  the  foundation  of  their 
policy.  Both  governments  believe  that  the  support  of  these  prin- 
ciples is  also  a  guarantee  of  the  interests  of  the  Far  East.  They  are 
compelled,  however,  not  to  lose  from  view  the  possibly  inimical 
action  of  other  powers,  or  a  repetition  of  disorders  in  China,  pos- 
sibly impairing  China's  integrity  and  free  development,  to  the 
detriment  of  their  reciprocal  interests.  They  therefore  reserve  to 
themselves  the  right  to  take  measures  to  defend  these  interests." 

In  this  connection  may  be  related  the  diplomatic  comedy 
enacted  at  Shanghai  in  October,  in  which  the  newly  formed  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  played  a  part.  According  to  the  just  wishes  of 
the  Chinese  authorities,  Great  Britain  proposed  on  July  31  to 
Japan,  Germany,  and  France  to  withdraw  the  troops  the  four 
powers  had  been  stationing  at  Shanghai,  where  peace  had  been 
restored.  Japan  and  France  cheerfully  assented,  on  the  condition, 
however,  that  all  the  parties  should  agree.  Germany  showed  an 
inexplicable  dilatoriness  in  giving  a  definite  answer,  proposing  that 


292  JAPAN 

1902 

the  four  powers  should  first  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  date 
of  a  joint  evacuation.  Great  Britain  fixed  November  i,  to  which 
France  agreed.  Japan,  however,  delayed,  as  she  descried  a  secret 
movement  being  made  by  one  of  the  parties.  Finally,  Japan  heard 
on  October  6,  and  Great  Britain  on  the  8th,  that  Germany  had 
secured  from  the  Chinese  government  a  pledge  that  it  would  give 
no  additional  rights  to  any  power  in  the  Yang-tse  basin,  the  British 
influence  over  which  had  always  embarrassed  the  German  policy  in 
China.  The  stroke  dealt  by  Germany  could  have  been  aimed  at 
no  other  power  but  Great  Britain.  The  latter  notified  the  former 
that  her  intention  was  to  prevent  any  power  from  taking  the  present 
opportunity  to  come  to  a  secret  agreement  of  an  exclusive  nature 
with  China — a  possibility  altogether  incompatible  with  the  terms 
of  the  alliance  so  recently  framed.  At  the  same  time,  the  Chinese 
government  pretended  that  it  had  made  no  special  pledge  to  Ger- 
many. Great  Britain,  now  fully  advised  by  Japan  of  the  nature 
of  the  case,  declared  that  it  would  be  unnecessary  and  undesirable 
to  bind  only  a  few  powers  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  a  portion 
of  the  Chinese  empire,  and  that  to  such  an  agreement,  if  any,  she 
would  not  consider  herself  in  any  way  bound.  She  also  expressed 
to  Prince  Ching  her  resentment  of  his  duplicity.  In  the  meantime, 
the  Viceroy  Chang  Chih-tung,  from  whom  the  German  consul  had 
sought  a  similar  pledge  to  one  that  had  been  given  by  the  prince, 
flatly  refused  the  demand.  Germany  ended  the  affair  with  a  clever 
but  unconvincing  explanation  to  Great  Britain.  Seeing  that  the 
sky  was  clear,  Japan  evacuated  Shanghai,  alone  and  boldly,  on 
November  22.    The  other  powers  soon  followed. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  agreement  was  an- 
nounced in  the  midst  of  the  negotiations  between  Lessar  and  the 
Chinese  government  concerning  Manchuria.  During  the  diplo- 
matic flurry  attending  the  momentous  declarations  made  first  by 
Japan  and  Great  Britain  and  then  by  Russia  and  France,  the 
Manchurian  negotiation  seemed  to  have  been  temporarily  forgotten, 
until  the  world  was  taken  by  surprise  to  hear  of  the  conclusion,  on 
April  8,  1902,  of  a  new  Russo-Chinese  convention  regarding  the 
three  eastern  provinces,  which  went  into  force  simultaneously  with 
the  signing  of  the  agreement  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  that 
memorable  day.  Not  the  least  surprising  feature  of  it  was  the  re- 
markable mildness  of  its  terms.  Russia  promised,  upon  the  con- 
dition that  China  should  protect  the  Russian  railways,  Russian  sub- 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  293 

1902-1903 

jects,  and  their  enterprises  in  Manchuria,  to  evacuate  the  territory 
and  restore  it  to  Chinese  sovereignty.  The  evacuation  was  to  take 
place  at  three  different  periods  within  the  ensuing  eighteen  months, 
as  follows :  from  regions  west  of  the  Liao  River,  by  October  8, 
1902 ;  from  the  rest  of  the  province  of  Sheng-king  and  the  province 
of  Kirin,  by  April  8,  1903 ;  and,  finally,  from  the  Amur  (Hei-lung) 
province,  by  October  8,  1903.  Pending  the  evacuation,  the  number 
of  Chinese  troops  and  the  sites  of  their  stations  in  Manchuria 
should  be  determined  by  consultation  between  the  Chinese  and  Rus- 
sian officers,  but  after  the  evacuation  those  troops  might  be  freely 
distributed  at  the  direction  of  the  Chinese  officers.  Then,  however, 
the  Russian  Government  should  be  notified  of  every  change  made 
in  this  respect.  Suppressing  other  points  in  the  convention  which 
do  not  concern  us  directly,  it  is  seen  that  it  says  nothing  about 
Chinese  territories  outside  of  Manchuria,  and,  within  the  latter, 
contains  no  new  mining  or  railway  demands,  while  it  appears  to 
promise  an  eventually  complete  restoration  of  Manchuria  to  China. 
The  moderate  tone  of  the  present  instrument  as  compared  with  the 
former  abortive  conventions,  and  coming  so  soon  after  the  renewed 
declaration  of  the  Russo-French  alliance  of  its  devotion  to  the 
principle  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  China,  seemed  to  confirm  the 
sincerity  of  Russia's  avowed  intention  in  the  East. 

The  first  period  of  the  Manchurian  occupation,  according  to 
this  convention,  was  to  close  on  October  8,  1902.  Before  that  date 
the  Russian  forces  had  completely  withdrawn  from  that  part  of  the 
Sheng-king  province  lying  to  the  west  of  the  Liao  River.  Russia 
had  fulfilled  her  pledge.  It  was  alleged,  however,  by  several  eye- 
witnesses that  the  so-called  evacuation  largely  meant  the  withdrawal 
of  Russian  troops  from  Chinese  quarters  into  the  numerous  and 
extensive  Russian  barracks  and  blockhouses  along  the  Manchurian 
railway.  The  most  important  section  of  Manchuria,  namely,  the 
rest  of  the  Sheng-king  and  the  whole  of  the  Kirin  province,  was, 
according  to  the  convention,  to  be  evacuated  on  April  8,  1903. 
That  day  came  and  passed,  without  seeing,  except  in  a  few  places, 
even  the  nominal  evacuation.  In  the  midst  of  a  suspense  full  of 
apprehension  the  Russians  lodged  at  the  Chinese  foreign  office,  as 
a  price  for  the  yet  unfulfilled  evacuations,  new  demands  in  seven 
articles,  which  astounded  the  diplomatic  world.  The  demands 
were  in  substance  as  follows:  1,  the  non-alienation  of  any  part  of 
Manchuria  to  any  other  power;  2,  the  right  to  construct  a  Russian 


294  JAPAN 

1903 

telegraph  line  between  Niu-chwang  and  Peking;  3,  the  promise 
that  under  no  pretext  any  other  foreigner  should  be  employed  in 
North  China;  4,  the  sole  management  of  the  customs  tariff  at 
Niu-chwang  by  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  and  the  Russian  super- 
vision of  the  quarantine  service  at  the  same  port;  5,  the  opening  of 
no  new  port  or  mart  in  Manchuria  to  foreign  trade ;  6,  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  status  quo  in  the  Mongolian  administration ;  and,  7,  the 
pledge  to  be  made  by  China  that  all  the  privileges  that  the  Russians 
enjoyed  before  the  late  emeute  should  not  hereby  be  affected.  The 
Japanese  minister,  Uchida,  entered  on  April  21  a  vigorous  pro- 
test at  the  foreign  office  at  Peking,  and  was  followed  by  the  British 
and  American  ministers.  The  United  States,  which  had  already 
been  negotiating  with  China  for  the  opening  of  two  new  ports 
in  Manchuria,  where  she  possessed  the  greatest  interest  of  any 
nation  in  the  import  trade,  made  a  query  on  April  24  direct  to  St. 
Petersburg  as  to  the  authenticity  of  the  reported  demand.  She 
was  assured  both  by  the  Russian  foreign  minister  and  Minister 
Cassini,  as  was  Great  Britain  by  the  Russian  representative  at 
London,  that  the  published  reports  of  the  proposed  convention 
were  absolutely  incorrect.  It  appeared  as  if  the  Russian  disclaimer 
were  final  and  a  signal  diplomatic  success  had  been  accomplished  by 
Secretary  Hay.  But  to  say  that  the  reported  articles  were  incorrect 
was  not  the  same  as  to  say  that  they  were  entirely  unfounded,  or 
even  that  every  one  of  them  was  incorrect.  The  government  of 
the  tsar  seems  to  have  left  sufficient  room  in  its  statements  for  the 
inference  not  only  that  there  was  proceeding  a  pourparler  with  the 
Chinese  foreign  office,  but  also  that  some  of  the  rumored  articles 
were  not  to  be  denied.  However  that  may  be,  it  is  noteworthy 
that  the  knowledge  of  the  Russian  demand  aroused  among  the  lead- 
ing classes  of  the  Chinese  people  a  patriotic  ebullition  not  known 
even  during  the  Japanese  war  and  the  Boxer  insurrection.  Petitions 
from  all  of  the  eighteen  provinces  reminded  the  Peking  govern- 
ment in  the  strongest  terms  that  the  loss  of  Manchuria  would  lead 
to  a  widespread  uprising  in  the  empire,  a  repetition  of  the  anti- 
foreign  crusade  of  1900,  a  probable  wholesale  partition  of  the 
Middle  Kingdom  by  the  rebels  and  the  powers,  and  an  eventual 
downfall  of  the  ruling  dynasty.  In  this  remarkable  upheaval, 
merchants  and  students,  including  those  staying  in  Japan,  took  no 
less  active  part  than  the  officials  and  literates,  who,  as  the  ruling 
class,  are  usually  the  most  alive  to  the  interests  of  the  government 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  295 

1903 

and  the  civilization  of  China.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is 
not  strange  that  before  May  10  the  foreign  office  at  Peking  replied 
to  the  Russian  government  that  the  former  could  assuredly  not 
concede  to  a  demand  that  ignored  previous  agreements,  the  stipu- 
lations of  which  China  had  never  violated. 

This  reply  of  China  to  Russia  hardly  had  a  greater  effect  to 
settle  the  dispute  than  did  the  pacific  disclaimer  given  about  ten 
days  before  by  Russia  to  the  United  States,  but  on  the  contrary, 
was  followed  by  a  month  the  uncertain  and  trying  nature  of  which 
to  Prince  Ching  and  his  foreign  office  has  seldom  since  been  equaled 
during  the  whole  period  of  the  negotiations.  While  Pokotilov, 
the  influential  Peking  agent  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  was  re- 
ported to  be  freely  dispensing  gifts  and  favors  to  win  over  certain 
members  of  the  office  and  of  the  inner  court,  the  Russian  charge, 
Plangon,  demanded  an  immediate  reply  to  three  of  the  once 
proposed  seven  articles,  which  pertained  to  the  non-alienation  of 
the  Manchurian  territory,  the  opening  of  no  new  ports,  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  Mongolia.  Prince  Ching,  as  well 
as  the  empress  dowager,  seemed  to  waver,  or  at  least  to  bide  time. 
The  attempt  of  some  patriots  to  install  in  the  foreign  office  the  most 
respected  Viceroy  Chang  Chih-tung  fell  through,  and  the  attitude 
of  the  Japanese  government  was  deemed  not  sufficiently  reassuring 
to  encourage  China  once  more  to  assume  a  decisive  tone.  In  the 
meantime  the  Russian  minister,  Lessar,  returned  on  May  29  to 
Peking  after  an  absence,  and  severely  reprimanded  the  foreign 
office  for  frequently  allowing  diplomatic  secrecy  to  be  violated. 
In  his  conference  with  Prince  Ching,  on  June  10,  he  renewed  the 
demand  in  each  of  the  seven  articles,  every  one  of  which  the  prince 
however,  was  obliged  to  refvfee,  as  before.  At  Lessar's  intima- 
tion that  an  indiscriminate  refusal  would  result  in  serious  disad- 
vantages to  China,  and  his  suggestion  that  some  substitute  for  the 
old  demand  might  be  devised  for  mutual  benefit,  the  prince  had 
only  to  request  the  minister  of  the  tsar  to  present  his  own  substitute, 
as  the  former  naturally  had  none.  A  new  demand  was  accordingly 
presented,  which  embodied  the  first,  fourth,  and  sixth  articles  of 
the  former  convention,  the  fourth  being  now  stated  in  two  articles. 
Prince  Ching  begged  for  five  days'  delay,  and  temporarily  secluded 
himself  from  the  world,  his  negotiation  with  Lessar  being  in  the 
meanwhile  carried  on  by  secret  correspondence.  The  protests  from 
the  Japanese,  American,  and  British  ministers,  as  well  as  the  re- 


296  JAPAN 

1903 

newed  demand  of  the  two  former  to  open  new  ports  in  Manchuria, 
did  not  avail. 

Irritating  to  Japan  as  was  the  Manchurian  situation,  she  was 
confronted  in  Korea  by  a  still  more  serious  state  of  things.  The 
diplomatic  history  of  the  latter  country  since  the  conclusion  of  the 
war  of  1 894- 1 895  may  now  be  briefly  recounted.  The  years  between 
1895  and  1898  witnessed  violent  fluctuations  of  influence  between 
the  Russians  and  the  Japanese  in  Korea.  The  Japanese  had  been 
too  eager  for  reform,  and,  at  least  on  the  occasion  of  the  murder  of 
the  queen  on  October  8,  1895,  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  too 
much  influenced  by  their  less  responsible  element  to  withstand 
the  obstruction  and  diplomacy  of  the  Russians.  It  was  not  until  the 
departure  of  Waeber,  the  astute  Russian  minister,  and  until  the 
activity  of  the  Russians  in  China  had  become  all-engrossing,  that 
the  latter's  influence  was  again  eclipsed  by  that  of  the  Japanese. 
During  this  period  of  struggle  Russia  and  Japan  concluded  three 
agreements  defining  their  position  in  Korea,  namely,  the  Komura- 
Waeber  memorandum  signed  at  Seul  on  May  4,  1896,  the  Yamagata- 
Lobanov  protocol  signed  at  St.  Petersburg  on  June  9,  1896,  and  the 
Nishi-Rosen  protocol  concluded  at  Tokyo  on  April  25,  1898.  Some 
of  the  more  permanent  of  the  terms  of  these  agreements  deserve 
notice,  as  they  gave  to  Japan  a  conventional  ground  for  her  negotia- 
tions with  Russia  in  1903-1904,  just  prior  to  the  war.  The  two 
governments  "  recognized  definitively  the  sovereignty  and  the  entire 
independence  of  Korea,  and  mutually  engaged  themselves  to  abstain 
from  all  direct  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  that  country." 
No  military  teacher  or  financial  adviser  should  be  furnished  to 
Korea  by  either  power  without  consulting  the  other.  In  view  of 
the  large  development  of  the  Japanese  commercial  and  industrial 
enterprises  in  Korea,  the  Russian  government  agreed  not  to  im- 
pede the  development  of  the  commercial  and  industrial  relations 
between  Japan  and  Korea.  In  case  further  definitions  of  principles 
should  become  necessary  or  other  points  for  discussion  should 
arise,  the  representatives  of  the  two  powers  should  be  instructed 
to  negotiate  amicably.  The  arrangement  made  in  these  agreements 
was  from  its  nature  temporary,  and  would  have  created  fresh 
complications  even  if  its  terms  had  been  strictly  observed. 

As  soon  as  her  hands  were  freer  in  Manchuria,  Russia,  repre- 
sented at  Seul  by  the  ambitious  Pavlov,  and  also  by  the  semi- 
official diplomats,  Baron  Gunzburg  and  Miss  Sonntag,  employed 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  297 

1903 

such  means  as  befitted  the  peculiar  situation  of  Korea  in  their 
persistent  effort  to  overthrow  Japanese  and  promote  Russian  in- 
fluence in  the  peninsula.  For  this  purpose  they  made  to  the  Korean 
court  propositions  of  almost  every  conceivable  nature,  including 
demands  for  concessions  at  Masampo,  Chinhai  Bay,  and  Kojedo 
Island,  in  the  south,  for  the  right  to  build  telegraph  and  railway 
lines  in  the  north,  and  for  the  employment  of  Russian  financial 
advisers  and  military  instructors.  It  was  not  till  April,  1903,  how- 
ever, that,  simultaneously  with  her  pressure  upon  Peking,  Russia 
began  to  work  the  timber  concession  which  she  was  said  to  have 
secured  in  1896,  when  the  Korean  king  had  taken  refuge  in  the 
Russian  legation  at  Seul.  Early  in  May,  ostensibly  to  defend  the 
forest  land,  forty-seven  Russian  soldiers  arrived  at  Yongam-po 
on  the  Yalu,  where,  despite  protests  from  the  Korean  government, 
an  extensive  tract  of  land  was  seized  and  fortification  was  begun. 
Presently,  one  hundred,  and  then  two  hundred  more  Russian  troops 
arrived,  while  on  the  Manchurian  side  of  the  frontier  fresh  troops 
entered  An-tung  and  Feng-hwang-Cheng,  so  that  the  pressure  of 
the  Russian  forces  was  heavily  felt  upon  the  Korean  border. 

At  length  the  Japanese  government  came  to  the  decision  that 
it  should  deal  directly  with  the  government  of  the  tsar  in  order 
to  establish  once  and  for  all  the  integrity  of  China  in  Manchuria,  as 
well  as  the  independence  and  reform  of  Korea,  to  define  the  re- 
spective rights  and  interests  in  those  countries  of  Japan  and  Russia, 
and  radically  and  fundamentally  to  free  the  general  peace  of  the 
Far  East  from  the  factors  that  had  continually  and  profoundly 
threatened  it.  The  decision  in  its  main  points  had  been  reached 
by  the  press  and  the  entire  nation  long  before  the  cabinet  min- 
isters and  privy  councilors  met  before  the  throne,  on  June  23, 
and  built  thereon  a  definite  policy  to  be  pursued  in  the  coming 
negotiations  with  Russia.  These  negotiations  were  attended  by 
tortuous  delays  on  the  part  of  Russia,  but  the  Japanese  nation, 
realizing  that  never  in  their  long  history  had  they  been  confronted 
with  a  graver  national  problem,  met  it  with  a  remarkable  perseve- 
rance. The  government,  also,  conducted  itself  with  dignity  and 
consideration,  for  none  knew  better  than  it  that  the  immediate 
peace  of  the  East  was  dependent  upon  the  success  of  the  pending 
negotiations.  The  different  motives  of  Russia  and  Japan  for  these 
negotiations  and  the  different  spirit  in  which  each  carried  them  on 
may  be  well  seen  in  the  following  official  statements  made  by  the 


298  JAPAN 

1903 

respective  governments  soon  after  the  diplomatic  relations  between 
them  had  been  severed.  The  Russian  communication,  issued  on 
February  9,  1904,  by  the  foreign  office  at  St.  Petersburg,  said : 

"Last  year  [1903]  the  Tokyo  cabinet,  under  the  pretext  of 
establishing  the  balance  of  power  and  a  more  settled  order  of  things 
on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  submitted  to  the  imperial  government 
[of  Russia]  a  proposal  for  a  revision  of  the  existing  treaties  with 
Korea.  Russia  consented,  and  Viceroy  Alexiev  was  charged  to 
draw  up  a  project  for  a  new  understanding  with  Japan  in  coopera- 
tion with  the  Russian  minister  at  Tokyo,  who  was  intrusted  with 
the  negotiations  with  the  Japanese  government.  Although  the 
exchange  of  views  with  the  Tokyo  cabinet  on  this  subject  was  of  a 
friendly  character,  the  Japanese  social  circles  and  the  local  and 
foreign  press  attempted  in  every  way  to  produce  a  warlike  ferment 
among  the  Japanese  and  to  drive  the  government  into  an  armed 
conflict  with  Russia.  Under  the  influence  thereof  the  Tokyo  cabinet 
began  to  formulate  greater  and  greater  demands  in  the  negotiations, 
at  the  same  time  taking  most  extensive  measures  to  make  the  country 
ready  for  war. 

"  All  these  circumstances  could  not,  of  course,  disturb  Russia's 
equanimity;  but  they  induced  her  also  to  take  military  and  naval 
measures.  Nevertheless,  to  preserve  peace  in  the  Far  East,  Russia, 
so  far  as  her  incontestable  rights  and  interests  permitted,  gave  the 
necessary  attention  to  the  demands  of  the  Tokyo  cabinet,  and  de- 
clared herself  ready  to  recognize  Japan's  privileged  commercial  and 
economic  position  in  the  Korean  peninsula,  with  the  concession  of 
the  right  to  protect  it  by  military  force  in  the  event  of  disturbances 
in  that  country.  At  the  same  time,  while  rigorously  observing  the 
fundamental  principle  of  her  policy  regarding  Korea,  whose  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  were  guaranteed  by  previous  understand- 
ings with  Japan  and  by  treaties  with  other  powers,  Russia  insisted 
on  three  points : 

"  (1.)  On  a  mutual  and  unconditional  guarantee  of  this 
principle. 

"  (2.)  On  an  undertaking  to  use  no  part  of  Korea  for  strategic 
purposes,  as  the  authorization  of  such  action  on  the  part  of  any 
foreign  power  was  directly  opposed  to  the  principle  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  Korea. 

"  (3-)  On  the  preservation  of  the  full  freedom  of  navigation 
of  the  Straits  of  Korea. 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  299 

1903 

"  The  project  elaborated  in  this  sense  did  not  satisfy  the  Jap- 
anese Government,  which  in  its  last  proposals  not  only  declined  to 
accept  the  conditions  which  appeared  as  the  guarantee  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  Korea,  but  also  began  at  the  same  time  to  insist  on  pro- 
visions to  be  incorporated  in  a  project  regarding  the  question  of 
Manchuria.  Such  demands  on  the  part  of  Japan,  naturally,  were 
inadmissible,  the  question  of  Russia's  position  in  Manchuria  con- 
cerning in  the  first  place  China,  but  also  all  the  powers  having 
commercial  interests  in  China.  The  imperial  government,  there- 
fore, saw  absolutely  no  reason  to  include  in  a  special  treaty  with 
Japan  regarding  Korean  affairs  any  provisions  concerning  territory 
occupied  by  Russian  troops. 

"  The  imperial  government,  however,  did  not  refuse,  so  long 
as  the  occupation  of  Manchuria  lasts,  to  recognize  both  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  Emperor  of  China  in  Manchuria  and  also  the  rights 
acquired  there  by  other  powers  through  treaties  with  China.  A 
declaration  to  this  effect  had  already  been  made  to  the  foreign  cab- 
inets. In  view  of  this  the  imperial  government,  after  charging  its 
representatives  at  Tokyo  to  present  its  reply  to  the  latest  proposal  of 
Japan,  was  justified  in  expecting  the  Tokyo  cabinet  to  take  into 
account  the  considerations  set  forth  above  and  that  it  would  ap- 
preciate the  wish  manifested  by  Russia  to  come  to  a  peaceful  under- 
standing with  Japan.  Instead  of  this  the  Japanese  Government, 
not  even  awaiting  this  reply,  decided  to  break  off  negotiations  and 
to  suspend  diplomatic  relations.  The  imperial  government,  while 
laying  on  Japan  the  full  responsibility  for  any  consequences  of  such 
a  course  of  action,  will  await  the  development  of  events,  and  the 
moment  it  becomes  necessary  will  take  the  most  decisive  measures 
for  the  protection  of  its  rights  and  interests  in  the  Far  East." 

The  official  statement  given  by  the  Japanese  foreign  office  on 
the  night  of  February  8  reads  as  follows : 

"  It  being  indispensable  to  the  welfare  and  safety  of  Japan  to 
maintain  the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  Korea,  and 
to  safeguard  her  paramount  interests  therein,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment finds  it  impossible  to  view  with  indifference  any  action 
endangering  the  position  of  Korea,  whereas  Russia,  notwithstand- 
ing her  solemn  treaty  with  China  and  her  repeated  assurances  to 
the  powers,  not  only  continues  her  occupation  of  Manchuria,  but 
has  taken  aggressive  measures  in  Korean  territory.  Should  Man- 
churia be  annexed  to  Russia,  the  independence  of  Korea  would 


300  JAPAN 

1903 

naturally  be  impossible.  The  Japanese  Government,  therefore,  being 
desirous  of  securing  permanent  peace  for  eastern  Asia,  by  means 
of  direct  negotiations  with  Russia,  with  the  view  of  arriving  at  a 
friendly  adjustment  of  their  mutual  interests  in  both  Manchuria 
and  Korea,  where  their  interests  meet,  communicated  toward  the 
end  of  July  last  such  desire  to  the  Russian  Government,  and  invited 
its  adherence.  To  this  the  Russian  Government  expressed  a  willing 
assent.  Accordingly,  on  August  12,  the  Japanese  Government  pro- 
posed to  Russia,  through  its  representative  at  St.  Petersburg,  the 
basis  of  an  agreement  which  was  substantially  as  follows: 

"  (1.)  A  mutual  agreement  to  respect  the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  and  Korean  empires. 

"  (2.)  A  mutual  engagement  to  maintain  the  principle  of  an 
equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations 
with  the  natives  of  those  countries. 

"  (3.)  A  reciprocal  recognition  of  Japan's  preponderating 
interests  in  Korea,  and  that  Russia  has  special  interests  in  railway 
enterprises  in  Manchuria,  and  a  mutual  recognition  of  the  respec- 
tive rights  of  Japan  and  Russia  to  take  measures  necessary  for  the 
protection  of  the  above-mentioned  interests,  so  far  as  the  principle 
of  article  1  is  not  infringed. 

"  (4.)  The  recognition  by  Russia  of  the  exclusive  rights  of 
Japan  to  give  advice  and  assistance  to  Korea  in  the  interest  of  re- 
form and  good  government. 

"  (5.)  The  engagement  on  the  part  of  Russia  not  to  impede 
the  eventual  extension  of  the  Korean  railway  into  southern  Man- 
churia, so  as  to  connect  with  the  Eastern  Chinese  [i.  e.,  Man- 
churian]  and  the  Shan-hai-kwan — Niu-chwang  lines. 

"  It  was  the  intention  of  the  Japanese  Government  originally 
that  a  conference  should  take  place  between  its  representative  at 
St.  Petersburg  and  the  Russian  authorities,  so  as  to  facilitate  prog- 
ress as  much  as  possible  in  reaching  a  solution  of  the  situation,  but 
the  Russian  Government  absolutely  refused  to  do  so,  on  the  plea 
that  the  Tsar  planned  a  trip  abroad;  and  for  other  reasons  it  was 
unavoidably  decided  to  conduct  the  negotiations  at  Tokyo.  It  was 
not  until  October  3  that  the  Russian  Government  presented 
counter-proposals.  She  therein  declined  to  engage  in  respect  to 
the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  China,  and  stipulate  the 
maintenance  of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China,  and  requested  that 


KOREA     AND     MANCHURIA  301 

1903 

Japan  declare  Manchuria  and  its  littoral  as  being  entirely  outside 
of  her  sphere  of  interest.  She  further  put  several  restrictions  upon 
Japan's  freedom  of  action  in  Korea ;  for  instance,  while  recognizing 
Japan's  right  to  dispatch  troops,  when  necessary,  for  the  protection 
of  her  interests  in  Korea,  Russia  refused  to  allow  her  to  use  any 
portion  of  Korean  territory  for  strategical  purposes ;  in  fact,  Russia 
went  so  far  as  to  propose  to  establish  a  neutral  zone  in  Korean 
territory  north  of  the  thirty-ninth  parallel. 

"  The  Japanese  Government  failed  utterly  to  see  why  Russia, 
who  professed  no  intention  of  absorbing  Manchuria,  should  be  dis- 
inclined to  insert  in  the  convention  a  clause  in  complete  harmony 
with  her  own  repeatedly  declared  principle  respecting  the  sover- 
eignty and  territorial  integrity  of  China.  Furthermore,  this  refusal 
on  the  part  of  the  Russian  Government  impressed  the  Japanese 
Government  all  the  more  with  the  necessity  for  the  insertion  of  that 
clause. 

"  Japan  has  important  commercial  interests  in  Manchuria,  and 
entertains  no  small  hopes  of  their  future  development;  and  po- 
litically she  has  even  greater  interests  there  by  reason  of  Manchuria's 
relations  to  Korea,  so  she  could  not  possibly  recognize  Manchuria 
as  being  entirely  outside  her  sphere  of  interest.  These  reasons  de- 
cided Japan  absolutely  to  reject  the  Russian  proposal. 

"  Accordingly,  the  Japanese  Government  explained  the  fore- 
going views  to  the  Russian  Government,  and  at  the  same  time  it 
introduced  other  necessary  amendments  in  the  Russian  counter- 
proposals. They  further  proposed,  with  regard  to  the  neutral  zone, 
that  if  one  was  to  be  created  it  should  be  established  on  both  sides  of 
the  boundary  line  between  Manchuria  and  Korea,  with  an  equal 
width,  say,  of  fifty  kilometers. 

"  After  repeated  discussions  at  Tokyo,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment finally  presented  to  the  Russian  Government  its  definitive 
amendment  on  October  30.  The  Japanese  Government  then  fre- 
quently urged  the  Russian  Government  to  give  it  an  early  reply, 
but  this  was  again  delayed,  and  only  delivered  on  December  II. 
In  that  reply  Russia  suppressed  the  clauses  relating  to  Manchuria 
so  as  to  make  the  proposed  convention  apply  entirely  to  Korea,  and 
maintained  its  original  demand  in  regard  to  the  non-employment  of 
Korean  territory  for  strategical  purposes,  as  well  as  a  neutral  zone ; 
but  the  exclusion  of  Manchuria  from  the  proposed  convention  being 
contrary  to  the  original  object  of  the  negotiations,  which  were  to 


302  J  A  P  A  N 

1903 

remove  causes  of  conflict  between  the  two  countries  by  a  friendly 
arrangement  of  their  interests,  both  in  Manchuria  and  Korea,  the 
Japanese  Government  asked  the  Russian  Government  to  reconsider 
the  question,  and  again  proposed  the  removal  of  the  restriction  re- 
garding the  use  of  Korean  territory,  and  the  entire  suppression  of 
the  neutral  zone,  on  the  ground  that  if  Russia  was  opposed  to  the 
establishment  of  one  in  Manchuria  it  should  not  establish  one  in 
Korea. 

"  The  last  reply  of  Russia  was  received  at  Tokyo  on  January 
6.  In  this  reply  it  is  true  Russia  proposed  to  agree  to  insert  the 
following  clause  in  the  proposed  agreement : 

" '  The  recognition  by  Japan  of  Manchuria  and  its  littoral  as 
outside  her  sphere  of  interest,  while  Russia,  within  the  limits  of  that 
province,  would  not  impede  Japan  or  any  other  power  in  the  em- 
ployment of  rights  or  privileges  acquired  by  them  under  existing 
treaties  with  China  exclusive  of  the  establishment  of  a  settlement.' 

"  But  this  was  proposed  to  be  agreed  upon  only  upon  con- 
ditions maintaining  the  clauses  regarding  a  neutral  zone  in  Korean 
territory  and  the  non-employment  of  Korean  territory  for  strategical 
purposes,  the  conditions  whereof  were  impossible  for  Japan  to 
accept,  as  had  already  been  fully  explained  to  Russia.  It  should 
further  be  observed  that  no  mention  was  made  at  all  of  the  territorial 
integrity  of  China  in  Manchuria,  and  it  must  be  self-evident  to 
everybody  that  the  engagement  now  proposed  by  Russia  would  be 
of  no  practical  value  so  long  as  it  was  unaccompanied  by  a  definite 
stipulation  regarding  the  territorial  integrity  of  China  in  Man- 
churia, since  treaty  rights  are  only  coexisting  with  sovereignty. 
Eventually,  the  absorption  of  Manchuria  by  Russia  would  annul 
at  once  those  rights  and  privileges  acquired  by  the  powers  in  Man- 
churia by  virtue  of  treaties  with  China." 

Both  the  negotiations  and  the  general  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween Japan  and  Russia  were  severed  by  the  former  power  on 
February  5.    With  this,  diplomacy  passed  into  war. 


Chapter    XXI 

THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR  AND  ITS  AFTERMATH 

1904-1910 

THE  first  hostile  acts  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  were,  as 
in  the  Chinese  war  ten  years  before,  committed  before  the 
war  was  formally  declared  by  the  ruler  of  either  belliger- 
ent nation,  and  were  of  even  more  decisive  nature  in  1904  than  in 
1894.  No  sooner  were  the  diplomatic  relations  severed  than  a  Rus- 
sian force  crossed  the  Korean  border  and  entered  the  peninsular  em- 
pire. The  Japanese  were  even  more  active.  Knowing  that  the 
Russian  fleet,  though  its  main  squadron  of  seven  battleships  and 
several  cruisers  was  near  Port  Arthur,  was  divided  also  between 
Vladivostok,  Chemulpo,  and  Shanghai,  Admiral  Togo  led  his  entire 
fleet  of  six  battleships  and  ten  armored  and  protected  cruisers  from 
Sasebo  directly  toward  Port  Arthur  early  on  February  7,  or  within 
thirty  hours  after  the  diplomatic  rupture.  Having  captured  a  Rus- 
sian merchantman  off  Fusan,  the  fleet  rendezvoused  at  Mokpo.  A 
squadron  of  cruisers  under  command  of  Rear  Admiral  Uryii  was  dis- 
patched to  Chemulpo  to  act  as  convoy  of  the  transports  carrying 
thousands  of  Japanese  soldiers  to  be  landed  at  the  Korean  port, 
while  the  remainder  of  the  fleet  proceeded  toward  Port  Arthur.  At 
Chemulpo  there  were  a  French,  a  British,  an  American,  and  an 
Italian  war  vessel,  besides  the  Russian  cruiser  Korietz  and  gunboat 
Variag,  as  well  as  the  Japanese  cruiser  Chiyoda.  The  last  steamed 
out  of  the  harbor  unnoticed  during  the  night  of  February  7,  and 
joined  Uryti's  squadron,  which  came  in  sight  of  Chemulpo  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  8th.  The  Korietz,  probably  in  an  attempt  to  get 
to  Port  Arthur,  ventured  out,  and,  meeting  Japanese  torpedo  boats, 
fired  at  them  and  then  returned  into  the  harbor.  She  was  soon  fol- 
lowed by  three  Japanese  cruisers  and  several  transports,  which, 
within  a  striking  distance  of  the  Russian  vessels,  anchored  in  the 
harbor  until  the  Japanese  troops  from  the  transports  were  all  landed 
on  the  morning  of  the  9th.     A  message  was  then  sent  to  the  Korietz 

303 


304  JAPAN 

1904 

by  Uryu,  saying  that  if  the  Russian  ships  did  not  clear  the  port  be- 
fore noon  his  squadron  would  be  obliged  to  use  forcible  measures. 
The  commanders  of  the  neutral  vessels  in  the  harbor  might  have 
agreed  to  protest  against  the  committing  of  a  hostile  act  in  a  port 
which  they  regarded  as  neutral,  had  not  the  Russians,  as  they  did, 
cheerfully  accepted  the  Japanese  challenge  and  steamed  out.  In  the 
exchange  of  fire  which  ensued  the  Variag  was  seriously  injured, 
and,  protected  by  the  gallant  Korietz,  returned  into  the  harbor. 
There  fire  was  set  to  the  magazine  of  the  Variag,  causing  a  terrific 
explosion  and  immediate  sinking  of  the  vessel.  The  Korietz  was 
also  burned  by  the  Russians  and  sank,  while  the  transport  Sungari 
was  scuttled.  The  Japanese  squadron  sustained  no  loss  and  no 
injury.  By  this  engagement  the  mastery  of  Korea  by  the  military 
forces  of  Japan  was  practically  assured. 

The  main  section  of  the  Japanese  fleet  continued  its  voyage 
toward  Port  Arthur,  after  Uryii's  squadron  was  sent  to  Chemulpo. 
The  morning  of  the  8th  found  the  sea  calm  and  the  temperature 
unusually  mild.  Late  in  the  afternoon  the  fleet  headed  for  Chifu, 
while  torpedo  flotillas  were  sent  to  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny.  The 
Russian  fleet,  which  was  still  outside  the  harbor  of  Port  Arthur, 
was  surprised,  toward  midnight,  by  a  sudden  torpedo  attack  of  the 
Japanese,  who  had  stolen  to  the  distance  of  6oo  meters.  The  fire 
returned  by  the  Russians  had  little  effect,  while  they  sustained 
serious  injuries  on  the  battleships  Retvizan  and  Cesar evich  and  the 
cruiser  Pallada.  The  main  squadron  of  the  Japanese,  which  was 
not  informed  of  the  success  of  their  torpedo  craft  until  io  a.  m., 
and  was  not  even  positive  that  the  Russian  vessels  had  not  left  for 
Chemulpo,  started  early  on  the  9th  toward  Port  Arthur  for  a 
general  attack.  At  noon  Vice  Admiral  Togo  signaled  to  the  fleet 
from  the  flagship  Mikasa:  "  The  decision  of  victory  or  defeat 
depends  on  this  battle;  everyone  will  do  his  utmost."  The  battle 
lasted  nearly  an  hour  in  the  middle  of  the  day,  in  which  the  Rus- 
sian fire  again  proved  comparatively  ineffective,  while  the  Japanese 
shells  hit  the  already  damaged  Retvizan  and  injured  the  battleship 
Poltava  and  the  cruisers  Diana,  Askold,  and  Novik,  all  below  the 
water-line.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  complete  mastery  of  the 
Yellow  Sea  which  Japan  was  soon  to  gain. 

On  the  following  day,  the  10th,  the  emperors  of  both  powers 
issued  proclamations  declaring  the  existence  of  warfare  between 
them.    The  Russian  manifesto  read  as  follows :    "  We  proclaim  to 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  305 

1904 

all  our  faithful  subjects  that,  in  our  solicitude  for  the  preservation 
of  that  peace  so  dear  to  our  heart,  we  have  put  forth  every  effort 
to  assure  tranquillity  in  the  Far  East.  To  these  pacific  ends  we 
declared  our  assent  to  the  revision,  proposed  by  the  Japanese 
Government,  of  the  agreements  existing  between  the  two  empires 
concerning  Korean  affairs.  The  negotiations  initiated  on  this  sub- 
ject were,  however,  not  brought  to  a  conclusion,  and  Japan,  not 
even  awaiting  the  arrival  of  our  last  reply  and  the  proposals  of  our 
government,  informed  us  of  the  rupture  of  the  negotiations  and  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  Russia. 

"  Without  previously  notifying  us  that  the  rupture  of  such 
relations  implied  the  beginning  of  warlike  action,  the  Japanese 
Government  ordered  its  torpedo  boats  to  make  a  sudden  attack  on 
our  squadron  in  the  outer  roadstead  of  the  fortress  of  Port  Arthur. 
After  receiving  the  report  of  our  viceroy  on  the  subject,  we  at  once 
commanded  Japan's  challenge  to  be  replied  to  by  arms. 

"  While  proclaiming  this  our  resolve,  we,  in  unshakable  con- 
fidence in  the  help  of  the  Almighty,  and  firmly  trusting  in  the 
unanimous  readiness  of  all  our  faithful  subjects  to  defend  the 
Fatherland  together  with  ourselves,  invoke  God's  blessing  on  our 
glorious  forces  of  the  army  and  navy." 

The  rescript  of  the  Japanese  emperor  was  a  formal  declaration 
of  war,  which  may  be  read  in  connection  with  the  similar  document 
issued  in  1894  at  the  beginning  of  the  Chinese  war.  The  rescript 
ran  as  follows :  "  We,  by  the  grace  of  Heaven,  the  Emperor  of 
Japan,  seated  on  the  throne  occupied  by  the  same  dynasty  from  time 
immemorial,  do  hereby  make  proclamation  to  all  our  loyal  and 
brave  subjects: 

"  We  hereby  declare  war  against  Russia.  We  command  our 
army  and  navy  to  carry  on  hostilities  against  her  with  all  their 
strength,  and  we  also  command  all  our  officials  to  make  effort,  in 
pursuance  of  their  duties  and  in  accordance  with  their  powers,  to 
attain  the  national  aim,  with  all  the  means  within  the  limits  of  the 
law  of  nations. 

"  We  deem  it  essential  to  international  relations,  and  make  it 
our  constant  aim,  to  promote  the  pacific  progress  of  our  empire  in 
civilization,  to  strengthen  our  friendly  ties  with  other  states,  and 
thereby  to  establish  a  state  of  things  which  would  maintain  endur- 
ing peace  in  the  East,  and  assure  the  future  security  of  our  empire 
without  injury  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  other  powers.     Our 


306  JAPAN 

1904 

officials  also  perform  their  duties  in  obedience  to  our  will,  so  that 
our  relations  with  all  powers  grow  steadily  in  cordiality. 

"  It  is  thus  entirely  against  our  wishes  that  we  have  unhappily 
come  to  open  hostilities  against  Russia. 

"  The  integrity  of  Korea  has  long  been  a  matter  of  the  gravest 
concern  to  our  empire,  not  only  because  of  the  traditional  relations 
between  the  two  countries,  but  because  the  separate  existence  of 
Korea  is  essential  to  the  safety  of  our  empire.  Nevertheless,  Russia, 
despite  her  explicit  treaty  pledges  to  China  and  her  repeated  as- 
surance to  other  powers,  is  still  in  occupation  of  Manchuria,  and 
has  consolidated  and  strengthened  her  hold  upon  it,  and  is  bent  upon 
its  final  absorption.  Since  the  possession  of  Manchuria  by  Russia 
would  render  it  impossible  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  Korea,  and 
would,  in  addition,  compel  the  abandonment  of  all  hope  for  peace 
in  the  Far  East,  we  expected,  in  these  circumstances,  to  settle  the 
question  by  negotiations  and  secure  thereby  a  permanent  peace. 
With  this  object  in  view,  our  officials  by  our  order  made  proposals 
to  Russia,  and  frequent  conferences  were  held  during  the  last  half 
year.  Russia,  however,  never  met  such  proposals  in  a  spirit  of  con- 
ciliation, but  by  her  prolonged  delays  put  off  the  settlement  of  the 
pending  question,  and,  by  ostensibly  advocating  peace  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other  secretly  extending  her  naval  and  military 
preparations,  sought  to  bring  about  our  acquiescence.  It  is  not  pos- 
sible in  the  least  to  admit  that  Russia  had  from  the  first  a  sincere 
desire  for  peace.  She  has  rejected  the  proposals  of  our  empire; 
the  safety  of  Korea  is  in  danger;  the  interests  of  our  empire  are 
menaced.  At  this  crisis,  the  guarantees  for  the  future  which  the 
empire  has  sought  to  secure  by  peaceful  negotiations  can  now  only 
be  sought  by  an  appeal  to  arms. 

"  It  is  our  earnest  wishes  that,  by  the  loyalty  and  valor  of  our 
faithful  subjects,  peace  may  soon  be  permanently  restored  and  the 
glory  of  our  empire  preserved." 

Night  attacks  by  the  Japanese  destroyers  were  repeated  several 
times  during  the  first  two  months  of  the  war,  and  succeeded  in 
inflicting  some  damages  on  the  Russian  destroyers  and  gunboats. 
The  Japanese  also  made  three  attempts,  on  the  nights  of  February 
23-24,  March  21-22,  and  May  2-3,  to  force  a  few  old  stone-laden 
steamers  up  to  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  in  order  to  sink  them  there 
and  thus  block  the  entrance.  The  glare  of  the  Russian  searchlights 
and  the  fierce  fire  from  the  shore  batteries  and  war  vessels  made  it 


<  " 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  307 

1904 

impossible  for  these  heroic  attempts  to  be  completely  successful,  and 
the  channel  remained  partially  open  to  large  vessels  at  high  tide. 

The  indirect  attacks  and  the  laying  of  machine  mines  by  the 
Japanese  were,  however,  much  more  successful.  The  former  proved 
so  damaging  to  the  Russian  warships  in  the  harbor  that  the  lately 
arrived  Vice  Admiral  Makarov,  whose  spirited  discipline  had  al- 
ready begun  to  inspire  the  squadron  with  courage  and  confidence, 
often  steamed  out  with  a  few  vessels,  and  returned  fire  with  fire. 
Mines  were  laid  by  the  Japanese  at  points  where  the  brave  Makarov 
always  moved  about.  On  the  morning  of  April  13  his  squadron 
of  seven  vessels,  including  the  flagship  Peteropavlovsk,  was  tempted 
by  Japanese  blockaders  to  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles  from  the  har- 
bor, where  it  was  suddenly  encountered  by  another  Japanese  de- 
tachment. Turning  about  and  pursued  by  the  enemy,  the  Russian 
vessels  retreated  toward  the  harbor,  when  the  Peteropavlovsk 
struck  a  mine,  at  10.32  a.  m.,  and,  after  a  terrific  explosion,  turned 
turtle  and  immediately  sank.  Makarov  and  600  men,  with  the 
artist  Vereshchagin,  went  down  with  the  vessel,  but  the  Grand  Duke 
Cyril  was  rescued.  The  Japanese  fleet  also  lost,  on  May  15,  the 
cruiser  Yoshino  by  collision,  and  the  battleship  Hatsuse  by  twice 
striking  Russian  mines.  Other  Japanese  vessels  sunk  during  the 
entire  period  of  the  war  by  contact  with  the  enemy's  mines  were : 
the  battleship  Yashima,  the  cruisers  Takasago,  Saiyen,  and  Miyako, 
and  two  destroyers  and  three  gunboats. 

After  the  disaster  of  April  13  the  Russian  vessels  seldom  ven- 
tured out  of  the  harbor  in  a  large  force.  Realizing,  however,  that 
the  Baltic  fleet  might  be  unable  to  reach  the  eastern  waters  before 
the  gradual  fall  of  the  land  forts  at  Port  Arthur  would  expose  the 
vessels  to  the  Japanese  fire  from  the  shore,  the  Russian  squadron 
made  two  desperate  attempts,  on  June  23  and  August  10,  to  force 
its  way  through  the  blockading  line  and  effect  a  junction  with  the 
Vladivostok  squadron.  On  the  former  occasion  the  Vladivostok 
vessels  had  just  started  on  one  of  their  raiding  expeditions,  and 
torpedoed  and  sank  three  Japanese  transports,  carrying  1400  sol- 
diers. The  entire  Port  Arthur  squadron,  led  by  the  gallant  cruiser 
Novik,  made  a  sortie  in  the  morning  at  high  tide,  and,  toward 
the  evening,  was  met  by  the  Japanese  fleet.  Returning  toward 
the  harbor,  and  finding  that  the  tide  was  now  too  low  at  the  en- 
trance for  their  larger  vessels,  the  Russians  anchored  them  bow 
out  and  stern  to  the  shore,  and,  under  the  protection  of  the  shore 


308  JAPAN 


1904 


batteries,  stood  at  bay  over  night.  Admiral  Togo  gave  an  order 
for  night  attack  to  his  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers,  which,  he 
reported  later  to  his  government,  "  dashed  ahead  like  a  swift 
wind."  Balancing  themselves  amid  the  columns  of  waterspouts 
raised  by  the  falling  shells  from  the  enemy,  the  little  boats  made 
charge  after  charge  against  the  narrow  front  of  the  Russian  vessels. 
It  was  seen  the  next  morning  that  the  battleship  Pereviet  had 
disappeared  and  two  other  vessels  were  towed  into  the  harbor. 

The  sortie  of  August  10  proved  even  more  desperate  and  far 
more  disastrous  to  the  Russians.  Rear  Admiral  Witthoeft  led 
out  six  battleships  and  three  protected  cruisers  southward  in  a 
hazy,  but  calm,  sea,  and  at  noon  was  nearly  thirty  miles  off  the 
harbor.  A  little  after  one  o'clock  began  the  first  serious  battle  of 
the  war,  in  which  modern  armored  vessels  met  on  nearly  equal 
terms.  The  battle  was  renewed  a  few  hours  later,  and  on  each 
occasion  the  Russians  suffered  from  the  heavy  shells  from  the 
8-inch  guns  of  the  Japanese,  aided  by  the  latter's  superior  gunnery 
and  highly  explosive  powder.  At  6.40  the  flagship  Cesarcvich 
lost  its  steering  gear,  and  the  commanding  Admiral  Witthoeft  was 
also  killed.  Then  the  Russian  vessels  began  utterly  to  lose  unity 
of  command  and  action,  and,  under  the  withering  fire  of  the  Japan- 
ese from  three  different  directions,  were  completely  routed  and  scat- 
tered. The  flagship  and  two  cruisers  reached  Tsing-tau  in  battered 
condition.  One  of  the  latter,  the  Novik,  was  later  found  off 
Sakhalin  and  there  sunk  by  Admiral  Kamimura's  squadron,  and  the 
other,  the  Askold,  and  a  gunboat  reached  Shanghai.  The  Ryeshi- 
telni  arrived  at  Chifu.  The  rest  of  the  squadron  hastened  back 
toward  Port  Arthur,  where  they  were  subjected  to  a  night  attack 
of  the  Japanese  torpedo  craft.  Of  the  vessels  which  finally  retired 
into  the  harbor,  not  one  was  uninjured,  while  the  fire  from  the 
advancing  land  forces  of  the  Japanese  was  soon  to  make  the  posi- 
tion of  these  ships  insufferable.  The  Japanese  fleet  sustained  no 
heavy  injury  on  any  of  the  vessels,  and  lost  only  170  in  killed  and 
wounded.  Of  the  Russian  vessels  which  found  shelter  in  neutral 
ports,  the  Cesarcvich  at  Tsing-tau  was  promptly  disarmed  at  the 
request  of  the  German  governor  of  Kiao-chow,  but  those  at  Shang- 
hai neither  were  disarmed  nor  left  the  port  for  more  than  two 
weeks.  The  Diana  reached  Saigon,  French  Indo-China,  and  was 
there  dismantled  without  much  delay.  The  Ryeshitelni  at  Chifu, 
which  was  said  to  have  sent  telegraphic  messages  to  Vladivostok 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR 


309 


1904 

and  St.  Petersburg,  and  was  imperfectly  disarmed,  was  finally 
forcibly  captured  by  two  Japanese  cruisers,  which  action  caused 
wide  criticism. 

Four  days  after  the  battle  of  the  Yellow  Sea,  the  Vladivostok 
squadron,  consisting-  of  the  splendid  cruisers  Rurik,  Rossia,  and 
Gromvoi — for  the  other  cruiser,  Bogatyr,  had  run  on  the  rocks 
near  the  harbor — which  had  more  than  once  eluded  Admiral 
Kamimura,  were  finally  discovered  by  him  north  of  the  Tsushima 
Island.  After  a  lively  engagement  the  Rurik  was  sunk,  and  the 
other  two  Russian  cruisers  narrowly  escaped  to  Vladivostok. 

During  these  six  months  between  February  and  August,  the 


Japanese  army  on  land  in  three  different  corps  had  been  steadily 
advancing  toward  Liao-yang.  The  first  corps,  under  Lieutenant 
General  Kuroki,  which  landed  at  Korean  ports,  had  encountered 
no  serious  opposition  on  its  march  through  the  peninsula,  until 
it  reached  the  Yalu  River  on  the  frontier.  There  took  place  on 
the  last  days  of  April  and  May  i  the  first  important  land  battle 
between  the  contending  armies.  The  Russian  forces  under  Zas- 
sulitch  were  overpowered  by  the  superior  artillery  of  the  enemy, 
and,  after  a  desperate  fight  and  disastrous  retreat,  fell  back  to 
Feng-hwang-cheng,  which  again  was  abandoned  on  May  6.    Then, 


310  JAPAN 

1904 

taking  Sai-ma-tsi  on  June  7  after  several  attempts,  Kuroki  came  to 
the  difficult  pass  of  Mo-tien-ling,  which  he  captured  on  July  4  after 
a  hard  fight,  and  which  the  Russians  made  a  costly,  but  unsuccess- 
ful, effort  to  retake  on  July  17.  Chiao-tow  fell  on  July  19,  and 
Yu-shu-lin-tsu  and  Yang-tsu-ling  on  August  1.  From  the  end  of 
August  Kuroki  cooperated  with  the  two  other  army  corps  which 
had  simultaneously  been  closing  upon  Liao-yang.  Of  these,  the 
second  corps,  under  Lieutenant  General  Oku,  landing  on  May  5 
at  Pi-tsu-wo  on  the  northeastern  coast  of  the  Liao-tung  penin- 
sula, immediately  took  Pu-lan-tien,  and,  after  a  sixteen-hour  battle 
of  the  most  desperate  character,  had  driven  the  enemy  toward  Port 
Arthur  from  Kin-chow  and  Nanshan  Hills  on  May  26.  These 
actions  completely  cut  the  forces  at  Port  Arthur  from  the  rest  of 
the  Russian  army  in  Manchuria.  General  Kuropatkin,  commanding 
the  army,  however,  now  possessed  nearly  100,000  men  south  of 
Liao-yang,  and,  yielding  to  the  impossible  request  from  St.  Peters- 
burg that  he  should  make  a  supreme  effort  to  relieve  Port  Arthur, 
dispatched  General  Stakelberg  with  perhaps  44,000  men  on  this 
difficult  mission.  He  was  attacked  on  June  13  at  Telissu  by  Gen- 
eral Oku's  army  of  a  nearly  equal  size,  and,  after  a  savage  battle 
of  artillery  fire  and  bayonet  charges,  was  forced  back  with  heavy 
losses.  Stakelberg's  retreating  army  offered  gallant  resistance  to 
the  Japanese  at  Hiung-yo-cheng  on  June  21,  at  Kai-ping  from  July 
6  to  9,  at  Taping-ling  and  Tashi-chiao  from  July  24  to  29,  and  at 
Tomu-cheng  between  July  31  and  August  1.  At  the  later  stage 
of  these  engagements  Oku's  forces  cooperated  with  divisions  of 
the  third  army  corps,  under  General  Nodzu,  which  had  landed  at 
Ta-ku-shan  on  May  19,  and  had  captured  Siu-yen  on  June  8  and 
Feng-shui  (Wafangao)  Pass  on  June  27.  The  fall  of  Anshan- 
chan  on  August  27  to  the  second  corps  practically  opened  the  great 
battle  of  Liao-yang,  the  military  center  of  southern  Manchuria,  to 
which  General  Kuropatkin  had  retired. 

The  battle  of  Liao-yang  while  not  the  greatest,  was  in  some  re- 
spects the  most  desperate,  engagement  of  the  war.  The  Japanese 
forces,  under  the  supreme  command  of  Field  Marshal  Oyama  (who 
had  arrived  at  Dalny  on  July  20),  probably  numbered  240,000  men, 
with  800  guns,  and  the  Russian,  under  General  Kuropatkin,  per- 
haps 200,000  men,  with  572  guns.  The  defenses  around  and  in 
the  city  were  most  elaborate  and  extensive.  The  Japanese  attack 
was  begun  a  little  before  its  plans  had  completely  matured,  and,  for 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  311 

1904 

nearly  a  week,  a  complex  series  of  fierce  and  determined  fightings 
raged  in  front  of  the  walled  city.  On  August  31  a  part  of  Ku- 
roki's  army  crossed  the  Taitsu  River  and  began  its  flanking  move- 
ment, and,  against  the  determined  effort  of  Kuropatkin  to  anni- 
hilate this  section  of  the  Japanese,  Kuroki  succeeded  after  three 
days  of  action  in  sending  his  entire  forces  across  the  stream.  On 
September  4  Kuropatkin  set  the  city  on  fire,  and,  by  a  masterly 
retreat,  extricated  the  remainder  of  his  army  from  a  threatened 
closure  by  Kuroki's  divisions,  the  entire  Russian  forces  reaching 
Mukden  September  20.  He  had  lost  nearly  25,000  men,  and 
Oyama  half  of  that  number. 

Heavy  rains  now  intervened.  Kuropatkin  at  Mukden  pro- 
claimed that  his  forces  were  now  for  the  first  time  strong  enough 
to  begin  a  forward  movement  against  the  enemy.  With  nine  army 
corps  he  advanced  southward  on  October  5,  easily  taking  the  rail- 
way station  by  the  Sha  River  and  also  the  defenses  of  Bentsiaputse 
to  the  east.  The  cavalry  outposts  also  scored  a  few  minor  vic- 
tories. Oyama  also  now  decided  to  take  the  offensive,  and  marched 
forward  with  a  wide  front  extending  over  fifty  miles  from  east 
to  northwest  to  the  Hun  River.  Both  sides  tried  flanking  move- 
ments, none  of  which  proved  decisively  successful.  In  the  heavy 
fighting  which  lasted  till  the  17th,  in  which  the  Russian  and  Japa- 
nese losses  probably  amounted,  respectively,  to  69,000  and  13,300, 
Kuropatkin  was  definitely  forced  back,  and  his  original  purpose  to 
turn  the  tide  of  the  war  failed.  This  is  known  as  the  battle  of  the 
Sha  River. 

In  the  meantime,  ever  since  General  Nogi  landed  early  in 
June  and  at  once  began  desperate  attacks  on  the  outer  forts,  Port 
Arthur  had  been  a  scene  of  prodigious  acts  of  heroism  by  both  the 
besiegers  and  the  besieged.  Points  were  taken  and  retaken,  and 
hundreds  lost  their  lives  at  each  explosion  of  mines  or  terrific 
cannonading  from  the  surrounding  forts.  In  the  midst  of  this 
series  of  engagements,  however,  officers  and  men  of  the  hostile 
armies  frequently  met  together  to  arrange  for  the  recovery  of  the 
dead  bodies,  always  fraternizing  in  kindly  spirit.  The  besieging 
army  steadily  closed  in,  and,  the  outer  line  of  forts  having  been 
reduced,  the  203-Meter  Hill  of  the  western  inner  forts  was  at  length 
captured,  on  November  29-30.  From  this  point  Japanese  shells 
could  sweep  over  the  harbor.  This  was  followed  by  the  fall  of 
the  eastern  forts  of  Sung-shu  and  Ki-kwan,  on  December   19, 


312  JAPAN 

1905 

which  were  blown  up  by  mines  laid  by  the  besiegers  in  tunnels 
dug  directly  under  the  feet  of  the  enemy.  When  ten  days  later 
the  Erlung  fort  was  taken,  the  position  of  the  gallant  General 
Stoessel's  defending  army  was  no  longer  tenable.  He  capitulated 
on  January  I,  1905,  with  his  remaining  army  of  nearly  25,000  menv 
and  surrendered  fifty  forts  and  546  guns  to  the  Japanese  army. 
The  war  vessels  in  the  harbor  had,  however,  been  blown  up  and 
sunk  by  the  Russians  before  the  surrender  of  the  forts.  Officers, 
including  Stoessel,  who  wished  to  return  were  allowed  to  depart 
on  parole  with  their  side-arms.  In  their  informal  meeting,  on 
January  4,  Generals  Nogi  and  Stoessel  lauded  the  high  qualities 
of  each  other's  army,  the  latter  visibly  moved  by  the  news  that  Nogi 
had  lost  his  two  sons  in  the  war.  Stoessel,  with  his  wife  and  a 
few  officers,  left  Nagasaki  on  January  17  on  their  homeward 
voyage. 

The  Japanese  veterans  at  Port  Arthur,  probably  50,000  or 
60,000  in  number,  were  now  ready  to  march  northward  to  join 
Oyama's  army.  Before  their  arrival  at  the  front,  however,  a  severe 
battle  took  place  in  the  heart  of  winter,  from  January  25  to  31,  at 
Hokau-tai,  on  the  Hun  River,  between  General  Grippenberg's  sec- 
ond Russian  army  and  Oyama's  forces.  The  result  was  not  a  de- 
cisive gain  to  either  side,  but  the  Russians  lost  twice  as  many  men 
as  the  Japanese,  nearly  15,000  of  their  numbers  being  killed  and 
wounded.  It  was  after  this  battle  that  Grippenberg  openly  de- 
clared his  disagreement  with  his  chief  Kuropatkin,  and  resigned 
his  command  and  was  succeeded  by  General  Kaulbars. 

With  the  addition  of  Nogi's  army  to  the  left  of  Oku's,  and  of 
General  Kawamura's  to  the  right  of  Kuroki's,  Oyama  now  com- 
manded five  corps  in  sixteen  divisions,  numbering  at  least  400,000 
men  and  occupying  a  front  of  nearly  a  hundred  miles.  This  colos- 
sal army  tried  conclusions  with  the  at  least  350,000  men  under 
Kuropatkin  at  Mukden  in  what  was  probably  the  greatest  battle 
or  series  of  battles  in  the  history  of  the  world.  The  engagements 
began  on  February  20  and  continued  till  March  16,  resulting  in 
a  decisive  defeat  of  the  Russians.  Until  March  7  Kuropatkin's 
left  was  harassed  by  Kuroki,  and  his  right  was  defending  itself 
desperately  against  the  flanking  movement  of  Nogi,  while  his  cen- 
ter, under  Linevitch  and  Kaulbars,  together  with  Rennenkampf's 
Cossacks,  took  a  determined  stand  against  the  onslaught  of  Nodzu 
and  Oku.    The  retreat  was  ordered  on  the  night  of  this  day,  for  a 


THE  ASSAULT  THROUGH   THE  BARBED  WIRE  ENTANGLEMENTS  AGAINST 
FORT   KI-KWAN,    DECEMBER    19,    IOXD4 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  313 

1905 

further  delay  would  cause  Kuropatkin's  divisions  to  be  surrounded 
and  annihilated.  The  Japanese  closely  pursued  the  fleeing  enemy, 
and  gave  him  no  time  to  rally  before  crossing  the  Hun  River.  The 
blinding  dust  storm  and  the  biting  cold  of  March  9  did  not  greatly 
detract  from  the  rigor  of  the  pursuit.  Mukden  was  entered  by 
Oyama  early  on  March  10,  and  the  strong  defense  and  the  great 
colliery  at  Fushun  to  the  east  were  taken  the  next  day.  The  Rus- 
sians now  retired  to  Tie-ling,  forty  miles  to  the  north,  in  a  com- 
plete rout,  Linevitch's  army  alone  making  an  orderly  retreat.  Tie- 
ling  was  also  taken  on  the  16th,  the  Russians  receding  further 
north.  Their  losses  probably  aggregated  150,000  men,  or  more 
than  forty  per  cent,  of  the  entire  army,  while  the  Japanese  lost 
about  one-third  as  many  in  killed  and  wounded.  The  tsar  at  once 
convoked  a  war  council,  and  resolved  to  dispatch  to  the  East  an- 
other Russian  army  of  450,000  men.  The  day  after  the  fall  of  Tie- 
ling,  he  telegraphed  Kuropatkin  and,  without  a  word  of  praise, 
transferred  the  latter's  command  over  the  Manchurian  army  to 
Linevitch.  Kuropatkin  retired  to  Harbin,  and  then  returned  to 
serve  under  the  new  commander-in-chief. 

The  Baltic  fleet  of  Russia,  the  departure  of  which  for  the  East 
had  been  announced  several  times,  at  last  started  from  Kronstadt 
in  the  middle  of  October,  1904,  under  Vice  Admiral  Rozhestven- 
ski.  Having  been  aroused  to  a  state  of  nervous  apprehension  by 
the  unfounded  rumor  that  Japanese  torpedo,  boats  were  in  European 
waters,  some  officers  of  the  Russian  fleet  fancied  that  they  descried 
two  of  these  small  war  vessels  among  the  British  fishing  boats 
at  Dogger  Bank  in  the  North  Sea,  on  the  night  of  October  21,  and 
fired  upon  them,  sinking  a  trawler,  killing  two  fishermen,  and  injur- 
ing several  others.  The  fleet  then  proceeded  south  at  full  speed.  It 
had  also  attacked,,  at  different  times,  a  Swedish,  a  Norwegian,  a 
Danish,  and  a  German  ship.  When  the  news  of  the  Dogger  Bank 
incident  reached  Hull  on  the  24th,  all  England  was  aflame,  and  the 
more  radical  people  counseled  war  with  Russia.  Owing  to  the 
calmness  of  the  British  government,  however,  and  also  to  the  as- 
sistance of  France,  the  matter  was  referred  to  the  investigation 
of  an  international  court  of  naval  experts.  The  latter  published 
the  opinion  of  its  majority,  on  February  25,  1905,  that  the  firing 
was  unjustifiable  and  unduly  prolonged,  but  that  it  did  not  impair 
the  military  valor  and  the  humanitarian  sentiment  of  the  Russian 
admiral  and  his  staff. 


814  JAPAN 

1905 

Soon  after  the  North  Sea  incident  the  Baltic  fleet  was  divided 
into  two  sections,  one  under  Admiral  Voelkersam  going  by  way  of 
the  Suez  Canal  and  the  other  under  Rozhestvenski  himself  rounding 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The  two  squadrons  reunited  in  January 
in  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  drilled  their  raw  crews  near  the  French 
Island  of  Madagascar.  A  third  section,  under  Admiral  Neboka- 
tov,  left  Libau  on  February  15,  and  joined  the  main  squadron  be- 
fore it  entered  the  Chinese  waters.  The  stay  of  the  fleet  near 
Saigon  and  Kamranh  Bay,  French  Indo-China,  raised  delicate 
questions  as  to  the  rights  of  the  hostile  vessel  in  a  neutral  harbor, 
but  a  friction  was  averted  by  the  tardy,  but  definite,  action  taken 
by  the  tsar  and  the  French  government  in  ordering  away  the  Rus- 
sian fleet  from  the  French  territorial  waters.  Near  the  end  of 
May  the  entire  fleet  was  headed  toward  its  final  destination. 

Admiral  Togo  had  visited  Tokyo  after  the  fall  of  Port  Arthur, 
and  by  his  natural  modesty  and  force  of  character  inspired  the 
nation  with  an  unbounded  confidence  in  his  success  in  the  coming 
contest  with  the  Baltic  fleet.  He  avoided  popular  ovation,  saying 
he  had  yet  much  to  do,  and  came  and  went  like  a  plain  farmer. 
Leaving  Tokyo  on  February  6,  1905,  the  very  day  when,  a  year  be- 
fore, he  led  his  fleet  from  Sasebo  toward  Port  Arthur,  he  made 
every  preparation  to  meet  Rozhestvenski's  ships.  A  few  days  be- 
fore the  latter's  arrival  Togo  was  convinced  that  in  their  attempt 
to  reach  Vladivostok  they  would  make  a  dash  through  the  Korean 
Straits,  instead  of  going  by  way  of  the  Tsugaru  or  La  Perouse 
Straits,  and  kept  his  entire  fleet  at  and  near  Masampo.  At  five 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  May  27  Togo's  scouts  reported  by  wire- 
less telegraphy  that  Russian  vessels  were  sighted  near  Quelpart 
Island.  Thrilled  by  the  news,  all  the  divisions  immediately  turned 
to  their  assigned  missions.  The  sea  was  overcast  by  a  heavy  fog 
and  the  waves  were  high  from  a  sharp  southwest  wind.  Two  of 
the  Japanese  cruiser  squadrons  advanced  toward  the  enemy,  and, 
between  10  and  11  a.m.,  led  him  gradually  toward  the  Japan 
side  of  the  straits,  and  then  at  1.30  p.  m.  joined  the  main  squadron. 
The  enemy's  vessels  were  now  visible  in  two  main  columns,  the 
battleships  to  the  starboard  and  the  cruisers  and  coast-defenders 
to  the  port,  and  headed  by  the  Jemchug  and  the  Izumrud,  and 
followed  by  a  long  line  of  smaller  vessels,  the  entire  formation 
extending  over  several  miles.  The  vessels  were  painted  black,  with 
the  funnels  whitish  yellow  and  the  rims  black,  so  that  they  were 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR 


315 


1905 

conspicuous  on  the  sea,  while  the  Japanese  ships  were  light  green 
and  gray,  and  not  so  easily  discernible  as  the  Russian.  Just  be- 
fore two  o'clock  Togo  signaled  to  the  entire  fleet :  "  The  destiny 
of  the  empire  depends  on  this  one  battle;  let  everyone  do  his 
utmost."  The  battleship  squadron  under  Togo's  direct  command 
and  the  cruisers  under  Kamimura  pressed  the  enemy  eastward, 
and,  from  a  distance  of  6000  meters,  concentrated  their  terrific  fire 
upon  the  foremost  Russian  vessels,  while  other  Japanese  squadrons 
attacked  the  enemy  from  the  rear.  The  main  issue  was  decided 
within  an  hour.    The  Oslabia,  the  Alexander  III.,  and  the  flagship 


BATTU  Or  THE   SU  Of  JAPAN 
RU»SO-  JOPANCSC 


Kniaz  Suvarov,  caught  fire  and  went  out  of  action,  as  well  as  several 
smaller  vessels  in  the  rear.  The  columns  of  smoke  wafted  by  the 
wind  over  the  sea  concealed  the  hostile  fleets  from  each  other's  view, 
and  the  firing  was  suspended  by  the  main  squadrons  at  2.45. 
Admiral  Voelkersam  had  been  killed,  and  Rozhestvenski  himself 
wounded  and  transferred  to  a  destroyer  in  an  unconscious  state, 
the  command  being  assumed  by  Nebogatov.  From  three  o'clock 
the  Russian  vessels  made  a  desperate  effort  to  flee  northward,  but 
were  so  fiercely  fired  upon  that  they  turned  south.  Now  the  battle 
raged  in  several  sections  till  sunset.  The  Oslabia,  the  Alexander 
III.,  the  Borodino,  and  the  Kniaz  Suvarov,  all  battleships,  and  two 


316  JAPAN 

1905 

special  service  boats,  were  sunk.  At  sundown  the  Japanese  torpedo 
craft,  whose  work  had  thus  far  been  secondary,  took  the  field, 
and  succeeded  in  throwing  the  enemy  into  a  hopeless  confusion, 
sinking  the  battleship  Navarin  and  incapacitating  the  battleship 
Sissoi  Veliki  and  the  armored  cruisers  Admiral  Nakhimov  and 
Monomakh.    The  last  three  vessels  sank  the  next  day. 

The  fog  lifted  on  May  28,  and  the  main  squadrons  under 
Togo  and  Kamimura  were  near  Ulung  Island  about  5.30  a.  m., 
when  a  Russian  fleet,  consisting  of  two  battleships,  two  coast-de- 
fenders, and  two  cruisers,  were  discovered  heading  northeast.  The 
different  squadrons  completely  surrounded  the  enemy  near  Lian- 
court  Islands  about  10.30,  and  Admiral  Nebogatov  soon  surren- 
dered, although  the  cruiser  Izumrud  alone  escaped.  In  the  after- 
noon two  Japanese  destroyers  found  and  pursued  two  Russian 
destroyers,  one  of  which,  Biedovy,  carrying  the  wounded  Rozhest- 
venski,  surrendered,  and  the  other  escaped.  The  cruisers  Svetlana 
and  Dmitri  Donskoi,  the  coast-defender  Onshakov,  and  a  destroyer, 
were  either  sunk  or  driven  aground,  making  the  total  Russian  loss 
during  the  two  days  six  battleships,  one  coast-defender,  five  cruis- 
ers, five  destroyers,  one  converted  cruiser,  and  four  special  service 
vessels.  Out  of  the  18,000  Russian  sailors,  nearly  12,000  must 
have  gone  down  with  the  sinking  vessels.  The  Japanese  lost  only 
three  torpedo  boats  and  116  killed  and  538  wounded,  but  captured 
two  battleships,  two  coast-defenders,  and  a  destroyer.  Of  the  Rus- 
sian vessels  which  escaped,  the  cruiser  Almas  and  two  destroyers 
reached  Vladivostok,  but  a  destroyer  and  two  special  service  boats 
which  got  to  Shanghai,  and  the  cruisers  Aurora,  Oleg,  and  Jem- 
chug,  that  went  to  Manila,  were  dismantled.  Admiral  Togo  re- 
ported, in  his  characteristic  manner,  that  the  "  miracle  "  of  his 
victory  was  "  entirely  owing  to  the  illustrious  virtues  of  the  em- 
peror, and  was  beyond  all  human  possibility,"  and  that  he  could 
not  but  believe  that  "  the  comparatively  small  losses  were  due  to 
the  protection  of  the  spirits  of  the  imperial  forefathers." 

As  soon  as  the  decisive  battle  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  was  fought, 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  President  of  the  United  States,  who  had  once 
before  failed,  in  February,  to  induce  Russia  to  agree  to  come  to 
treat  for  peace  with  Japan,  renewed  his  effort  to  bring  the  bellig- 
erent powers  together  to  a  discussion  of  peace  terms  exclusively 
between  themselves.  In  this  effort  he  was  supported  by  the  French 
government  and  the  German  emperor.     After  preliminary  consul- 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  317 

1905 

tations  with  Takahira  and  Count  Cassini,  the  Japanese  and  Rus- 
sian representatives  at  Washington,  Roosevelt  addressed  the  fol- 
lowing note  to  the  governments  of  St.  Petersburg  and  Tokyo: 
"  The  President  feels  that  the  time  has  come  when  in  the  interest 
of  all  mankind  he  must  endeavor  to  see  if  it  is  not  possible  to  bring 
to  an  end  the  terrible  and  lamentable  conflict  now  being  waged. 
With  both  Russia  and  Japan  the  United  States  has  inherited  ties 
of  friendship  and  good-will.  It  hopes  for  the  prosperity  and  wel- 
fare of  each,  and  it  feels  that  the  progress  of  the  world  is  set  back 
by  the  war  between  those  two  great  nations. 

"  The  President  accordingly  urges  the  Russian  and  Japanese 
Governments,  not  only  for  their  own  sakes,  but  in  the  interest  of 
the  whole  civilized  world,  to  open  direct  negotiations  for  peace 
with  each  other.  The  President  suggests  that  those  peace  nego- 
tiations be  conducted  directly  and  exclusively  between  the  belliger- 
ents, in  other  words,  that  there  may  be  a  meeting  of  Russian  and 
Japanese  plenipotentiaries  or  delegates  without  any  intermediary, 
in  order  to  see  if  it  is  not  possible  for  those  representatives  of  the 
two  powers  to  agree  to  terms  of  peace.  The  President  earnestly 
asks  that  the  Russian  Government  do  now  agree  to  such  a  meeting, 
and  is  asking  the  Japanese  Government  likewise  to  agree. 

"  While  the  President  does  not  feel  that  any  intermediary 
should  be  called  in  in  respect  to  the  peace  negotiations  themselves, 
he  is  entirely  willing  to  do  what  he  properly  can,  if  the  two  powers 
concerned  feel  that  his  services  will  be  of  aid,  in  arranging  the  pre- 
liminaries as  to  the  time  and  place  of  meeting.  But  if  even  these 
preliminaries  can  be  arranged  directly  between  the  two  powers,  or 
in  any  other  way,  the  President  will  be  glad,  as  his  sole  purpose 
is  to  bring  about  a  meeting  which  the  whole  civilized  world  will 
pray  may  result  in  peace." 

The  Japanese  government  responded,  saying  that  Japan  would 
open  negotiations  directly  and  exclusively  with  Russia  regarding 
terms  of  peace.  The  Russian  reply,  at  first  given  orally  and  then 
made  with  some  reservation,  was  finally  couched  in  substantially 
the  same  language  as  the  Japanese.  Japan  appointed  as  her  peace 
envoys  Baron  Komura,  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  and  Kogoro 
Takahira,  minister  at  Washington.  Russia's  choice  of  her  chief 
envoy  first  fell  on  Nelidov,  ambassador  at  Paris,  then  on  Mura- 
viev,  ambassador  at  Rome,  but  later  was  changed  to  Count  Serge 
Witte,  president  of  the  committee  of  ministers.    The  new  Russian 


318  JAPAN 

1905 

ambassador  at  Washington,  Baron  Rosen,  was  appointed  the  sec- 
ond envoy  of  Russia.  As  for  the  place  of  the  conference,  neither 
Paris,  suggested  by  Russia,  nor  Chifu,  suggested  by  Japan,  being 
acceptable  to  the  other  party,  respectively,  the  two  governments 
finally  agreed  upon  Washington.  Because  of  the  excessive  summer 
heat  of  the  American  capital,  however,  it  was  decided  that  actual 
negotiations  should  be  held  at  the  navy  yard  near  the  quiet  historic 
town  of  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire.  The  envoys  were  an- 
nounced to  arrive  by  August  I. 

In  the  meantime,  before  the  end  of  July,  the  Russian  Island 
of  Sakhalin,  the  southern  half  of  which  had  till  1875  been  claimed 
by  Japan,  was  occupied  by  the  Japanese  forces,  which  also  seized 
a  few  points  on  the  coast  of  southeastern  Siberia. 

The  envoys  of  the  belligerent  powers  having  arrived,  they  were 
introduced  to  one  another  by  President  Roosevelt  on  the  Mayflower, 
on  August  5,  and  then  proceeded  to  Portsmouth,  arriving  there  on 
the  8th.  They  sojourned  at  the  Hotel  Wentworth  on  the  small 
Island  of  New  Castle  near  Portsmouth,  whither  flocked  many  curi- 
ous summer  visitors  and  more  than  a  hundred  newspaper  corre- 
spondents from  various  parts  of  the  world.  The  first  informal  meet- 
ing of  the  envoys  was  held  at  the  naval  stores  building  at  the 
navy  yard,  but  the  actual  business  of  the  peace  negotiations  began 
on  the  following  day.  On  that  day  Baron  Komura  presented,  in 
writing,  the  entire  list  of  twelve  terms  of  peace,  which  are  believed 
to  have  covered  the  following  points:  1,  Japan's  preponderant  in- 
terest in  Korea,  and  the  principle  of  the  open  door  therein;  2, 
evacuation  of  Manchuria  by  the  Japanese  and  Russian  armies;  3, 
restoration  of  Chinese  administration  in  Manchuria;  4,  China's 
territorial  integrity  and  the  open  door  in  Manchuria;  5,  cession  to 
Japan  of  the  Island  of  Sakhalin ;  6,  surrender  to  Japan  of  the  lease 
of  the  Kwan-tung  district,  containing  Port  Arthur,  Dalny,  and  ad- 
jacent islands;  7,  transfer  to  Japan  of  the  railway  between  Port 
Arthur  (and  Dalny)  and  Harbin;  8,  retention  by  Russia  of  the 
main  Manchurian  railway  from  Mandchourie  to  Grotekovo;  9,  re- 
imbursement by  Russia  of  Japan's  cost  of  war;  10,  surrender  by 
Russia  of  her  war  vessels  interned  in  neutral  ports;  11,  limitation 
of  Russia's  naval  power  in  the  Pacific;  and  12,  the  rights  of  the 
Japanese  subjects  to  fish  in  the  waters  of  the  Siberian  littoral.  To 
these  terms  Witte  gave  a  written  reply  on  the  12th,  stating  his 
assent  to  some  points,  willingness  to  discuss  some  others,  and  ab- 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR 

1905 

solute  dissent  from  the  rest.  Then  the  envoys  discussed  the  terms 
one  after  another,  and,  within  six  days,  found  themselves  in  agree- 
ment, in  substance  or  in  principle,  on  the  first,  second,  third, 
fourth,  sixth,  seventh,  eighth,  and  twelfth  terms.  As  regarded  the 
other  four  points,  particularly  the  cession  of  Sakhalin  and  the  pay- 
ment of  the  war  expenditures,  the  Russian  envoy  considered  them 
as  incompatible  with  the  honor  and  dignity  of  the  tsar's  empire. 

The  conference  now  seemed  to  be  ending  in  failure,  when  on 
August  1 8  occurred  the  visit  of  Baron  Kaneko  to  President  Roose- 
velt at  Oyster  Bay,  followed  on  the  next  day  by  the  invitation  ex- 
tended to  Baron  Rosen  to  come  on  from  New  Castle.  Kaneko  again 
called  on  Roosevelt  on  the  21st,  while  Meyer,  American  ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg,  had  a  long  interview  with  the  tsar  two  days  after. 
The  president  was  urging  the  two  governments,  through  these 
various  channels,  to  arrive  at  some  compromise  of  their  differences 
for  the  sake  of  peace.  When  Meyer  had  an  audience  of  the  tsar, 
the  Japanese  government  had  already  accepted  Roosevelt's  sugges- 
tion for  compromise  by  intimating  its  willingness  to  drop  the  de- 
mands for  the  surrender  of  the  interned  vessels  and  for  the  limita- 
tion of  Russia's  naval  power,  and  to  allow  Russia  to  repurchase 
the  northern  half  of  Sakhalin,  which  was  in  Japan's  military  occu- 
pation, for  1,200,000  yen.  The  tsar,  however,  unequivocally  de- 
clined to  agree  to  this  compromise,  for  he  considered  the  proposed 
repurchase  as  an  indemnity  in  disguise,  to  which  he  was  opposed  in 
principle.  Despite  Ambassador  Meyer's  repeated  appeal,  Nicholas 
II.  remained  firm,  although — whether  by  his  instruction  or  on 
Witte's  own  initiative  is  not  known — the  southern  half  of  Sakhalin 
was  offered  to  Japan.  In  the  meantime,  President  Roosevelt  ap- 
pealed to  Japan,  until  the  deliberations  of  the  privy  councilors  at 
Tokyo  resulted  in  the  emperor's  instructions  to  his  envoys  at  Ports- 
mouth to  waive  their  demand  for  money  and  to  accept  the  southern 
half  of  Sakhalin.  This  final  concession,  which  at  length  made 
peace  possible,  was  announced  by  Baron  Komura  at  the  morning 
session  of  August  29,  and  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  Witte 
and  to  the  whole  world.  The  articles  of  the  treaty  were  then 
drafted,  and  signed  by  the  envoys  on  September  5. 

The  concessions  of  the  privy  councilors  greatly  disappointed 
the  Japanese  people,  who  had  been  somewhat  flushed  by  their  un- 
expected victories  over  the  mighty  foe.  The  popular  dissatisfaction, 
intensified  by  local  conditions,  broke  out  in  an  open  riot  on  the 


320  JAPAN 

1905 

streets  of  Tokyo  on  September  5-7.  In  Russia,  also,  the  treaty  was 
not  received  with  unmixed  joy  even  by  the  peace-loving  peasants, 
for  although  peace  was  welcome,  the  war  and  consequently  the 
results  of  its  failure,  which  were  embodied  in  the  terms  of  the  treaty, 
were  considered  by  them  as  unnecessary  and  ignominious.  The 
sovereigns  of  both  powers,  however,  ratified  the  treaty  on  October 
14.  The  following  is  the  English  version  of  this  memorable 
document : 

"  The  Emperor  of  Japan  on  one  part  and  the  Emperor  of  All 
the  Russias  on  the  other  part,  animated  by  a  desire  to  restore  the 
blessings  of  peace  to  their  countries,  have  resolved  to  conclude  a 
treaty  of  peace  and  have  for  this  purpose  named  their  plenipoten- 
tiaries, that  is  to  say,  for  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  Baron 
Komura  Jutaro  Jusami,  Grand  Cordon  of  the  Imperial  Order  of 
the  Rising  Sun,  his  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  and  his  Excellency 
Takahira  Kogoro,  Imperial  Order  of  the  Sacred  Treasure,  his 
minister  to  the  United  States,  and,  for  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
All  the  Russias  his  Excellency  Serge  Witte,  his  secretary  of  state 
and  president  of  the  committee  of  ministers  of  the  empire  of  Rus- 
sia, and  his  excellency  Baron  Roman  Rosen,  master  of  the  imperial 
court  of  Russia,  his  Majesty's  ambassador  to  the  United  States, 
who,  after  having  exchanged  their  full  powers,  which  were  found 
to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  concluded  the  following  articles : 

"Article  One — There  shall  henceforth  be  peace  and  amity 
between  their  majesties  the  Emperor  of  Japan  and  the  Em- 
peror of  All  the  Russias  and  between  their  respective  States  and 
subjects. 

"  Article  Two — The  Imperial  Russian  Government,  acknowl- 
edging that  Japan  possesses  in  Korea  paramount  political,  military, 
and  economical  interests,  engages  neither  to  obstruct  nor  interfere 
with  measures  for  guidance,  protection,  and  control  which  the 
Imperial  Government  of  Japan  may  find  necessary  to  take  in  Korea. 
It  is  understood  that  Russian  subjects  in  Korea  shall  be  treated 
in  exactly  the  same  manner  as  the  subjects  and  citizens  of  other 
foreign  powers,  that  is  to  say,  they  shall  be  placed  on  the  same  foot- 
ing as  the  subjects  and  citizens  of  the  most  favored  nation.  It  is 
also  agreed,  in  order  to  avoid  causes  of  misunderstanding,  that  the 
two  high  contracting  parties  will  abstain  on  the  Russian-Korean 
frontier  from  taking  any  military  measure  which  may  menace  the 
security  of  Russian  or  Korean  territory. 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  321 

1905 

"  Article  Three — Japan  and  Russia  mutually  engage : 

"  First — To  evacuate  completely  and  simultaneously  Man- 
churia, except  the  territory  affected  by  the  lease  of  the  Liao-tung 
peninsula,  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  additional  Ar- 
ticle One  annexed  to  this  treaty,  and, 

"  Second — To  restore  entirely  and  completely  to  the  exclusive 
administration  of  China  all  the  portions  of  Manchuria  now  in 
occupation  or  under  the  control  of  the  Japanese  or  Russian  troops, 
with  the  exception  of  the  territory  above  mentioned. 

"  The  Imperial  Government  of  Russia  declare  that  they  have 
not  in  Manchuria  any  territorial  advantages  or  preferential,  or 
exclusive  concessions  in  the  impairment  of  Chinese  sovereignty,  or 
inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity. 

"  Article  Four — Japan  and  Russia  reciprocally  engage  not  to 
obstruct  any  general  measures  common  to  all  countries  which  China 
may  take  for  the  development  of  the  commerce  or  industry  of 
Manchuria. 

"  Article  Five — The  Imperial  Russian  Government  transfers 
and  assigns  to  the  Imperial  Government  of  Japan,  with  the  consent 
of  the  Government  of  China,  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur,  Ta-lien,  and 
the  adjacent  territory  and  territorial  waters,  and  all  rights,  priv- 
ileges, and  concessions  connected  with  or  forming  part  of  such  lease, 
and  they  also  transfer  and  assign  to  the  Imperial  Government  of 
Japan  all  public  works  and  properties  in  the  territory  affected  by 
the  above  mentioned  lease.  The  two  contracting  parties  mutually 
engage  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Chinese  Government  mentioned 
in  the  foregoing  stipulation.  The  Imperial  Government  of  Japan 
on  their  part  undertake  that  the  proprietary  rights  of  Russian  sub- 
jects in  the  territory  above  referred  to  shall  be  perfectly  respected. 

"  Article  Six — The  Imperial  Russian  Government  engage  to 
transfer  and  assign  to  the  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  without 
compensation  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Chinese  Government  the 
railway  between  Chang-chun-fu  and  Kuan-chang-tsu  and  Port 
Arthur  and  all  the  branches,  together  with  all  the  rights,  privileges, 
and  properties  appertaining  thereto  in  that  region,  as  well  as  all 
the  coal  mines  in  said  region  belonging  to  or  worked  for  the  benefit 
of  the  railway.  The  two  high  contracting  parties  mutually  engage 
to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Government  of  China  mentioned  in  the 
foregoing  stipulation. 

"Article  Seven — Japan  and  Russia  engage  to  exploit  their 


823  JAPAN 

1905 

respective  railways  in  Manchuria  exclusively  for  commercial  and 
industrial  purposes  and  in  nowise  for  strategic  purposes.  It  is  un- 
derstood that  this  restriction  does  not  apply  to  the  railway  in  the 
territory  affected  by  the  lease  of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula. 

"  Article  Eight — The  Imperial  Governments  of  Japan  and 
Russia,  with  the  view  to  promote  and  facilitate  intercourse  and 
traffic,  will,  as  soon  as  possible,  conclude  a  separate  convention  for 
the  regulation  of  their  connecting  railway  services  in  Manchuria. 

"  Article  Nine — The  Imperial  Russian  Government  cedes  to 
the  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  in  perpetuity  and  full  sover- 
eignty the  southern  portion  of  the  Island  of  Sakhalin,  and  all  the 
islands  adjacent  thereto,  and  the  public  works  and  properties 
thereon.  The  fiftieth  degree  of  north  latitude  is  adopted  as  the 
northern  boundary  of  the  ceded  territory.  The  exact  alignment  of 
such  territory  shall  be  determined  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  the  additional  Article  Eleven  annexed  to  this  treaty.  Japan  and 
Russia  mutually  agree  not  to  construct  in  their  respective  posses- 
sions on  the  Island  of  Sakhalin,  or  the  adjacent  islands,  any  forti- 
fications or  other  similar  military  works.  They  also  respectively 
engage  not  to  take  any  military  measures  which  may  impede  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Strait  of  La  Perouse  and  the  Strait  of 
Tartary. 

"  Article  Ten — It  is  reserved  to  Russian  subjects,  inhabitants 
of  the  territory  ceded  to  Japan,  to  sell  their  real  property,  and  re- 
tire to  their  country,  but  if  they  prefer  to  remain  in  the  ceded  terri- 
tory they  will  be  maintained  and  protected  in  the  full  exercise  of 
their  industries  and  rights  of  property,  on  condition  of  submitting 
to  the  Japanese  laws  and  jurisdiction.  Japan  shall  have  full  lib- 
erty to  withdraw  the  right  of  residence  in,  or  to  deport  from  such 
territory  any  inhabitants  who  labor  under  political  or  administra- 
tive disability.  She  engages,  however,  that  the  proprietary  rights 
of  such  inhabitants  shall  be  fully  respected. 

"  Article  Eleven — Russia  engages  to  arrange  with  Japan  for 
granting  to  Japanese  subjects  rights  of  fishery  along  the  coasts  of 
the  Russian  possessions  in  the  Japan,  Okhotsk,  and  Bering  Seas. 
It  is  agreed  that  the  foregoing  engagement  shall  not  affect  rights 
already  belonging  to  Russian  or  foreign  subjects  in  those  regions. 

"  Article  Twelve — The  treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation  be- 
tween Japan  and  Russia  having  been  annulled  by  the  war,  the  Im- 
perial Governments  of  Japan  and  Russia  engage  to  adopt  as  a  basis, 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  323 

1905 

for  their  commercial  relations  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  new 
treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation,  the  basis  of  the  treaty  which 
was  in  force  previous  to  the  present  war,  the  system  of  reciprocal 
treatment  on  the  footing  of  the  most  favored  nation,  in  which  are 
included  import  and  export  duties,  customs  formalities,  transit,  and 
tonnage  dues,  and  the  admission  and  treatment  of  agents,  subjects, 
and  vessels  of  one  country  in  the  territories  of  the  other. 

"  Article  Thirteen — So  soon  as  possible  after  the  present  treaty 
comes  in  force  all  prisoners  of  war  shall  be  reciprocally  restored. 
The  Imperial  Governments  of  Japan  and  Russia  shall  each  appoint 
a  special  commissioner  to  take  charge  of  the  prisoners.  All  prison- 
ers in  the  hands  of  one  government  shall  be  delivered  to  and  re- 
ceived by  the  commissioner  of  the  other  government  or  by  his  duly 
authorized  representative  in  such  convenient  numbers  and  such  con- 
venient ports  of  the  delivering  state  as  such  delivering  state  shall 
notify  in  advance  to  the  commissioner  of  the  receiving  state.  The 
governments  of  Japan  and  Russia  shall  present  each  other  so  soon 
as  possible  after  the  delivery  of  the  prisoners  is  completed  with 
a  statement  of  the  direct  expenditures  respectively  incurred  by  them 
for  the  care  and  maintenance  of  the  prisoners  from  the  date  of 
capture  or  surrender  and  up  to  the  time  of  death  or  delivery. 
Russia  engages  to  repay  to  Japan  so  soon  as  possible  after  the  ex- 
change of  statement  as  above  provided  the  difference  between  the 
actual  amount  so  expended  by  Japan  and  the  actual  amount  sim- 
ilarly disbursed  by  Russia. 

"  Article  Fourteen — The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  their 
Majesties  the  Emperor  of  Japan  and  the  Emperor  of  All  the  Rus- 
sias.  Such  ratification  shall  be  with  as  little  delay  as  possible  and 
in  any  case  no  later  than  fifty  days  from  the  date  of  the  signature 
of  the  treaty,  to  be  announced  to  the  Imperial  Governments  of  Japan 
and  Russia  respectively  through  the  French  minister  at  Tokyo 
and  the  ambassador  of  the  United  States  at  St.  Petersburg  and 
from  the  date  of  the  later  of  such  announcements  this  treaty  shall 
in  all  its  parts  come  into  full  force.  The  formal  exchange  of  ratifi- 
cations shall  take  place  at  Washington  so  soon  as  possible. 

"  Article  Fifteen — The  present  treaty  shall  be  signed  in  du- 
plicate in  both  the  English  and  French  languages.  The  texts  are 
in  absolute  conformity,  but  in  case  of  a  discrepancy  in  the  interpre- 
tation, the  French  text  shall  prevail. 

"  In  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  Articles  Three  and 


324 


JAPAN 


1905 

Nine  of  the  treaty  of  peace  between  Japan  and  Russia  of  this  elate 
the  undersigned  plenipotentiaries  have  concluded  the  following  ad- 
ditional articles: 

"  Sub-Article  to  Article  Three — The  Imperial  Governments  of 
Japan  and  Russia  mutually  engage  to  commence  the  withdrawal 
of  their  military  forces  from  the  territory  of  Manchuria  simul- 
taneously and  immediately  after  the  treaty  of  peace  comes  into 
operation,  and  within  a  period  of  eighteen  months  after  that  date 
the  armies  of  the  two  countries  shall  be  completely  withdrawn  from 
Manchuria  except  from  the  leased  territory  of  the  Liao-tung  penin- 
sula. The  forces  of  the  two  countries  occupying  the  front  positions 
shall  first  be  withdrawn. 

"  The  high  contracting  parties  reserve  to  themselves  the  right 
to  maintain  guards  to  protect  their  respective  railway  lines  in 
Manchuria.  The  number  of  such  guards  shall  not  exceed  fifteen 
per  kilometer,  and  within  that  maximum  number  the  commanders 
of  the  Japanese  and  Russian  armies  shall  by  common  accord  fix  the 
number  of  such  guards  to  be  employed  as  small  as  possible  while 
having  in  view  the  actual  requirements. 

"  The  commanders  of  the  Japanese  and  Russian  forces  in  Man- 
churia shall  agree  upon  the  details  of  the  evacuation  in  conformity 
with  the  above  principles  and  shall  take  by  common  accord  the 
measures  necessary  to  carry  out  the  evacuation  so  soon  as  possible 
and  in  any  case  no  later  than  the  period  of  eighteen  months. 

"  Sub-Article  to  Article  Nine — So  soon  as  possible  after  the 
present  treaty  comes  into  force,  a  commission  of  delimitation  com- 
posed of  an  equal  number  of  members  is  to  be  appointed  respectively 
by  the  two  high  contracting  parties  which  shall  on  the  spot  mark 
in  a  permanent  manner  the  exact  boundary  between  the  Japanese 
and  Russian  possessions  on  the  Island  of  Sakhalin.  The  com- 
mission shall  be  bound  so  far  as  topographical  considerations  permit 
to  follow  the  fiftieth  parallel  of  north  latitude  as  the  boundary 
line,  and,  in  case  any  deflections  from  that  line  at  any  points  are 
found  to  be  necessary,  compensation  will  be  made  by  correlative 
deflections  at  other  points.  It  shall  also  be  the  duty  of  said  com- 
mission to  prepare  a  list  and  a  description  of  the  adjacent  islands 
included  in  the  cession,  and  finally  the  commission  shall  prepare  and 
sign  maps  showing  the  boundaries  of  the  ceded  territory.  The  work 
of  the  commission  shall  be  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties. 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  325 

1905 

"  The  foregoing  additional  articles  are  to  be  considered  ratified 
with  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace  to  which  they  are  an- 
nexed. 

"  Portsmouth,  the  Fifth  Day  of  the  Ninth  Month  of  the  Thirty- 
eight  year  of  Meiji,  corresponding  to  the  Twenty-third  of  August, 
1905.     (September  5,  1905.) 

"  In  witness  whereof  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  and  affixed  seals  to  the  present  treaty  of  peace. 

"  Done  at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  this  Fifth  day  of 
the  Ninth  Month  of  the  Thirty-eighth  Year  of  the  Meiji,  corre- 
sponding to  the  Twenty-third  day  of  August,  One  Thousand  Nine 
Hundred  and  Five." 

No  less  important  than  the  Russo-Japanese  treaty  is  the  re- 
newed agreement  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  concluded  between 
Lord  Lansdowne,  the  British  foreign  minister,  and  Baron  Hayashi, 
the  Japanese  minister  at  London,  on  August  12  at  London,  and 
published  on  September  2j  simultaneously  at  London  and  Tokyo. 
Its  text  reads  as  follows : 

"  The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  being  de- 
sirous of  replacing  the  agreement  concluded  between  them  January 
30,  1902,  by  fresh  stipulations,  have  agreed  upon  the  following 
articles,  which  have  for  their  object: 

"  A — The  consolidation  and  the  maintenance  of  general  peace 
in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India. 

"  B — The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all  the 
powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independence  and  integrity  of 
the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  principles  of  equal  opportunities  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China. 

"  C — The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India,  and 
the  defense  of  their  special  interests  in  the  said  regions. 

"  Article  1 — It  is  agreed  that  whenever  in  the  opinion  either 
of  Great  Britain  or  Japan  any  of  the  rights  and  interests  referred 
to  in  the  preamble  to  this  agreement  are  in  jeopardy,  the  two  gov- 
ernments will  communicate  with  each  other  fully  and  frankly  and 
will  consider  in  common  the  measures  which  should  be  taken  to 
safeguard  these  menaced  rights  or  interests. 

"  Art.  2 — Should  either  of  the  high  contracting  parties  be  in- 
volved in  war  in  defense  of  its  territorial  rights  or  special  interests, 
the  other  party  will  at  once  come  to  the  assistance  of  its  ally  and 


326  JAPAN 


1905 


both  parties  will  conduct  a  war  in  common  and  make  peace  in  mutual 
agreement  with  any  power  or  powers  involved  in  such  war. 

"  Art.  3 — Japan  possessing  paramount  political,  military,  and 
economic  interests  in  Korea,  Great  Britain  recognizes  Japan's  right 
to  take  such  measures  for  the  guidance,  control,  and  protection  of 
Korea  as  she  may  deem  proper  and  necessary  to  safeguard  and 
advance  those  interests,  providing  the  measures  so  taken  are  not 
contrary  to  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce 
and  industry  of  all  nations. 

"  Art.  4 — Great  Britain  having  a  special  interest  in  all  that 
concerns  the  security  of  the  Indian  frontier,  Japan  recognizes  her 
right  to  take  such  measures  in  the  proximity  of  that  frontier  as 
she  may  find  necessary  for  safeguarding  her  Indian  possessions. 

"  Art.  5 — The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  neither  will, 
without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into  a  separate  arrangement 
with  another  power  to  the  prejudice  of  the  objects  described  in 
the  preamble. 

"  Art.  6 — As  regards  the  present  war  between  Japan  and  Rus- 
sia, Great  Britain  will  continue  to  maintain  strict  neutrality,  unless 
some  other  power  or  powers  join  in  hostilities  against  Japan,  in 
which  case  Great  Britain  will  come  to  the  assistance  of  Japan,  will 
conduct  war- in  common,  and  will  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement 
with  Japan. 

"  Art.  7 — The  conditions  under  which  armed  assistance  shall 
be  afforded  by  either  power  to  the  other  in  the  circumstances  men- 
tioned in  the  present  agreement  and  the  means  by  which  such  as- 
sistance shall  be  made  available  will  be  arranged  by  the  naval  and 
military  authorities  of  the  contracting  parties,  who  will  from  time 
to  time  consult  one  another  fully  and  freely  on  all  questions  of 
mutual  interest. 

"  Art.  8 — The  present  agreement  shall  be  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  Art.  6  and  come  into  effect  immediately  after  the  date 
of  signature  and  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  from  that  date 
in  case  neither  of  the  parties  shall  have  been  notified  twelve  months 
before  the  expiration  of  said  ten  years  of  an  intention  of  terminat- 
ing it.  It  shall  remain  binding  until  the  expiration  of  one  year  from 
the  day  on  which  either  of  the  parties  shall  have  denounced  it,  but 
if,  when  the  date  for  the  expiration  arrives,  either  ally  is  actually 
engaged  in  war  the  alliance  shall  be  ipso  facto  and  continue  until 
peace  shall  be  concluded." 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  327 

1906-1910 

The  armistice  was  arranged  between  the  Russian  and  Japa- 
nese armies  on  September  13.  During  the  nineteen  months  of  war 
between  February,  1904,  and  September,  1905,  Russia  probably 
sent  between  eight  and  nine  hundred  thousand  soldiers  to  the  East, 
and  Japan  not  less  than  six  hundred  thousand.  Never  before  in 
the  world's  history  had  such  large  armies  been  sent  to  the  seat  of 
war  in  so  brief  a  period.  The  Russian  losses  probably  amounted  to 
more  than  350,000,  including  the  killed,  the  wounded,  the  sick, 
and  the  captured,  and  Japan  lost,  in  deaths  only,  72,490.  Of  the 
latter,  15,300  died  of  sickness,  while  the  rest  either  fell  in  battle  or 
subsequently  died  from  wounds — an  unusually  low  death-rate  from 
sickness.  Russia  has  lost  the  major  part  of  her  Pacific  and  Baltic 
fleets,  while  the  Japanese  navy  has  been  increased  in  size  by  the 
surrender  of  the  enemy's  vessels  and  by  the  raising  of  several  of 
the  sunken  ships.  The  war  has  greatly  intensified  the  otherwise 
strong  national  sentiment  of  the  Japanese  people  and  enhanced  their 
position  among  the  powers  of  the  world,  while  the  moderate  terms 
of  peace  and  the  catholicity  of  national  character  must  serve  as  an 
efficient  check  against  an  undue  expansion.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
unexpected  exposure  of  the  weakness  of  Russia's  bureaucracy  has 
sensibly  reduced  the  hitherto  overestimated  value  of  her  political 
power.  In  Europe,  as  well  as  in  Asia,  her  position  in  international 
affairs  has  already  begun  to  show  signs  of  this  change.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Russian  people  have  renewed  their  conviction  of  the  need 
of  their  national  administration,  and  the  weakened  autocracy  is 
compelled  to  consider  popular  demands  for  reform.  Not  the  least 
important  result  of  the  war  is  the  fact  that  it  has  insured  the  hu- 
mane principles  of  China's  territorial  integrity  in  Manchuria,  and 
of  equal  opportunity  for  the  trade  and  industry  of  all  nations  in 
that  region  and  Korea.  The  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  has  recognized 
these  principles  and  the  Anglo-Japanese  agreement  has  insured  them 
by  a  powerful  coalition. 

On  November  6,  1905,  the  Order  of  the  Garter  was  conferred 
on  the  emperor  by  King  Edward  VII.  of  England,  and  the  British 
legation  in  Japan  was  raised  to  an  embassy.  The  emperor  visited 
the  shrine  of  Ise  in  November  and  there  reported  the  successful 
conclusion  of  the  war  to  the  spirits  of  his  ancestors.  The  end  of 
the  year  was  marked  by  a  treaty  concluded  with  China  which  made 
Japan's  position  the  same  in  Korea  as  Russia's  had  been  before  the 
war. 


328  JAPAN 

1906-1910 

In  October,  1906,  the  school  board  of  San  Francisco  in  the 
United  States  issued  an  order  excluding  the  Japanese  children 
from  the  public  schools  of  that  city  and  requiring  them  to  attend  a 
separate  school  for  Orientals.  This  action  was  taken  as  an  affront 
by  the  Japanese  government  and  a  protest  was  sent  by  the  latter 
to  the  United  States  government  on  October  15.  President  Roose- 
velt took  prompt  action  on  the  matter,  sending  Victor  H.  Metcalf, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  to  investigate  and  report.  President 
Roosevelt  also  announced  that  Japan's  treaty  rights  would  be  en- 
forced at  every  hazard.  Conferences  were  held  between  the  State 
officials  of  California  and  the  President,  resulting  in  the  President 
issuing  an  order  on  March  14,  1907,  that  all  Japanese  and  Koreans 
without  passports  would  be  excluded  from  the  United  States  and 
the  San  Francisco  Board  of  Education  deciding  to  admit  Japanese 
pupils  up  to  the  age  of  sixteen  to  the  schools.  Sensational  news- 
papers both  in  Japan  and  in  the  United  States  at  this  period  were 
filled  with  rumors  of  war  between  the  two  countries  and  at  times 
during  the  year  1907  they  would  insist  that  war  was  imminent. 

In  the  meantime  the  Japanese  government  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Viscount  Hayashi,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  took  meas- 
ures to  enforce  certain  laws  on  her  own  statute  books  concerning 
the  use  of  foreign  coolies  in  Japan  and  to  limit  Japanese  emigra- 
tion to  the  United  States.  The  visit  of  William  Howard  Taft,  the 
American  Secretary  of  War,  to  Japan  on  his  way  to  the  Philippines 
and  the  friendliness  of  his  reception  by  the  Japanese  and  his  own 
words  of  assurance  did  much  toward  allaying  whatever  feeling  of 
actual  hostility  still  remained  among  the  Japanese  people  and  the 
visit  of  the  American  fleet  of  sixteen  battleships  in  the  next  year 
ended  all  talk  of  a  war.  In  1907  similar  friction  occurred  between 
Great  Britain  and  Japan  because  certain  Japanese  merchants  and 
laborers  in  Vancouver,  Canada,  were  attacked  and  driven  from 
their  houses.  This  matter  was  adjusted  peacefully  by  Viscount 
Hayashi  and  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  the  British  Ambassador.  As 
a  proof  that  Japan  intends  to  keep  her  promises  to  regulate  immi- 
gration to  the  United  States  may  be  cited  some  immigration  figures 
for  1908;  during  that  year  there  were  admitted  to  the  entire  United 
States  only  185  more  Japanese  of  all  classes  than  departed  from  it, 
and  a  great  many  more  Japanese  laborers  left  the  United  States 
than  entered  it. 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  328a 

1906-1910 

In  the  fall  of  1909  a  Commercial  Commission,  sent  by  the 
merchants  of  Japan,  visited  the  United  States,  studying  American 
business  and  industrial  methods  and  purchasing  a  large  variety  of 
manufactured  articles  which  had  never  found  a  market  in  the 
Orient  and  buying  the  newest  machinery  used  in  lumber,  mining, 
and  milling  industries,  and  also  devices  for  food  preservation,  and 
learned  many  of  the  labor-saving  methods  used  in  banking  and 
commercial  offices. 

A  Franco-Japanese  Agreement  was  signed  on  June  10, 1907,  pro- 
viding that  the  most-favored-nation  treatment  should  be  accorded 
the  officials  and  subjects  of  Japan  in  French  Indo-China  for  every- 
thing concerning  their  persons  and  the  protection  of  their  property, 
and  that  the  same  treatment  should  be  granted  the  subjects  of 
French  Indo-China  in  the  Empire  of  Japan  and  that  these  pro- 
visions should  hold  until  the  expiration  of  the  Treaty  of  Commerce 
and  Navigation  concluded  between  France  and  Japan,  August  4, 
1896.  In  regard  to  the  continent  of  Asia,  the  two  countries  agreed 
to  "respect  the  independence  and  integrity  of  China  as  well  as  the 
principles  of  equality  of  treatment  in  that  country  for  the  com- 
merce and  subjects  of  all  nations,  and  having  a  special  interest  in 
seeing  that  order  and  a  pacific  state  of  affairs  guaranteed,  partic- 
ularly in  the  regions  of  the  Chinese  Empire  adjacent  to  the  terri- 
tories where  they  have  rights  of  sovereignty,  protection,  and 
occupation,  bind  themselves  mutually  to  support  one  another  in 
order  to  assure  the  peace  and  security  of  those  regions,  with  a 
view  to  the  maintenance  of  the  respective  positions  and  territorial 
rights  of  the  two  contracting  parties  on  the  Asiatic  continent." 

During  1907  several  Russo-Japanese  conventions  were  signed. 
The  first,  concluded  on  July  28,  was  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  nav- 
igation in  accordance  with  article  12  of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth ; 
in  the  second,  concluded  two  days  later,  each  agreed  to  respect  the 
territorial  integrity  of  the  other,  the  agreements  then  in  force  be- 
tween the  contracting  parties  and  China,  and  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  China,  and  to  uphold  the  status  quo  with  all  the 
peaceable  means  at  their  disposal;  a  third  convention  related  to 
the  fisheries  of  the  Sea  of  Japan,  the  Okhotsk  Sea,  and  the  Behring 
Sea ;  the  fourth  provided  for  the  joining  of  the  Russian  railways  in 
Manchuria  at  Kwang-cheng-tsze.  In  August  the  legations  at 
Tokio  and  St.  Petersburg  were  raised  to  the  status  of  embassies  by 
their  respective  governments. 


328b  JAPAN 

1906-1910 

On  February  5,  1908,  Chinese  custom  officers  seized  the  Japa- 
nese steamer  Tatsu  Maru  in  Portuguese  waters  off  Macao,  where  it 
had  landed  to  discharge  arms  shipped  from  a  Japanese  port  to  a 
Chinese  merchant  at  Macao.  The  Japanese  resented  the  seizure 
and  complained  to  the  Chinese  authorities  demanding  an  apology 
and  an  indemnity.  At  first  the  latter  defended  their  action,  but 
on  the  receipt  of  an  ultimatum  from  the  Japanese  on  March  5, 
China  apologized  and  gave  assurance  that  the  indemnity  would  be 
paid  and  the  responsible  persons  punished.  Japan  in  return  agreed 
to  prevent  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  between  Japanese 
and  Chinese  citizens.  Thus  a  friendly  feeling  was  restored  be- 
tween the  two  countries  but  public  opinion  had  been  greatly  in- 
flamed in  China  and  a  boycott  of  Japanese  goods  had  begun.  Dur- 
ing the  year  many  Japanese  vessels  left  Chinese  ports  without  the 
goods  for  which  they  had  come.  It  is  estimated  that  the  Japanese 
lost  some  $8,000,000  by  this  boycott. 

China  also  felt  embittered  against  Japan  in  this  same  year 
because  of  the  latter's  course  in  Manchuria,  where  she  had  retained 
the  public  buildings  at  Mukden  and  the  Manchurian  gold  mines, 
taken  possession  of  the  Manchurian  post-offices  and  telegraph  lines, 
occupied  a  portion  of  the  province  of  Kirin,  claiming  it  as  Korean 
territory,  although  it  had  long  been  held  as  part  of  China,  and  for- 
bade the  building  of  a  railway  to  the  west  of  the  Liau  River,  from 
Hsenmintun  to  Fakumen,  saying  that  it  would  compete  with  the 
Japanese  system.  These  difficulties  were  adjusted  soon.  Japan 
agreed  to  the  building  of  the  railroad  on  condition  that  at  no  point 
should  it  come  within  a  minimum  distance  from  the  Japanese  line. 
On  October  12  and  November  7,  agreements  were  signed  at  Tokio 
concerning  the  telegraph  lines.  China  agreed  to  place  special  tele- 
graph wires  between  the  treaty  ports,  Kwang-cheng-tsze,  Tiding, 
Mukden,  Liau-yang,  Niu-chwang,  Antung,  and  the  railroad  terri- 
tory at  the  exclusive  disposal  of  Japan  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years, 
the  service  on  the  wires  to  be  worked  by  Japanese  clerks  in  the  em- 
ploy of  the  Japanese  government  from  the  Chine  telegraph  build- 
ings, but  only  to  be  used  for  the  exchange  of  telegrams  from  or  to 
places  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Japanese  telegraph  system. 
Japan  undertook  to  pass  over  to  China  all  Japanese  telegraph  lines 
in  Manchuria  outside  her  railway  territory,  to  construct  no  telegraph 
or  telephone  lines  in  Manchuria  outside  the  same  territory,  and  to 
construct  no  telegraph  or  telephone  lines  or  erect  wireless  stations 


RUSSO-JAPANESE     WAR  328c 

1906-1901 

outside  her  leased  territory.  She  also  agreed  to  pay  China  a  small 
annual  royalty  on  all  messages  sent  over  the  Japanese  Manchurian 
telegraph  lines.  On  September  4,  1909,  an  agreement  was  signed 
at  Peking  regarding  the  improvement  of  the  Antung-Mukden  Rail- 
road and  which  gave  to  Japan  the  advantages  in  Manchurian  trade. 

General  elections  to  the  House  of  Representatives  were  held 
on  May  15,  1908,  resulting  in  a  sweeping  victory  for  the  Seiyu-kai. 
For  the  first  time  since  the  formation  of  the  diet,  one  party  had 
elected  a  majority  of  all  the  members.  On  July  12,  Marquis 
Katsura  was  given  the  imperial  command  to  form  a  ministry.  As 
this  nobleman  was  connected  with  the  weakest  of  the  political  par- 
ties, the  Daids  Club,  his  appointment  as  premier  was  a  great  dis- 
appointment to  the  Seiyu-kai,  who  had  hoped  to  have  one  of  their 
own  leaders  hold  that  office. 

In  July,  1909,  twenty-three  members  of  the  Imperial  Diet  were 
convicted  for  complicity  in  a  graft  scandal.  Five  directors  of  the 
Great  Japan  Sugar  Company  were  at  the  same  time  convicted  of 
bribing  the  nation's  representatives  and  all  twenty-eight  received 
very  severe  sentences. 

In  the  meantime  Japan's  influence  in  Korea  had  increased  to 
such  an  extent  that  by  the  end  of  1907,  Korea  was  for  all  practical 
purposes  an  integral  part  of  the  Japanese  Empire.  Soon  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  Japan  and  Korea  signed  an 
agreement,  by  which  Japan  undertook  to  insure  the  safety  of  the 
imperial  household  and  guaranteed  the  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Korean  Empire,  in  return  for  which  Korea  agreed 
to  accept  the  advice  of  Japan  as  to  improvements  in  administra- 
tion. Six  months  later  Korea,  in  another  agreement  with  Japan, 
pledged  herself  to  regulate  her  finances  in  accordance  with  the  ad- 
vice of  the  Japanese  financial  adviser  and  a  foreign  diplomatic  ad- 
viser, named  by  Japan,  and  also  to  consult  the  government  of 
Japan  before  making  treaties  or  conventions  with  other  powers  or 
granting  them  concessions.  Following  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth, 
another  agreement  was  entered  into  by  Japan  and  Korea  on  No- 
vember 17,  1905,  which  provided  that  Japan  should  control  and 
direct  the  external  relations  in  the  affairs  of  Korea  through  the 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  Tokio ;  and  that  Japan  should  be 
represented  at  the  court  of  the  Emperor  of  Korea  by  a  Resident- 
General,  residing  at  Seoul,  and  should  have  the  right  to  station  rep- 
resentatives at  the  several  open  ports  and  at  such  other  places  in 


328d  JAPAN 

1996-1910 

Korea  as  it  might  deem  necessary.  In  accordance  with  this  agree- 
ment, Mr.  Durham  White  Stevens,  an  American,  experienced  in 
diplomatic  service,  was  chosen  by  Japan  to  be  Diplomatic  Adviser 
at  Seoul  to  the  Foreign  Office.  In  spite  of  these  agreements  the 
Korean  Emperor  sent  to  The  Hague  Peace  Conference  in  1907,  a 
delegation  consisting  of  Prince  Yi-Ui-Tjyong,  Yi-Tjun,  a  Korean 
judge,  and  Yi-Sang-Sul,  former  vice-premier  of  Korea;  these 
men  claimed  that  Japan  had  committed  acts  contrary  to  the 
agreement  of  1884,  and  had  forced  the  Korean  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  sign  the  agreement  giving  Japan  the  control  of  Korea's 
foreign  affairs.  The  conference  could  do  nothing  for  the  delega- 
tion as  it  was  understood  that  the  deliberations  of  the  peace  com- 
missioners should  not  be  concerned  with  relations  between  nations 
that  had  been  Settled  by  treaty.  As  a  result  of  his  sending  this 
delegation  the  Emperor  of  Korea  was  forced  to  abdicate  on  July  19, 
1907,  in  favor  of  his  son,  the  Crown  Prince.  The  ministry  of 
Korea  opposed  this  abdication  and  the  Abolitionists  broke  out  into 
riots ;  therefore  Japan  forced  the  signing  of  another  treaty  on  July 
25.  This  (1)  placed  the  administration  of  all  Korean  affairs  in  the 
hands  of  the  Japanese  Resident-General;  (2)  provided  that  the 
enactment  of  all  laws  and  ordinances  and  the  transaction  of  im- 
portant state  affairs  must  receive  the  approval  of  the  Resident- 
General;  (3)  decided  that  a  definite  line  of  demarcation  is  to  be 
drawn  between  administrative  and  judicial  affairs;  (4)  stated  that 
Japanese  subjects  recommended  by  the  Resident-General  are  eligi- 
ble to  office  under  the  Korean  government;  (5)  provided  that  for- 
eigners may  be  employed  only  with  the  consent  of  the  Resident- 
General  ;  (6)  agreed  that  the  clause  of  the  agreement  of  August  22, 
1904,  providing  for  the  employment  of  a  financial  adviser  be  an- 
nulled. 

Following  this  agreement  and  in  order  to  enforce  it,  the  Korean 
native  army  was  disbanded  on  August  1,  1907.  The  new  emperor, 
Yi-Chok,  at  the  instance  of  Prince  Ito,  the  Resident-General,  or- 
dered the  punishment  of  The  Hague  envoys  and  of  men  of  his 
father's  court  suspected  of  fostering  resistance.  Japanese  forces 
in  Korea  were  increased  and  the  new  crown-prince  was  sent  to 
Japan  to  be  educated.  During  1908  the  Japanese  colonization  of 
Korea  continued;  new  regiments  were  sent  to  Korea,  the  number 
of  Japanese  officials  were  increased,  radical  reforms  were  under- 


RUSSO-JAPANESE    WAR  328e 

1906-1910 

taken  in  the  judiciary,  and  the  imperial  assets  were  transferred  to 
the  national  treasury. 

All  this  was  not  done  without  opposition  on  the  part  of  the 
Koreans :  parties  of  rebels  gathered  over  the  country  and  there  was 
a  continual  guerrilla  warfare;  plots  were  formed  against  Japanese 
officials,  an  attempt  being  made  to  derail  Prince  Ito's  train  in  the 
latter  part  of  April,  1908;  and  the  native  press  became  so  virulent 
in  its  denunciation  of  the  Japanese  government  that  the  latter  pro- 
mulgated and  enforced  a  law  forbidding  the  sale  of  any  paper  con- 
taining matter  subversive  of  the  public  peace  under  penalty  of 
fine  or  imprisonment. 

On  October  26,  1909,  Prince  Ito  was  shot  and  killed  at  Harbin, 
Manchuria,  by  a  Korean,  who  confessed  to  the  police  that  he  had 
journeyed  to  Harbin  for  the  express  purpose  of  assassinating  the 
Prince  "to  avenge  my  country,"  blaming  Prince  Ito  for  his  country- 
men's loss  of  political  liberty. 

The  terrible  storms  which  prevailed  all  over  the  world  during 
the  latter  part  of  1909,  were  especially  severe  off  the  coast  of  Japan, 
and  two  Japanese  steamers  foundered  off  Korea  and  Japan,  on  No- 
vember 30,  the  loss  of  life  being  very  heavy.  Manchuria  is  a 
center  of  disturbance  in  all  eastern  questions,  and  Japan  registered 
her  protest  on  January  8,  1910,  against  the  plan  proposed  by  the 
United  States  Secretary  of  State,  Knox,  for  neutralizing  the  rail- 
roads in  Manchuria,  the  Japanese  statesmen  being  utterly  opposed 
to  such  a  measure. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


The  following  list  of  books  does  not  represent  the  sources  and  literature 
used  in  revising  the  text  and  preparing  the  supplementary  part  of  the  present 
volume,  but  is  intended  solely  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader  who  would 
naturally  confine  his  attention  to  works  written  in  English. 

There  is  hardly  a  work  on  general  Japanese  bibliography  which  can  be  com- 
pared with  that  great  Chinese  bibliography,  the  "  Bibliotheca  Sinica,"  by  Henri 
Cordier.  Fr.  von  Wenckstern's  "  Bibliography  of  the  Japanese  Empire,"  London, 
1895,  gives,  with  few  comments,  works  written  only  in  European  languages,  and 
covers  the  period  between  1859  and  1893.  It  also  contains  a  facsimile-reprint  of 
Leon  Pages's  "Bibliographic  japonaise  depuis  le  XVe  siecle  jusqu'a  1859."  As 
to  articles  written  on  Japan  in  the  English  and  American  periodicals,  "  Poole's 
Index  "  may  be  consulted  with  profit. 

Of  works  of  general  information  on  Japan,  the  first  eight  volumes  ("  Japan : 
Its  History,  Art  and  Literature")  of  Captain  Frank  Brinkley's  "Oriental 
Series,"  in  twelve  volumes,  London  and  Boston,  1902-1903,  perhaps  deserve  the 
first  mention.  The  work  is  eminently  free  from  both  the  superficiality  of  the 
tourist  and  the  well-meaning  but  not  harmless  prejudices  of  many  a  missionary. 
The  author's  thorough  acquaintance  with  men  and  things  of  Japan,  where  he 
has  lived  for  more  than  thirty  years  and  is  editor  of  perhaps  the  best  informed 
and  most  fair-minded  English  journal,  the  Japan  Mail,  has  enabled  him  to  give 
an  intimate  view  of  the  history  and  the  national  life  of  the  Japanese.  The  facile 
style  of  the  author  also  adds  greatly  to  the  value  of  his  work  for  popular 
reading.  This  work  grew  out  of  the  author's  edition  of  "Japan,"  containing 
essays  on  various  topics  originally  written  by  great  native  authorities  but  much 
revised  and  rendered  into  English  by  Brinkley.  A  new  edition  of  this  latter 
work  ("Japan,"  Boston,  1005),  has  been  published  by  J.  B.  Millet  &  Co., 
bringing  the  account  down  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  Captain 
Brinkley  also  has  an  admirable  article  on  Japan  in  the  twenty-ninth  volume  of 
the  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica."  For  the  student's  ready  reference,  J.  J.  Rein's 
"  Japan :  Travels  and  Researches  Undertaken  at  the  Cost  of  the  Prussian  Govern- 
ment," English  translation,  New  York,  1884,  and  his  "  Industries  of  Japan, 
Together  with  an  Account  of  Its  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Commerce,"  English 
translation,  New  York,  1889,  are  very  useful.  B.  H.  Chamberlain's  "Things 
Japanese,"  originally  published  in  Tokyo  in  1890  but  now  in  its  fourth  edition 
(New  York,  1902),  is  a  dictionary  of  all  subjects  of  interest,  and  contains 
bibliographical  references  for  many  of  the  subjects  treated.  The  work,  how- 
ever, is  in  need  of  further  revision.  The  same  author  has  compiled  with  W.  B. 
Mason  a  "  Hand-book  for  Travelers  in  Japan,"  which  is  now  in  its  seventh 
edition  (London,  1903).  W.  E.  Griffis's  "Mikado's  Empire"  at  first  appeared 
in  New  York  in  1876,  but,  owing  to  the  absence  of  better  works  of  this  nature, 
has  been  so  popular  that  it  is  in  its  tenth  edition  (New  York,  1003).  It  was 
once  unrivaled  in  its  comprehensiveness,  but  has  never  been  considered  a  work 
upon  which  the  student  could  rely  for  objective  truths  regarding  Japan.  E.  W. 
Clement's  little  book,  "A  Hand-book  of  Modern  Japan,"  Chicago,  1903,  and 

331 


88S  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Henry  Dyer's  "  Dai  Nippon,  A  Study  in  National  Evolution,"  London  and  New 
York,  1904,  are  both  useful  when  used  critically.  Alfred  Stead  has  edited 
"Japan  by  the  Japanese:  A  Survey  by  the  Highest  Authorities,"  London  and 
New  York,  1904. 

In  the  field  of  general  history  several  older  works  have  been  superseded 
by  newer  onces,  all  of  which,  however,  leave  vastly  much  to  be  desired.  David 
Murray's  "Japan,"  New  York,  1894  (in  the  "Story  of  the  Nations"  series),  is 
more  narrative  than  analytical  or  interpretative.  Max  von  Brandt  has  a  brief 
survey  in  the  second  volume  of  the  "  History  of  the  World :  A  Survey  of  Man's 
Record,"  edited  by  H.  F.  Helmolt,  English  translation,  London  and  New  York, 
1904.  Among  works  on  different  periods  of  history,  the  present  editor's  "  Early 
Institutional  Life  of  Japan,"  Tokyo  and  New  York,  1903,  covers  the  period 
between  500  and  900  a.  d.,  and  James  Murdoch  and  Isoh  Yamagata's  "  History 
of  Japan  during  the  Century  of  Early  Foreign  Intercourse  (1542-1651),"  Tokyo, 

1904,  takes  up  the  important  period  of  Japan's  earliest  European  relations  under 
the  feudal  regime.  For  the  beginning  of  the  foreign  relations  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  F.  O.  Adams's  "  History  of  Japan  to  1871,"  in  two  volumes,  London, 
1874-1875,  Richard  Hildreth's  "Japan  as  It  Was  and  Is,"  Boston,  1855,  and  the 
lives  of  "  M.  C.  Perry "  and  "  Townsend  Harris  "  by  W.  E.  Griffis,  Boston,  1897 
and  1895,  may  be  recommended.  I.  Nitobe's  "  Intercourse  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan,"  extra  volume  8  of  the  "  Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies  in 
History  and  Political  Science,"  Baltimore,  1891,  is  useful.  Coming  down  to  a 
later  period  of  history,  the  accounts  of  the  Chino-Japanese  War  of  1894-1895 
by  "Vladimir"  (the  "China-Japan  War,"  New  York,  1896)  and  F.  W.  Eastlake 
and  Y.  Yamada  (the  "  Heroic  Japan,"  Tokyo,  1896)  may  be  mentioned.  Brink- 
ley's  large  work,  of  course,  covers  history,  as  well  as  arts,  literature,  customs 
and  manners,  and  religion.  For  a  still  more  recent  period,  one  may  consult  the 
present  editor's  "  Russo-Japanese  Conflict :  Its  Causes  and  Issues,"  London  and 
Boston,  1904.  As  to  the  progress  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  we  have  yet  to 
look  for  its  authentic  history. 

Among  authors  on  Old  Japan,  or,  that  side  of  the  national  life  in  which  the 
old  civilization  has  not  been  greatly  affected  by  the  inroad  of  European  influences, 
no  writer  has  shown  a  greater  aptitude  to  grasp  its  spirit  or  has  presented  it  in 
more  charming  English  than  the  late  prolific  author,  Lafcadio  Hearn,  in  his 
"  Glimpses  of  Unfamiliar  Japan,"  Boston,  1894,  "  Out  of  the  East,"  Boston,  1895, 
"  Kokoro :  Hints  and  Echoes  of  Japanese  Inner  Life,"  Boston,  1896,  "  Gleanings 
in  Buddha-fields,"  Boston,  1897,  "  Exotics  and  Retrospectives,"  Boston,  1898,  "  In 
Ghostly  Japan,"  Boston,  1899,  "  Shadowings,"  Boston,  1900,  "  A  Japanese  Miscel- 
lany," Boston,  1901,  "  Kwaidan,"  Boston,  1904,  "  Romance  of  the  Milky  Way," 
Boston,  1905,  "  Japan :  An  Interpretation,"  New  York,  1004,  and  others.  Miss  Alice 
M.  Bacon's  "  A  Japanese  Interior,"  Boston  and  New  York,  1893,  "  Japanese  Girls 
and  Women,"  new  edition,  Boston,  1902,  and  "  In  the  Land  of  the  Gods,"  Boston, 

1905,  as  well  as  G.  W.  Knox's  "Japanese  Life  in  Town  and  Country"  ("Our 
Asiatic  Neighbor"  series),  New  York,  1904,  are  recommended.  For  other  sides 
than  are  so  well  described  by  these  works,  the  reader  must  again  turn  to  Captain 
Brinkley's  great  work,  and  also  to  articles  in  the  Transactions  of  the  Asiatic 
Society  of  Japan  published  at  Tokyo  since  1872. 

There  are  a  few  works  interpretative  of  the  moral  side  of  the  evolution  of 
the  Japanese  nation,  among  which  again  chapters  in  Brinkley,  as  well  as  I. 
Nitobe's  "  Bushido,"  Philadelphia,  1900,  and  New  York,  1905,  and  K.  Okakura's 
"  Soul  of  the  East,"  London  and  New  York,  1004,  may  be  mentioned.  These 
able  authors  will  admit,  however,  that  the  subject  requires  so  extensive  and 
rigorous  a  training  and  so  naturally  refined  and  delicate  an  intellect,  and  it  is 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  338 

so  impossible  to  pass  a  final  or  even  a  definite  judgment  on  the  matter,  that  it 
seems  hazardous  to  rely  upon  the  opinion  of  any  one  writer.  S.  L.  Gulick's 
"  Evolution  of  the  Japanese,  Social  and  Psychic,"  New  York,  1903,  is  a  misnomer, 
as  no  work  of  such  claim  can  afford  to  be  more  seriously  defective  in  showing 
the  development  of  a  historic  nation.  The  author's  notion  of  social  evolution, 
which  forms  the  basis  of  this  work,  does  not  seem  to  have  been  tested  by  the 
modern  student,  and  the  entire  work  unfortunately  breathes  a  certain  type  of 
mind  and  training  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  In  studying  such  a  subject  as  is 
aimed  at  in  this  work,  no  student  can  be  too  well  trained  and  too  thorough,  and 
no  statement  can  be  too  undogmatic. 

Of  books  written  on  the  politics  of  New  Japan,  Count  (now  Marquis) 
Hirobumi  Ito's  "  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  Empire  of  Japan," 
English  translation,  Tokyo,  1889,  is  the  authoritative  work  and  is  indispensable. 
Chapters  in  Brinkley,  Stead  and  Clement  are  interesting.  The  last  writer  has 
also  an  article  on  the  local  self-government  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly 
for  June,  1892,  and  another  on  the  constitutional  government  in  the  Annals  of 
the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science  for  March,  1903.  T. 
Ienaga's  "Constitutional  Development  of  Japan"  ("Johns  Hopkins  Studies,"  9th 
Series,  No.  9),  Baltimore,  189 1,  takes  up  the  earlier  years  of  the  new  regime, 
while  K.  Kawakami's  "  Political  Ideas  of  Modern  Japan,"  University  of  Iowa, 
1903,  brings  the  account  of  the  theoretical  side  of  the  development  down  to 
about  1902.  An  article  by  H.  N.  Lay  on  the  political  parties  of  Japan  in  the 
Transactions  of  the  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan,  volume  30,  No.  3,  is  valuable. 

In  regard  to  the  economic  and  financial  conditions  of  Japan,  the  United 
States  Consular  Reports  and  the  British  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Reports  are 
very  useful.  The  Japanese  Government  publishes  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Annals  of  Japan.  Among  other  official  publications  by  the  same  government,  the 
"  Report  on  the  Adoption  of  the  Gold  Standard,"  1899,  the  "  Post-Bellum 
Finance,"  1900,  and  "  Japan  in  the  Beginning  of  the  Twentieth  Century,"  1903, 
are  important.  Y.  Kinos[h]ita's  "Past  and  Present  of  Japanese  Commerce" 
("Columbia  University  Studies  in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law"),  New 
York,  1902,  is  an  interpretative  account  of  Japan's  foreign  trade.  J.  Morris  has 
written  a  volume  on  "  Japan  and  Its  Trade "  ("  Harper's  International  Com- 
merce Series"),  London  and  New  York,  1902. 

Passing  to  the  matter  of  literature,  W.  G.  Aston  has  a  "  History  of  Japanese 
Literature,"  New  York,  1901,  while,  for  practical  studies  of  the  language,  one 
may  turn  to  W.  Imbrie's  "  English-Japanese  Etymology,"  Toyko,  and  B.  H. 
Chamberlain's  "  Hand-book  of  Colloquial  Japanese,"  Tokyo,  1888,  "  A  Simplified 
Grammar  of  the  Japanese  Language,"  Toyko,  1886,  and  the  "  Moji-no-Shirube; 
a  Practical  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  the  Japanese  Writing,"  London,  New 
York,  and  Shanghai,  1899. 

We  conclude  by  again  recommending  Captain  Brinkley's  "  Oriental  Series  " 
to  general  readers,  who  may  also  profitably  consult  some  articles  in  the  Transac- 
tions of  the  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan  and  of  the  Japan  Society  at  London. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abe  Masahiro:  urges  signing  of  treaty 

with  America,  157 
Abe-no-Hirafu :    his    campaigns    in    the 

north,  27 
Abe-no-Nakamaro :  scholarship  of,  35 
Achiki :  introduces  Chinese  learning  into 

Japan,  13 
Adams,  William :  settles  in  Japan,  135 
Aigun :  occupied  by  Russia,  285 
Akamatsu  Mitsusuke :  rebellion  of,  95 
Akechi  Mitsuhide:  rewarded  with  lands 

of  Buddhist  priests,  Hi;  kills  Oda 

Nobunaga,  112 
Akira,  Prince :  made  gijo,  167 
Akita :  built,  27 
Alexiev,  Admiral:  concludes  treaty  with 

Tsang-chi,  286 
Alexis,  Prince :  visits  Japan,  191 
Amakusa:  battle  of  (1638),  137 
Amoy  Affair,  The,  283 
Ando  Nobumasa :  assassination  of,  161 
Anglo-German  Agreement:  signed,  285 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  (1902),  231,  289 
Anglo-Russian       Railway       Agreement 

(1899),  279 
Anshan  chan:  captured  by  Japanese,  310 
Antoku,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  59 ; 

death  of,  62 
An-tung:  occupied  by  the  Japanese,  267 
Aoki  Kanaiye :  skill  of,  107 
Aoki,    Viscount:    becomes    minister    of 

foreign  affairs,  100 
Arai  Hakuseki :  sketch  of,  142 
Araki  Matayemon :  slays  Kawai,  152 
Argun :  occupied  by  Russia,  285 
Arisugawa,    Prince:    made   commander- 
in-chief  of  army,  169;  commissioned 

to  quell  rebellion  of  Saigo,  179 
Asana  Naganori:  story  of,  152 
Asano   Yukinaga:   at  battle  of   Sekiga- 

hara,  123 


Ashikaga  Motouji:  regent  at  Kamakura, 

92;  joins  rebellion  of  Ouchi  Yoshi- 

hiro,  95;  revolt  of,  95 
Ashikaga    Takauji:     his     campaign    in 

Kyoto,  86;  sketch  of,  87;  death  of, 

91 
Ashikaga  Yoshiaki :  shogunate  of,  101 ; 

opposes   growing  influence   of   Oda 

Nobunaga,  ill 
Ashikaga  Yoshiakira:  shogunate  of,  91 
Ashikaga  Yoshihisa :  birth  of,  97 
Ashikaga  Yoshikazu :  shogunate  of,  96 
Ashikaga  Yoshimasa:  shogunate  of,  96 
Ashikaga  Yoshimi :   assumes  the  duties 

of  a  regent,  97 
Ashikaga  Yoshimitsu :  shogunate  of,  91, 

92;  his  relations  with  China,  102 
Ashikaga  Yoshimochi:  shogunate  of,  92; 

severs    official    intercourse    between 

Japan  and  China,  103 
Ashikaga  Yoshinori :  shogunate  of,  95 ; 

reopens     official     intercourse     with 

China,  103 
Ashikaga  Yoshiteru :  assassinated,  100 
Austria-Hungary:  concludes  treaty  with 

Japan,  189 
Awada-no-Mahito :  scholarship  of,  34 
Azumi-no-Hirafu :      his     campaign      in 

Korea,  26 


P» 


Belgium:  concludes  treaty  with  Japan, 

189 
Bentsiaputse :  captured  by  the  Russians, 

3" 
Bitchu-no-Kami :  see  Hotta  Masaatsu 
Blagovestchensk :  bombarded,  284 
Bosatsu :  see  Gyogi 
Boxer  Uprising,  The,  279 
Buddha,  The  Great  Image  of:  built,  32 
Buddhism:  introuuced  into  Japan,  14 


337 


338 


INDEX 


Chang  Chih-tung:  attempts  to  have 
Manchuria  opened  to  foreign  trade, 
288 

Chang  Pak:  in  command  of  Chinese 
army,  76 

Chemulpo:  destroyed  by  Japanese,  194; 
battle  of,  303 

Chiao-tow:  captured  by  the  Japanese, 
310 

China:  early  relations  with  Japan,  16; 
conquests  in  Korea,  26;  concludes 
treaty  with  Japan  (1871),  192;  re- 
lations with  Russia,  276 

Ching,  Prince:  his  negotiations  concern- 
ing Manchuria,  289,  295 

Chino-Japanese  War,  252 

Chiulien-cheng :  captured  by  the  Japa- 
nese, 267 

Chom  Wei-king:  attempts  to  negotiate 
peace  with  Japan,  119 

Christianity:  introduced  into  Japan,  105; 
sketch  of  its  progress  in  Japan,  137 

Chuai,  emperor  of  Japan:  his  campaign 
against  the  Kumaso,  12 

Chukyo,  emperor  of  Japan :  accession  of, 

7i 

Constitutional  Party:  organized,  219 

Constitutional  Political  Association:  or- 
ganized, 227 

Constitution,  The:  promulgated,  185;  in 
theory  and  practice,  199 

Cyril,  grand  duke  of  Russia:  at  siege  of 
Port  Arthur,  307 


Dannoura:  battle  of,  62 
Danrin-ji:  built,  41 
Dazaifu:  battle  of  (1281),  75 
Denmark:  concludes  treaty  with  Japan, 

189 
Deities,  Age  of  the,  3 
Dogger  Bank  Incident,  313 
Dokyo :  influence  of,  36 
Dutch :  begin  trade  with  Japan,  134 


Edo:    rise    of,    123;    taken    by    imperial 
forces,  169;  see  also  Tokyo 


Eikyo:  captured  by  the  Japanese,  1 18 

Emi  Oshikazu :  rebellion  of,  36 

Emishi:    rebellion   of,    10;    brought  into 

subjection,  27 
England:  begins  trade  with  Japan,  135; 

concludes  treaty  with  China,  277 
Enomoto    Takeaki:    rebellion    of,    169; 

sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  188 
Enotake:  siege  of,  181 
Enryaku-ji:  built,  41 
Eto  Shimpei:  rebellion  of,  177 


F 


Feng-hwang-cheng :  captured  by  Japa- 
nese, 309 

Feng-shui  (Wafangao)  Pass:  captured 
by  the  Japanese,  310 

Formosa:  invaded  by  Japanese,  192; 
ceded  to  Japan,  273 

Francis  Xavier,  St. :  preaches  in  Japan, 
104 

Fuj  iwara-no-Fuhito :  aids  the  spread  of 
Buddhism,  32;  services  of,  to  the 
empire,  45 

Fujiwara-no-Hidehira:  kindness  of,  to 
Minamoto-no-Yoshitsune,  65 ;  death 
of,  66 

Fujiwara-no-Hidesato:  defeats  Tairo- 
no-Masakado,  53 

Fujiwara-no-Kamatari:    services    of,    45 

Fujiwara-no-Michinaga:  influence  of,  48 

Fujiwara-no-Michinori:  influence  of,  57 

Fujiwara-no-Morosuke:  minister  of  the 
right,  48 

Fujiwara-no-Mototsune:  ministry  of,  46 

Fujiwara-no-Narichika:  plots  against 
the  Taira  sway,  59 

Fujiwara-no-Nobuyori:   rebellion  of,   57 

Fujiwara-no-Sadakuni :  conspires  against 
Sugawara-no-Michizane,  47 

Fujiwara-no-Sanesuke:  opposes  influ- 
ence  of  Fujiwara-no-Michinaga,  49 

Fujiwara-no-Saneyori:  minister  of  the 
left,  48 

Fujiwara-no-Sumitomo:  rebellion  of,  53 

Fujiwara-no-Tadahira:  chief  minister  of 
state,  48 

Fuj  iwara-no-Tadamichi :  regent  for  Em- 
peror Konoye,  56 

Fujiwara-no-Tokihira:  conspires  against 
Sugawara-no-Michizane,  47 


INDEX 


339 


Fujiwara-no-Yasuhira:  kills  Minamoto- 
Yoshitsune,  66 

Fujiwara-no-Yoshifusa:  influence  of,  46 

Fujiwara-no-Yoritsune:  made  shogun,  70 

Fukushima,  Lieutenant  Colonel :  ap- 
pointed director  of  Korean  adminis- 
tration, 267 

Fukushima  Masanori:  at  battle  of 
Sekigahara,  123;  his  estates  con- 
fiscated, 128 

Fusan:  attacked  by  Japanese  (1510), 
104;  captured  by  the  Japanese 
(1592),  117 

Fushimi:  battle  of,  168 


Gemmyo,  empress  of  Japan:  reign  of,  31 

Genghis  Khan  (Temujin)  :  plans  subju- 
gation of  Japan,  73 

Germany:  treaty  with  China  (1898),  277 

Godaigo,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  83 

Gohorikawa,  emperor  of  Japan:  acces- 
sion of,  72 

Gokashiwabara,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign 
of,  100 

Gokameyama,  emperor  of  Japan :  abdi- 
cation of,  91 

Gokomatsu,  emperor  of  Japan :  accession 
of,  91 

Gokomyo,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of, 
132 

Gold  Standard:  established   (1898),  226 

Gominoo,  emperor  of  Japan:  grieves 
over  power  of  the  nobles,  132 

Gomurakami,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign 
of,  90 

Gonara,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of,  100 

Gonijo,  emperor  of  Japan:  accession  of, 
83 

Gosaga,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of,  83 

Gosai-in,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of, 
132 

Goshirakawa,  emperor  of  Japan:  acces- 
sion of,  56 

Gotoba,  emperor  of  Japan:  plots  against 
feudal  administration,  70 

Goto  Shojiro,  Count:  counsels  war  with 
Korea,  178;  reforms  of,  183;  at- 
tempts to  negotiate  treaties  with 
European  powers,  190 

Goto  Sukenori:  sketch  of,  107 


Gotsuchimikado,     emperor     of     Japan: 

reign  of,  100 
Gouda,  emperor  of  Japan:  at  war  with 

the  Mongols,  76 
Grant,  Ulysses  S. :  visits  Japan,  191 
Grippenberg,  General:  at  battle  of  Ho- 

kau-tai,  312 
Gunzburg,  Baron:  represents  Russia  at 

Seul,  296 
Gyogi  (Bosatsu)  :  teachings  of,  32 


II 


Hagiwara  Shigehide:  proposes  the  issue 
of  a  debased  currency,  143 

Hai-cheng:  captured  by  the  Japanese, 
268,  272 

Hakozaki:  battle  of,  74 

Hanabusa  Yoshimoto:  minister  to 
Korea,  195 

Hamada  Yahei :  conquers  Formosa,  136 

Hanazono,  emperor  of  Japan:  accession 
of,  83 

Harbin:  occupied  by  Russia,  285 

Harris,  Townsend:  sent  as  consul-gen- 
eral to  Japan,  157 

Hasankin,  king  of  Shiragi:  submits  to 
the  Japanese,  13 

Hashiba  Hideyoshi :  see  Toyotomi  Hide- 
yoshi 

Hatakeyama  Masanaga:  plots  against, 
98 

Hatakeyama  Yoshinari:  claims  regency, 
98. 

Hawaii :  concludes  treay  with  Japan,  189 

Hay,  John:  his  negotiations  with  the 
Great  Powers,  279;  his  note  to  Rus- 
sian and  Chinese  governments  con- 
cerning Manchuria,  289 

Hayashi,  Viscount:  negotiates  treaty 
with  England,  232 

Hegushagu:  battle  of,  119 

Hei-an  Epoch:  38 

Heiji  Insurrection,  57 

Hekitei-kan:  battle  of,  119 

Hieda-no-Are :  compiles  annals  of  the 
reigns  of  Japanese  sovereigns,  35 

Hiki  Yoshikazu:  plots  against  the  Ho  jo 
family,  69 

Hiraga  Tomomasa:  plots  to  obtain  the 
shogunate,  70 

Hogen  Insurrection,  56 


$40 


INDEX 


Hojo  Family:  rise  of,  69 

Hojo  Morotoki:  regency  of,  77 

Hojo  Sadatoki :  regency  of,  77 

Hojo    Sanemasa:    commands    Japanese 

army,  75 
Hojo  Takatoki:  regency  of,  77,  84 
Hojo   Tokifusa:    his   campaign   against 

the  imperial  forces,  71 
Hojo     Tokimasa:     restores     order     in 

Nyoto,  66;  assumes  government  of 

Kamakura,  68 
Hojo    Tokimune:    saves    Japan    from 

Mogul   conquest,   73;   puts   Chinese 

envoy  to  death,  75 
Hojo  Tokiyori:  rule  of,  72 
Hojo  Tsunetoki:  rule  of,  72 
Hojo  Yasutoki :  his  campaign  against  the 

imperial    forces,    71 ;    rule    of,    72 ; 

raises  Gosaga  to  the  throne,  83 
Hojo  Yoshitoki:  power  of,  71 
H6jo-ji:  built,  41 
Hokau-tai :  battle  of,  312 
Honda    Masazumi:    his    estates    confis- 
cated, 128 
Hosokawa  Kazumoto:  rebellion  of,  08 
Hosokawa  Mochiyuki :  crushes  revolt  of 

Akamatsu  Mitsusuke,  96 
Hotta  Masaatsu  (Bitchu-no-Kami)  :  at- 
tempts to  negotiate  treaty  with  the 

United  States,  157 
Hotto  Masatoshi:  made  taird,  140 
Hu    Weiyung:    plots    assassination    of 

Chinese  emperor,  102 
Huing-yo-cheng :  battle  of,  310 
Hun-chun :  occupied  by  Russia,  285 
Hu-shan:  captured  by  the  Japanese,  267 
Hwan  Bunko :  his  campaign  in  Japan,  75 

I,  J 

Ichijo,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of,  43 

Ichinotani :  battle  of,  62 

Ii  Naosuke  (Kamon-no-Kami) :  made 
tairo,  158;  assassination  of,  161 

Imagawa  Yoshimoto:  invades  Owari, 
no 

Inouye     Kaoru,     Count:     attempts     to 

negotiate    treaties    with     European 

countries,   190;  vice  ambassador  to 

Korea,   194;   ambassador  to   Korea, 

.196 

Ishida  Mitsunari:  his  campaign  against 
Korea,  116 


Itagaki  Taisuke:  counsels  war  with 
Korea,  178;  reforms  of,  182;  leads 
Liberal  Party,  214 ;  made  home  min- 
ister, 220 

Itakura  Shigemasa:  attempts  to  crush 
rebellion  of  Shimabara,  138 

Italy:  concludes  treaty  with  Japan, 
189 

Ito  Hirobumi,  Marquis:  examines  con- 
stitutional laws  of  European  coun- 
tries, 184;  made  minister  of  state, 
185;  negotiates  convention  with 
China,  196;  forms  a  constitutional 
party,  214;  first  premiership  of,  215; 
second  premiership  of,  218;  fourth 
premiership  of,  227;  makes  tour  of 
the  world,  231 

Ito,  Admiral:  at  battle  of  Wei-hai-Wei, 
270 

Iwafune:  built,  27 

Iwakura  Tomomi :  made  gijo,  167 ;  visits 
United  States  and  Europe,  189 

Japan,  History  of:  the  mythical  age,  3; 
the  beginning  of  the  empire,  6;  rela- 
tions with  Korea  and  China,  12; 
the  Taikwa  Reform,  22;  the  Nara 
Epoch,  31;  the  Hei-an  Epoch,  38; 
the  Kamakura  government,  65;  the 
temporary  restoration  of  imperial 
power,  83;  the  Muromachi  period, 
92;  internal  peace  and  external  war, 
109;  the  foundation  of  the  Edo  gov- 
ernment, 122;  the  decline  of  the 
Edo  government,  140;  the  fall  of 
the  Edo  government,  155;  internal 
affairs,  173;  foreign  relations,  188; 
the  Constitution  in  theory  and  in 
practice,  199 ;  parties  and  politics, 
213;  economic  progress,  243;  the 
Chino-Japanese  War,  252;  Japan 
and  Russia  in  Korea  and  Manchuria, 
275;  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and 
its  aftermath,  303 

Japan,  Sea  of:  battle  of,  316 

Jimmu,  emperor  of  Japan :  founds 
dynasty,  7 

Jingo,  empress  of  Japan :  her  expedition 
against  Korea,  12 

Jito,  empress  of  Japan:  reign  of,  30 

Joost,  Jan:  settles  in  Japan,  135 

Josetsu :  sketch  of,  106 

Juntoku,  emperor  of  Japan :  plots  against 
the  Hojo  family,  71 


INDEX 


841 


Kabayama,  Rear  Admiral:  at  battle  of 
Yalu,  266 

Kagoshima:  battle  of  (1863),  164;  cap- 
tured by  Saigo's  forces  (1876),  182 

Kaineifu :  captured  by  the  Japanese,  118 

Kai-ping:  battle  of,  310 

Kalakaua,  king  of  Hawaii :  visits  Japan, 
191 

Kameyama,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of, 

83 
Kamon-no-Kami :  see  Ii  Naosuke 
Kang-wa-seh:  captured  by  the  Japanese, 

268 
Kannuna-gau-amimi :  see  Suisei 
Kano  Masanobu:  sketch  of,  106 
Kano  Oyenosuke:  sketch  of,  106 
Kato   Kiyomasa:   his   campaign   against 

Korea,  116;  at  battle  of  Sekigahara, 

123 
Katsura,    Viscount:    made    minister    of 

the  navy,  220;  made  premier,  230; 

his   campaigns    in   the    Chino-Japa- 

nese  War,  267 
Kaulbars,    Alexander,    Baron:    his    ser- 
vices  in   the    Russo-Japanese   War, 

312 
Kawamura      Sumiyoshi:      attempts     to 

crush  rebellion  of  Saigo,  179,  180 
Kegushagushu :    captured   by  the   Japa- 
nese, 117 
Keiko,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  9 
Keishoki :  see  Shokei 
Ketteler,  Baron  von:  murder  of,  280 
Kibi-no-Makibi :  scholarship  of,  34 
Kido  Takakoto:  persuades  the  lord  of 

Choshu  to  surrender  his  feudal  do- 
mains to  the  crown,  174 
Kin-chow:    captured    by    the    Japanese, 

268 
Kinoshita     Hideyoshi:     see     Toyotomi 

Hideyoshi 
Ki-no-Tsurayuki :  compiles  the  "  Kokin- 

shu,"  43 
Kitabatake  Akiiye:  his  campaign  against 

Ashikaga  Takauji,  88 
Kitabatake     Chikafusa:     his     campaign 

against  the  Hojo,  90 
Kitabatake     Mitsumasa:     declares     war 

against  Ashikaga  Yoshimochi,  93 
Kitano-no-Tenjin:      see      Sugawara-no 

Michizane 


Kobun,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of,  29 
Kodama,    Baron:    becomes   member    of 

cabinet,  239 
Kohogen  Motonobu :  sketch  of,  106 
Kokaku,   emperor   of  Japan:   reign   of, 

149 
Koko,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  46 
Kokyoku    (Saimei),  empress  of  Japan: 

first  reign  of,  20;  second  reign  of, 

25 

Komei,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of, 
158;  death  of,  166 

Komura,  Baron:  appointed  director  of 
Korean  administration,  267;  ap- 
pointed peace  commissioner,  317 

Komura- Waeber  Memorandum  (1896), 
296 

Komyo,  empress  of  Japan :  her  devotion 
to  Buddhism,  32 

Komyo,  emperor  of  the  North:  acces- 
sion of,  89 

Kongobu-ji:  built,  41 

Konin,  emperor  of  Japan:  accession  of, 

37 

Konishi  Yukinaga:  his  campaign  against 
Korea,  116 

Kono  Hironaka:  attempted  reforms  of, 
184 

Kono  Tokama:  forms  a  provisional 
court  in  Kiushii,  182 

Konoye,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  56 

Korea:  early  relations  with  Japan,  12; 
conquests  of  China  in,  26;  relations 
with  Japan  under  the  Edo  govern- 
ment, 134;  refuses  to  acknowledge 
the  new  government  in  Japan,  178; 
adopts  some  Western  civilization, 
194;  the  Chino- Japanese  War,  252; 
Russia  and  Japan  in,  275 

Koya :  battle  of,  85 

Kozenbo,  Prince:  rebellion  of,  169 

Kublai  Khan:  his  conquests   in   Korea, 

73 

Kudo   Suketsune:  death  of,  152 

Kukai :  teachings  of,  41 

Kuki  Yoshitaka :  commands  fleet  for  in- 
vasion of  Korea,  116 

Kumaso:  rebellions  of  (ca.  50  B.  c),  9; 
(ca.  200  a.  d.),  12 

Kumamota  Castle :  siege  of,  180 

Kumoi  Tatsuo :  plots  against  the  new 
government,  177 

Kuroda  Kiyotaka,  Count:  his  campaign 


INDEX 


against  Saig5,   180;  made  minister 

of  state,  185;  ambassador  to  Korea, 

194 
Kuroda  Nagamasa:  at  battle  of  Sekiga- 

hara,  123 
Kuroki,     Itei:     his    campaigns    in    the 

Russo-Japanese  War,  309 
Kuropatkin,    Alexei    Nikolayevitch :    his 

services  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 

310 
Kusunoki  Masashige:  revolt  of,  85;  his 

campaigns  against  the  Hojo,  86 
Kusunoki  Masatsura:  death  of,  91 
Kwammu,  emperor  of  Japan:  transfers 

the  capital  to  Kyoto,  38 
Kyokutei  Bakim:  sketch  of,  142 
Kyoto:    made    capital    of    Japan,    38; 

ruined,  99 


Land  Tax  Bill  (1898),  225 

Lessar,  Paul:  appointed  minister  to 
Peking,  288 

Li  Ching  Fang:  negotiates  treaty  of 
peace  with  Japan,  273 

Li  Chiu :  his  campaign  against  the  Japa- 
nese, 119 

Li  Hung  Chang:  negotiates  convention 
with  Japan,  196;  negotiates  treaty 
of  peace  with  Japan,  273;  death  of, 
289 

Li  Sei-kei:  revolt  of,  102 

Li  Shunshin :  his  campaigns  against  the 
Japanese,  118,  120 

Liao-yang:  battle  of,  310 

Lien,  king  of  Korea :  at  war  with  Japan, 
117 

Linevitch,  General :  his  services  in  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  313 

Liu  Fok-heng:  commands  fleet  for  in- 
vading Japan,  74 

Liu  Kan-yi :  attempts  to  have  Manchuria 
opened  to  foreign  trade,  288 

Loochoo,  Islands  of:  sketch  of  the  his- 
tory of,  192 


M 

MacDonald,      Sir     Claude : 
treaty  with  Japan,  232 


negotiates 


Makarov,  Vice  Admiral :  his  services  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  War,  307 

Manchuria:  Russia  and  Japan  in,  275 

Marubashi  Chuya:  attempts  to  revolt, 
140 

Masuda  Nagamori :  his  campaign  against 
Korea,  116 

Masuda  Shiro :  leads  rebellion,  137 

Matsudaira  Katamori:  rebellion  of,  170 

Matsudaira  Nobutsuna :  crushes  rebellion 
of  Shimabara,  138;  makes  improve- 
ments in  Edo,  148 

Matsudaira  Sadanobu :  encourages  mar- 
tial exercises,  147;  policy  of,  149 

Matsukata,  Count:  made  premier,  217 

Matsukura  Shigemasa :  made  feudal 
chief  of  Shimabara,  137 

Matsumaye  Nobuhiro:  recognized  as 
lord  of  Ezo,  113 

Mayeda  Toshiiye :  member  of  council  of 
state,  114;  appointed  guardian  for 
Toyotomi  Hideyori,  121 

Meiji  Era,  174 

Meyer,  George  von  Lengerke:  aids 
peace  negotiations  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  319 

Mikawa:  battle  of  (1335),  88 

Minamoto,  Clan  of:  rise  of,  51 

Minamoto-no-Hikaru :  conspires  against 
Sugawara-no-Michizane,  47 

Minamoto-no-Kugyo :  kills  Minamoto- 
no-Sanetomo,  69 

Minamoto-no-Noriyori :  at  battle  of  Seta, 
62 

Minamoto-no-Sanetomo :  made  shogun, 
69 

Minamoto-no-Tameyoshi :  supports  plans 
of  Emperor  Sutoku,  56 

Minamoto-no-Tsunemoto :  defeats  Mina- 
moto-no-Sumitomo,  53 

Minamoto-no-Yoriiye :  made  generalis- 
simo, 68 

Minamoto-no-Yorimasa :  supports  acces- 
sion of  Emperor  Goshirakawa, 
56;  plots  against  the  Taira  sway, 
60 

Minamoto-no-Yorinobu :  crushes  rebel- 
lion of  Taira-no-Tadatsune,  53 

Minamoto-no-Yoritomo :  leads  rebellion, 
60;  quarrels  with  Minamoto-no- 
Yoshinaka,  62;  influence  of,  65 

Minamoto-no-Yoriyoshi :  crushes  insur- 
rection in  Mutsu,  54 


INDEX 


343 


Minamoto-no-Yoshiiye :  crushes  revolt 
of  the  Kiyowara  family,  54 

Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka :  leads  rebel- 
lion, 60 ;  defeats  Taira  forces,  61 ; 
defeated  by  revolted  followers,  62 

Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo :  supports  ac- 
cession of  Emperor  Goshirakawa, 
56;  rebellion  of,  57 

Minamoto-no-Yoshitsune :  at  battle  of 
Seta,  62 ;  story  of,  65 

Minamoto-no-Yukiiye :  attempts  to  over- 
throw the  Taira  family,  60 

Mincho  Chodensu:  sketch  of,  106 

Miura,  Major  General:  his  campaign 
against  Saigo,  179 

Miura  Yoshimura:  duplicity  of,  71 

Miyako,  empress-dowager  of  Japan:  her 
devotion  to  Buddhism,  32 

Miyoshi,  Major  General:  his  campaign 
against  Saigo,  179 

Miyoshi  Yasunobu :  made  minister  of 
justice,  68 

Mommu,  emperor  of  Japan :  accession  of, 
30 

Mononobe  Moriya:  fe.ud  with  Soga-no- 
Umako,  19 

Mononobe-no-Okoshi :  opposes  the  ac- 
ceptance of  Buddhism,  15 

Montoku,  emperor  of  Japan :  birth  of,  45 

Mori  Motonari :  provides  coronation  ex- 
penses for  Emperor  Ogimachi,  100 

Mori  Terumoto:  member  of  council  of 
state,  144;  at  battle  of  Sekigahara, 
123 

Mori  Yosichika,  lord  of  Choshu :  at- 
tempts to  restore  tranquillity  to 
Japan,  161 ;  expelled  from  Kyoto, 
163 

Morinaga,  Prince:  made  abbot  of  Emy- 
aku-ji,  84;  his  campaigns  against  the 
Hojo,  85;  fate  of,  87 

Mo-tien-ling :  battles  of  (1894),  269; 
(1904),  310 

Mount  Kasagi:  siege  of  (1331),  84 

Mount  Kongo:  siege  of  (1333),  86 

Mount  Tsukuba  Insurrection,  164 

Mukden:  battle  of,  312 

Mura-saki-shikibu  :  scholarship  of,  43 

Mutsu  Munemitsu :  negotiates  treaty 
with  Great  Britain,  191 

Myochin  Muneyasu :  sketch  of,  107 

Myochin  Nobuiye :  skill  of,  107 

Myosho,  empress  of  Japan:  reign  of, 
132 


X 


Nagasaki  Takasuke :  power  of,  77 

Naka-no-6ye,  Prince :  see  Tenchi,  em- 
peror of  Japan 

Nakahara  Chikayoshi:  made  vice-minis- 
ter of  the  public  archives,  68 

Nakatomi-no-Kamako :  opposes  the  ac- 
ceptance of  Buddhism,  15 

Nakatomi-no-Kamatari :  plots  against 
Soga-no-Iruka,  20;  death  of,  28 

Nara  Epoch,  The,  31 

Navy  Increase  Question,  233 

Nawa  Nagatoshi:  aids  Emperor  Go- 
daigo,  85 

Nebokatov,  Admiral:  his  services  in  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  314 

Nicholas  II,  emperor  of  Russia:  visits 
Japan,  191 

Nikko :  battle  of,  170 

Nimmyo,  emperor  of  Japan:  marriage 
of,  45 

Nishi-Rosen  Protocol  (1898),  296 

Nitta  Yoshisada:  besieges  Mount  Kongo 
(1333),  86;  sketch  of,  87;  his  cam- 
paign against  Ashikaga  Takauji,  88; 
death  of,  90 

Niu-chwang:  captured  by  the  Japanese, 
272;  occupied  by  Russia,  285 

Nodzu  Michitsura,  Viscount:  his  cam- 
paigns in  the  Chino-Japanese  War, 
267 

Nogi :  his  services  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  311 

Nozu :  his  campaign  against  Saigo,  179 

Nutari :  built,  27 


Oama,  Prince:  see  Temmu,  emperor  of 

Japan 
Oda  Nobunaga :  aids  Ashikaga  Yoshiaki 

to  regain  the  shogunate,  101 ;  career 

of,  no 
Oda  Nobukatsu:  rebels  against  Hashiba 

Hideyoshi,  113 
Oda   Nubutaka:   plots   against   Hashiba 

Hideyoshi,  113 
Oda  Samboshi :  succeeds  Oda  Nobunaga, 

.  II3  . 
Ogimachi,  emperor  of  Japan :  coronation 

of,  100 

Ohara  Shigenori:  made  sanyo,  167 


344 


INDEX 


Oishi  Kuranosuke:  revenges  death  of 
Asana  Naganori,  152 

Ojin,  emperor  of  Japan:  promotes 
Chinese  learning,  13 

Ojin  War,  97 

Okehazama:  battle  of,  no 

Oku,  Hokyo:  his  campaigns  in  the 
Chino-Japanese  War,  267;  his  serv- 
ices in  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
310 

Okubo  Toshimichi:  made  sanyo,  167; 
persuades  the  lord  of  Satsuma  to 
surrender  his  feudal  domains  to  the 
crown,  174;  crushes  rebellion  of 
Eto  Shimpei,  177;  opposes  war  with 
Korea,  178;  sent  as  plenipotentiary 
to  Peking,  192 

Okuma  Shigenobu,  Count:  reforms  of, 
183;  attempts  to  negotiate  treaties 
with  European  powers,  190;  leads 
Progressive  Party,  214;  made  min- 
ister of  foreign  affairs,  217;  made 
premier,  220;  opposes  navy  expan- 
sion, 236 

Omura  Masujiro:  assassination  of,  177 

O-no-Yasumaro :  scholarship  of,  34 

Ono-no-Yoshifuru :  defeats  Minamoto- 
no- Sumitomo,  53 

Ooka  Tadasuke:  sketch  of,  146;  es- 
tablishes the  fire-brigade  system, 
149 

Osaka:  siege  of,  126 

Oseka :  his  campaigns  in  the  Chino-Japa- 
nese War,  267 

Oshima:  his  campaigns  against  Chinese, 
262,  267 

Oshio  Heihachiro:  leads  rebellion,  155 

Otani  Yoshitaka:  his  campaign  against 
Korea,  116 

Otomo,  Prince:  see  Kobun,  emperor  of 
Japan 

Otomo-no-Yakamochi :  aids  in  the  com- 
pilation of  the  "  Manyoshu,"  35 

Otori,  Japanese  minister:  his  career  in 
Korea,  259 

Otori  Keisuke :  rebellion  of,  169 

Ouchi  Yoshihiro :  rebellion  of,  94 

Ouchi  Yoshitaka:  provides  coronation 
expenses  for  Emperor  Gonara,  100 

Oyama,  Count:  his  campaign  in  Chino- 
Japanese  War,  268;  his  services  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  War,  310 

Oye   Hiromoto:   made   minister   of   the 


public  archives,  68;  plans  campaign 
against  the  imperial  forces,  71 
Ozaki :     causes    downfall     of    Okuma's 
cabinet,  221 


P,  Q 

Pavlov,   General:    represents   Russia   at 

Seul,  296 
Peking:  siege  of  (1900),  280 
Perry,  Matthew  Calbraith:  visits  Japan, 

155;    concludes   treaty   with   Japan, 

157 
Phung-do  Island:  battle  of,  261 
Ping-yang:  battle  of,  265 
Plangon:  minister  to  China,  295 
Pokotilov:  his  attempts  to  win  Chinese 

officials,  295 
Port  Arthur:  siege  of (1894),  2°8;  leased 

to    Russia,    277;    battle    of    (1904), 

304;  siege  of  (1904),  306 
Portsmouth  Treaty,  The  (1905),  318 
Portugal :  concludes  treaty  with  Japan, 

189 
Portuguese :  visit  Japan,  104 
Prussia:    concludes   treaty   with   Japan, 

189 
Pu-lan-tien:   captured  by  the  Japanese, 

310 

R 

Rai  Sanyo :  influence  of  his  writings,  160 

Reigen,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  132 

Religion  and  Mythology:  the  mythical 
age,  3;  introduction  of  Buddhism, 
14;  Christianity  introduced  into 
Japan,  105 

Richu,  emperor  of  Japan:  appoints  his- 
toriographers throughout  Japan,  13 

Rikkeu  Seiyii  Kwai:  see  Constitutional 
Political  Association 

Rokuhara:  destroyed  (1333),  86 

Roosevelt,  Theodore :  attempts  to  in- 
duce Russia  to  treat  for  peace  with 
Japan,  316 

Rosen,  Baron:  appointed  peace  commis- 
sioner, 318 

Rozhestvenski,  Vice  Admiral :  commands 
Baltic  fleet,  313 

Russia:  in  Korea  and  Manchuria,  275 

Russo-Japanese  War,  303 

Russo-Chinese  Bank:  established,  276 


INDEX 


845 


Saicho:  teachings  of,  41 

Saigo  Takamori,  lord  of  Satsuma:  joins 
lord  of  Choshu  against  the  shogun, 
165;  made  sanyo,  167;  negotiates 
treaty  for  surrender  of  Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu,  169;  rebellion  of,  178 

Saigo  Tsugumichi,  Marquis:  attempts  to 
negotiate  treaties  with  European 
powers,  190;  his  campaign  in  For- 
mosa, 192;  accompanies  Count  Ito 
to  China,  196;  made  minister  of  the 
army,  220 

Sai-ma-tsi :  captured  by  the  Japanese 
(1894),  268;  (1904),  3io 

Saimei :  see  Kokyoku 

Saionji,  Marquis:  made  president  of  the 
Constitutional  Political  Association, 
238 

Sakai  Tadakiyo :  influence  of,  140 

Sakanoue-no-Tamuramaro :  his  cam- 
paign against  the  Emishi,  27 

Sakhalin:  occupied  by  Japan,  318;  treaty 
regulations  concerning,  319 

Sakuma  Shozan :  assassination  of,  177 

San  jo  Sanetomi:  accompanies  Mori 
Yoshichika  to  his  fief,  163;  restored 
to  his  former  rank,  167 

Sano  Takenosuke:  leads  plots  for  assas- 
sination of  Ii  Naosuke,  161 

Sanuki :  battle  of,  62 

San-sin:  occupied  by  Russia,  285 

Sea  of  Japan:  battle  of,  316 

Sei-Shonagon :  scholarship  of,  43 

Sekigahara:  battle  of,  124 

Sesshu :  sketch  of,  106 

Seta :  battle  of,  62 

Seul :  uprising  of  1884,  256 ;  captured  by 
the  Japanese,  260 

Seiwa,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  46 

Seymour,  Sir  Edward  Hobart:  attempts 
to  relieve  foreigners  in  Peking,  279 

Sha  River:  battle  of,  311 

Shanghai:  evacuation  of,  by  allied 
forces,  292 

Shijonawate:  battle  of,  91 

Shimabara:  rebellion  of,  137 

Shimazu  Hisamitsu :  attempts  to  restore 
tranquillity  to  Japan,  161 ;  causes  a 
breach  between  Japan  and  England, 
162 

Shimazu  Narishigi,  lord  of  Satsuma:  at- 


tempts to  restore  tranquillity  to 
Japan,  161 

Shimonoseki  Affair,  The,  163,  165 

Shingon:  founded,  41 

Shinsai :  battle  of,  121 

Shiragi :  revolt  of,  25 

Shirakawa,  emperor  of  Japan:  gives  in- 
fluence to  Buddhist  priests,  54 

Shiroyama:  battle  of,  182 

Shisen :  battle  of,  121 

Sho  Tai,  king  of  Loochoo:  his  relations 
with  Japanese  government,  193 

Shohei-ko :  growth  of,  141 

Shokei  (Keishoki)  :  sketch  of,  106 

Shoko,  emperor  of  Japan:  accession  of, 

93 

Shokoku-ji:  built,  93 

Shomei,  emperor  of  Japan :  accession  of, 
20 

Shomu,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of,  10; 
aids  the  spread  of  Buddhism,  32; 
marriage  of,  45 

Shoni  Kagesuke:  his  campaign  against 
the  Chinese,  76 

Shotoku,  Prince:  distinguishes  himself 
as  a  scholar,  14 

Shozui:  aids  the  development  of  ce- 
ramics, 107 

Shuban:  sketch  of,  106 

Silk :  production  and  manufacture  of,  in- 
troduced into  Japan,  18 

Siu-yen:  battle  of  (1894),  268;  cap- 
tured by  Japanese  (1904),  310 

So  Yoshitomo:  invites  king  of  Korea  to 
visit  Japan,  116 

Soga  Dasoku :  sketch  of,  106 

Soga  Sukenari :  kills  father's  foe,  152 

Soga  Tokimune:  kills  father's  foe,  152 

Soga-no-Emishi :  influence  of,  20 

Soga-no-Iname :  counsels  the  acceptance 
of  Buddhism,  14 

Soga-no-Iruka :  influence  of,  20 

Soga-no-Mako :  works  for  the  accept- 
ance of  Buddhism  in  Japan,  15 

Soga-no-Umako :  builds  temples  and 
pagodas  for  Buddha,  16;  feud  with 
Monobe  Moriya,  19 

Song-hwan:  battle  of,  262 

Sonntag,  Miss:  represents  Russia  at 
Seul,  296 

Sotan :  sketch  of,  106 

Sotaro  Iba:  assassinates  Toru  Hoshi, 
229 


846 


INDEX 


Soyeshima  Taneomi:  counsels  war  with 

Korea,  178 
Spain:  concludes  treaty  with  Japan,  189 
Stakelberg,  General:  his  services  in  the 

Russo-Japanese  War,  310 
Stoessel,  General:  surrenders  Port  Ar- 
thur, 312 
Sugawara-no-Michizane :     influence     of, 

47;  disgraced,  47;  honored,  48 
Sugiyama,  Chancellor:  murder  of,  280 
Suiko,  empress  of  Japan:  accession  of, 

20 
Suinin,  emperor  of  Japan:  condition  of 

the  empire  under,  9 
Suisei     (Kannuna-gawamimi),    emperor 

of  Japan :  accession  of,  7 
Sujin,    emperor    of    Japan:     separates 

shrine  and  palace,  9;   condition  of 

the  empire  under,  9 
Sumatah:     introduces     Buddhism     into 

Japan,  14 
Sung-ching:   his  campaigns  against  the 

Japanese,  267 
Suruga:  battle  of  (1335),  88 
Sutoku,  emperor  of  Japan :  deposed,  56 ; 

leads  rebellion,  56 
Sweden :   concludes   treaty   with   Japan, 

189 
Switzerland:      concludes     treaty     with 

Japan,  189 


Tachilana  Moroye:  collects  Japanese 
poems,  35 

Tadaranohama :  battle  of,  88 

Taga:  built,  27 

Taikwa  Reform,  22 

Taira,  Clan  of:  rise  of,  51 

Taira-no-Kiyomori :  supports  accession 
of  Emperor  Goshirakawa,  56; 
crushes  rebellion  of  Nobuyori  and 
Yoshitomo,  57;  influence  of,  58 

Taira-no-Masakado :  revolt  of,  53 

Taira-no-Munemori :  influence  of,  60; 
death  of,  62 

Taira-no-Sadamori :  defeats  Taira-no- 
Masakado,  S3 

Taira-no-Shigemori :  crushes  rebellion 
of  Nobuyori  and  Yoshitomo,  57 

Taira-no-Tadamasa :  supports  plans  of 
Emperor  Sutoku,  56 

Taira-no-Tadatsune :  rebellion  of,  53 


Taira-no-Takamochi :    vice-governor    of 
Kazusa,  52 
,  Taiwon-kun:  anti-foreign  policy  of,  195, 

255 
Takahira,  Kogoro :  appointed  peace  com- 
missioner, 317 
Takakura,  emperor  of  Japan:  reign  of, 

58 
Takanaga,  Prince:  his  campaign  against 

Ashikaga  Takauji,  87 
Takasugi     Shinsaku:     leader    of    anti- 

Tokugawa  party,  165 
Takeuchi     Shikibu :     plots    against    the 

Tokugawa,  160 
Takezoye:  minister  to  Korea,  256 
Takishimimi,  Prince:  attempts  to  usurp 

the  throne,  7 
Ta-ku-shan:  taken  by  the  Japanese,  268 
Ta-lien-wan :  captured  by  the  Japanese, 

268;  leased  to  Russia,  277 
Tani-Tateki:    attempts    to    defend    Ku- 

mamoto  castle,  180 
Taping-ling:  battle  of,  310 
Tashi-chiao :  battle  of,  310 
Tatsumi:  his  campaigns  in  the   Chino- 

Japanese  War,  267 
Ta-tung-kau:    taken   by    the    Japanese, 

268 
Tawara-saka:  battle  of,  180 
Telissu:  battle  of,  310 
Tenchi,  emperor  of  Japan:  plots  against 

Soga-no-Iruka,  20;  reign  of,  25 
Tendai:  founded,  41 
Temmu,  emperor  of  Japan:  rebellion  of, 

29;  reign  of,  30;  aids  the  spread  of 

Buddhism,  31 
Tie-ling:  captured  by  Japanese,  313 
Tien-chwang-tai :  destroyed  by  the  Japa- 
nese, 272 
Tientsin:  captured  by  the  allied  forces, 

280 
Tientsin  Convention  (1885),  256 
Tik  Ho:  his  campaign  against  the  Japa- 
nese, 120 
Ting  Ju-chang,   Admiral :    at   battle   of 

Wei-hai-Wei,  270 
Toba,  emperor  of  Japan:   intrigues  of, 

55 ;  death  of,  56 
Toba :  battle  of,  168 
Togo,   Heihachiro:   his   services   in  the 

Russo-Japanese  War,  303 
Tokugawa    Hidetada:    concludes    peace 

with  Korea,  121 ;  shogunate  of,  127 


INDEX 


347 


Tokugawa  Iyeharu :   shogunate  of,   149 
Tokugawa  Iyemitsu :  character  of,  127 
Tokugawa    Iyemochi :    accession    to   the 

shogunate,    158;    marriage   of,    161; 

visits  Kyoto,  162 
Tokugawa  Iyenari :  shogunate  of,  149 
Tokugawa  Iyesada :  shogunate  of,  156 
Tokugawa  Iyeshige :   shogunate  of,   149 
Tokugawa  Iyetsuna:  shogunate  of,  140 
Tokugawa  Iyeyasu :   rebels  against  Ha- 

shiba    Hideyoshi,    113;    member    of 

council  of  state,  114;  sketch  of,  122; 

death  of,  127;  encourages  literature, 

141 
Tokugawa    Nariakira:    urges    policy    of 

national  seclusion,  156 
Tokugawa    Tsunayoshi:    shogunate    of, 

140 
Tokugawa    Yoshimune:    shogunate    of, 

144 
Tokugawa  Yoshinobu :  his  claims  to  the 

shogunate,  158;  shogunate  of,  166 
Tokunegi :    captured    by    the    Japanese, 

117 
Tokyo,     formerly    Edo:    made    capital, 

174 
Tomu-cheng:  captured  by  the  Japanese 

(1894),  268;  battle  of  (1904),  310 
Tonghak  Rebellion,  257 
Toru   Hoshi:   influence  of,  222;    sketch 

of   his   career,    229 
Tosa  Mitsunobu :  sketch  of,  105 
Tosabo  Shoshun :  sent  to  destroy  Mina- 

moto-no-Yoshitsune,  66 
Toyotomi  Hidetsugu :  regency  of,  121 
Toyotomi  Hideyori :  accession  of,  to  his 

father's   position,    121 ;    regency   of, 

123;  influence  of,  125 
Toyotomi    Hideyoshi :    guards   the    sho- 

gun,     in;     crushes     rebellion     of 

Akechi   Mitsuhide,    112;    sketch   of, 

113;  invades  Korea,  116 
Tsang-chi:    concludes    treaty   with    Ad- 
miral Alexiev,  286 
Tso  Shingfon:  sent  to  aid  the  Koreans, 

118 
Tsushima:  battle  of  (1419),  103 


U,V 

Uchida:    protects    against    Russian    de- 
mands (1903),  294 


Uda,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  47 
Ukita    Hideiye :    member   of   council    of 

state,     114;     his    campaign    against 

Korea,  116;  at  battle  of  Sekigahara, 

123 
United    States :    concludes    treaty    with 

Japan  (1879),  190 
Urosan :  siege  of,  120 
Uryu,  Rear  Admiral :  his  services  in  the 

Russo-Japanese  War,  303 
Utsunomiya:  battle  of,  170 
Uyesugi  Kagekatsu :  member  of  council 

of  state,  114;  at  battle  of  Sekigahara, 

123 
Uyesugi    Norizane :    crushes    revolt    of 

Ashikaga  Mochiuji,  95 
Vereshchagin,  Alexander  V. :   death  of, 

307 
Voelkersam,  Admiral :  his  services  in  the 

Russo-Japanese  War,  314 


W 


Wafangao  Pass:  see  Feng-shui  Pass 
Wake-no-Kyomaro :  opposes  influence  of 

Dokyo,  36 
Wani:  introduces  Chinese  learning  into 

Japan,  13 
Watanabe,  Viscount:  causes  downfall  of 

fourth  Ito  cabinet,  228 
Watanabe  Kazuma :  slays  Kawai,  152 
Wei-hai-Wei :  captured  by  the  Japanese, 

270;  naval  battle  of,  270;  leased  to 

Great  Britain,  278 
William  II,  emperor  of  Germany:  visits 

Japan,  191 
Witte,    Count    Serge:    appointed    peace 

commissioner,  317 
Witthoeft,    Rear   Admiral :   his   services 

in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  308 


X,  Y,  Z 

Xavier,  St.  Francis:  see  Francis  Xavier, 

St. 
Yalu:  battle  of  (1894),  266 
Yalu  River:  battle  of  (1904),  309 
Yamada  Nagamasa:  career  of,  136 
Yamagata  Aritomo,  Count:  attempts  to 
crush   rebellion   of   Saigo,    179;   be- 
comes minister  president,  190;  made 


848 


INDEX 


premier,  221 ;  his  campaigns  in  the 
Chino-Japanese  War,  267 

Yamagata-Lobanov  Protocol  (1896),  296 

Yamaji,  Baron:  his  campaign  in  Chino- 
Japanese  War,  268 

Yamana  Mochitoyo:  crushes  revolt  of 
Akamatsu  Mitsusuke,  96 

Yamana  Sozen :  rebellion  of,  97 

Yamano  Ujikiyo:  rebellion  of,  94 

Yamanouchi  Toyonobu,  lord  of  Tosa: 
attempts  to  restore  tranquillity  to 
Japan,  161 

Yamato-dake,  Prince:  his  campaign 
against  the  Kumaso,  9 ;  his  campaign 
against  the  Emishi,  10;  death  of,  10 

Yamazaki:  battle  of,  112 

Yanagiwara  Sakimitsu :  warns  the  Shim- 
azu  against  joining  rebellions,  180 

Yanagiwara  Sakimitsu :  sent  as  ambas- 
sador to  China,  192 

Yanagizawa  Yoshiyasu :  rise  of,  142 


Yang-tse  Agreement,  The:  see  Anglo- 
German  Agreement 

Yang-tsu-ling :  captured  by  the  Japa- 
nese, 310 

Yellow  Sea:  battle  of,  309 

Ying  Kai :  commands  army  against 
Japan,  120 

Ying-kau :  captured  by  the  Japanese,  272 

Yokoi  Heishiro :  assassination  of,  177 

Yoshiaki,  Prince:  made  gijo,  167;  sent 
to  crush  rebellion  of  Eto  Shimpei, 

177 
Yoshino:  battle  of,  85 
Yozei,  emperor  of  Japan :  reign  of,  46 
Yuan  Shih-kai :  minister  to  Korea,  256 
Yuino  Shosetsu:  attempts  to  revolt,  140 
Yu-shu-lin-tsu :    captured    by   the   Japa- 
nese, 310 
Zassulitch :    his    services   in   the   Russo- 
Japanese  War,  309 
Zen  Sect:  teachings  of,  80 


Slutcham         *-Mln 


O  J38 


•> 


.-•"Mln 


'  our,. 


lliof 


V£  yf  ^  /      ft  Jr^    ££&£ 


) 


<E      N 


.jfiSMW 


roBkd^v^okliig, 

i^Hualye 


N 


•'Bay 


140        0*o*o^rt;r°gse  Strait  144 

/^-    ntsHim 


JAPAN,  KOREA 
^©MANCHURIA 


10O  90O 

Capital  ol  Coumra..*  Trwj  Porta---  WU?  ° 

Railroada...  Frapoaad  Rallraull ■ 

■orrlfkatw...      a|"  Navy  Vwdi aV  aWbaurtM  CabUt 

CtiaxJfal  Watet  ftow.t  arlli.  DlaUKta  in  Nautical  Milaa ~iU — 

Copyright  HtM.  by  gj.Htmroond  >  Co.,  lf.T.      , 
N  "0  O  142 


■m^jpg 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A  A      000  071943    5 


